1861. ATTY-GEN. OF MASS. V. MEETING HOUSE. death. We are of opinion, therefore, that the claim was properly rejected. The third claim arises upon a codicil to the will of the testator, Thomas Law, which bequeaths to the three grandchildren, the children of his daughter, Eliza, by Lloyd N. Rogers, $8,000 each, upon this express condition, that if the grandchildren, as heirs or devisees of their late grandmother, Mrs. Law, shall claim or de mand, &c., any portion of his estate, rights or credits, under or by virtue of certain indentures in the said codicil specially enumerated, then, and in that case, the bequest in the codicil to be null and void. The other legatees under the will of the testator object to the allowance of these three legacies, for the reason that the condition upon which they were to become null and void has happened, namely: a claim against the estate of the testator as heirs or representatives of their grandmother, Mrs. Law. The auditor, after stating the facts of the case, as presented to him, and the question of law arising out of them, referred it to the court below for their direction. Besides the distributive shares to the grand- The testator in his will had stated his fears that he had settled upon the children of his daughter-these grandchildren-more than the estate, unless his property should rise in value, other grandchildren would receive from his The court held that the sum of $32,585.76, in which case he would make another will. which had been awarded to Lloyd N. Rogers, This impression, doubtless, led to the stringent as administrator of Eliza, his wife, and which condition annexed to the bequest in the codicil was claimed and allowed under one of the which was executed nearly two years later. interdicted deeds, and which belonged to her The condition is not put upon the possession, children, as distributees, if claimed, or re-recovery or receipt of any portion of his estate ceived by them, would be inconsistent with under these deeds, but upon a claim or demand, their right to the legacies according to the con- or suit for the same; and the testator directs, if dition of the bequest, and by the decree gave the terms of the bequest are not acceptable to the choice to the legatees to take the legacies the grandchildren, that his executor shall conunder the will, or the distributive shares of the test with them, to the utmost, their right to fund. The court were of opinion that no claim claim the legacies. It may well, we think, be had yet been made for the distributive shares; but doubted, if the judgment of the court against that, according to the true meaning of the be- their claim, under these deeds, after a long and quest, the legatees were not entitled to both expensive litigation, can save the legacies from funds, and that, for the purposes of the settle- a breach of the condition. The very special ment of the estate, they should be put to their terms of it would seem to have been intended election within a time mentioned. We are in- to save the estate from any such litigation, so clined to think, upon the facts in the case, a far as regarded the right to the enjoyment of claim had already been made of the fund by the legacies. the legatees and those representing them, which came from the estate of the testator through their grandmother, under and by virtue of one of the interdicted deeds, and which operated to annul the legacies; but, as the views of the court below, and the decree in pursuance thereof, lead to the same result substantially, it is unnecessary to interfere with them. if See 1 BLACK. An objection was taken, on the argument, to the legal effect and operation of this condition, but we entertain no doubt as to its force and validity, The condition is lawful, and one which the testator had a right to annex in the disposition of his own property. The but, if accepted, it must be subject to the dislegatees are not bound to accept the bequest, or not at all. abilities annexed; it must be taken cum onere, There are some other items of minor importance, to which exceptions have been taken, The decree of the court below affirmed. but we see no well grounded objection to them. Cited-1 Hughes, 262. COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUTHE ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF THE SETTS, ex. rel., THE ASSOCIATE REFORMED PRESBYTERIAN SYNOD OF NEW YORK, ET AL., Piffs. in Er., v. THE PROPRIETORS OF THE MEETING 61 (See S. C., 1 Black, 262-266.) and so decided, that, of course, suffices to satis Jurisdiction, when record sufficient to sustain-fy the requirements of the Act of Congress. when not when validity of Act was not drawn in question. Where the writ of error suggests, as a foundation for the jurisdiction of this court, that there was drawn in question the validity of a Statute of Massachusetts as being repugnant to the Constitution