NORTHERN IRELAND TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 29, 1972 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, The subcommittee met at 2 p.m., in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Benjamin S. Rosenthal (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. Mr. ROSENTHAL. The subcommittee will be in order. Our first witnesses this afternoon are our colleagues, Congressman Jonathan Bingham, Congressman James O'Hara, and Congressman Mario Biaggi. Congressman Ryan will soon join us. Each of you can make an initial presentation. Then we will proceed with questions. We are very honored to have Congressman Jonathan Bingham with us as a member of this committee and former member of the U.S. delegation to the United Nations. Congressman Monagan has a preliminary statement prior to your presentation. We are pleased that Mr. Monagan, who is a distinguished Member of the House and longtime member of this committee, is with us. We are pleased to hear from you. STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN S. MONAGAN, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT Mr. MONAGAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I was not here yesterday during the exchange of mortar fire, and I thought I should like briefly to make a few remarks for the record, since I have filed a resolution on this subject, myself. I should like to emphasize, first of all, that on the question of Ulster justice, my motives, and I am sure those of the subcommittee, are based in sympathy for the people who are involved in this tragedy. Certainly, one with my name and obvious racial origin could not fail to have a sympathetic interest in the problem of Ulster and its minority. I have studied this situation for many weeks. The question is how best we in the United States can assist, if we can assist, in bringing about a solution of this problem. DISCRIMINATION EXISTED Since the time of partition, there has been gerrymandering, there has been discrimination. That is agreed on all sides. The British have concurred in this, and all responsible parties have agreed that these abuses should go, and in fact some steps have been taken to abolish the discrimination and the misrepresentation; more must be immediately forthcoming. The other and larger question relates to the union of the North and the South, which of course is a different, although connected, issue. This objective was not achieved by force 50 years ago. The partition was obviously a compromise, but it was one that was signed by Michael Collins and represented a recognition of a factual situation, and that situation still exists; that is, that there are some million people who do not want union at this time. My own commitment is to a united Ireland, but I cannot fail to recognize that there are stubborn human problems involved. I think all of us would agree that we do not approve the use of force to bring about unification. This policy, in fact, has been condemned by ! the Irish Prime Minister, Jack Lynch, and even the IRA is apparently not agreed upon the use of force and terror to bring about unification. So, Mr. Chairman, the most we can do is to express an opinion that justice should be arrived at by peaceful means. I don't know that we are in a position to prescribe any one solution. Some say Stormont must go. Others say there should be a commis sion for an interim period. Still others say that the British should take over. Others say there should be ultimate independence. So a variety of proposals have been made. I think also we might well ask whether there is any real force in passing a resolution. We have had experience with resolutions about many other areas throughout the world, and certainly, in Greece or Rhodesia, South Africa, Vietnam, and Latin America, to name a few. the effect of these resolutions has been minimal. So, in considering this question, Mr. Chairman, I do not see how we can be particularly specific in prescribing any single remedy. We don't want to do anything that would push the parties toward greater violence. One of the tragedies of polarization is that it is more difficult, as we have learned in our own country, to deal with problems that are not too different from those that are faced in North Ireland today. A PROBLEM FOR COUNTRIES INVOLVED We should allow the parties to work out the solution of these prob lems, and we should assist them if possible. Some time ago, I requested the President to bring up this question at his Bermuda meeting with Prime Minister Heath, and the White House later informed me that he had done so. From statements that have been made by Mr. Lynch and by the Prime Minister, I would hope that the way would be open to embark upon a course of orderly change. So these are the difficulties, as I see them, in considering the various proposals, including my own, that have been placed before the committee. In trying to reach agreement on any one of them, naturally, the desirability of a resolution and its terms will be for consideration by the committee itself, but while yielding to no one in my support of the objectives of bringing political justice, adequate representation, education opportunity, and economic progress to the minority as well as the majority of Northern Ireland, I do believe that this is a very difficult problem for us on the other side of the ocean to try to solve. I wanted to present these thoughts to you as we began our deliberations. Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I congratulate my colleague for a thoughtful statement about a very complex situation. I would like to add that if you had been here yesterday you might have found advocates of a very specific solution differing with you quite sharply as to what should be done. What makes me unhappy is that we are, at least ostensibly, discussing specific resolutions that propose withdrawal of troops, the end of the Stormont Parliament, and the convening of a conference to discuss reunification. Those are specific steps to be taken immediately. I hope such advice won't be given and I don't assume it would be acted upon. Mr. MONAGAN. I certainly would not take away from any individual his right to have an opinion about a particular solution and to express that opinion. I have my own opinion as to what the course might be, but when we are acting from a governmental point of view I think it is different from what the individual may do. Mr. ROSENTHAL. Thank you very much. STATEMENT OF HON. JONATHAN B. BINGHAM, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK Mr. BINGHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would beg leave to read my statement. I think I have new thoughts to suggest to the committee and some matters of substance that I don't believe have been touched on before. I appreciate this opportunity, Mr. Chairman, to appear before your distinguished subcommittee and I commend you for holding hearings on this vital and urgent topic. Even before Bloody Sunday in Derry, it was clear that British policies in Northern Ireland-policies based