Burglary with explosives or burglary accompanied by the use of explosives for the purpose of committing any crime is specially punished in some states. 8 § 457. Character of the premises-Dwelling house. Burglary at common law is peculiarly an offense against the security of the habitation, and not an offense against the property as property." And to be the subject of burglary at common law, the building broken and entered must be a dwelling house, or mansion house, except that it is burglary to break and enter a church or a walled town 10 with felonious intent. The breaking and entry of dwelling houses is also made burglary by the statutes on the subject,11 although they have generally extended the offense to include many other structures as well.12 And the burglary of a private residence is specially punished under some statutes.13 Oklahoma. Cunningham v. State, 16 Okla. Cr. 151, 181 Pac. 317. 5 Jolly v. State, 87 Tex. Cr. 288, 221 S. W. 279. 6 To come within such a statute the breaking and entering must have been with intent to commit the crime charged, and the explosive must have been used for the purpose of committing such crime. Howard V. People, 62 Colo. 131, 160 Pac. 1060. 7 People v. Carr, 255 Ill. 203, 99 N. E. 357, 41 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1209, Ann. Cas. 1913 D 864; State v. Burton, 27 Wash. 528, 67 Pac. 1097. And see the cases cited in the following notes. 84 Bl. Com. 224, 225; 1 Hale P. C. 550, 556. See also the following decisions: 273. Mississippi. Scott v. State, 62 Miss. 781. Missouri. State v. Clark, 89 Mo. 423, 1 S. W. 332. Pennsylvania. Hollister v. Com., 60 Pa. St. 103. England. Rex v. Lyons, 1 Leach C. C. 185; Rex v. Martin, Russ. & R. 108. 93 Inst. 64; 1 Hale P. C. 556; 1 Hawk, P. C. c. 38, § 17; Anon., 1 Dyer, 99a, pl. 58; Resolution of Judges, Poph. 52; Reg. v. Baker, 3 Cox C. C. 581. Lord Coke gave as the reason, that a church is the mansion house of Almighty God; but Hale says: "This is only a quaint turn, without any argument, and seems invented to suit his definition of burglary, viz., the breaking into a mansion house." 1 Hale P. C. 556, note. And see 1 Hawk. P. C. c. 38, § 10. 101 Hale P. C. 556; 1 Hawk. P. C. c. 38, § 17. 11 See the statutes of the various states. To come within a statute punishing the breaking and entry of a dwelling house, it must appear that the house was the dwelling house of another at the time of the breaking and entry. Smith v. State, 80 Fla. 315, 85 So. 911. 12 See § 460, infra. 13 A room in a hotel where the prosecutor resides is a private residence, Holland v. State, 45 Tex. Cr. 172, 74 S. W. 763; and the same is true of a room in a school dormitory. The term "mansion house" or "dwelling house" includes every house for the dwelling and habitation of man,14 as, for example, a room or rooms in a hotel or a boarding house or apartment house, permanently occupied by a person as a dwelling, 15 or a public institution, such as a home for the friendless in which persons are confined.16 And it also includes outhouses within the curtilage.17 § 458 Outhouses within the curtilage. The term "dwelling house" includes, in addition to the dwelling proper, all outhouses which are within the curtilage or common inclosure, and which are used in connection with the dwelling proper-as the stable, outdoor kitchen, smokehouse, offices, and the like.18 And even when there is Mays v. State, 50 Tex. Cr. 391, 97 S. W. 703. 141 Russell, Crimes 797; Hayes v. Com., 171 Ky. 291, 188 S. W. 415. 15 People v. Carr, 255 Ill. 203, 99 N. E. 357, 41 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1209, Ann. Cas. 1913 D 864; Smith V. People, 115 Ill. 17, 3 N. E. 733; State v. Burton, 27 Wash. 528, 67 Pac. 1097; State v. Johnson, 4 Wash. 593, 30 Pac. 672. And see § 462, infra. 16 Hayes v. Com., 171 Ky. 291, 188 S. W. 415. 17 See § 458, infra. 18 4 Bl. Com. 225; 1 Hale P. C. 558; 1 Hawk. P. C. c. 38, § 12; Fisher v. State, 43 Ala. 17; People v. Aplin, 86 Mich. 393, 49 N. W. 148; Pitcher v. People, 16 Mich. 142; State v. Whit, 4 Jones (N. C.) 349; Rex v. Gibson, 2 East P. C. 508, 1 Leach C. C. 357; Rex v. Brown, 2 East P. C. 487, 2 Leach C. C. 1016 note; Rex v. Clayburn, Russ. & R. 360. And see Quinn v. People, 71 N. Y. 561; State v. Johnson, 45 S. C. 483, 23 S. E. 619. Thus, a smokehouse, the front part and door of which is within the yard of the dwelling house, is the subject of burglary. Fisher v. State, 43 Ala. 17; State v. Whit, 4 Jones (N. C.) 349. The same is true of a barn with doors opening into the yard, and forming part of the common inclosure, situated about eight rods from the dwelling. Pitcher v. People, 16 Mich. 142. And see People v. Taylor, 2 Mich. 250. If the front part and front door of an outhouse-as a smokehouse, for