a concise state which shall set forth It will be noticed that the Constitution and the statute provide, in substance, that sued until ten days have expired after the date of their allowance; that in pursuance of this agreement Thiemens and White, as members of the board of county commissioners, did on April 17, 1917, produce a resolution having the foregoing effect, and Thiemens then and there stated to White in the presence of Twining, "We might as well spring the white elephant on Tommy," meaning Twining, and that the resolution was passed by Thiemens and White without Twining having an opportunity to consider the question or discuss it, or view the property to ascertain its value, or to become advised concerning whether property of equal suitability could be obtained for less money, or more advantageously to the interests of the county; that this resolution fixed the value of lots 6 to 13 in the sum of $3,500; that it authorized Thiemens to purchase the property at the amount fixed in the resolution, and directed the auditor of Grant county to draw warrants for the respective amounts, and tender to the respective parties owning the said lots the total purchase price of said lots in the block, being $10,600 without the building on lots 1 and 2, or $10,900 with the directly, in any contract, sale, lease or purchase "(2) Be beneficially interested, directly or inbuilding, either of which amounts is clearly which may be made by, through or under the in excess of the real or marketable value of supervision of such officer, in whole or in part, the lots; and that this resolution was puror which may be made for the benefit of his ofposely and designedly passed late in the aft-fice, or accept, directly or indirectly, any comernoon immediately before the end of the session of the board then being held, and was the last business performed by the board before its adjournment on April 17, 1917. In the petition for removal there are also charges of nonfeasance and of violation of the oaths of office of these commissioners in several respects. We think it is unnecessary to set out the petition further. It is first argued by the appellants that these charges were insufficient because they attempted to charge misfeasance, but do not The constitutional provision with reference to the recall of public officers is as do so. follows: * ex pensation, gratuity or reward from any other [1, 2] It is apparent that, if these commissioners were the owners of the lots named in the charge, or beneficially interested therein, and were attempting to and did sell the same to the county of which they were the commissioners, which sale was made by these officers for their benefit, they were no doubt guilty of a gross misdemeanor under the law. We think there can be no doubt of the sufficiency of the petition in this respect, and that it charges malfeasance in office. The mere fact that the petition recited that these officers were guilty of misfeasance instead of malfeasance has no merit, because the statute and the Constitution require the act or acts done to be stated in plain and concise language. Even if the rule in criminal pleadings must be followed in these petitions, we are satisfied that an incorrect "Every elective public officer cept judges is subject to recall * whenever a petition demanding his recall, reciting that such officer has committed some act or acts of malfeasance or misfeasance while in office, or has violated his oath of office, stating the matters complained of, * is filed. Section 33, art. 1, State Constitution, Amendment 8. Section 4940-1, Rem. Code, provides as designation of the offense would not invalifollows: * "Whenever any committee date a petition. This court has held that the misnomer of a crime would not vitishall desire to demand the recall and discharge ate an information otherwise sufficient to of any elective public officer * * * they shall prepare a typewritten charge, reciting that such officer, naming him and giving the title of his office, has committed an act or acts of malfeasance, or an act or acts of misfeasance while in office, or has violated his oath of office, * * ** which charge shall state the act or acts complained of in concise language, without unnecessary repetition. * ** Section 4940-3, Rem. Code, provides that: charge a crime. State v. Nelson, 39 Wash. 221, 81 Pac. 721. Without further considering the other charges in the petition, we are satisfied that the one already mentioned is sufficient upon which to base a recall election. [3] It is next argued that the statement of the receipts and expenditures does not comply with the law. The statute (Rem. "At the time of submitting such petition the person, committee, or organization submitting the same shall file with the officer to whom such petition is submitted a full, true and detailed statement, giving the names and post office addresses of all persons, corporations and orcanizations who have contributed * to aid in the preparation of the charge and in the preparation [circulation] and filing of the peuition, with the amount contributed by each, and a fell, true and detailed statement of all expenditures, giving the amounts expended, the purpose for which expended and the names and posioffice addresses of the persons and corporations to whom paid, which statement shall be verised by the affidavit of the person or some member of the committee or organization making the charge, and until such statement is filed the officer shall refuse to