of the United States, and the decision of the court was in favor of the validity of said statute," held, that this suggestion of the writ is not supported. The decree of the court is simply that the bill be dismissed, without any reasons alleged for such dis missal. The bill itself raises no such issue; it refers to the Act in question only as conferring the privilege of a corporation on the defendants. It does not aver that the defendants pretend to have title to the property in question by virtue thereof; and challenge its validity. The issue was not on the validity of the Act, but on the construction of an original deed or agreemet of the parties. The validity of the Act was not drawn in question directly by any averment of the pleadings, by the decree or any necessary intendment from other averments in the pleadings, or evidence on the record. But it is not indispensable that it should appear on the record in totidem valis, or by direct and positive statement, that the question was made and the decision given by the court below on the very point. It is sufficient if it be clear from the facts stated, by just and necessary inference, that the question was made, and that thus the court below must, in order to have arrived at the judgment pronounced by it, have come to the very decision of that question as indispensable to that judgment. Armstrong v. The Treas. of Athens Co., 16 Pet., 281; Mills v. Brown, 16 Pet., 525. So it would have to be said, if the same things appeared in the bill or answer. In each of the several subsequent cases in which this point was before the court, either directly or indirectly, the same doctrine is announced. Such are Com. Bank of Cincinnati v. Buckingham's Ex'rs, 5 How., 317, 341; Smith v. Hunter, 7 How., 738; Neilson v. Lagow, 12 How., 98; Williams v. Oliver, 12 How., 111; Submitted Dec. 20, 1861. Decided Jan. 13, 1862. Grand Gulf R. R. v. Marshall, 12 How., 165; IN ERROR to the Supreme Court of the State of Massachusetts, at Boston. This action was commenced by an information filed in the court below by the Attorney General of Massachusetts. The Supreme Court of Massachusetts dismissed the information and the case was brought to this court. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion of the court and arguments of counsel. Mr. C. Cushing, for plaintiffs in error: It is requisite, in order to maintain the jurisdiction of the court here, to show (a) That there was a final judgment or decree in the Supreme Court of Massachusetts. (b) That the validity of the Statute of Massachusetts was drawn in question. (c) That the Supreme Court of Massachusetts decided in favor of its validity. (d) That all this duly appears in the record brought up by the writ of error. The respondents do not deny the fact alleged, of a final judgment or decree in the case by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts. Nor can they deny that if the validity of the Act were in issue, the decision was in favor thereof. But the respondents say: (a) That it does not appear by the record that the validity of the Act was drawn in controversy, in any manner or upon any grounds what ever. (b) That if it sufficiently appears that the validity of the Act was drawn in controversy, then it does not appear that the decision of the court in its favor was upon any ground giving jurisdiction to this court, but on the contrary, that it was on some ground, if any, appertain ing to the exclusive jurisdiction of the State. It is convenient, preliminarily, to consider how it must appear that this pertinent and material question was made and decided by the court of a State. The rule on this subject was carefully considered by the court in the case of Crowell v. Randell, 10 Pet., 369, and seems to be this: If the record shows that the questions shall have been made in specific and positive terms, Lawler v. Walker, 14 How., 149; Maxwell v. Newbold, 59 U. S. (18 How.), 511; Christ Church v. Co. of Philadelphia, 61 U. S. (20 How.), 26; Medberry v. State of Ohio, 65 U. S. (24 How.), 413; Porter v. Foley, 65 U. S. (24 How.), 415. Such, then, is the rule of the court-express averment or necessary intendment. It remains to show that, although the point be not expressly averred in this record, yet it was necessarily intended on the face of the bill, answer or decree. 2. The Act of Massachusetts was directly and expressly in issue. (a) The bill of the relators alleges a trust contract, establishing a charity for specific religious uses. It alleges the perversion or abuse of that trust by the church or society existing in the persons of the respondents or their predecessors. It prays that the trust be re-established. It prays that the respondents may be removed from the administration of the trust, and other trustees appointed. In sum, it denies the right of respondents to be in possession of the property and the muniments of its title, and demands an account of the rents of a part of the premises. (b) To all this the respondents, while making certain answers to other matters of the bill, commence their defense by saying, that "Under the said Act, they are the true and sole owners of the premises occupied by them and demanded in the bill." And that, 'by virtue thereof, these defendants have ever since been in open, exclusive and undisputed possession of the said premises and have exercised all the rights and acts of ownership thereto." They do not show any other right to the possession of the property as against the relators, except claim of title by such possession, protected, as they allege, by the Limitation Act of the Commonwealth. (c) That Act does two things, namely: First. It incorporates "the proprietors of the pews in the Congregational Meeting House, situated in Federal Street." Second. It declares that the " said Corpora tion shall be, and hereby are deemed in law to be seised of the same Meeting House, with all the lands under and adjoining the same, with the privileges and the appurtenances " (d) And the relators reply, that they will prove their bill to be true and sufficient in law, and to join issue with the defendants. 3. The question of the constitutionality of the Act was in issue. (a) The adverse title set up by the respondents is one of “ownership" in fee, under alternative sources of one of two titles, namely: Either the direct force of the legislative Act of the State; Or, by force of prescription under possession conferred by that Act. In fact, of each alternative pretense of title, the Act is the alleged foundation. To escape the possible consequences of rely. ing on the direct force of the Act as the sole source of title, the respondents resort to prescription. But the relators say that a title by direct force of the Act would be a nullity, as already argued, because in that view of the subject the Act would be a nullity by the Constitution of the United States, as impairing the obligation of the contract, by which the lands were dedicated to the public charity and religious use of the Presbyterian Churchi. (b) Assuming that to have been proved, then, as to the grounds of prescription, the question is this: If the Legislature of a State pass an Act impairing the obligation of a contract, and which Act, if the case were before it, the Supreme Court of the United States would, for that reason, pronounce to be void in that respect, can this consequence be evaded or avoided by setting up prescription? No; for if it could, then it is in the power of any State to nullify completely this conserva tive provision of the Constitution, by enacting a law avowedly impairing the obligation, and enacting, at the same time, a brief summary and peremptory prescription. Mr. S. Bartlett, for defendants in error: This writ of errror seeks to reverse the judg. ment therein referred to, on the single ground that there was drawn in question, in the suit in which it was rendered, the validity of a statute of the State of Massachusetts, as being repugnant to the Constitution of the United States, and that the decision in said suit was in favor of the validity of said statute; whereas, it does not appear by the record, or by necessary intendment therefrom, that the valid ity of said statute was drawn in controversy in any manner or upon any ground whatever. To give this court jurisdiction, it must appear by the record, or "by clear and necessary intendment, that the question (on which the jurisdiction is founded) must have been raised and must have been decided, in order to have induced the judgment." Crivell v. Randell, 10 Pet., 368, 398. "That the question was necessarily involved in the decision, and that the State Court could not have given the judgment or decree which they passed, without deciding it." Grand Gulf R. R. v. Marshall, 12 How., 165; Lawler v. Walker, 14 How.. 155; Maxwell v. Newbold, 59 U. S. (18 How.), 515; Christ Church v. Co. of Philadelphia, 61 U. S. (20 How.), 26. The latest application of the doctrine to a suit in equity, is Mich. Cent. R. R. v. Mich. So. R. R., 60 U. S. (19 How.), 379, where it is stated thus: "If the subject of complaint be that a state statute is repugnant to the Constitution of the United States and, therefore, void, and that the state court has declared it to be void, this fact should appear by some direct averment either on the bill or answer, or in the decree of the court." See, also, Medberry v. Ohio, 65 U. S. (24 How.), 413. In this case, the bill and information is framed singly and solely on the assumed ground that under and by virtue of a certain conveyance of land, with the Meeting House thereon, on the 9th of June, 1735, a charity or trust was founded and created under which said land and Meeting House were forever devoted to the use of a Scotch Presbyterian Church, which charity, it alleges, has become perverted by the defendants. The bill refers to the Statute of 1805 but once, and there avers in substance that it is valid. Thus, it avers the premises to be now occupied by the defendant Society, "which said Society is now a Corporation duly established by the laws of this Commonwealth, under an Act of Incorporation passed about the year 1805. It will be noted that this averment was not amended, nor any allegation of the unconstitutionality of the Act of 1805 inserted. The answer is next to be examined; and its averments, so far as they relate to the Act of 1805, are, that by it defendants were incorporated, and that " under it they were the true and sole owners of the premises occupied by them and demanded in the bill; and that said Act was passed on the application and petition of parties" who, prior thereto, as owners of pews, were tenants in common of the land and the house thereon." The decree contains no declarations or recital, but simply orders the bill to be dismissed. It is submitted, therefore, that the record, neither on its face nor by any possible intendment, necessary or otherwise, shows that the constitutionality of the Statute of 1805 was drawn in question or decided. Mr. Justice Grier delivered the opinion of the court: The writ of error in this case suggests, as a foundation for the jurisdiction of this court, "that there was drawn in question the validity of a statute of said Commonwealth, to wit: an Act of the Legislature, passed the 15th day of June, 1805, entitled An Act declaring and confirming the incorporation of the Proprietors of the Meeting House in Federal Street,' in the Town of Boston, being repugnant to the Constitution of the United States, and the decision of the court was in favor of the validity of said statute.' Armstrong v. Treasurer, &c., 16 Pet., 281, 285; Mills v. Brown, 16 Pet., 525; Smith v. Is this suggestion of the writ supported by Hunter, 7 How., 738; Neilson v. Lagow, 12 the record, either by direct averment, or by any How., 109; Williams v. Oliver, 12 How., 124;necessary intendment? We think it is not. 1. The decree of the court is simply that the bill be dismissed without any reasons alleged for such dismissal 2. The bill itself raises no such issue; it refers to the Act in question, only as conferring the privilege of a corporation on the defendant. It does not aver that the defendants pretend to have title to the property in question by virtue thereof, and challenge its validity. The answer alleges that respondents were incorporated by the Act of 1805, and that, under it, they are the true and sole owners of the premises, and that said Act was passed on the application and petition of parties who, prior thereto, were owners of pews, or tenants in common of the land and the house thereon." It is not alleged that the Act "proprio vigore devested the plaintiff's title and vested it in the Corporation, but that the title was vested in the Corporation at the request of the owners. The only questions, therefore, which could arise on these pleadings were, whether the persons who obtained the Act of Incorporation were the owners, and whether, after an adverse possession of forty years, a court of equity would interfere to disturb the possession of respondents. The answer takes issue on the charge of the bill, that Little and his associates had contributed land and money to support a public charity; it averred that, on a proper construction of the original deed of the premises, the Meeting House was not dedicated to a charitable use, but was erected for their common use, and held by them in proportion to the sums severally contributed and consequently, if the representatives of these tenants in common had their rights transferred to the Corporation, it was only a transfer of their rights by their consent, and for their own convenience an enabling Act, with which the complainants had no concern. The issue, then, was not on the validity of the Act, but on the construction of the original deed or agreement of the parties who built the Meeting House. The validity of the Act of Assembly of Massachusetts was not, therefore, drawn in question directly by any averment of the pleadings by the decree, or by any necessary intend ment from other averments in the pleadings, or evidence on the record. The opinion of the State Court to be found in Atty Gen. v. Federal St. Ch., 3 Gray, 1, confirms this conclusion. The case is, therefore, dismissed, for wunt of jurisdiction. JAMES O'BRIEN, Piff. in Er., V. RICHARD SMITH. (See S. C., 1 Black, 99-100.) NOTE. What delay in presentment of check, wlll discharge drawer. As between the holder and the drawer of a check a demand at any time before suit brought will be sufficient, unless it appears that the drawee has failed, or the drawer has, in some other manner, sustained injury by the delay. Then