That an offense was committed by a member of a partnership in the conduct of the partnership business does not relieve him from criminal responsibility, even though the other partners would also be guilty.35 § 273. Husband and wife-Liability of husband for wife's crimes. Generally a man is not criminally responsible for his wife's acts unless he aids, procures or acquiesces in their commission.36 But he is liable where she acts at his direction, or under his coercion, or with his authority,87 or where he aids or assists her in violating the law.38 He is also generally held responsible where she sells intoxicating liquor in violation of law,39 or keeps a house of ill sold liable to indictment, a partner is liable for an illegal sale made by his copartner in the course of the partnership business, whether he participated in the act or not. Whitton v. State, 37 Miss. 379. The same is true under a statute making any person guilty of a misdemeanor who shall sell, or be interested in the sale of," liquor to a minor. Waller v. State, 38 Ark. 656; Robinson v. State, 38 Ark. 548. See also Partridge v. State, 88 Ark. 267, 114 S. W. 215, 20 L. R. A. (N. S.) 321, 129 Am. St. Rep. 100. 35 City of Spokane v. Patterson, 46 Wash. 93, 89 Pac. 402, 8 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1104, 123 Am. St. Rep. 921, 13 Ann. Cas. 706. 36 Alabama. Seibert v. State, 40 Ala. 60. Georgia. Lumpkin v. City of Atlanta, 9 Ga. App. 470, 71 S. E. 755. Indiana. Pennybaker v. State, 2 Blackf. 484. Massachusetts. Com. v. Carroll, 124 Mass. 30. South Carolina. Geuing v. State, 1 McCord (12 S. C.) 573; State v. Collins, 1 McCord (12 S. C.) 355. A druggist is not criminally responsible for the act of his wife in selling liquor in his absence, and contrary A husband is not responsible for the acts of his wife in using a house which is her separate property, and in which he resides with her, as a disorderly house, where he takes no part in keeping it for such purposes, and she keeps it of her own free will, and without his consent and against his will. Com. v. Hill, 145 Mass. 305, 14 N. E. 124. 37 Alabama. Mulvey v. State, 43 Ala. 316, 94 Am. Dec. 684; Seibert v. State, 40 Ala. 60. Massachusetts. Com. v. Reynolds, 114 Mass. 306; Com. v. Neal, 10 Mass. 152, 6 Am. Dec. 105. New Hampshire. State v. Colby, 55 N. H. 72. New Jersey. State v. Martini, 80 N. J. L. 685, 78 Atl. 12; State v. Grossman, 94 N. J. L. 301, 110 Atl. 711. New York. Marselis v. Seaman, 21 Barb. 319. 38 Com. v. Pratt, 126 Mass. 462. 39 United States v. Birch, 1 Cranch C. C. 571, Fed. Cas. No. 14,595; Com. v. Reynolds, 114 Mass. 306; Geuing v. State, 1 McCord (12 S. C.) 573. This is true where they own the house jointly, although he has no interest in the liquor or in the profits fame,40 or carries on a business without paying a license,41 with his knowledge and consent. And it has been held by some courts that he is responsible where she sells liquor contrary to law in a house occupied by them jointly, even though such sales are made in his absence and without his authority or against his consent,42 although other courts have held to the contrary.48 44 The common-law presumption that offenses committed by her in his presence and with his knowledge were committed under his coercion, applies against the husband as well as in favor of the wife, and will warrant his conviction for offenses so committed,45 unless such presumption is rebutted or contradicted by evidence.46 § 274. Liability of wife for husband's crimes. A married woman is not criminally responsible for the acts of her husband,47 from the sale. Com. v. Kennedy, 119 Mass. 211. 40 In a building owned by her but occupied by them jointly, and in which he exercises various acts of control and management. Com. v. Wood, 97 Mass. 225. 41 Williamson v. State, 16 Ala. 431. 42 A husband living with his wife in the house in which she unlawfully sells liquor is criminally responsible for such sales, though made in his absence and after he had remonstrated with her against selling liquor, since he has authority to prevent sales by her in the house. State v. McDaniel, 1 Houst. Cr. Cas. (Del.) 506. If the wife keeps a liquor nuisance in her husband's house, he is liable if he has knowledge of the fact and of her intent to sell liquor in violation of law, unless he uses reasonable means to prevent her from carrying out such intent. Com. v. Walsh, 165 Mass. 62, 42 N. E. 500; Com. v. Barry, 115 Mass. 146. And he is liable even though she owns the house, since he has authority to prevent her from using it for an illegal purpose. Com. v. Carroll, 124 Mass. 30. But he is not responsible where she owns the premises, and he has used all reasonable and practicable means to prevent her from violating the law. Com. v. Hill, 145 Mass. 305, 14 N. E. 124. 43 Pennybaker v. State, 2 Blackf. (Ind.) 484. And see Seibert v. State, 40 Ala. 60, where the unlawful sales were made in the husband's store. 44 See § 105, supra. 45 Alabama. Hensly v. State, 52 Ala. 10; Mulvey v. State, 43 Ala. 316, 94 Am. Dec. 684. Massachusetts. Com. v. Hill, 145 Mass. 305, 14 N. E. 124; Com. v. Pratt, 126 Mass. 462; Com. v. Gannon, 97 Mass. 547. New Jersey. State v. Martini, 80 N. J. L. 685, 78 Atl. 12; State v. Grossman, 94 N. J. L. 301, 110 Atl. 711. New York. Board of Com'rs of Excise Wayne Co. v. Keller, 20 How. Pr. 280. Tennessee. See Morton v. State, 141 Tenn. 357, 209 S. W. 644, 4 A. L. R. 264. 46 Com. v. Hill, 145 Mass. 305, 14 N. E. 124; Com. v. Pratt, 126 Mass. 462; State v. Martini, 80 N. J. L. 685, 78 Atl. 12; State v. Grossman, 94 N. J. L. 301, 110 Atl. 711. 