receive such petition." The statement of receipts and expenditures contained the names of 135 persons, with their post office addresses, and with the amount of cash contributed by each; it also contained the names of about 60 persons, with their post office addresses, but it does not state what these persons contributed. The statement also contains the names and addresses of the persons to whom the money was disbursed, with a detailed statement of the purposes of the expenditures. These statements are properly verified. No question is made upon the regularity of the verification; but it is contended by the appellants that there were a number of persons who contributed money who were not designated in the statement. It is also contended that because there are a number of names without cash contributions, the statement is insufficient under the statute. In the case of State ex rel. McCauley v. GilHam, 81 Wash. 186, 142 Pac. 470, we held that the county auditor was not authorized to file a petition for a recall where the statement of expenses and disbursements was not verified as required by law. But the statement of receipts and expenses in this case is properly verified. The county auditor, with whom the statement was filed, is not authorized to investigate the items of receipts and disbursements in order to determine its correctness. He must rely upon the affidavit of the person or persons who verify the statement, which, if properly verified, required him to file the petition and call an election. State ex rel. Case v. Superior Court, 81 Wash. 623, 143 Pac. 461, Ann. Cas. 1916B, 838. If the person verifying such statement makes false verification, he is amenable under the criminal law. We are satisfied that the statement complied with the statute, and the defects shown did not require the county auditor to refuse to file the statement, or the petition, or to call an election. (102 Wash. 402) STATE ex rel. CONSTANTI v. DARWIN, State Fish Com'r. (No. 14837.) (Supreme Court of Washington. May 10, 1918.) 1. WAR 12-LICENSE-RIGHTS OF ALIENSTATUTES AND PROCLAMATION. In view of the proclamation of the President of the United States dated December 11, 1917, pursuant to the congressional resolution declaring the existence of a state of war between the United States and Austria-Hungary, and to Rev. St. U. S. §§ 4067-4070 (U. S. Comp. St. 1916, §§ 7615-7618), the proclamation concerning the natives, citizens, denizens, or subjects of Austria-Hungary, their rights and obligations pending the existence of a state of war between the United States and the imperial and royal Austro-Hungarian government, a native of Austria-Hungary who came to the that year declared his intention to become a state of Washington in 1913, and in December of citizen of the United States, and who during the years of 1915, 1916, and 1917 has worked on fishing appliances in the Puget Sound disfish commissioner, is entitled, under Rem. Code trict under fishing licenses issued by the state 1915, § 5150-43, providing that no license for taking fish shall be issued to any person not a citizen of the United States unless he has dehas been an actual resident of the state for a clared his intention to become a citizen, and year, to issuance from the commissioner of a purse seine fishing license for the Puget Sound district for the current year of 1918; the intention of Congress or the President to nullify or suspend the terms of the Washington statute not being clear. 2. WAR 10(2)-ALIEN ENEMY-RIGHT TO SUE. Under the proclamation of the President, the native of Austria-Hungary was entitled to prosecute action for mandamus to compel the state fish commissioner to issue to him the purse seine fishing license; the right given natives of Austria-Hungary by the proclamation to be undisturbed in the peaceful pursuit of their lives and occupations authorizing them to maintain actions to secure to themselves their lawful occupations. Mackintosh, J., dissenting. Department 2. Application for writ of mandate by the State of Washington, on the relation of Nick Constanti, against Lester H. Darwin as State Fish Commissioner. Writ directed to issue. Clinton W. Howard, of Bellingham, for re lator. W. V. Tanner, Atty. Gen., and Glenn J. Fairbrook, of Olympia, for respondent. writ of mandate to require the fish commisMOUNT, J. This is an application for a sioner of this state to issue to the relator a Sound district for the current year. purse seine fishing license for the Puget The facts are conceded as follows: The relator is a native of Austria-Hungary. He came to the United States in May, 1913, and since June of that year has been an actual resident of this state. On the 29th day of December, 1913, he regularly, and in the manner required by law, declared his intention to become a citizen of the United States. Since the year 1914, and during the years ELLIS, C. J., and HOLCOMB, CHAD- 1915, 1916, and 1917, his regular occupation WICK, and MAIN, JJ., concur. has been that of a salt water fisherman, Upon a consideration of all the facts in the case as shown by the record, the trial court properly denied the injunction. judgment is therefore affirmed. The For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes thority vested in me by the Constitution of the United States and the aforesaid sections of the and direct that the conduct to be observed on Revised Statutes, I do hereby further proclaim the part of the United States towards all natives, citizens, denizens. or subjects