prehend all assistance rendered by acts or words of encouragement or support or presence, actual or constructive, to render assistance, should it become necessary.18 § 233. Presence, acquiescence. Mere presence, even with knowledge that an offense is about to be committed or is being committed, is not enough to make a person an aider or abettor or a principal in the second degree 19 nor is mere mental approval, suffi is guilty of the offense committed. Lyons v. State, 30 Tex. App. 642, 18 S. W. 416. 18 Jones v. State, 174 Ala. 53, 57 So. 31; Raiford v. State, 59 Ala. 106; Loeb v. State, 6 Ga. App. 23, 64 S. E. 338. As to the meaning of the words "aids or abets" in the federal statute making any person who aids or abets a clerk or agent of a national bank to embezzle, abstract or misapply its funds, guilty of a misdemeanor, see Keliher v. United States, 193 Fed. 8. "The words 'encourage, aid or abet' mean or imply the will of a person has contributed to the act actually committed by another, and fully and accurately describe an accessary before the fact, if he is too far away to aid in the felonious act, or a principal in it if near enough to aid." True v. Com., 90 Ky. 651, 14 S. W. 684. "Requested, advised and incited" in an instruction held equivalent to "aid, abet or procure" in a statute. Long v. State, 23 Neb. 33, 36 N. W. 310. 191 Hale P. C. 439; 2 Hawk. P. C. c. 29, § 10. See also the following decisions: Alabama. Morris v. State, 146 Ala. 66, 41 So. 274; Elmore v. State, 110 Ala. 63, 20 So. 323; State v. Tally, 102 Ala. 25, 15 So. 722. California. People v. Woodward, 45 Cal. 293, 13 Am. Rep. 176; People v. Ah Ping, 27 Cal. 489. Georgia. Thornton v. State, 119 Ga. 437, 46 S. E. 640; Butler v. State, 11 Ga. App. 815, 76 S. E. 368; Pirkle v. State, 11 Ga. App. 98, 74 S. E. 709. Illinois. People v. Cione, 293 Ill. 321, 127 N. E. 646. Indiana. Wade v. State, 71 Ind. 535. Iowa. State v. Wolf, 112 Iowa 458, 84 N. W. 536; State v. Maloy, 44 Iowa 104. Kentucky. Levering v. Com., 132 Ky. 666, 117 S. W. 253, 136 Am. St. Rep. 192, 19 Ann. Cas. 140; Butler v. Com., 2 Duv. (63 Ky.) 435. Massachusetts. Brown v. Perkins, 1 Allen 89. Michigan. People v. Chapman, 62 Mich. 280, 28 N. W. 894, 4 Am. St. Rep. 857. Missouri. State v. Orrick, 106 Mo. 111, 17 S. W. 176, 329; Cooper v. Johnson, 81 Mo. 483. Nebraska. Brinegar v. State, 82 Neb. 558, 118 N. W. 475. North Carolina. State v. Powell, 168 N. C. 134, 83 S. E. 310; State v. Hildreth, 31 N. C. (9 Ired.) 440, 51 Am. Dec. 369. Ohio. Goins v. State, 46 Ohio St. 457, 21 N. E. 476. Oklahoma. Drury v. Territory, 9 Okla. 398, 60 Pac. 101. South Carolina. State v. Newman (S. C.), 80 S. E. 482. Texas. Burrell v. State, 18 Tex. 713; Villareal v. State, 78 Tex. Cr. 369, 182 S. W. 322; Taylor v. State, cient,20 nor passive acquiescence or consent.21 But it suffices to make one an aider and abettor that he is present by preconcert or with the knowledge of the actual perpetrator, with a view to render aid if it becomes necessary,22 or, according to some courts, if he is a friend. 77 Tex. Cr. 376, 179 S. W. 113; Espinoza v. State, 73 Tex. Cr. 237, 165 S. W. 208; Nowlin v. State, 60 Tex. Cr. 356, 132 S. W. 800; Chapman v. State, 43 Tex. Cr. 328, 65 S. W. 1098, 96 Am. St. Rep. 874; Walker v. State, 29 Tex. App. 621, 16 S. W. 548. Virginia. Kemp v. Com., 80 Va. 443; Reynolds v. Com., 33 Gratt. 834. West Virginia. State v. Prater, 52 W. Va. 132, 43 S. E. 230. Wisconsin. Connaughty v. State, 1 Wis. 159, 60 Am. Dec. 370. England. Reg. v. Coney, L. R. 8 Q. B. D. 534; Reg. v. Young, 8 Car. & P. 644. 20 Indiana. Clem v. State, 33 Ind. 418. Iowa. State v. Wolf, 112 Iowa 458, 84 N. W. 536. Kentucky. Omer v. Com., 95 Ky. 353, 25 S. W. 594; True v. Com., 90 Ky. 651, 14 S. W. 684. Missouri. State v. Cox, 65 Mo. 29. Nebraska. Brinegar v. State, 82 Neb. 558, 118 N. W. 475. North Carolina. State v. Powell, 168 N. C. 134, 83 S. E. 310. Virginia. Kemp v. Com., 80 Va. 443. Approval after commission of the crime is not sufficient. Cooper v. Johnson, 81 Mo. 483. Approval is not sufficient, since a person may be present and heartily approve of an act after it is done without being at all willing or capable of aiding, advising or procuring it to be done, especially if it be felonious. True v. Com., 90 Ky. 651, 14 S. W. 684. 21 Alabama. State v. Tally, 102 . Ala. 25, 15 So. 722. Georgia. Wright v. State, 14 Ga. App. 185, 80 S. E. 544; Pirkle v. State, 11 Ga. App. 98, 74 S. E. 709. Illinois. People v. Cione, 293 Ill. 321, 127 N. E. 646; People v. Novick, 265 Ill. 436, 107 N. E. 138; Burnett v. People, 204 Ill. 208, 68 N. E. 505, 66 L. R. A. 304, 98 Am. St. Rep. 206; White v. People, 139 Ill. 143, 28 N. E. 1083, 32 Am. St. Rep. 196; White v. People, 81 Ill. 333. Indiana. Clem v. State, 33 Ind. 418. Iowa State v. Bosworth, 170 Iowa 329, 152 N. W. 581. Kentucky. Levering v. Com., 132 Ky. 666, 117 S. W. 253, 136 Am. St. Rep. 192, 19 Ann. Cas. 140; True v. Com., 90 Ky. 651, 14 S. W. 684; