to a charge of assault with intent to rape, or of an aggravated assault by fondling her person in an indecent manner.45 44 California. People v. Johnson, 131 Cal. 511, 63 Pac. 842; People v. Vann, 129 Cal. 118, 61 Pac. 776; People v. Lourintz, 114 Cal. 628, 46 Pac. 613; People v. Verdegreen, 106 Cal. 211, 39 Pac. 607, 46 Am. St. Rep. 234; People v. Stewart, 85 Cal. 174, 24 Pac. 722. Dakota. Territory v. Keyes, 5 Dak. 244, 38 N. W. 440. Delaware. State v. Davis, 9 Houst. 558, 33 Atl. 439. Georgia. Suggs v. State, 24 Ga. App. 323, 100 S. E. 778. Illinois. Addison v. People, 193 Ill. 405, 62 N. E. 235. Indiana. Hanes v. State, 155 Ind. 112, 57 N. E. 704; Murphy v. State, 120 Ind. 115, 22 N. E. 106. Iowa. State v. Grossheim, 79 Iowa 75, 44 N. W. 541. Kentucky. Nider v. Com., 140 Ky. 684, 131 S. W. 1024, Ann. Cas. 1913 E 1246. Louisiana. State v. Miller, 42 La. Ann. 1186, 8 So. 309, 21 Am. St. Rep. 418. Massachusetts. Com. v. Murphy, 165 Mass. 66, 42 N. E. 504, 30 L. R. A. 734, 52 Am. St. Rep. 496; Com. v. Roosnell, 143 Mass. 32, 8 N. E. 747; Com. v. Nickerson, 5 Allen 518. Michigan. People v. Goulette, 82 Mich: 36, 45 N. W. 1124; People v. Courier, 79 Mich. 366, 44 N. W. 571; People v. McDonald, 9 Mich. 150. Missouri. State v. Shaw, Mo. New Jersey. Farrell v. State, 54 N. J. L. 416, 24 Atl. 723; Cliver v. State, 45 N. J. L. 46. New York. Hadden v. People, 25 N. Y. 373; Singer v. People, 13 Hun 418. North Carolina. See State v. Dancy, 83 N. C. 608. North Dakota. State v. Fujita, 20 N. D. 555, 129 N. W. 360, Ann. Cas. 1913 A. 159, citing many cases. Oregon. State v. Sargent, 32 Ore. 110, 49 Pac. 889. Texas. Cromeans v. State, 59 Tex. Cr. 611, 129 S. W. 1129; Taylor v. State, 50 Tex. Cr. 362, 97 S. W. 94, 123 Am. St. Rep. 844; Allen v. State, 36 Tex. Cr. 381, 37 S. W. 429. Virginia. Lawrence v. Com., 30 Gratt. 845. Wisconsin. Loose v. State, 120 Wis. 115, 97 N. W. 526. Wyoming. Ross v. State, 16 Wyo. 285, 93 Pac. 299, 94 Pac. 217. 45 St. John v. State, 77 Tex. Cr. 290, 178 S. W. 360; Hill v. State, 37 Tex. Cr. 279, 38 S. W. 987, 39 S. W. 666, 66 Am. St. Rep. 803. § 454. Obtaining or attempting to obtain money or property-In general. - Money or property legally due. § 455. § 446. Definitions and nature of offense. Blackmail has been defined to be "an extortion of hush money; obtaining value from a person as a condition of refraining from making an accusation against him, or disclosing some secret calculated to operate to his prejudice." 1 It is synonymous with extortion when the latter word is used in its broad sense. Extortion in its broad sense, is a wrongful exaction, and has been defined to be the obtaining of money or other valuable thing, either by compulsion, by actual force, or by the force of motives applied to the will. The common-law offense of extortion was restricted to cases where the taking was by a public officer under color 1 Rapalje's Law Dict.; In re Algoe, 74 Neb. 353, 104 N. W. 751. Other definitions: Mitchell V. Sharon, 51 Fed. 424; Hess v. Sparks, 44 Kan. 465, 24 Pac. 979, 21 Am. St. Rep. 300; Edsall v. Brooks, 26 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 426. 2 Mitchell v. Sharon, 51 Fed. 424; Hess v. Sparks, 44 Kan. 465, 24 Pac. 979, 21 Am. St. Rep. 300; In re Algoe, 74 Neb. 353, 104 N. W. 751. In New York, sending or delivering a letter or writing threatening to accuse another person of a crime, with intent to extort money property from him, is or blackmail, while obtaining money or property from another with his consent, induced by a wrongful use of fear, is extortion. People v. Gillette, 140 N. Y. App. Div. 27, 124 N. Y. Supp. 470. 3 Mann v. State, 47 Ohio St. 556, 26 N. E. 226, 11 L. R. A. 656. 