also majority dissidents with a vehicle to participate in a coalition government with moderate Unionists if they should lose their parliamentary majority or to govern alone if sufficient electoral support develops. These speculative notions deserve subordination to questions about SDL's survival in transitional politics and its policy toward Pan-Ireland and Anglo-Irish relations. SDL will have to be more than an imitation of the British Labor Party to withstand the cross-pressures which these questions entail.

5. The conflict generated citizens defense committees, prominently in Belfast and Derry, which mobilized and organized minority efforts to resist or negotiate with police and army authorities who sought with uneven success to enforce the law in Catholic locales. Attracting middle class and clerical support, they tended to become nonrevolutionary power bases for future SDL leaders. The emergency groups helped to preserve minority ethnocentricity and communal morale during stress. They may not continue in more peaceful times.

6. Another result of conflict was the creation of the liberal and "loyalist" Alliance Party, an out-growth of an integrationist group, the New Ulster Movement. Recruiting former members of the Unionist, Labor and Liberal Parties, the non-sectarian, but chiefly Protestant Alliance Party indicated Ultras and the Orange Order for opposing reforms, Nationalists for rejecting partition, Liberals and Laborites for stressing economics, and all extremists for direct action or violence. Untested at the polls, the Alliance Party is a reminder that Northern Ireland politics includes progressive, British nationalists who judged the subsystem with systemic values ("British standards"), finding that nearly all political actors were imperfect except the government. The Alliance Party represents governmental supporters who anticipated the governing party's dissolution and prepared a life-raft for reformist Unionists and a possible basis for an alternative to Ultras and Irish nationalists.

7. Finally, what of the Roman Catholic Church? Entering the unrest with eclectic loyalties and objectives, the Church supported peaceful means and a redress of minority grievances. Assessments brought controversies. The hierarchy responded to the serious disturbances in August 1969 with charges that Ultra militants were responsible, a judgment that drew criticism of Cardinal Conway, the Primate of Ireland, from Protestant spokesmen. Importantly, at the end of 1970 the Church accepted an invitation of two years' standing to name a chaplain to the Stormont Parliament. By this act the Catholic Church gave recognition to the northern regime which surpassed any earlier Petrine acknowledgment of Caesar and partition. Welcomed by Unionist moderates but deplored by Republicans and Paisleyites, this decision may have been induced by regime concessions to the minority. Owing to the act the Church's outlook on the regime was no longer quite so ambiguous.

Outcomes of civil rights conflict for the political subsystem. After nearly half a century in which Northern Ireland had operated as if it were a system rather than part of one, civil rights conflict brought numerous developments and changes within and between the subsystem and its environments. The more important of these may be noted.

1. Under elite conciliation and oppositional and systemic pressures, the subsystem began to increase minority participation in governmental decision-making, to distribute public services more equitably, and to discontinue or alter practices or structures that had adversely affected the traditionally powerless community. Centralization in policy-making and bureaucracy were by-products of these changes. The net effect was to decrease conditions of neo-polarization and low consensus as they apply to regime performance, although not necessarily as they relate to the system's existence.

2. The process of conflict introduced new ways and idioms for the minority opposition to deal with the regime. These means and rationales may have had their own illusions as to what was possible.22 They circumvented conventional rulemaking and rule-application which lost credibility as innovators, convertors and enforcers. Rule adjudication and regime investigation remained critically independent of rule making and enforcement, thereby lending legitimacy to the subsystem in the judgments of dissenters and observers.

3. Political pluralism increased among regime supporters and critics, followed by a counter-trend which partially, but not entirely, restored the preexisting coalescence of opinion around the governing party and a new opposition group (SDL). That the nature of opinion had changed should not be overlooked. The elative unity and strength of the governing party and the transitional state of

22 On ideological misconceptions in the North, see Cornelius O'Leary, "Northern Ireland: The Politic of Illusion," Political Quarterly, 40 (July 1969), pp. 307–315.

minority politics suggest that no progress was made toward significant party competition with the prospect of coalition government or alternation of one party governments.