he is discharged only to the extent of such loss or injury. Murray v. Judah, 6 Cow., 490; Mohawk B'k v. Broderick, 10 Wend., 306; Cruger v. Armstrong, 3 Johns. Cas., 5; Conroy v. Warren, 3 Johns. Cas., 259; Rothschild v. Corney, 9 Barn. & C., 388; Purcell v. Allemong, 22 IN ERROR to the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Columbia. This action was commenced in the court be O'Brien at this time low by Smith, the present defendant in error, Cashier of the Bank of the Metropolis, upon a check drawn by O'Brien, plaintiff in error, on Chubb, Brothers & Co., in favor of the Bank of the Metropolis. This check was given by O'Brien in part payment of an acceptance due from him at the Bank of the Metropolis. This check was given and received at the Bank of the Metropolis between 1 and 2 o'clock on Saturday, Sept. 18, 1858. had sufficient funds in the hands of the drawee to meet the check. The check was presented to Chubb, Brothers & Co. about 11 o'clock on the next Monday, and payment refused, they having failed. Chubb, Brothers & Co. paid all demands upon them during Saturday, and on Monday until about 11 o'clock. The places of business of the Bank of the Metropolis, and of Chubb, Brothers & Co., are both in Washington, upon the same street, about eighty feet apart. The plaintiff's evidence was to the effect that it was the usage of all banks in Washington to send out but once a day the checks upon the banks received up to the time of so sending; that the check in question was received by them on Saturday, after the regular sending out of checks for that day; that it was presented by them on Monday, at the usual hour. The defendant gave evidence, however, that other banking houses did send out checks for collection on other banks in the neighborhood, twice a day. The trial resulted in a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff, and the defendant brought the case to this court. Messrs. W. D. Davidge and C. Ingle, for plaintiff in error: Reasonable diligence was not used in presenting the check and demanding payment. The check was received before half past one o'clock on Saturday, and was not presented until about eleven o'clock on the following Monday, on which day the drawees stopped payment. Their place of business was distant only about eighty feet from the Bank of the Metropolis. The usage is for banks to send out checks on other banks in the neighborhood, twice a day. Gratt., 743; Bell v. Alexander, 21 Gratt., 1; Stewart v. Smith, 17 Ohio St., 82; Taylor v. Sip, 1 Vroom (N. J.), 284; Little v. Phoenix B'k, 2 Hill, 425; Planter's B'k v. Kesee, 7 Heisk, 200; Park v. Thomas, 13 Sm. & M., 11; Daniel v. Kyle, 1 Kelly, 304; Morrison v. Bailey, 5 Ohio St., 13; Lovett v. Cromwell, 6 Wend., 369; Matter of Brown, 2 Story, 502; Searle v. Norton, 2 M. & R., 401; Keene v. Beard, 8 C. B. N. S., 380: Hoyt. v. Seeley, 18 Conn., 360. If all the funds be lost by neglect or delay, the holder suffers a total loss. Smith v. Jones, 2 Bush., 103. 1861. HOYT V. THOMPSON. Where no time is specified for the payment of a check or bill of exchange, it is payable on demand. Admitting that, in the case of the check in controversy here, the demand might have been made on the day after it was received, if that day had not been Sunday, the custom of merchants required the demand to be made on the preceding Saturday. That this custom is applicable to all bank transac tions, and is extended by analogy to the exe cution of all contracts. See, Kilgour v. Miles, 6 Gill & J., 274. Messrs. J. M. Carlisle and Badger, for defendant in error: As to the refusal to instruct the jury to the effect that the failure to present the check received on Saturday afternoon (after the daily clearing by the usage of the banks), until Monday, at eleven o'clock, made the check an absolute payment to the plaintiff below. This is clearly settled, on principle and authorities, to the contrary. As to O'Brien it could only be regarded as a conditional payment; that is, if, upon present ment in a reasonable time, the check should be paid. And the presentment on Monday morn ing was in reasonable time. For this it is hardly necessary to refer to authorities. It is so laid down in the text books. Story, Bills, sec. 419; Grant, Banking, 50 and 209, and cases cited. Mr. Chief Justice Taney delivered the opinion of the court: We think the decision of the Circuit Court was right upon both of the points raised in the argument. The authorities referred to by the counsel for the defendant in error are conclu sive, and it cannot be necessary to discuss here questions which we consider as too well settled to be now open to serious controversy. Judgment of the Circuit Court is affirmed. If no demand is made, and bank fails after time it should have been demanded, the loss falls on the holder. Farwell v. Curtis, 7 Biss., 160. Where there has been no