STATEMENT OF R. GRANVILLE CURRY ON BEHALF OF THE ALBANY PORT DISTRICT COMMISSION, ALBANY, N. Y. My name is R. Granville Curry, of the law firm of Curry & Dolan, Washington, D. C. My appearance before this committee is on behalf of the Albany Port District Commission, of Albany, N. Y., in opposition to the proposed construction of the St. Lawrence seaway. This matter is believed to deserve careful study and objective consideration, particularly in view of the fact that proponents have over a long period of years failed to present convincing reasons to establish the necessity for this project and to justify the tremendous Government expenditures which would be required. In presenting its position here the Albany Port District Commission has endeavored to weigh the various contentions in the light of the public interest, as well as the particular interest of this commission. THE VITAL INTEREST OF THE ALBANY PORT DISTRICT COMMISSION AND THE PORT OF ALBANY While, in the early history of this country, Albany, located 143 miles north of New York City on the Hudson River, was a seaport of considerable importance, the advent of larger ocean vessels and the impracticability of navigating the upper reaches of this river resulted in disuse of this seaport until it was reestablished in 1932, following the deepening of the channel by the Federal Government. It is important to note, however, that the Federal project was undertaken with the express condition that local interests would provide facilities for a modern, efficient port. To accomplish this the Albany Port District, embracing the territory within the waters between the cities of Albany and Rensselaer, was created by an act of the State of New York to constitute a taxing area with which funds might be raised for the development of the port, and the Albany Port District Commission was provided for to discharge the duties of developing the port and administering it saffairs. At a cost of over $8,000,000 this Commission has established at the port of Albany, carefully planned port facilities, including transit sheds, warehouses, concrete docks with marginal railroad tracks, a terminal railroad, which it operates, a lumber terminal, and a 13.5 million bushel grain elevator, believed to be the largest single-unit grain elevator in the world. In addition to these large expenditures, private industries, including important oil companies, have established terminals at this port. The port has shorter rail hauls from a large interior territory than other nort Atlantic ports, and is located nearer to the Great Lakes than any of such ports. Traffic from the Lakes can reach it by way of the New York State Barge Canal system, the water route from Buffalo on Lake Erie being about 360 miles, and from Oswego, on Lake Erie, about 196 miles. Because of these and other facts, the business of this seaport had a remarkable development following its reestablishment, but this was interrupted by World War II, when a large part of the facilities were taken over by the War Department, and the movement of oceangoing vessels up the river to the part was severely curtailed in order to conserve steamship utilization. Since World War II there has been difficulty in reestablishing the business which this port had before the war. There has been a reduction in the number of ships serving the port and in the in-bound and out-bound cargo. While the trend is upward, the Albany Port District Commission has the serious responsibility of protecting the taxpayers in the port district against what is believed to be an unnecessary injury to the port and a burden upon them if the St. Lawrence project should be authorized. It also takes this position because of the adverse effect upon local industries doing business at the port and those provided with employment as a result of such business. CONTENT ONS BY PROPON NIS OF TH ST LAWRENCE SEAWAY PROJECT AS TO THE NLCESS FOR THIS ADD ON ALT ANS O TATION AGENCY ARE SUBJECT TO SERIOUS INF.R IT ES The uns ece sful attempts by pop n nts of the St. Lawrence seaway project to justify it before Congress are run counter to basic and commonsense facts. In a vem de as lear a o as 1929 by th Bookings Institution, this project was condemne as commerely nt just fied. Many of the basic bjections ther me continu to the same. The mor recent emphas's on its justification as a self-liquidating project and reliance upon imported iron or as a principal source of traffic deserve careful analysis but are believed to b an insufficient basis for approval. In dealing with these contentions there are certain facts which should b particularly borne in mind. (1) The proposed seaway will be open for navigation for only about 240 day of the year, and allowing for uncertainties as to weather conditions, it wil be available for volume movement for only about 7 months of the year. (2) The projected 27-foot channel will restrict the use of the seaway to smalle vessels, and require interchange at Montreal to a considerable extent betwee ocean steamships and smaller lake carriers. The disadvantages of a 27-foo channel project appear to be admitted in the suggestions which have been mad by the Chief of Engineers of a 30- or 35-foot project, in spite of the resulting tremendously increased