4. Conflict strained the subsystem and caused losses in life, property and reputation. But it did not collapse. The preventative factors included concessions to minority dissidents, repression of minority and regime extremists, strength borrowed from the system, and the governing party's rigidity and oligopoly. Of Special mention as contributors to subsystem endurance and persistence were the principled nonviolence or weakness of internal opponents and the evolutionary policy toward the North of the government in the contiguous system, the Republic of Ireland.

5. The interaction of the political system and its social system was revealed to observers who may not have been fully aware of how the regime and the minority opposition relate to their divergent ethnic and confessional heritages and social institutions. Some detachment of governing segments (Unionist moderates) from political dependency on traditional socio-political structures, e.g., the Orange Order, can be identified, along with a relative shift in the ascendent ideology toward a secular idiom. The church of the minority began to detach itself from Irish nationalism and to move in the direction of allegiance to the subsystem. Residual sectarianism appeared to have declined more in the minority subculture than in the culture of the majority. The decline may be explained as a result of the recent conflict, but more probably it is a result of long-term, affirmative responses of the minority to criticism of political Catholicism, and to the impact of aggiornamento and modernism. The majority clings to Protestant symbols as badges of systemic loyalty, despite lower levels of piety and church attendance than the minority exhibits.

6. The subsystem's autonomy decreased within the system (UK) while the linkage of the two was reaffirmed. Thus, the Westminster and Stormont governments endorsed systemic military steps and reforms in the subsystem simultaneously with a reaffirmation that it would not cease to be a part of the system without the consent of the (majority) people in Northern Ireland.23 Ideologically, British nationalism or imperialism gained and Ulster nationalism declined.

IV

The outcomes of Northern Ireland's overall conflict between 1964-70 may be understood in relation to eight tests of political development and modernization of political systems. One criterion, that of effective and rational decision making by the government existed before the conflict. Although disturbed by the unrest, this characteristic was maintained, however one may judge the "wisdom" of particular decisions. A conflict-induced increase in the number of political participants who had been subjects or parochials may be listed as a "gain" for Northern Ireland. Slight progress was made in movement toward a secularized and universalistic political culture, enhanced capacity for attitudinal and structural innovation, and a detachment of the political subsystem from primordial and ascriptive sentiments and loyalties in the social environment.

As to a standard of autonomy for the political subsystem with respect to other political systems, conflict produced a reduction in Northern Ireland's devolved authority and power within its comprehensive system (UK) and a strengthening of its legal and political posture in relation to a competitive system, the Republic of Ireland. The criteria of increased governmental power and consensus about the subsystem's legitimacy have unclear results. Governmental power may seem to have risen in security terms but fallen as a support for a controversial regime. The relative absence of insurrection by minority and related dissidents suggests the possibility of an upswing in their consensual attitude in response to regime reforms. Yet it is premature to make a firm estimate as to whether minority support and allegiance have actually increased.

One ought not to conclude a paper of this kind without commenting on social and political theories which may explain Northern Ireland's conflict in ways that have not been attempted. Some possibilities may be canvassed. The view of conflict as a relief valve, developed by Heinrich Schurtz and interpreted by Lewis Coser, is a logical candidate.24 Evidence suggests, however, that while systemic pressures were

See the Joint Declaration of the Wilson and Chichester-Clark governments on August 19, 1969, included in Stormont's effort to defend its pre-conflict record, explain reforms and call for mutuality and peaceful development: A Commentary by the Government of Northern Ireland to Accompany the Cameron Report. Cmd. 534 (Belfast, 1969). 24 Lewis Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict (New York, 1956), pp. 41-48.

ventilated, there are signs of on-going hostilities that make it difficult to conclude that a healthful cleansing took place. A Marxian study which subordinates all other conflicts to class struggle has been made of the recent Ulster conflict and its roots.25 But the study is artificial and contrived when it assumes or proposes the proletarian unity of the highly nationalistic or sectarian workers in both communities. A third prospect is Samuel P. Huntington's thesis that rapid mobilization and participation of citizens in systems without previous institutional adjustment to this kind of experience may lead to systematic decay.28 On this question sufficient data may not be available to judge with any certainty. Yet one should not ignore that in the present case the subsystem survived a considerable mobilization, and to some degree, participation, of many previously alienated or passive minority members without decaying either in the meaning of regime collapse or shrinkage of participatory opportunities.