47 Bell v. State, 92 Ga. 49, 18 S. except where such acts are done by him in the capacity of her agent.48 § 275. Liability of landlord for acts of tenant. Except where the statute provides to the contrary, "the owner of leased premises is not liable to indictment for violations of the criminal or penal laws committed or suffered thereon by the tenant, in the absence of knowledge at the time of entering into the lease that such was the use to which the tenant intended to put the property."49 According to some of the courts the owner is criminally responsible where he leases the premises with knowledge and the intent that they are to be used for an illegal purpose, as for the purpose of maintaining a bawdy house, 50 or for the illegal sale or storage of intoxicating liquors,51 and where they are actually so used with his knowledge, consent and connivance. Other courts hold that he is not criminally responsible even though he knowingly rents the premises to be used for an illegal purpose and knows that they are being so used, where he surrenders possession and control of the premises E. 186; State v. Kelly, 74 Iowa 589, 38 N. W. 503. In states where the husband has control of the wife's separate estate during marriage, she is not criminally responsible if he erects a nuisance on her land. People v. Townsend, 3 Hill (N. Y.) 479. 48 City Council v. Van Roven, 2 McCord (13 S. C.) 465. As to the liability of a person for the acts of his agent generally, see § 265, supra. 49 Crocker v. State, 49 Ark. 60, 4 S. W. 197. This is true even though such use by the tenant furnished the landlord grounds for applying to a court of equity for a forfeiture of the lease. Louisville R. Co. v. Com., 130 Ky. 738, 114 S. W. 343, 132 Am. St. Rep. 408. 50 State v. Treweilder, 103 Miss. 859, 60 So. 1015. If he leases a house for that purpose, or, knowing that it will be used for that purpose, derives any profit or advantage from renting it for such use, which he would not otherwise have enjoyed as certainly or beneficially, he may be deemed a particeps criminis on the theory of having voluntarily aided in establishing the house, and be punishable for a misdemeanor. Ross v. Com., 2 B. Mon. (41 Ky.) 417. A person who demises a house to be kept as a disorderly house, and which is so kept with his knowledge, especially where he derives a profit from that mode of using the property, may be charged and punished as a keeper of the house, since in misdemeanors all the guilty actors are principals. People v. Erwin, 4 Den. (N. Y.) 129. 51 Crocker v. State, 49 Ark. 60, 4 S. W. 197. Under such circumstances he is an accessary, aiding and abetting in the commission of the offense. Moody v. State, 14 Ga. App. 523, 81 S. E. 588. to the lessee and takes no part in the maintenance and conduct of the place.52 But he may be convicted as a keeper of a bawdy house even under this rule, where he retains control over the leased building and actively participates and assists in running it as a bawdy house.55 Statutes in some states make the landlord criminally liable if he permits the tenant to continue in the use of the leased premises with knowledge that he is conducting in them business in violation of law, and, to afford him the means of relieving himself from liability, give him a right at any time during the term to eject a tenant who has been guilty of violations of the statute.54 And it is sometimes made a substantive offense to let premises with knowledge that the lessee intends to use them as a house of ill-fame,55 or as a gambling house or place for gaming,56 or to sell liquor thereon in violation of law.57 52 People v. Hoek, 169 Mich. 87, 134 N. W. 1031; Reg. v. Stannard, 9 Cox C. C. 405. 53 People v. Hoek, 169 Mich. 87, 134 N. W. 1031. 54 An owner who knows that his tenant is using the leased premises for gambling may be convicted of knowingly permitting gambling on premises under his control, where the statute provides that the use of the premises for such a purpose shall terminate the lease and entitle the owner to immediate possession. Such a statute does not give a right of possession to a lessee because of the use of the premises for an illegal purpose by one to whom he has sublet them with the consent of the owner, but under such circumstances such right inures to the owner only. Hence it 55 See § 1034, infra. 57 The landlord is not liable under such a provision where he does not know when the lease is made that the lessee intends to sell liquor on the premises in violation of law, although he does know of the illegal sales subsequently made by the tenant when they are made, provided he does not consent to or approve of them. Com. v. Morris, 129 Ky. 440, 112 S. W. 580; Com. v. Conway (Ky.), 112 S. W. 575. CHAPTER 8 JURISDICTION, LOCALITY AND POWER TO PUNISH I. GENERAL PRINCIPLES § 276. In general. § 277. Same act may be an offense against different sovereignties. § 278. Jurisdiction as between counties. $279. Countries, states or counties bounded by the sea-In general. § 280. - Bays and other arms of the sea. § 281. Rivers and lakes-As between states. $ 282. As between counties. § 283. Vessels of a nation as part of its territory. § 284. Jurisdiction over foreigners-In general. § 286. Jurisdiction over subjects or citizens abroad. § 287. Offenses committed partly in one jurisdiction and partly in another— Different states or countries. § 290. Offenses on or near county line. § 291. Offenses on railroad trains or other conveyances. § 292. Necessity for personal presence. § 293. Acts committed by means of an innocent agent. § 294. Accessaries, aiders and abettors-Different states. § 300. Abduction, enticing, inveigling, etc. § 301. Assault and assault and battery. § 302. Attempts to commit crimes. § 303. Bigamy and polygamy. § 304. Burglary. $305. Conspiracy. § 306. Dueling. § 307. Embezzlement. § 308. False pretenses and cheats. $309. Forgery and uttering. $310. Gaming, etc. § 311. Homicide-Injury on high seas or in one country or state, and death in another country or state. |