cost. (3) There are many difficulties of navigation, including narrow channels, cana locks, frequent fogs, and dangers of collision and damage, particularly i congested portions of the route. (4) Physical conditions, just mentioned, will severely limit normal speed o ocean-going vessels and restrict the cargoes to be carried, both factors bein significant in determining pay loads. (5) To provide harbors for seagoing vessels expenditures of many million of dollars would be required by lake cities in addition to the expenditure contemplated in connection with the proposed seaway. A hope has been ex pressed that such improvements would be made but there has been no showing that they actually would be. (6) The entire project on the basis of a 27-foot channel depth is estimated to cost hundreds of millions of dollars. The Chief of Engineers estimated, or December 1950 levels, a total additional cost of at least $818,063,000, the Unite States share to be $566,794,000. The part of the total expense to be represented by the seaway, as distinguished from the power project, he estimated to be $374,301,000. The actual share of the United States is not entirely clear and there is considerable ground for believing that these totals are understatement: of the actual costs that would be incurred. (7) In order to provide for self-liquidation, as now claimed by proponents many millions of dollars from tolls would be required annually. Secretary of Commerce Sawyer stated at the House hearings in February 1951, that “a present cost levels, revenue of $22 million a year will be sufficient to cover maintenance expenses, interest at 2% percent, and amortization of the invest ment in 50 years." These estimates have been challenged as unduly low and are hardly supported by convincing detailed figures. (8) While it is claimed that tolls would be charged on the improved seaway the parallel canal system would apparently remain in effect and no tolls would be charged on traffic moving on these waters. It is not clear to what extent that system might divert traffic from the seaway. In the light of these facts a pivotal question is as to the estimates of traffic which could reasonably be expected to move through the seaway and furnish revenue in the form of tolls in order to liquidate this project. Here, however there is sharp conflict. It is the view of this Commission that such doubt has been raised as to these estimates that they cannot reasonably be relied upor to justify the tremendous expenditures which would be required if this seaway were constructed. The record appears woefully weak and remarkably incomplete as to the esti mated traffic which the proponents of the St. Lawrence project claim can be counted upon. The Secretary of Commerce, for example, in his statement of February 20, 1951, refers to studies indicating "that the potential traffic through the St. Lawrence seaway lies somewhere between 57 and 84 million tons a year Under fair and equitable toll charges, the resulting revenue is estimated as totaling between 361⁄2 and 49 million dollars a year." Of the total, iron ore alone is estimated to produce "potential traffic" of from 30-371⁄2 million tons, and petroleum 6-20 million tons. It is apparently assumed that of the total ore estimates perhaps 10 million tons may after several years originate in Labrador and move through the seaway. Such tonnage, however, appears to be a clear overestimate in the light of the expressed plans of the Labrador producing company and the practical considerations which must be taken into account As to the remaining 20 to 27 million additional tons of ore in the Secretary's estimate, the assumption is that this ore would be imported through the seaway from Venezuela or foreign origins and would move via the circuitous and more expensive route through the seaway rather than to, and through, eastern ports of the United States. This estimate appears to be fundamentally unsound. In this connection it is to be noted that the distance from Venezuela to Baltimore, Md., is 2,206 miles, and to Montreal, 3,339 miles, or 1,133 miles greater. Because of the size of the ore vessels transfer would be necessary to lake vessels at Montreal. Costs have been estimated indicating that it would be more economical not only to bring ore to Baltimore and other eastern United States ports than to use the seaway, which is navigable for only approximately 7 months of the year, but such lesser cost would be incurred in the movement of ore through eastern United States ports to interior points such as Pittsburgh, Pa. The Secretary's estimates as to petroleum tonnage admittedly lack support as to the origin or direction of the traffic, fail to take into account the new oil fields being developed in Canada, and assume such wide variations in volume of traffic as to render the figures a wholly unreliable base for the tremendous expenditures sought to be justified. The remaining estimates as to general cargo and other traffic are highly speculative and appear to be overoptimistic. Also the estimates of the Secretary apparently fail to recognize the physical limitations in the movement of traffice through the Welland Canal locks. It seems difficult to believe that practical men, on further reflection, would be willing