It is urged, however, that by the terms of the contract appellant cannot retain its membership and stock in the Associated Press, and have the right to purchase news accumulated by it at contract price, without complying with that part of the contract which requires appellant to refrain from receiving news from any person or corporation which has been declared by the board of directors of appellee to be antagonistic to the latter, and without appellant being controlled or governed by the by-law of appellee to the same effect. The character of appellee's business is not to be determined by the contract which it made respecting the liabilities which would attend it, but by the nature of the business, its fixed legal character, growing out of the manner in which that business is conducted, and the purpose of its creation. The legal character of the corporation and its duties cannot be disregarded because of any stipulation incorporated in a contract that it should not be liable to discharge a public duty. Its obligation to serve the public is not one resting on contract, but grows out of the fact that it is in the discharge of a public duty, or a private duty which has been so conducted that a public interest has attached thereto. The clause of the contract in this case which sought to restrict appellant from obtaining news from other sources than from appellee is an attempt at restriction upon the trade and business among the citizens of a common country. Competition can never be held hostile to public interests, and efforts to prevent competition public, nor is it pretended that it has been made so by statute. Ordinarily the adoption of new rules of public policy, or the application of existing rules to new subjects, is for the Legislature and not for the courts. Accordingly it may be held to be a general, though perhaps not an invariable rule, that the question whether a particular business which has hitherto been deemed to be private, is public and impressed with a public use, is for the Legislature. The doctrine on this subject is stated in Ladd v. Southern Cotton Press Manufacturing Company, 53 Tex. 172, where a question very similar to the one under discussion was before the court, as follows: We know of no authority, and none has been shown us, for saying that a business strictly juris privati will become juris publici, merely by reason of its extent. If the magnitude of a business is such, and the persons affected by it are so numerous, that the interests of society demand that the rules and principles applicable to public employment should be applied to it, this would have to be done by the Legislature (if not restrained from doing so by the Constitution), before a demand for such use could be enforced by the courts.' The view thus expressed would seem to be precisely applicable to the present case, and we are inclined to adopt it as a correct statement of the law as it should be applied to the facts before us. We do not say that there may not be exceptions to the rule thus stated, but if there are they are not of such a character as to be material here." "Apart from the consideration that the extension and application of even existing rules of law to subjects not heretofore within their purview is legislative in its nature, the determination by the courts as to the precise point at which a mere private business reaches that stage of growth and expansion which is sufficient to render it juris publici, would be surrounded by very great difficulties, and would present questions for which the courts, unaided by legislation, would be able to find no just or satisfactory criterion or test. But when the Legislature, acting upon a competent state of facts, has interposed and declared the business to be juris publici, all diffi culty is removed." by contract or otherwise can never be looked upon with favor by the courts. In People v. Live Stock Exchange, 170 Ill. 556, it was said (p. 566): "Efforts to prevent competition and to restrict individual efforts and freedom of action in trade and commerce are restrictions hostile to the public welfare, not consonant with the spirit of our institutions and in violation of law." The provisions of the contract that the appellant should purchase news from no other source, and the restrictive clause of the bylaw, are both null and void, and the contract is the same as if these provisions had not been incorporated therein. Rejecting entirely these illegal provisions, on which the right to suspend the appellant as a member and to refuse to furnish it news and information gathered by the Associated Press for publication rests, no reason is presented, under the pleadings and affidavits in the case, why the appellant is not entitled to an injunction, as prayed for in its bill. We hold that the circuit court of Cook county erred in entering a decree dismissing the bill for want of equity, and the Appellate Court for the First District erred in affirming the same. The judgment of the Appellate Court for the First District and the decree of the circuit court of Cook county are each reversed, and the cause is remanded to the circuit court of Cook county, with directions to enter a decree as prayed for in the bill. Reversed and remanded.* Held! Lupuction See the comment on the principal case in People ex rel. Gaskill v. Forest Home Cemetery Co. (1913), 258 Ill. 36, 42. Following the principal case, it was determined in News Publishing Co. v. Associated Press (1904), 114 Ill. App. 241, that the defendant was under a duty to render news service which it had contracted to render to one of its members upon the same terms and conditions upon which it rendered like service to other newspaper publishers. See also Tallasee Oil & F. Co. v. Halloway (1917), 200 Ála. 492. In State v. Nebraska Telephone Co. (1885), 17 Neb. 126, where it was sought by mandamus to compel the company to give relator telephone service, the Court concluded that the company must serve relator, and said: "The views herein expressed are not new. Similar questions have arisen in, and have been frequently discussed and decided by, the courts, and no statute has been deemed necessary to aid the courts in holding that when a person or company undertakes to supply a demand which is affected with a public interest,' it must supply all alike who are alike situated, and not discriminate in favor of, nor against any." The Court cited in support of this proposition the last part of Lord Ellenborough's opinion in Allnutt v. Inglis, supra. Although the Court said that "the respondent is not possessed of any special privileges," it is in fact stated in the case that "the wires of respondent pass the office of relator. Its posts are planted in the street in front of his door." In some other cases virtual monopoly has been referred to as though it were a possible ground for public service duties, although the decisions in those cases have really been reached on the ground of grant of franchises, or statutory duty. See for example, Williams v. Mutual Gas Co. (1884), 152 Mich. 499; Wheeler v. Northern C. I. Co. (1887), 10 Col. 582; Owensboro G. L. Co. v. Hildebrand (Ky., 1897), 42 S. W. 351; Cincinnati H. & D. R. R. Co. v. Village of Bowling Green (1879), 57 Oh. St. 336. And see MR. JUSTICE MILLER'S comment on Munn v. Illinois, in Wabash, etc., Ry. Co. v. Illinois (1886), 118 U. S. 557, 569. See also dicta in Nash v. Page (1882), 80 Ky. 539. STATE ex rel. STAR PUBLISHING CO. v. THE ASSOCIATED PRESS. 159 Mo. 410. 1901.1 SHERWOOD, J. The object of this original proceeding [for a writ of mandamus] is to compel respondent, the Associated Press, to furnish to the Star Publishing Company, for publication in its newspaper, The Star, the budget of news collected daily by respondent, and also its Saturday night news reports. . . . The substance of the issues presented by the pleadings of the parties to this litigation has been very well condensed by counsel for respondent, and we adopt such condensation: Relator asserts: (1) That it has a contract with the Associated Press for the Sunday morning news. (2) That the gathering of general news for publication in a daily newspaper is a public employment, which must be exercised by those who engage in it for all publishers of dailies who may desire it, upon equal terms, and without discrimination. (3) That the Associated Press has, by its charter, assumed this public employment, and so is bound to exercise it on behalf of the relator, upon tender of compensation equal to that paid by other publishers similarly situated, and receiving a similar service. (4) That the Associated Press has broken down all competitors, and secured a monopoly of the business of newsgathering, in consequence of which it is not practicable to publish a daily newspaper without the aid of its service. (5) That the Associated Press has been granted telegraph and telephone franchises by the states of Illinois and Missouri, and also possesses the power of eminent domain. (6) That the by-law of the Associated Press which makes the consent of existing members a condition of admitting new members in any locality is in violation of the anti-trust laws of Missouri, Illinois, and the United States. The respondent, on the other hand, asserts: (1) That it never made any contract with the relator. (2) That the gathering of news, whether for daily newspapers or for otner publications, is a purely private business, requiring for its conduct no public franchises or privileges. (3) That, while the Associated Press is in form a corporation for pecuniary profit, in its substance it is but a voluntary association of publishers of newspapers, who have combined their energies for the sake of greater efficiency and economy in newsgathering. (4) That it has not and cannot possibly monopolize the business 1 Arguments of counsel and parts of the opinion are omitted.