internees. (In France during the O.A.S. emergency the advisory body could likewise give binding decisions). In Northern Ireland, as in the United Kingdom during the war, decisions are merely advisory and can be ignored by the detaining authorities.

Thirdly, the Irish Government released prisoners who gave an oath-which was later revised to avoid affronting political conscience to observe the law and refrain from illegal activity. In Northern Ireland the present authorities will release prisoners who take a somewhat similar oath, but the oath differs in that it requires internees to renounce by implication their Republican principles. For this reason some internees have refused to take the requisite oath.

To avoid a breach of the European Convention, proper Parliamentary supervision must be introduced. Arguably supervision by a regional assembly (the Parliament of Northern Ireland) may not suffice as it is the High Contracting Parties to the Convention who are empowered to take action derogating therefrom. Apart from the need to observe international obligations, the United Kingdom with its traditions of democracy should not be satisfied with safeguards against detention which are inferior to those of other nations.

The Northern Ireland system is unique in that an order of detention is without time limit. During this indefinite period interrogation is permitted before any decision on internment is reached. In practice 28 days is usually observed as a limit, but in some cases detention has been far longer. During this period detainees cannot make representations to the independent advisory committee. People are presumably arrested on reliable information and not on mere vague suspicion. (In Tanzania there is the safeguard that information leading to detention must have been given on oath, but this is not required in Northern Ireland). After a short defined period a detention order should be made or the prisoner should be released. In India detention must end within 12 days unless it has been authorised by the highest executive authority. In wartime Britain interrogation of suspects was for a defined limited period.

In all Commonwealth countries, except Northern Ireland, representations to the advisory body are permitted after a man has first been detained. They do not require another internment order which can be indefinitely postponed before representations are permissible. Again in these countries detainees (as under Regulation 18B) are offered the earliest possible opportunity to make written representations to the Minister concerned or detaining authority.

In Nkrumah's Ghana, in India, in Kenya, Malaya, in wartime Britain, and in Lee Kuan Yew's Singapore, the detainee must be informed of the allegations against him, but this is not required in Northern Ireland. In most cases this has to be done within 5 days or earlier. The allegations usually must contain sufficient details to enable the detainee to present his case, unless the disclosures would damage sources of information or would be against the national interest.

In wartime Britain, in Ireland, and in Rhodesia (under the preventive detention law approved by Whitehall in 1959) legal advice and representation was permitted. This is not so in Northern Ireland. Nor is there provision for publication of the names of the detainees (as was required within 14 days in the Kenya independence constitution).

The advisory body has to hear appeals quickly-"with all convenient speed" in the Republic, and within one month in Kenya, Nigeria, Singapore, and in France. But in Northern Ireland it need only give "due consideration" to the representations which are made. Strangely, there is no automatic duty to examine every internee's case, individually as in India, Kenya and in Mr. Smith's Rhodesia, although the Government has made an administrative concession by stating that all cases will be examined. The Nigerian and Kenya independence constitutions required automatic review of the cases of every detainee every six months. In Rhodesia this is required every twelve months. Again in Northern Ireland there is no time limit to the powers of internment and the executive authority is not required to re-examine the decision and make a fresh order.

Again Northern Ireland has no proper machinery for detainees and internees to complain against ill-treatment. In South Africa under the 90 day interrogation law provision was made for a private visit by a magistrate at least once weekly to every detainee. The Irish regulations require proper machinery for complaints about ill-treatment. Indeed, the Irish regulations of 1957 set out detailed rules regarding the treatment of interness and of which rules they are to be kept fully informed. In particular there are specific provisions for continuous medical supervision and the keeping of records (much of the worry voiced in the Compton Report would have been precluded had similar regulations been applicable in Northern Ireland).

Any rules should contain all reasonable precautions to obviate hardship so far as this is not inconsistent with the purpose of detention.

It is strange that in Northern Ireland the executive authority is empowered to depart from the rules regarding unconvicted prisoners when detainees and internees (who have not been charged with any offence) are held in custody outside any of Her Majesty's prisons. In any case, the regulations for unconvicted prisoners are unduly harsh on persons not charged with any offence. In the Republic regulations carefully define interned men's privileges.