of Austria-Hungary, being males of the age of fourteen years and upwards, who shall be within the United States and not actually naturalized, shall be as follows: "All natives, citizens, denizens, or subjects of and upwards, who shall be within the United Austria-Hungary, being males of fourteen years States and not actually naturalized, are enjoin working on fishing appliances in the Puget Sound district under fishing licenses issued by the respondent. He owns property in the city of Tacoma, is a married man, 45 years of age, having four children, two of whom were born in Austria-Hungary, and the two youngest were born in this state. On April 15, 1918, upon application therefor to the United States Food Administration, a fisherman's license was issued to the relator by that administration, authorizing the relator to engage in the business of catching and distrib-ed to preserve the peace towards the United uting salt water fish. On the 29th day of April, 1918, the relator applied to the respondent, who is the duly qualified and acting fish commissioner of this state, for a purse seine fishing license for the district of Puget Sound, and tendered the amount required by law to be paid therefor. The application was denied for the reason that the applicant was not a naturalized citizen of the United States, but a citizen of Austria-Hungary, with which country the United States are at war. [1] This application is resisted by the Attorney General, upon behalf of the respondent, upon the grounds that the relator is an alien enemy and therefore is not entitled to maintain this proceeding, and under the law is not entitled to the license from this state. The statute of this state (Rem. Code, 5150-43) provides that: "No license for taking or catching salmon or other food or shell fish required by this act shall be issued to any person who is not a citizen of the United States of the age of eighteen years or over, unless such person has declared his intention to become a citizen, and is and has been an actual resident of the state for one year immediately preceding the application for such li cense. * It is plain under this provision of the statute that the relator, being an actual resident of the state for more than one year prior to the application, and having declared his intention to become a citizen of the United States, is entitled to the license he seeks unless the fact that this country is at war with Austria-Hungary impels the suspension of the statute in so far as applicants are not citizens of the United States. On December 7, 1917, the Congress of the United States passed a resolution that a state of war is declared to exist between the United States States and to refrain from crime against the public safety, and from violating the laws of the United States and of the states and territories thereof, and to refrain from actual hostility or giving information, aid or comfort to the enemies of the United States, and to comply strictly with the regulations which are hereby or which may be from time to time promulgated by the President; and so long as they shall conduct themselves in accordance with law, they shall be undisturbed in the peaceful pursuit of their lives and occupations and be accorded the consideration due to all peaceful and law-abiding persons, except so far as restrictions may be necessary for their own protection and for the safety of the United States; and towards such of said persons as conduct themselves in accordance with law, all citizens of the United States are enjoined to preserve the peace and to treat them with all such friendliness as may be compatible with loyalty and allegiance to the United States. "And all natives, citizens, denizens or subjects of Austria-Hungary, being males of the age of fourteen years and upwards, who shall be within the United States and not actually naturalized, who fail to conduct themselves as so enjoined, in addition to all other penalties prescribed by law, shall be liable to restraint, or to give security, or to remove and depart from the United States in the manner prescribed by sections four thousand and sixty-nine and four thousand and seventy of the Revised Statutes, and as prescribed in regulations duly promulgated by the President; "And pursuant to the authority vested in me, I hereby declare and establish the following regulations, which I find necessary in the premises and for the public safety: "(1) No native, citizen, denizen or subject of Austria-Hungary being a male of the age of fourteen years and upwards and not actually naturalized, shall depart from the United States until he shall have received such permit as the President shall prescribe, or except under order of a court, judge, or justice, under sections 4069 and 4070 of the Revised Statutes; United States, except under such restrictions "(2) No such person shall land in or enter the and at such places as the President may prescribe; reasonable cause to believe that he is aiding or "(3) Every such person of whom there may be about to aid the enemy, or who may be at large to the danger of the public peace or safety, or who violates or attempts to violate, or of whom there is reasonable ground to believe that he is about to violate any regulation duly promulgat of America and the imperial and royal Ausstro-Hungarian government. Thereafter, on December 11, 1917, the President, in pursuance of that resolution and in pursuance of sections 4067, 4068, 4069, and 4070, of the Revised Statutes of