it; and it is useful and reasonable for the benefit of the public that it should be so considered. It is better that those who undertake the carriage of parcels, for their mutual benefit, should arrange matters of this kind inter se, and should be taken each to have made the others their agents to carry forward.

GURNEY, B.-I think there was no misdirection in this case, and that the jury might fairly infer that the contract was such as was stated by the learned Judge. If the goods were to be carried only in the narrow sense contended for by the defendants, then, if the place of their destination were but three miles beyond Preston, and they were lost on the other side of the railway terminus, the defendants are not to be liable, but the plaintiff is to find out somebody or other who is to be liable in respect of the carriage for those three miles.

ROLFE, B.- I am of the same opinion, and think the construction we are putting on the agreement is not only consistent with law, but is the only one consistent with common sense and the convenience of mankind. What I told the jury was only this, that if a party brings a parcel to a railway station, which in this respect is just the same as a coach-office, knowing at the time that the company only carry to a particular place, and if the railway company receive and book it to another place to which it is directed, prima facie they undertake to carry it to that other place. That was my view at the trial, and nothing has occurred to alter my opinion. As to the case which has been put, of a passenger injured on the line of railway beyond that where he was originally booked, I suppose it is put as a reductio ad absurdum; but I do not see the absurdity. If I book my place at Euston Square, and pay to be carried to York, and am injured by the negligence of somebody between Euston Square and York, I do not know why I am not to have my remedy against the party who so contracted to carry me to York. But at all events, in the case of a parcel, any other construction would open the door to incalculable inconveniences. You book a parcel, and on its being lost, you are told that the carrier is responsible only for one portion of the line of road. What would be the answer of the owner of the goods? "I know that I booked the parcel at the Golden Cross for Liverpool, and my contract with the carrier was to take it to Liverpool." All convenience is one way, and there is no authority the other way. Rule discharged.2

2 As to passenger carriage see Great Western Ry. v. Blake (1862), 7 H. & N. 987; Central R. R. v. Combs (1883), 70 Ga. 533.

ROY v. CHESAPEAKE AND OHIO RAILWAY COMPANY.

61 W. Va. 616. 1907.

Error to Circuit Court, Fayette County.

Action by M. L. Roy against the Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Company. From a judgment before a justice, defendant appeals, and, from a judgment for plaintiff in the circuit court, he brings error. Reversed and remanded.

BRANNON, J. M. L. Roy brought an action before a justice against the Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Company, which went to the circuit court of Fayette county by appeal, and was there tried by a jury, and verdict and judgment went against the railroad company, and it sued out a writ of error.

A question is raised, as to bill of exceptions No. 2, whether it brings the evidence before this court. We think it is sufficient to do so. We need not discuss it, as the principles touching bills of exception have been amply stated in prior decisions of this court. We must not be overcritical and rigid in this matter, and thereby turn out of this court those seeking redress from erroneous decisions.

The action is to recover damages for the loss of a box and trunk containing articles delivered to the railroad agent for shipment from Sewell Station, on the Chesapeake & Ohio Railroad, to a point in Randolph county not on its line. On the trial it was agreed by the plaintiff that two absent witnesses would, if present, testify that the Kanawha & Michigan Railroad Company received from the Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Company the box and trunk, and that they were delivered by the Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Company to the Kanawha & Michigan Railroad Company at Gauley Junction in good order, and were delivered by the Kanawha & Michigan to the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company at Point Pleasant. This agreement was read to the jury; but afterwards the plaintiff moved to strike it out as irrelevant and not material to the issue. This evidence was given to show that the loss occurred, not on the line of the Chesapeake & Ohio Railway, but on the Baltimore & Ohio. Is the Chesapeake & Ohio Company liable for loss of the goods occurring after they left its line? The Supreme Court of the United States in Michigan C. v. Mineral Springs, 16 Wall. 324, said that "the rule that holds the carrier only liable to the extent of his own route, and for the safe storage and delivery to the next carrier, is in itself so just and reasonable that we do not hesitate to give it our sanction."

"In the absence of a special contract, a railroad company by receiving cattle for transportation over its own line and other lines therewith connected is only bound to carry the cattle over its own lines and deliver them safely to the next connecting carrier. A contract whereby the liability of the company is sought to be extended beyond such carriage and delivery will not be inferred from loose and doubtful expressions, but must be established by clear and satisfactory evidence. Taking a through fare on the receipt. of the cattle does not establish such liability." Myrick v. Michigan Central, 107 U. S. 102. "In the absence of special agreement to extend its liability beyond its own line, such liability will not attach, and such agreement will not be inferred from doubtful expressions or loose language, but must be established by clear and satisfactory evidence." Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. Stewart, 155 U. S. 333. Liability of common carrier is limited to its own route, unless the contract is to carry the goods to their ultimate destination. Such contract is not established by proof that carrier received the goods with knowledge of their destination, and named the through rate therefor. In absence of special contract to deliver the goods at a point beyond its line, the receiving carrier is not liable for loss or damage occurring to them after delivery to connecting carriers." McConnell v. Norfolk & Western R. R. Co., 86 Va. 248. Likewise is Herring v. C. & O., 101 Va. 778. Many, many decisions so hold. 4 Elliott on Railroads, section 1432, says: "As a general rule, no carrier is bound by law to accept and carry goods beyond the terminus of its own line. In the absence of any agreement, either express or clearly implied, for transportation beyond its own line, the common-law duty of an independent carrier is performed by safely transporting the goods over its own line and delivering them to the consignee or connecting carrier, as the case may be. If, in such a case, the goods are to be delivered by the initial carrier to a connecting carrier for further transportation, the former is considered as a forwarding agent, rather than a carrier as to such further transportation, and is not liable for the default of subsequent carriers." 6 Cyc. 480, cites many of such cases. So does 6 Am. & Eng. Ency. L. (2d Ed.) 615. Hutchinson on Carriers (3d Ed.) section 231 (section 149), after saying that the English rule is different, says: "English rule denied in majority of states. On the other hand, the majority of our courts have pronounced with equal emphasis against the rule as unjust to the carrier, and as unnecessary upon any grounds of public policy, and have held that, in the absence of any other contract than such as is generally to be implied from the acceptance