Finally, some financial provisions should be made to elleviate hardships on the families of detainees and internees. Sympathetic though the social welfare authorities may be in their administration of law, severe hardships may be suffered by families whose income is suddenly reduced, by reason of internment of the breadwinner, to the level of supplementary benefits.

With preventive detention a common occurrence in the post-war world, the skill and experience of legislators has grown. There is no excuse in 1971 for not introducing detailed rules with modern safeguards to replace the regulations of 1956 which (though less strict than 1922 regulations) are largely modelled on the now antiquated regulations introduced in 1914 under the Defence of the Realm Acts. The United Kingdom Government, being internationally responsible for its preventive detention laws, should assert its authority, or act through the Westminster Parliament, to ensure the passage of laws consistent with its international obligations and its democratic traditions.

LETTER AND STATEMENT OF PROFESSOR PAUL F. POWER, DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI

Congressman BENJAMIN ROSENTHAL,

House Office Building, Washington, D.C.

DEAR CONGRESSMAN ROSENTHAL: For the emerging hearings on Northern Ireland, permit me to submit as a possible resource a research paper of mine which was given at the 1971 annual meeting in Puerto Rico of the International Studies Association. It is concerned chiefly with the civil rights phase of the struggle (1967-69) and not with the more somber phases since then. My paper was based on field work in Ulster in 1970.

I would add two substantive comments:

(1) The conflict is not sectarian despite easy headlines; but it is of a kind United States opinion has traditionally been vitally concerned with in other human rights and civil rights situations in this country and abroad. Manifestly, Northern Ireland should not be denied policy ventilation by the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

(2) Federation of northern and southern Ireland is a realistic response (not "solution"—there is none) to answer widespread dissatisfaction in Ireland with the controversial Stormont government and related socio-economic rule in the North and to assure the legitimate interests and rights of the long-settled, British Unionist community that, as Prime Minister Lynch has said, is one of the several traditions of the varied society of Ireland. Federation could be approached by the "people of the area”, to use Secretary Rogers term employed after the recent Derry tragedy, without deep involvement of the United States which he correctly warned against, if our government gave relevant diplomatic encouragement.

Sincerely yours,

PAUL F. POWER, Professor.

CONFLICT AND PLURALISM: THE CASE OF NORTHERN IRELAND*

(Paul F. Power, University of Cincinnati)

Established in controversy fifty years ago this year, Northern Ireland has experienced recent disorders that have lessons for the comparative study of conflict. Since the founding of the United Kingdom's only political subsystem, the Unionist party has been in power despite governmental alteration in Westminster. Moreover, this party and its supportive and enforcing regime, which is nearly coterminous with the society's British and Protestant majority, have had a semi-monopoly over constitutional principles. For these reasons until the mid1960s the ascendent institutions and people dealt with the mainly Irish and Roman Catholic minority on hierarchial terms. Because of the terms and its own ambivalent or non-allegiant values, the minority responded with varying degrees of alienation, passivity and resistance. The recent conflict of 1964-70, however, originated not with minority dissidents but with Protestant Ultras who in the name of regime defense protested against the North's first conciliatory government and signs of ecumenism. Departing from the opposition's traditional notions and tactics, a civil rights movement based essentially on the minority and its grievances responded to the Ultras, but especially to the government which became reluctant to grant implied relief. The mounting crisis brought systemic intervention, pressured reforms, violence by all sides, and divisions or realignments in the government, regime and opposition. It is doubtful that these results aided the reconciliation of the British and the Irish in Northern Ireland. The consequences did shift the balance of legal and political forces toward the democratic advancement of the subsystem.

A paper prepared for the 1971 annual meeting of the International Studies Association, March 17-20, 1971, San Juan, Puerto Rico.