A theory of revolution based on a study of Third World conflict whereby political violence followed a shortfall between expectations and some demonstrable achievements is an inviting model.27 Northern Ireland had a short-fall of this type. But the accompanying or ensuing violence of the Ultras, government and IRA has been at the margin while civil protest functioned at the pivot of the struggle. It was not revolution but nonviolent, direct action which was the key component in the overall conflict and its most innovative aspect. The role of civil protest in the present case will be incorporated into a larger study of mine which includes the cases of India and the United States. Generally speaking, I conclude here that because of conflict and positive responses in the subsystem and its neighbors, Northern Ireland is less retarded now than before 1964 and has begun a transition toward democratic pluralism.

25 Peter Gibbon, "The Dialectic of Religion and Class in Ulster," New Left Review, No. 55 (May-June 1969), pp. 20-41.

26 Samuel P. Huntington, "Political Development and Political Decay," World Politics, 18 (April 1965), pp. 386-430.

27 Raymond Tanter and Manus Midlarsky, "A Theory of Revolution," Journal of Conflict Resolution, 11 (September 1967), pp. 264-280.

RECENT EVENTS IN NORTHERN IRELAND IN PERSPECTIVE

This statement has been prepared by a group of Ulster people who are privileged to live and work on the mainland of the United Kingdom. The views expressed are those of the authors and while they are conservative in tone the authors have no connection with any political party in Northern Ireland. It is hoped that the statement will help to promote better understanding of the feelings and frustrations of the loyal majority in Northern Ireland. The main theme of the statement is that Northern Ireland is an integral part of the United Kingdom and the great majority of its people want it to remain so. It is, of course, always open to the Republic to rejoin the United Kingdom to form a Federation of the United Kingdom of England, Wales, Scotland and Ireland in which the undoubted if wayward talents of the Irish could be harnessed to the common good.

NORTHERN IRELAND TROUBLES IN PERSPECTIVE

INCONSISTENCIES UNEXPLAINED

1. Many people outside Northern Ireland are understandably perplexed by the apparent support of Roman Catholics in Northern Ireland for the I.R.A. campaign of violence against the security forces, civilians and property at a time when the Northern Ireland Government has been busily bringing in the reforms requested by the civil rights campaigners. Outside observers have also been concerned at the sympathy shown in the Irish Republic for the I.R.A. attacks in Northern Ireland as indicated by the extent of the efforts to import guns through the Republic and by the fact that most of the gelignite used by the I.R.A. in Northern Ireland has been manufactured in the Republic. The question must now be asked-Was the civil rights campaign of 1968/69 genuinely aimed at enabling the Roman Catholic minority to play a greater part in the running of Northern Ireland or was it merely a phase or a tactic in the minority's campaign for a united Ireland? The answer to this question is relevant to the current attitudes of the Protestant majority. Protestants in Northern Ireland feel let down and frustrated in that opinion outside Northern Ireland has tended to put too large a share of the blame for the unrest on them and too little on the U.K. Government and on the Roman Catholic minority for its uncooperative attitude during the past 50 years.

2. The time has therefore come for a more rational and objective assessment of Northern Ireland's problems. There is no validity in the emotive and one-sided judgment that if only the Northern Ireland Government would bring in reforms all would be well.

3. Here are some of the inconsistencies:

(a) Those in Great Britain who most loudly called for civil rights and equal citizenship in Northern Ireland in the late 1960's chose to ignore the fact that for 50 years a large proportion of the Roman Catholic minority had deliberately refused to accept the responsibility of U.K. citizenship while demanding all its benefits and so had tended to alienate the Protestant majority. The minority's demands for reforms in 1968 did not ring true in Protestant ears. Nevertheless the Northern Ireland Government has carried through a major programme of change and reform.