of the goods for carriage, the obligation of the carrier extends only to the transportation to the end of his route and a delivery there to the next succeeding carrier to further or complete the transportation. In order to be bound further, there must be a positive agreement, either expressed or implied, extending the liability; and the burden of proof will be upon the shipper to prove that such agreement was made." In such a matter, if we have any doubt, as we have not, we should follow the national Supreme Court. The rule is just. Why should one man or corporation be liable for the negligence of another where there is no agreement to be so? There is no evidence to prove any contract to carry beyond the line of the Chesapeake & Ohio Railroad, no payment of freight for carriage, indeed, no freight at all paid. As the evidence stricken out tended to prove a full defense under the law above given, the striking out of it is error. Even if the agent had made any contract for carriage over other lines, it could not bind the company in the absence of proof of special authority to so contract. 4 Elliott on Railroads, section 1406, says that a mere station agent will not, under ordinary circumstances, be presumed to have authority to bind the company by contract to carry freight beyond its own line." Much authority so holds. Hutchinson on Carriers (3d Ed.) vol. 1, section 241 (section 152a), reads thus: "Under the English rule and the cases adopting it, it is held that the agent authorized to receive the goods for carriage has implied authority to bind his principal by a contract for through carriage; but under the American rule it is held that, while the general freight agent of a railroad may have such authority, it will not be implied in the case of local freight agents from their general authority to receive and receipt for goods offered for transportation on the carrier's road; and the mere fact that a through rate of freight is collected, or that the goods are billed for through shipment, will be insufficient to support an inference that he has such authority." To charge the company, it is absolutely necessary, not only that there be a special contract for liability for loss on other lines of railroad, but also that the agent has power to make such contract. There is no shadow of evidence to show such authority in the agent; but, in fact, there is no shadow of evidence going to show that the agent made any such contract.

There was evidence tending to show that some of the goods belonged to a woman who was not his wife or relative, but Roy's housekeeper. Evidence of the plaintiff as to the total value of all the goods in the box and trunk included those goods. The defendant asked, but was refused, an instruction that the plaintiff was "only entitled to recover the value of the goods owned by him,

The

and not for goods of any other person shipped in his name." refusal of this instruction is error.

We reverse the judgment, set aside the verdict, and remand the case for a new trial according to the principles above given. Reversed. Remanded.1

THE LEHIGH VALLEY TRANSPORTATION COMPANY v. THE POST SUGAR COMPANY.

228 Ill. 121. 1907.1

Appeal from the Appellate Court for the Second District;heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Peoria county; the Hon. T. N. GREEN, Judge, presiding.

On August 13, 1903, appellee, Post Sugar Company, a limited partnership doing business at Peoria Heights, Ill., ordered from H. O. Wilbur & Sons, of Philadelphia, Pa., 5,000 pounds of Chocolate, at 2112 cents per pound, f. o. b. cars Philadelphia, to be shipped to Peoria Heights via lines of Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Company, hereinafter referred to as the Rock Island Company. Peoria Heights is about five miles from the city of Peoria, and is on a branch line of the company just mentioned. That company has no agent at Peoria Heights, and requires the prepayment of freight billed to that station, unless special arrangements for the payment of freight are made with the company by the consignee at some other station. Peoria Heights is therefore known as a prepay station. The Rock Island Company has a line of railroad extending from Peoria to Chicago. It does not own or operate any railroad running into Philadelphia or any other place east of Chicago.

Appellant, Lehigh Valley Transportation Company, is a steamboat company, operating a line of boats between Buffalo, N. Y. and Chicago. The Lehigh Valley Railroad Company operates a railroad from Jersey City, N. J., to Buffalo, but does not enter Philadelphia. Goods shipped from Philadelphia to Chicago, or points west thereof, under contracts with the Lehigh Valley Transportation Company, are carried by the Philadelphia & Reading Railway Company to Bethlehem, Pa., and there transferred to the Lehigh Valley Railroad Company, which conveys them to Buffalo, where they are turned over to appellant and carried by boat to

1 As to passenger carriage see Pennsylvania Ry. Co. v. Jones (1894), 155 U. S. 333, 339; Pennsylvania Ry. Co. v. Loftis (1905), 72 Oh. St. 288. 1 Parts of the statement of facts and of the opinion are omitted.— ED.