on official discrimination, internment, and attempted repression by armed force-were doomed to fail, indeed, were only making matters worse. The killing at Derry of 13 unarmed citizens engaged in a peaceful march was an almost inevitable consequence of those policies and signaled their utter bankruptcy. In judging the significance of that tragic event, it is worth recalling that in the famous or infamous-Boston Massacre of 1770, only five citizens were killed by British troops, in contrast to the 13 killed at Derry. Two centuries after the American Revolution, the British seem to be following the same kind of bullheaded policy in reacting brutally to demonstrations of protest. Prime Minister Heath and his Government seem unable to recognize their own mistakes. Meanwhile, the Nixon Administration stands idly by, seemingly paralyzed by a fear of offending the British Government, and unwilling to challenge that Government's contention that the problem of Northern Ireland is purely an internal problem, not properly a matter of international concern. In this situation, what can the Congress do? We cannot bring pressure directly on the Government of Britain or on the U.N. Security Council or General Assembly. What we can do, however, is to bring pressure on the executive branch to follow a policy that will be less timid, more constructive, and more in line with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations. To that end, a number of resolutions have been introduced which are before this subcommittee. While I have cosponsored Mr. Carey's resolution (H. Res. 653) and Mr. Tiernan's (H. Con. Res. 523), I should like here to address myself especially to H. Con. Res. 424, which I introduced on October 14, 1971, with a number of eminent cosponsors. A DIFFERENT RESOLUTION My resolution differs from the others in that it emphasizes the need for the United States Government to act in this matter "in consultation with the Government of Ireland." While some of us may feel that the Government in Dublin has not taken a strong enough stand in relation to the violence in Northern Ireland and has not even proposed any specific steps to be taken leading toward the goal of a united Ireland, still the United States Government can hardly act in this matter without considering the prob lems confronting the Government of Ireland and the desires of that Government. This would be particularly true-and I want to emphasize this-if the U.S. Government were to adopt the view as urged in all the resolutions before you that the goal must be a united Ireland. If we were merely seeking to ameliorate conditions in Northern Ireland, then the United States could perhaps work solely with the Government of the United Kingdom and with the authorities and dissident leaders in Northern Ireland. But if we want to work toward the objective of a united Ireland, then we surely cannot ignore the position of the Dublin Government. My resolution also differs from the Carey Resolution in stressing the need for working through the United Nations. H. Con. Res. 523 (Tiernan) likewise contemplates action at the U.N., but is somewhat less specific than mine and does not mention the need for Security Council action. A ROLE FOR THE SECURITY COUNCIL In my view, the Security Council would necessarily have to be involved if a U.N. force were to be sent in to Northern Ireland to replace the British troops. And it seems clear to me that, in the early stages at least, some disinterested peacekeeping force would be needed in the six counties if the British troops were to be withdrawn. Otherwise, the Catholic minority there would be at the mercy of the far more powerful Protestant forces. In this regard, I would suggest that the proposal in H. Res. 653 (Carey) for "the institution of law enforcement and criminal justice under local control acceptable to all parties" as a substitute for the British troops is vague and unrealistically optimistic. It is true that at the present time the Irish Republic does not seem to be favorably inclined toward a drive for U.N. action, or so Foreign Minister Hillery indicated on his recent visit to Washington. Yet in 1969, the Irish Delegation at the U.N. did put forward the idea of a U.N. peacekeeping force, and I believe the Irish Republic could readily be persuaded to return to this proposal if encouraged to do so by the United States. Recently, the Irish Republic did request Secretary-General Waldheim to use his good offices in the matter, and Mr. Waldheim declared his readiness to lend a hand if both parties wished him to do so. But at his press conference of February 11, 1972, the Secretary-General reported that "Britain had advised him that it did not consider this matter lent itself to United Nations intervention as it was an internal problem." It is regrettable that the Heath government is stubbornly saying to the U.N. and to the United States, "Hands off; this is our problem"but it is perhaps understandable. What is not understandable is why the Nixon administration should supinely accept the British Government's view in the matter. A PROPER U.N. CONCERN In a number of respects, the situation in Northern Ireland is properly the concern of the United Nations. Clearly it is an international question, involving at the very least the Governments of Britain and Ireland. Next, the Stormont-British policies of discrimination based on religion and of internment violate fundamental precepts of the U.N. Charter and Declaration of Human Rights. And finally, the situation is an explosive one, which might easily lead to hostilities between the north and the rest of Ireland, and is therefore a "dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security" under Chapter VI of the Charter, thus properly a matter for Security Council action. The position of the Nixon administration that the problem of Northern Ireland is a purely domestic British problem is inconsistent with the position the United States has taken in a number of other U.N. cases. For example, the United States has for years refused to accept the position of the Portuguese Government that its actions in its African territories are its own affair because it considers those territories. "provinces" of Portugal. The same was true with regard to France and its territories in Algeria, at least during the latter stages of that dispute. Even more striking is the case of the Security Council action with respect to the situation in South Africa following the Sharpeville massacre of 1960, when 67 demonstrating South Africans were shot to death. In spite of South Africa's insistence that this case fell within the terms of article 2(7) as a matter "essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state," the United States voted to inscribe the items on the Security Council agenda and then voted in favor of the resolution adopted (S. Con. Res. 134) April 1, 1960. Because it is of extraordinary interest, I would like to submit the text of that resolution for inclusion in the record at this point. Mr. ROSENTHAL. That will be so included. |