the United States, relative to natives, citizens, denizens, or sub-ed by the President, or any criminal law of jects of a hostile nation or government, issued a proclamation as follows: the United States, or of the states or territories thereof, will be subject to summary arrest by the United States marshal, or his deputy, or such other officer as the President shall designate, and to confinement in such penitentiary, prison, jail, military camp, or other place of detention as may be directed by the President. "This proclamation and the regulations herein contained shall extend and apply to all land and water, continental or insular, in any way to natives of Austria-Hungary, quoted above, within the jurisdiction of the United States." On the next day after this proclamation was issued, the Attorney General of the United States, referring to it, said: "This proclamation differs from the preceding proclamation relating to the subjects of the German Empire in that, while it authorizes the arrest and internment of any subjects of the dual empire whose conduct may be a menace to the safety of the country, the only restrictions which it contains are prohibitions against either entering or leaving the United States without first obtaining permission. Many subjects of Austria-Hungary have already demonstrated their strong loyalty to this country by their faithfulness in industrial work, their organization of recruiting committees, and in service with our armies. For the present, therefore, no restrictions will be placed upon the movements of subjects of Austria-Hungary. They are not subject to the restrictions of the previous proclamations relating to German enemy aliens; they will be permitted to reside and labor in prohibited areas and to travel freely without molestation. Only those who are dangerous or disloyal are subject to arrest." intended to preserve the rights of such persons in this country to follow their peaceful pursuits and occupations and to accord them the consideration due to all peaceful and law-abiding persons under the law of their domicile. As confirming this position, the Food Administration, acting under authority of Congress, has issued to this relator, knowing his nationality and his status, a license "to engage in the business of catching and distributing salt water fish, shellfish, and crustaceans." The respondent argues that it was the intention of the Legislature, in enacting section 5150-43, Rem. Code, above quoted, to confine the right of fishing in this state to citizens, or to those entitled to become citizens, and that, since section 4362 of the Compiled Statutes of the United States of 1916 provides: "No alien who is a native citizen or subject, or a denizen of any country, state, or sovereignIt seems plain, under this proclamation, ty with which the United States are at war, at that, though the relator may be an alien en-mitted to become a citizen of the United States" the time of his application, shall be then ademy because he has not been naturalized, yet there is nothing in this proclamation which treats a native of Austria-Hungary as an alien dangerous to the peace and safety of the country. The proclamation declares, with reference to such persons, that: "So long as they shall conduct themselves in accordance with law, they shall be undisturbed in the peaceful pursuit of their lives and occupations and be accorded the consideration due to all peaceful and law-abiding persons. And that: "All citizens of the United States are enjoined to preserve the peace and to treat them with all such friendliness as may be compatible with loyalty and allegiance to the United States." So it is apparent that this proclamation recognizes such persons as friendly aliens and not as alien enemies. That the Legislature may prohibit any but citizens of this state and of the United States from receiving a fishing license within the state admits of no doubt. It has not done so. That the federal government may establish the status of a subject of an enemy country residing within the United States also admits of no doubt. It has done so by authorizing the proclamation above quoted. That the federal government, or the President of the United States under authority of Congress, may nullify the statute with reference to permitting privileges to aliens who have declared their intention to become citizens of the United States, admits of no doubt. In our opinion, this has not been done. But before the terms of the statute may be nullified or suspended by Congress, or by the President acting under authority of Congress, the intention to do so must be clear. We think such intention is not clear. On the other hand, it seems entirely clear that the proclamation of the President relating -the relator is not entitled to become a citi zen of the United States, and for that reason the respondent was justified in refusing to issue the license. It is true relator is not now entitled to be admitted to citizenship. He declared his intention to become a citizen in December, 1913. The time of residence does not expire until December, 1918. He will then have two years in which to make his final proof and become a naturalized citizen. So it is apparent that the relator may not at this time become a citizen. In due time, he may, or he may not, as future events develop. We think this point is entirely immaterial, because the statute says a person who has declared his intention to become a citizen and has been a resident of the state