instance is within the common inclosure, the whole building is protected, and burglary may be committed by breaking and entering at the back. Fisher v. State, 43 Ala. 17. within The Georgia statute provides that all outhouses contiguous to or the curtilage or protection of the mansion or dwelling house shall be considered as parts of the same. Wright v. State, 12 Ga. App. 514, 77 S. E. 657. Under this provision the offense is complete if the outhouse is within the protection of the dwelling house, whether within the cu -tilage or not. It covers a gear house within the inclosure of the yard, but rated from it by a fence with a gate, which was left open at night to have the house protected by the yard dog. Bryant v. State, 60 Ga. 358. sepa So as The reason why it is held to be burglary to break and enter buildings adjoining and used in connection with the dwelling proper is "the mid night terror excited, and the liability no common inclosure the dwelling house will include and protect an outhouse adjoining it and used in connection with it, as outhouses within the curtilage are generally used.19 Buildings, however, that are entirely separated from the dwelling proper-as where they are beyond the common inclosure, if any, or are on the other side of a public highway-are no part of the dwelling house, and are not the subject of burglary at common law.20 There need be no direct communication with the dwelling proper.21 But it is sometimes provided by statute that no building shall be deemed a dwelling house or any part of a dwelling house unless it is joined to, immediately connected with, and is part of, a dwelling house.22 19 Rex v. Brown, 2 East P. C. 493. An outhouse is within the curtilage though not inclosed with the dwelling house by a common fence, if it is situated within such close proximity as to be conveniently accessible and is actually used in connection with the dwelling house for domestic purposes.'' Wright v. State, 12 Ga. App. 514, 77 S. E. 657. 20 4 Bl. Com. 225; State v. Jenkins, 5 Jones (N. C.) 430; Rex v. Westwood, Russ. & R. 495. And see Whalen v. Com., 17 Ky. L. Rep. 921, 32 S. W. 1095; People v. Parker, 4 Johns. (N. Y.) 424; State v. Sampson, 125 S. C. 567, 32 Am. Rep. 513. A smokehouse or meathouse in a field two or three hundred yards from the dwelling house, and not within a common inclosure with it, was held not within the curtilage. Wright v. State, 12 Ga. App. 514, 77 S. E. 657. In Curkendall v. People, 36 Mich. 309, it was held that a barn situated fifteen rods from the dwelling house, with a public highway between them, was not within the curtilage. And in Rex v. Westwood, Russ. & R. 495, it was held that buildings separated from the dwelling house by & public road, however narrow, could not be regarded as a part of the dwelling house, so as to be the subject of burglary, where there was no common fence or roof to connect them, though some of the offices necessary to the dwelling house adjoined thereto, and though there was an awning extending therefrom to the dwelling house. And see for a like holding on similar facts, Rex v. Garland, 1 Leach C. C. 144. 21 Mitchell v. Com., 88 Ky. 349, 11 S. W. 209; Quinn v. People, 71 N. Y. 561; Rex v. Gibson, 2 East P. C. 508, 1 Leach C. C. 357; Rex v. Lithgo, Russ. & R. 357; Rex v. Hancock, Russ. & R. 170. Compare Reg. v. Higgs, 2 Car. & K. 322. A cellar under a dwelling house is a part of the dwelling house for the purpose of burglary, though it is entered from the outside only, and has no internal communication with the rest of the house. Mitchell v. Com., 88 Ky. 349, 11 S. W. 209. 22 State v. Hecox, 83 Mo. 531. Where a house consisted of two $459. Shops, stores, etc. A shop, store, factory or other business building, not being within the curtilage of a dwelling house, is certainly not the subject of burlary at common law, if no person sleeps in it.23 But it is a dwelling house, or part of a dwelling house, within the definition of burglary, if habitually used in part as a place in which to sleep, either by the proprietor or by his servants, or if it is in a building another part of which is used by the proprietor as his dwelling. And it makes no difference that the building is used principally for other purposes, or that the occupant does not take his meals there. The test is whether it is habitually used as a place to sleep.24 The rule, according to the better opinion, is the same, if rooms covered by the same roof, separated by a space of four feet and connected by porches on each end, extending from the door of one to the door of the other, in one of which the owner resided and the other of which was used as a storeroom, it was held that the latter was a part of a dwelling house. State v. Hutchinson, 111 Mo. 257, 20 S. W. 34. 