— ED. of newsgathering, and that in fact there are now other general newsgathering agencies in successful operation in the United States. (5) That it does not own or operate telegraph or telephone lines, and has no means for the transmission of news except such as are open to everybody on like terms. (6) That it has never exercised, and does not possess, the power of eminent domain. (7) That it is not a trust in any sense, nor is there anything unlawful in its methods or aims, since that which the combination accomplishes among its members has exclusive reference to a matter of internal economy, and leaves the members unaffected and unrestrained in so far as concerns their relations to the general public. That its business is national and international in its scope and character, and so is protected against state interference by various provisions of the federal constitution, which are cited. (8) It has been thought best to consider at large the doctrine announced in the case relied on, as well as opposing views, in order to endeavor to discover whether Munn's case, granting it correctly decided, has any application to the case at bar. Following a familiar rule, the general words employed in that opinion should be restricted to the particular facts of that case, and should not be extended to other cases which could not have been in the mind of the court at the time; nor has that court so extended them to any case of similar sort to the one before us. The controlling element which gave origin to the opinion relied on seems to have been that of a monopoly. But, of course, that element can have no place in the present instance, because respondent has been granted no special or exclusive right or privilege by the state, nor has it received any benefits from that quarter. Nor has the respondent acquired any additional right, by reason of its incorporation, to that it possessed before. Every one is at liberty to gather news, and the fact that one has greater facilities or finances for gathering and transmitting news, or that the business has grown into one of great magnitude, widespread in its ramifications, or that mere incorporation has been granted a company organized for the purpose of gathering news, does not and cannot of itself give the state the right to regulate what before incorporation was but a natural right. [Tied. Pol. Pow. p. 234, § 93.] Were the rule otherwise than as just stated, the effect would be to deprive a person of a right to pursue any lawful calling, or to contract where and with whomsoever and at what price he will. The right thus to contract cannot be interfered with. It is part and parcel of personal liberty, and therefore under the 2 Munn v. Illinois, supra. protection of section 30, art. 2, of our state constitution, and of the fourteenth amendment of the Constitution of the United States, as heretofore quoted. [Cooley, Const. Lim. 944, 945; Ib., Torts, 278; State v. Loomis, 115 Mo. 307, and cases cited; State v. Julow, 129, Mo. 163, and cases cited. To like effect see Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U. S. 589, 591; Williams v. Fears, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 128, 129, 130.] If relator's position as to its right to compel respondent to turn over to it the results of its labors and researches after news is correct, then by the same token any citizen could compel any newspaper to admit him as a subscriber; or, as news is a synonym of information, intelligence, and knowledge, then a lawyer profoundly versed in his profession could be compelled to yield his treasures of erudition to some less fortunate member of the bar, of the type described by Swift: 66 Who knows of law nor text nor margent, And, even if the business of respondent can justly be deemed a monopoly, then relator's efforts should be directed towards the destruction of that monopoly, and not towards obtaining the mandate of this court compelling relator's admission into that "real genuine article," as counsel are pleased to designate it. Conceding respondent's business to be in truth a monopoly would furnish an all-sufficient reason and answer for denying the relief relator asks, because the addition of one more monopolist to a monopolistic organization would not lessen its monopolistic features, or abate its vicious tendencies. But there is nothing here on which a monopoly can attach. The business is one of mere personal service; an occupation. Unless there is "property" to be "affected with a public interest," there is no basis laid for the fact or the charge of a monopoly. [See, on this point Morris v. Colman, 18 Ves. 437 (per LORD ELDON); Mogul S. S. Co. v. McGregor, 23 Law R. Q. B. D. 598, 609 (per LORD ESHER); Express Cases, 117 U. S. 1, 21, 24; Railway v. Pullman Car Co., 139 U. S. 79, 89–91.] Nor is there any more property in "news," to wit, "information," "intelligence," "knowledge," than there is in "the viewless winds," until the “guinea stamp" of a copyright is impressed upon its external similitude, thus giving it one of the elements of property, to wit, governmental protection for a limited period. That there is no monopoly, even in fact, in the business in which respondent is engaged, is shown in the clearest possible manner by this record. Other newsgathering agencies have the same facilities over the wires of the Western Union Telegraph as has |