for one year immediately preceding his application shall be entitled to such license. The Legislature meant what it said in that respect. It made no exceptions; and since the statute has not been suspended or nullified by higher authority it is still in force and must be followed. [2] We think it clear that the relator is entitled to prosecute this action for the writ. If such persons shall be undisturbed in the peaceful pursuit of their lives and occupations and be accorded the consideration due all peaceful and law-abiding persons, we think it follows that they are authorized to maintain actions to secure to themselves their lawful occupations. Fritz Schultz, Jr., Co. v. Raimes & Co., 99 Misc. Rep. 626, 164 N. Y. Supp. 454; Id., 100 Misc. Rep. 697, 166 N. Y. Supp. 567; Speidel v. Barstow Co. (D. C.) 243 Fed. 621; Porter v. Freudenberg, Ann. Cas. 1917C, 215. We are of the opinion, therefore, that the relator is entitled to the license and is authorized to maintain the action. The writ will therefore issue as prayed and others appeal, and the receivers file a for. ELLIS, C. J., and FULLERTON and PARKER, JJ., concur. MACKINTOSH, J. (dissenting). The relator, being a subject of a country with which we are at war, cannot resort to our courts. As I read it, the President's proclamation does no more than preserve to the subjects of Austria-Hungary the privilege of peaceful life and work in this country, and does not attempt to abrogate the rule of law which closes our courts to them during wartime. I therefore dissent. (102 Wash. 386) cross-appeal. Reversed, with instructions. Higgins & Hughes, of Seattle, for appellants. Scott Calhoun and John A. Homer, both of Seattle, for respondents. HOLCOMB, J. This is an appeal by the principal creditors and also the receivers of the Seattle, Renton & Southern Railway Company, from an order fixing the receivers' compensation and approving their final ac counts. before the court before. CRAWFORD v. SEATTLE, R. & S. RY. CO. 165 Pac. 1070; 97 Wash. 651, 167 Pac. 44; 2. RECEIVERS <198(1) COMPENSATION HOW DETERMINED. Amount of receivers' compensation is to be determined, not by reference to his previous earning capacity, but to the nature of the matter administered, the amount involved, the obligations attending it, the amount of the bond required, the time spent, the labor and skill needed or expended, the degree of success attained under all circumstances, the fidelity to details, the appreciation evidenced as to the responsibilities of the position, the character of such responsibilities, the expedition with which the trust has been administered in view of results reached, and the method, character, and promptness of the accounting, having regard as a standard to what is paid for somewhat similar services in the performance of official duties, not the standard in private business trans actions. Receivers of 13-mile interurban railroad, who operated it efficiently and made accurate accounting and defended many suits and much litigation, were entitled to compensation of $500 each per month while operating the road and to half that amount after the road was sold and they retained charge of the funds. Department 2. Appeal from Superior Court, King County; A. W. Frater, Judge. Seattle, R. & S. R. Co. v. Seattle (D. C.) 216 The principal creditors appealing are the bondholders of the Seattle, Renton & Southern Railway Company. They assign errors of the court below as follows: (1) In allowing Receiver Parkin the sum of $7,305, or any sum at all in excess of $21,061.29 theretofore received by him as compensation as receiver; (2) in allowing Receiver Calhoun the sum of $7,305, or any sum at all in excess of the $21,083.87 theretofore received by him as compensation as receiver; (3) in approving that portion of the receivers' final accounts which covered the payment to Receiv er Parkin of the sum of $2,695 in addition to the sum of $366.29 theretofore received by him as compensation as receiver; (4) in approving that portion of the receivers' final accounts which covered the payment to Receiver Calhoun of the sum of $2,695 in addition to the sum of $18,388.87 theretofore received by him as compensation as receiver; (5) in approving the receivers' final accounts without requiring them to return to the trust fund the amount of the loss they had recklessly and wrongfully inflicted upon that fund by their deposits in the bankrupt Northern Bank & Trust Company. No assignment of error is made by the receivers on their appeal, but it is contended by them generally that the amount of compensation allowed them is inadequate for the services rendered, and that further allowance should be made by this court. Many assertions are made in the briefs on behalf of the bondholders as to the reckless, wasteful, and partisan character of the services for which the receivers were allowed an Suit by William R. Crawford against the Seattle, Renton & Southern Railway Compa-aggregate of over $56,000 out of the trust ny and others, wherein Scott Calhoun and Joseph Parkin, receivers, filed claims for compensation, which were opposed by Augustus S. Peabody, trustee, and others. From an order fixing the receivers' compensation and approving their final accounts, Peabody funds passing through their hands. It is somewhat bitterly contended by them that the proceedings throughout were unduly delayed by the receivers by reason of their conduct of affairs and of their occasioning much litigation which, the bondholders con |