23 People v. Parker, 4 Johns. (N. Y.) 424; State v. Jenkins, 5 Jones (50 N. C.) 430; Hollister v. Com., 60 Pa. St. 103; Rex v. Eggington, 2 East P. C. 494, 2 Leach C. C. 913; Rex v. Martin, Russ. & R. 108. 24 Alabama. Ex parte Vincent, 26 Ala. 145, 62 Am. Dec. 714. Michigan. People v. Dupree, 98 Mich. 26, 56 N. W. 1046; People v. Griffin, 77 Mich. 585, 42 N. W. 1061; Moore v. People, 47 Mich. 639, 11 N. W. 415. New York. Quinn v. People, 71 N. Y. 561; People v. Snyder, 2 Park. Cr. 23. North Carolina. State v. Williams, 90 N. C. 724, 47 Am. Rep. 541. England. Rex v. Stock, 2 Leach C. C. 1015, Russ. & R. 185, 7 Taunt 339. A shop or store in a dwelling house is a part of the dwelling house for the purpose of burglary. Quinn v. People, 71 N. Y. 561; People v. Sny In People v. Dupree, 98 Mich. 26, 56 N. W. 1046, where the front room of the building was occupied by the owner as a shoe shop, and was connected with the rear and overhead portion, which was used as a dwelling, the whole building was held a dwelling house, so as to make a breaking and entering of the shop burglary. In Ex parte Vincent, 26 Ala. 145, 62 Am. Dec. 714, the building was a two-story house. The front room of the first floor was used as a store, and the back room as a sleeping apartment by the proprietor. The rooms on the second floor were used by the clerks as sleeping apartments, but they neither took their meals nor had their washing done there. It was held that the building was a dwelling house. Where one or more of the rooms of a building are used for business purposes, and another or others under the same roof, and within the same four cuter walls, as the dwelling of the proprietor, there need be no internal communication between them to render the former a part of the dwelling, a clerk or servant sleeps in a store merely for the purpose of watching and protecting the property, provided it is his regular sleeping place.2 But occasionally sleeping in a store does not give it the character of a dwelling house or make it the subject of burglary.26 These rules have been changed by statutes in many states.27 § 460. Statutory provisions. Statutes in most states have made many structures besides dwelling houses the subject of burglary,28 as, for example, warehouses and storehouses,29 or any building where there shall be at the time any goods, wares, merchandise or other valuable thing kept or deposited,30 a place of business 31 where valuable for the purpose of burglary. Quinn v. People, 71 N. Y. 561. See also Rex v. Burrowes, 1 Moody C. C. 274. Compare State v. Clark, 89 Mo. 423, 1 S. W. 332, where it was held that a basement or cellar, with only an outside door, used for the storage of ice and beer, and having rooms above it occupied by families as a residence, with no internal communication between it and the rooms above, and in which the families had no interest, and over which they had no control, was not a dwelling house. 25 United States V. Johnson, 2 Cranch C. C. 21, Fed. Cas. No. 15485; State v. Williams, 90 N. C. 724, 47 Am. Rep. 541; State v. Outlaw, 72 N. C. 598; Rex v. Gibbons, Russ. & R. 422. Compare, contra, Rex v. Davies, 2 Leach C. C. 876; Rex v. Flannagan, Russ. & R. 187. In State v. Potts, 75 N. C. 129, it was held, Judge Rodman delivering the opinion, that the person sleeping in the store to watch and protect the property must be either the owner, or a member of his family, or his servant, and that the store is not a dwelling house, so as to be the subject of burglary, if the person sleeping there is employed to sleep there solely as a watchman. This decision, however, though supported by some of the early English cases, is contrary to the weight of authority. In the later case of State v. Williams, 90 N. C. 724, 47 Am. Rep. 541, Judge Ashe said that Judge Rodman drew "a nice and subtle distinction," and expressed doubt as to its soundness. 26 State v. Jenkins, 5 Jones (50 N. C.) 430; Rex v. Davies, 2 Leach C. C. 876. 27 See § 460, infra. 28 See the statutes of the various states. 29 Com. v. Ballard, 18 Ky. L. Rep. 782, 38 S. W. 678. A livery stable is a storehouse or warehouse. Webb v. Com., 18 Ky. L. Rep. 220, 35 S. W. 1038. And a cornerib on a farm is a storehouse and a warehouse. Metz V. State, 46 Neb. 547, 65 N. W. 190. 30 A chicken house, whether the chickens are kept there for the owner's use or for the purpose of trade and commerce, or whether they voluntarily enter it at night or are driven into it, is within such a provision. State v. Helms, 179 Mo. 280, 78 S. W. 592; State v. McGuire, 193 Mo. 215, 91 S. W. 939. 31 To come within such a provision it must appear that the place broken and entered was being used as a place of business. The mere fact that valuable goods were contained or stored |