66 'Extort" as used in a statute making it an offense to threaten another with extent to extort any money, etc., is used in the sense of obtain, Com. v. Coolidge, 128 Mass. 55; and means the taking or obtaining of anything from another by means of illegal compulsion. State v. Logan, 104 La. 760, 29 So. 336. of his office, and hence could not be committed by a private individual, and this is equally true under some of the statutory definitions of the offense. But statutory definitions of extortion in a number of states are much broader, and in terms include the obtaining of money or property by any person from another with his consent induced by a wrongful use of force or fear.5 Threatening another with a view to extort money is an indictable offense at common law, provided the threat is of such a nature as is calculated to overcome a firm and prudent man. And obtaining or attempting to obtain money or other advantage by accusations or threats is punishable by statute in England," and in most if not all of the states in this country. The statutes vary somewhat both as to the character of the threats included and the intent and purpose with which they must be made.10 Under most, if not all of them, the offense may be committed by public officers as well as by private persons.11 § 447. Distinguished from other offenses. Crimes of this character are distinct from bribery, 12 obtaining money or property by false 4 See § 1199, infra. 5 See the statutes of the various states and the following cases: Arizona. Bush v. State, 19 Ariz. 195, 168 Pac. 508. California. People v. Beggs, 178 Cal. 79, 172 Pac. 152; People v. Peck, Cal. App. - 185 Pac. 881. Minnesota. State v. Lampe, 131 Minn. 65, 154 N. W. 737; State v. Coleman, 99 Minn. 487, 110 N. W. 5, 116 Am. St. Rep. 441. Montana. In re McCabe, 29 Mont. 28, 73 Pac. 1106. New York. People v. Gillette, 200 N. Y. 275, 93 N. E. 953, rev'g 140 App. Div. 27, 124 N. Y. Supp. 470; People v. Warden of City Prison, 145 App. Div. 861, 130 N. Y. Supp. 698, aff'd 206 N. Y. 632, 99 N. E. 1116. 6 State v. Evans, Houst. Cr. Cas. (Del.) 97; Rex v. Southerton, 6 East 126, 102 Eng. Reprint 1235. 7 See 4 Bl. Com. 144; 2 East P. C. 1104; 1 Hawk P. C. 226; Rex v. Rob inson, 2 Leach C. C. 749, and the present English statutes. 8 See the statutes of the various states. 9 See § 448 et seq., 11 State v. Browning, 153 Iowa 37, 133 N. W. 330; State v. Schuermann, 146 La. 110, 83 So. 426; People v. McLaughlin, 150 N. Y. 365, 44 N. E. 1017; People v. Sheridan, 186 N. Y. App. Div. 211, 174 N. Y. Supp. 327. 12 State v. Browning, 153 Iowa 37, 133 N. W. 330; People v. McLaughlin, 2 N. Y. App. Div. 419, 37 N. Y. Supp. 1005. A person with authority to make an arrest may be guilty of threats to extort, even though an arrest is finally made. This is true, for example, if he threatens to accuse another of crime unless he pays a sum of money, although he afterwards arrests him. But if an officer whose duty it is to make an arrest suggests that for a 13 pretenses, 18 larceny, 14 and robbery.15 But the same acts may constitute both blackmail and robbery.1 16 And some of the statutes provide that persons who do the prohibited acts shall be deemed guilty of an attempt to rob.17 § 448. The threat or accusation-In general. To come within a statute punishing actual or attempted extortion or blackmail by threats there must be a threat of the character specified in the statute.18 A threat has been defined to be the expression of an intention price he will not make it, his offense is an offer to accept a bribe, and not the making of malicious threats to extort money. if, after having arrested another, he offers to release him upon the paying of money or the doing of some other thing, State v. Browning, 153 Iowa 37, 133 N. W. 330; or where an officer represents that he has a warrant to search a person's premises for liquor, and intimates that he will not serve it if paid a certain sum. State v. Pierce, 76 Iowa 189, 40 N. W. 715. And the same is true 13 The broad line of distinction between blackmail and fraud is that in the former the money or property is obtained through fear and in the latter through persuasion. United States v. Horman, 118 Fed. 780, aff'd 116 Fed. 350. Where a person falsely represents that he is a federal officer, arrests the prosecutor on an alleged criminal charge and threatens to take him before court, and then offers to settle the case without prosecution for a certain sum, which is paid by the victim because of his fear of such prosecution, the offense is blackmail and not cheating and swindling, where it is not alleged that the defendant represented that he had a right to settle or that the victim believed that he had. Jackson v. State, 118 Ga. 125, 44 S. E. 833. 14 State v. Coleman, 99 Minn. 487, 110 N. W. 5, 116 Am. St. Rep. 441. 