presentment and notice, injury to the drawer is prima facie presumed. Ford v. McClung, 5 W. Va., 166; Little v. Phoenix B'k, 2 Hill, 425: Daniel v. Kyle, 1 Kelly, 304; Harbeck v. Craft, 4 Duer, 122; 2 Pars., N. & B., 71. The drawer may, however, be bound absolutely to the payee or to any subsequent holder or indorsee, by a presentment for payment at any time before the bank closes on the next business day. Transfers do not prolong this period. A subsequent transferee, in this respect, has no advantage over the transferrer. Sy., &c., R. R. Co. v. Collins, 3 Lans., 29; 3 Kent, Com.. 110; Merch.'s B'k v. Spicer, 6 Wend., 443; Nunnemaker v. Lanier, 48 Barb., 234; Kelly v. B'k, 52 Barb., 328: Cawein v. Browinski, 6 Bush., 457; Shrieve v. Duckham, 1 Litt., 192; Veazie B'k v. Winn, 4 Me., 60; Himmelman v. Hotaling, 40 Cal., 111; Simpson v. Pacific, &c., Ins. Co., 44 Cal., 139; Morrison v. Bailey, 5 Ohio St., 13; Bailey v. Bodenham, 16 C. B. N. S., 288; 111 Eng. C. L.; Boddington v. Schlencker, 4 Barn. & Ald.. 752; Robson v. Bennet, 2 Taunt.,410; Rickford v. Ridge, 2 Camp., 537; Story, N. sec. 493; Story, Bills, secs. 470, 471; St. John v. Homans, 8 Mo., 382; Foster v. Paulk, 41 Me.. 425; Reid v. Reid, 11 Tex., 585; Lilley v. Miller, 3 Nott. & McC., 275; Brown v. Lusk, 4 Yerg., 210; Taylor v. Young, 3 Watts, 343; Harker v. Anderson, 21 Wend., 372; Cruger v. Armstrong, 5 Johns. Cas., 5; Boehm v. Sterling, 7 Term, 423; Clark v. Nat. Met. B'k, 2 MacArthur, 249. If check is once presented and payment tendered, U. S., Book 17. JESSE HOYT, Piff. in Er., v. will annexed of ABRAHAM G. THOMPSON, (See S. C., 1 Black., 518-522.) Judgment of state court, in what cases may be In order to give this court the power to revise the judgment of a state court, it must appear upon the transcript, filed by the plaintiff in error, that the point on which he relies was made in state tion of the Constitution of the U. S. relied on was court, and decided against him, and that the secbrought to the notice of the state court, and the Where all of the matters put in issue by the bill right which he now claims here claimed under it. and answers and decided by the state court, were questions which depended for their decisions upon principles of law and equity, as recognized and adthe construction or effect of any provision in the ministered in the State, and without reference to Constitution of the U. S. or any Act of Congress, this court has no appellate power over the judgment of the State Court pronounced in such a con troversy. Argued Jan. 9, 1862. Decided Jan. 20, 1862. IN ERROR to the Superior Court of the City of New York. This action was commenced by a complaint filed in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, by Jesse Hoyt, the present plaintiff in error. Hoyt claimed to be the assignee of a debt of $40,000, which in its origin was due from the Long Island Railroad Company to the Morris Canal and Banking Company, and which was secured by a bond and mortgages. The main objects of the bill were, to set aside an assignment of the debt and its securities from the Where check is given payee on a distant bank, it day, and if person receiving it present for payment is enough if he forward it by mail on next business on next business day after he receives it. The drawer must have contemplated this delay, and remains absolutely liable for this length of time. Story, 28 Barb., 616; Moule v. Brown, 4 Bing. N. C., 266; Notes, sec. 493: Byles, 20; Middleton B'k v. Morris, Hare v. Henty, 30 L. J. C. P., 302; Rickford v. Ridge, 2 Camp., 537: Bond v. Warden, 1 Collyer, 583; Smith v. Janes, 20 Wend., 192. The drawer is liable without presentment or notice if he had no funds in the bank when he drew the check, or subsequently withdrew them, or court had restrained banker from paying out money. Coyle v. Smith, 1 E. D. Smith, 300; Conroy v. Warren, 3 Johns. Cas., 259; Franklin v, Vanderpool, 1 Hall, 78; Bell v. Alexander, 21 Gratt., 6: Lilley v. Miller, 2 N. & McC., 257; Kemble v. Mills, 1 Man. & G., 757; 2 Scott, N. R., 121; 9 Dowl., 446: Conn., 353; True v. Thomas, 16 Me., 36; Jack v. Valk v. Simons, 4 Mason, 113; Hoyt v. Seeley, 18 Darrin, 3 E. D. Smith, 557: Whaley v. Houston, 12 La. Ann., 585; Purchase v. Mattison, 6 Duer, 587; Cushing v. Gore, 15 Mass., 59: Norris v. Despard, v. Cornwall, 6 Wend., 367: Eichelberger v. Finley, 28 Md., 491; Healey v. Gillman, 1 Bosw., 235; Lovett 7 Harr. & J., 381; Murray v. Judah, 6 Cow., 484; Blankenship v. Rogers, 10 Ind., 333; Valk v. Simons, 4 Mason, 113; Com. B'k v. Hughes, 17 Wend., 94; Brown, matter of, 2 Story, 50%. If holder cannot present check within the time, from removal of bank, and disturbed condition of country, he should notify drawer and offer to return check; otherwise, drawer is not liable. Peterson v. Union Nat. B'k, 52 Pa. St., 207; Martin v Morgan, 3 Moore, 645; Thomson, Bills, 270. 65 |