to authorize expenditures of hundreds of millions of dollars in Government money on the unreliable and exaggerated traffic figures brought forward by the proponents of the St. Lawrence seaway project. Neither the Secretary of Commerce nor anyone else has satisfactorily shown that the proposed development of the Labrador iron ore is dependent upon the seaway or would not take place if that project should not be authorized. In fact the record shows that this development is going forward irrespective of the construction of the seaway. Again as to the claimed dire need of certain steel plants for the Labrador ore, the evidence before this committee is far from convincing that ore deposits in the Lake Superior area are inadequate, or that Labrador ore would move via the seaway in anything like the quantities estimated in replacement of economically available and transportable ores from the Lake Superior areas. Estimates as to other traffic overlook the circuitous routes which would be involved in handling it via the St. Lawrence seaway and fail to take into account the limiting factors as to closed navigation during a large portion of the year, the restriction of drafts in respect to oceangoing vessels, reductions in speed, delays in passing through locks and difficulties in coping with fogs, ice conditions, and bad weather. While it is believed that there is insufficient and inadequate basis for concluding that this project would be self-liquidating, it would, in all probability, divert to a great extent grain and other traffic which is now moving through the port of Albany to the serious and unjust injury of this port and those dependent upon it. The Secretary of Commerce, it is to be remembered, referred to the contention of port interests on the Atlantic and Gulf coasts, saying "There is no question but that a considerable amount of traffic now moving to and from the Middle West via these ports will be diverted to the seaway." The national transportation policy enacted in the Interstate Commerce Act is directed in part against the wasteful and unnecessary duplication of existing transportation facilities. The Interstate Commerce Commission's jurisdiction does not extend to such projects as the one here involved, but it is noteworthy that that Commission was called upon in February 1939, to report concerning the proposed Lake Erie-Ohio River canal and Congress declined to approve that project on the basis of the report made (235 I. C. C. 753). There it was pointed out that large tonnages of existing railroad and motor carriers would be diverted if the proposed waterway were constructed, that they had ample capacity to carry the traffic, and that "the public has a vital interest in the protection of the revenues of an agency of transportation whose services are available the year around and to large and small shippers on equal terms." Here there appears to be no real need for the St. Lawrence seaway, the construction of which would result in injury to the port of Albany and the carriers serving it, including those on the New York State Barge Canal system. Such injury should not be permitted in the absence of a dispassionate, careful investigation and analysis such as that made by the Commission in respect to the proposed Lake Erie-Ohio River Canal. The result of such analyses and study, it is believed, would require disapproval of the project here in question. CONTENTIONS THAT THE ST. LAWRENCE SEAWAY PROJECT IS JUSTIFIED ON THE GROUND OF NATIONAL DEFENSE ARE BELIEVED TO BE UNSOUND The Albany Port District Commission wishes to be understood as thoroughly desirous of aiding the Government in its efforts to provide adequate national defense. However, it believes that with the tremendous expenditures required for this purpose there should be realistic regard for actual needs and care taken to avoid being carried away by empty patriotic phrases and unsound expressions of needs. It has not been claimed here that the seaway project could be considered in the category of guns, tanks, ships, aircraft, and other items which are necessarily procured with Department of Defense funds. At most it could be assigned to the indefinite position of a "support activity." While the proponents have stressed the need of the seaway as an instrumentality in making Labrador iron ore available in connection with national-defense efforts, a serious flaw in their contention is that Lake Superior ore is actually available and that the Labrador ore admittedly will be developed and shipped to plants in this country irrespective of the construction of the seaway project. Such project is clearly, therefore, not a necessity. Moreover, there is some evidence to the effect that such ore may be transported by railroad with consider able economy in supplying south-bound loads in cars hauling coal north-bound and ordinarily returning empty. Moreover, the national defense theory of the proponents was considerably undermined by frank admissions made during the House hearings in 1951. For example, Mr. John D. Small, Chairman of the Munitions Board, who was designated by the Secretary of Defense to explain the Department's views as to the seaway project, said, among other thing, "Question has been raised as to the vulnerability of the major