I. THE SOURCES AND EVOLUTION OF TRADITIONAL CONFLICT

Despite ecological, linguistic and economic forces that work for socio-political unity, Northern Ireland has two political communities, one of which controls the subsystem. Richard Rose describes the condition as a "divided regime."! He is impressed with survey evidence that there are potential repudiators of the regime within the majority, as more obviously exist in minority circles. The intramajority differences are chiefly about how best to safeguard the regime and its territorial base. Although these differences play a role in the conflict under study, they do not provide broad explanations about its context. More vital is the division between an ascendent community and a subordinate community. The unequal division stems partly from the size of the Protestant majority in the total population of 1.5 million (about 63 percent), but also from other sources. The condition is fed by factors that coincide and reinforce one another along the lines of belief, descent, structure and process. The outcome is not two discontinuous, autonomous nations. The Ulster land, the English language and the economic order provide some integrative commonalities. Yet they are offset by conflicting loyalties to ethnic, religious and political references that create a neo-polarized and lowconsensus subsystem.

To what can the unequal division of power and the condition of neo-polarization and low-consensus in Northern Ireland be attributed? Brief mention of leading origins 2 will help to explain the dynamics of conflict in contemporary affairs. One source is the Stuart and Tudor plantations of Presbyterian Scottish and Anglican English colonists in Ulster soon after the revolt and defeat of the Gaelic Irish under Hugh O'Neill at the end of the 16th Century. Displacing many but not all Roman Catholic peasants who had lost their leaders to exile, the Reformation-imperialist colonization, which Cromwellian violence reconfirmed and elaborated, provided the creedal, ethnic and military foundations of the basic division and the majority's ascendency which have persisted into contemporary Northern Ireland. If the ascendents have not viewed these foundations as certifying their place and power, they believe as Zionist pioneers in Palestine and White Settlers in Kenya believed in their contexts that post-settlement events validated their authority and legitimacy.

Prominent among the Ulster events, each of which is a source of hegemonic division, are the following: (1) the emergence of agrarian and commercial progress in Ulster under favored Protestant leadership, eventually followed by partial industrialization and a higher wealth level than that found in the South; (2) the military defeat without expunging the rebellious elan of socio-creedal resistance or anti-Crown insurgencies within or into the North, e.g., by the Catholic Defenders in the late 18th Century and the Irish Republican Army (IRA) in the 20th: (3) the creation of a Unionist ideology and movement during the constitutional integration of Ireland and Britain (1801-1921), serving general imperalist as well as northern ascendency interests; (4) the Tory-Unionist prevention by political means or revolutionary preparations of all-Ireland Home Rule and united Irish independence; (5) the division of the island and Ulster province in 1921 to permit Crown-Unionist rule in six of its nine counties and the continuation of the myths of Union and the British mission in Ireland. These developments have been normalized into achievements by ascendency cults, notably the Orange Order and the Apprentice Boys of Derry. With the aid of tenacious memories and fear of revolution, they organize and conduct symbolic and affective renewals of the accomplishments, especially the victory of William III and Protestant forces at the Battle of the Boyne in 1690 and the relief of Catholic-besieged Londonderry the year before. The modernity of tradition is a typical feature of Northern Ireland's political cultures.

No less than the majority group, the minority community has its own convictions, folk heroes and residues that provide cohesive and motivational forces for itself but separates it from the ascendant group. That its members are lineal descendants of the ancient Gaelic Irish of Ulster is a leading and credible belief. Ulster and all-Irish folk heroes include Niall of the Nine Hostages, the legendary founder of the O'Neill dynasty. A Catholic notable was Richard Talbot, Duke

1 Richard Rose, "The Dynamics of a Divided Regime," Government and Opposition, 5 (Spring 1970), 166-192. See also his "Dynamic Tendencies in the Authority of Regimes," World Politics, 21 (July 1969), 602-628, and his forthcoming Governing Without Consensus: An Irish Perspective, to be published by Beacon Press, 1971.