(b) Those who sympathised with the minority's early demands for civil rights must be wondering why the introduction of reforms by the Northern Ireland Government has been accompanied by an increase in the opposition to that Government. Indeed it was shortly after the Northern Ireland Prime Minister actually went ahead of the minority's demands at that time by offering the opposition M.P.s the chairmanships of two of the four Parliamentary committees to be set up that the S.D.L.P. and Nationalist members decided to boycott Stormont. This was done on the pretext that the British army refused to hold a public enquiry into the deaths of two civilians shot by the army in Londonderry.

(c) Those in Britain who accepted the propaganda against the Northern Ireland Government and the character assassination of the R.U.C. and the B. Specials in 1968 and 1969 will since have seen the same smear tactics used by the I.R.A and its supporters against the British army and even the present U.K. Government.

(d) Those who called for the abolition of the B. Specials blamed the Northern Ireland Government for having such a force but failed to admit that the Northern Ireland Government had had no alternative while the U.K. Government left to it the responsibility for defending Northern Ireland against the frequent I.R.A. attacks. Many Northern Ireland Protestants believe that the campaign against the B. Specials was waged by those in Northern Ireland who wanted more freedom for the I.R.A. and that it succeeded because the then U.K. Government was more concerned to humiliate the Northern Ireland Unionists than to help the cause of peace and justice in Northern Ireland.

(e) Those who c.iticised the B. Specials for being practically 100 per cent Protestant failed to recognise that this was because Roman Catholics were unwilling to join a force set up to safeguard Northern Ireland against subversive activity. The British army is now finding it difficult to recruit and retain Roman Catholics in the Ulster Defence Regiment which was formed to replace the B. Specials.

(f) Those who criticise Northern Ireland for having a Special Powers Act fail to admit that a serious risk of subversion and a state of war exist in Northern Ireland and in similar circumstances from 1939/45 (although without the Northern Ireland problem of intimidation) the U.K. Government also used special powers to detain and intern those who might endanger the state.

(g) Those in the U.K. Parliament and Government who began publicly to attack Ulster Unionist M.P.s and the Ulster Government from 1964 onwards nipped in the bud the moves then being made by the Ulster Government to try to bring the minority and majority closer together. Indeed the effect of these attacks was to weaken the authority of the Northern Ireland Government, to encourage the minority to make more demands, and to alarm the majority— thus widening the gap between minority and majority.

(h) Those who now call for political initiatives to solve the problem of terrorism overlook three obvious facts, namely (I) the Northern Ireland Government and Parliament have already initiated far reaching changes in the political framework of the state, (II) the terrorists are not interested in any political initiative short of an all Ireland Republic and (III) the greater proportion of the minority is so intimidated by the terrorists as to be incapable of responding to any further political initiatives while the terrorists remain in control.

4. It is clear therefore that the crushing of the terrorists must be the first priority. It is hard to imagine that if a city in Great Britain had suffered the shootings and bombings that have become commonplace in Belfast the Government would not have crushed the revolt long ago.

It is true that the problem may be more difficult to solve in Northern Ireland. But Northern Ireland is a part of the U.K. and deserves the same priority in the provision of resources to beat the terrorists that any English, Scottish or Welsh area would expect in similar circumstances. Having taken the means of security from the Northern Ireland Government (following the disarming of the R.U.C. and the abolition of the B. Specials in 1969) the U.K. Government has a clear duty to marshal all possible resources-both national and local—to end the terrorism.

5. This brochure is an attempt mainly to help the public in Great Britain to understand more clearly the causes of the troubles in Northern Ireland and the responsibility of the U.K. Government for security there as in other parts of the U.K.

ORIGIN OF THE PROBLEM

6. Northern Ireland has a long history of intermittent communal strife dating mainly from the Plantation of Ulster by English and Scottish settlers in the early 17th century.

The descendants of those settlers, who make up about two-thirds of Northern Ireland's population, are mainly Protestant in religion and want to remain within the U.K. The other one-third of the population are of Irish heritage, are Roman Catholic in religion and in the main favour a united Ireland.

This combination of characteristics (race, religion and political affiliation which coincide in each of the two main groups, has over the years produced a potentially explosive situation in which emotions are easily roused. The British