15 People v. Peck, Cal. App. 3 185 Pac. 881; State v. Hollyway, 41 Iowa 200, 20 Am. Rep. 586; State v. Coleman, 99 Minn. 487, 110 N. W. 5, 116 Am. St. Rep. 441; In re Sherin, 27 S. D. 232, 130 N. W. 761, 40 L. R. A. (N. S.) 801, Ann. Cas. 1913 D 446. The offense is not robbery where there is no violence other than a pretended arrest and threat to prosecute. Jackson v. State, 118 Ga. 125, 44 S. E. 833. As to robbery by threats, see § 942, infra. 16 Chunn v. State, 125 Ga. 789, 54 S. E. 751. 17 State v. Ricks, 108 Miss. 7, 66 So. 281, Ann. Cas. 1917 E 244; Elliott v. State, 36 Ohio St. 318, 2 Ky. L. Rep. 144. 18 State v. Pierce, 76 Iowa 189, 40 N. W. 715; People v. Jones, 62 Mich. 304, 28 N. W. 839; State v. Coleman, 99 Minn. 487, 110 N. W. 5, 116 Am. St. Rep. 441; People v. Eichler, 75 Hun (N. Y.) 26, 26 N. Y. Supp. 998; People v. Gillian, 50 Hun (N. Y.) 35, 2 N. Y. Supp. 476, aff'd 115 N. Y. 643, 21 N. E. 1117. To come within a statute making it an offense to threaten to injure the person or property of another, the threat must be directed toward his person or property. An undisclosed intent to inflict such an injury is not enough. State v. Strickland, 21 N. M. 411, 155 Pac. 719. A statement in a letter that unless to inflict evil or injury on another.19 No particular words are necessary to constitute a threat, and it need not be in any particular form or phrase, but any language which conveys the intended meaning with sufficient clearness to be understood is enough.20 It may be made by suggestion or innuendo or implication.21. And it is sufficient if the language used, in connection with what preceded and what follows between the parties, imports a threat to make the charge alleged in the indictment, and was so understood by the parties.22 The relations the person to whom it was sent deposited money in a certain place, etc., woe be unto you and yours," was held not to be a threat to kill or injure. Hanson v. State, 35 Tex. Cr. 593, 34 S. W. 929. Vague threats which do not indicate to the person threatened some criminal charge are not within the statute. People v. Jones, 62 Mich. 304, 28 N. W. 839. 19 Webster Dict.; Brooker v. Silverthorne, 111 S. C. 553, 99 S. E. 350, 5 A. L. R. 1283. Other definitions, State v. Brownlee, 84 Iowa 473, 51 N. W. 25. And see § 450, infra. 20 Moore v. People, 69 Ill. App. 398; People v. Thompson, 97 N. Y. 313, 2 N. Y. Cr. 520; People v. Wickes, 112 N. Y. App. Div. 39, 98 N. Y. Supp. 163; People v. Gillian, 50 Hun (N. Y.) 35, 2 N. Y. Supp. 476, aff'd 115 N. Y. 643, 21 N. E. 1117. It is sufficient if the alleged threat be definite and understandable to a mind of ordinary intelligence. Bush v. State, 19 Ariz. 195, 168 Pac. 508. It is enough if it is sufficient to so impress the mind of the person threatened as to accomplish the end in view. State v. Blackington, 111 Me. 229, 88 Atl. 726; State v. Robinson, 85 Me. 195, 27 Atl. 99. It is not necessary that the defendant use the word "kill" or any other set phrase in order to constitute a threat to kill, but it is sufficient if by his language, coupled with his conduct, he caused his victim to believe that he intended to take his life unless he complied with his demands. Glover v. People, 204 Ill. 170, 68 N. E. 464. In the case of threats to accuse of crime with intent to extort money, it is sufficient if, from a reading of the letter, it is manifest, in a clear and unambiguous manner, that the writer intended to extort money on a proposed prosecution, and if such is the case, it is immaterial how the letter is worded. Wynne v. State, 41 Tex. Cr. 504, 55 S. W. 837. The defendant need not directly state that he will charge the other person with a crime, but it is sufficient if he uses language which clearly imports an intention to do so. People v. Whittemore, 102 Mich. 519, 61 N. W. 13. And see § 449, infra. 21 State v. Coleman, 99 Minn. 487, 110 N. W. 5, 116 Am. St. Rep. 441; People v. Thompson, 97 N. Y. 313, 2 N. Y. Cr. 520; People v. Misiani, 148 N. Y. App. Div. 797, 133 N. Y. Supp. 291; People v. Wickes, 112 N. Y. App. Div. 39, 98 N. Y. Supp. 163; People v. Gillian, 50 Hun (N. Y.) 35, 2 N. Y. Supp. 476, aff'd 115 N. Y. 643, 21 N. E. 1117. It may be bluntly spoken, or thinly veiled in suggestive terms. Moore v. People, 69 Ill. App. 398. 22 People v. Wickes, 112 N. Y. App. Div. 39, 98 N. Y. Supp. 163; People |