installations of the project to determined air attack. That vulnerability is recognized." He further said, "It is also recognized that the seaway is admittedly susceptible to serious traffic interruptions by enemy action, particularly sabotage." It requires no expert to visualize the devastating effects on the proposed seaway of a few well-placed bombs. Prior to World War II, the proponents of the seaway emphasized the need of this project because of the claimed inadequacy of railroads and port terminals in time of war. The experience in the last war, however, has demonstrated the fallacy of this contention. Moreover, it is shown that at such time the critical shortage is in oceangoing vessels, and it seems highly doubtful that it would be in the public interest to run the risk of having such vessels bottled up in the seaway or of reducing their availability by long inland voyages at slow speeds and by the handling of traffic which could be moved by smaller vessels or by other forms of transportation. The lessons of the last war show that from the national defense standpoint railroads are far less vulnerable to attack than canal and dam systems. As to the suggestion that ships might be built in the lakes region in time of war, this fails to consider the long period during which navigation is closed, the danger that through enemy action the seaway would be put out of use, and the significant fact that the larger vessels could be built with better results nearer to the ocean. When carefully analyzed and tested, the St. Lawrence seaway project, it is he lieved, cannot be justified as a necessary additional transportation agency or as an instrumentality of national defense. The Albany Port District Commission is firmly of the view that this project as it relates to the construction of a seaway has not been shown to be in the public interest, that it would be unnecessarily injurious to existing transportation facilities and the port of Albany, and that it should be disapproved. I am also authorized to state on behalf of the New York State Waterways Association that it joins with the Albany Port District Commission in opposing the seaway project. This association is a nonprofit corporation, the members of which include port authorities, trade associations, civic and commercial organizations, business firms, shippers, and owners and operators of barges interested in the transportation of freight on the New York State canal system and the Hudson River. Its specific aims and purposes are to promote and protect the harbors, rivers, and other waterways of the State of New York, and the development of traffic on these arteries of transportation. Its views coincide with those of the Albany Port District Commission, as stated herein. NEW YORK STATE WATERWAYS ASSOCIATION Mr. CURRY. I am also authorized to appear on behalf of the New York State Waterways Association, which joins with the Albany Port District Commission in opposing the seaway project. This association is a nonprofit corporation, the members of which include port authorities, trade associations, civic and commercial organizations, business firms, shippers and owners and operators of barges interested in the transportation of freight on the New York State canal system and the Hudson River. The specific aims and purposes are to promote and protect the harbors, rivers, and other waterways of the State of New York and the development of traffic on these arteries of transportation. Its views coincide with those of the Albany Port District Commission as stated in this statement. In brief, the view of the Albany Port District Commission is that the facts do not justify this additional agency that is proposed here, and second, that national defense does not justify it. The CHAIRMAN. Well, what about the power project; are you interested in that? Mr. CURRY. I am not authorized to take any position on the power project. ALBANY RIVER AND CANAL COMMERCE The CHAIRMAN. Is there much seaborne commerce in Albany? It is mostly river boats, isn't it? Mr. CURRY. It is more river and canal. You see, Albany is the closest port to the Great Lakes of any of the North Atlantic ports, and it is 196 miles from Oswego on the canal, and about 360 miles to Buffalo, and a good deal of grain comes down the canal, down the lakes and down the canal to Albany. The CHAIRMAN. Do you mean it comes over the Erie Canal? The CHAIRMAN. What is the draft of that canal now? What is the depth? Mr. CURRY. It has varying depths, but the draft is less than 14 feet. It is about 9, mostly by barge. The CHAIRMAN. All right; thank you. You are excused. Mr. William L. Cleary. Where is Mr. Cleary? (No response.) The CHAIRMAN. Everett T. Winter, Mississippi Valley Association. STATEMENT OF EVERETT T. WINTER, VICE PRESIDENT, Mr. WINTER. My name is Everett T. Winter. I am vice president of the Mississippi Valley Association, a voluntary nonprofit organization with members in 23 States in the Midwest and the South. The association headquarters are in St. Louis, Mo. My home is in Omaha, Nebr. With the limited time, Mr. Chairman, I think I can best utilize this time by filing this statement and giving back to the committee about 22 minutes. The CHAIRMAN. Your statement will be printed in the record. 96175-52-51 |