2 The sources and development of the cultural, ethnic and political forces at work in Northern Ireland are revealed from an Irish nationalist and socialist perspective in Liam de Paor, Divided Ulster (Baltimore, 1970. Unionist assumptions underlie Thomas Wilson, ed., Ulster Under Home Rule (London, 1955).

of Tyrconnell, who served James II and contested Protestant power in Ireland. In the folklore Talbot coexists with Protestant nationalist heroes such as Wolfe Tone, executed leader of the United Irishmen rebellion of 1798. Substantial Presbyterian support for the revolt would have helped ecumenical nationalism except for the rebellion's clear defeat and the later coalescence of most northern Protestants around the Crown. The major contributions of Protestant leaders of nationalist or home-rule movements from Tone through Robert Emmett and Parnell to Douglas Hyde provide grounds for the claim, vital in the northern context, that the cause of Irish self-determination is non-sectarian and that it is not, as some Unionists have said, a front for expansive and anti-liberal Catholicism. The Catholic factor in the northern minority's political heritage has developed from the Church's wider diplomatic and ideological concerns as well as from its place in Irish conditions. Thus from the first to the second Elizabethan Age, the Papacy has been attentive to Britain as a world or European power apart from its role in Irish affairs. After experiencing British repression and disability, in the 19th century the Church and its communicants in Ireland secured legal and economic relief, including the Gladstonian disestablishment of their nearly convertless opponent, the Anglican Church of Ireland. During this time it was a lay leader, Daniel O'Connell, who joined Catholic Emancipation and irenic nationalism while the clergy tended to support the Union. The impact of socialism on nationalism has been a special problem which the Church has countered with noticable but not full success. From James Connolly in the 1890s to Bernadette Devlin in the mid-1960s, socialist nationalists have combined ideologies without causing the individuals or the Church to reject one another. Typically, the Church has resisted emerging independence movements, especially those with violent means.3 The hierarchy opposed the United Irishmen, excommunicated Fenians and deplored the 1916 Easter Rising. Adapting to a nationalist surge, the Irish Church did resist Lloyd George's unsuccessful conscription effort in 1918. The hierarchy welcomed the creation of the Irish Free State in 1922 but opposed DeValera's Republicans who lost the ensuing civil war and denounced the IRA which outlived it. The Church gained semi-establishment in the 1937 Constitution, giving northern and other critics data for Mediterranean analogies.

In the North since partition the Roman Catholic Church has had no less freedom than in the South, although not social or legal preference which in effect all churches share in a highly confessional society. Toward the northern regime the Church's view has shifted from non-recognition to tacit acceptance. The former outlook stems from many sources, among them the partition's offense against a national Church ideal owing to the North's inclusion of the first see of all-Ireland in St. Patrick's cathedral town of Armagh, the residency of Ireland's only Cardinal. A more negative influence was the regime's self-proclaimed Protestant character from its founding under Sir Edward Carson until Terence O'Neill became Prime Minister in 1963. The O'Neill phenomenon, whereby a descendent of a 17th century plantation leader began to move the Unionist regime to treat Catholics as allegiant subjects-even as potential Unionist voters and party members-coincided with the appearance of post-Johannus ecumenism in both religious communities. These developments contributed to a climate of opinion in which 70 percent of the Catholic community and 50 percent of the Protestants believed in 1967 soon after the start of the recent civil rights protest that inter-faith (inter-group) relations had improved. During the mid-1960s an increase in already generous regime aid to the Church's closely-guarded schools may have helped to sustain this belief and to encourage the Church to socialize its communicants to at least accept the regime. By the eve of the recent unrest the Irish hierarchy's view of the regime had become one of provisional acceptance and some support.

An ambivalent influence on the acceptance-support question has been the slowly rising percentage of the minority in the total population. The percentage was between 33.5-34.9 from 1911 to 1961. The upward trend began in the 1950s due to the impact of British health insurance and improved economic conditions which reduced emigration. Traditionally having a higher birth rate than the majority, the minority may become the majority early in the next century, if favorable factors persist. To view itself as the majority, however, the minority 3A prominent casualty of the 1916 Easter Rising, James Connolly once observed that the Church did not object to Irishmen fighting for other nations, only for Ireland, and that religious faith and political freedom are unrelated: James Connolly, Socialism and Nationalism (Dublin, 1948), p. 51.

N.O.P. Market Research, "Opinion Survey in Ulster" for the Belfast Telegraph, November 1967. The forner Prime Minister's attempts at bridge- building may be found in Terence O'Neill, Ulster At the Crossroads (London, 1969), pp. 112 ff.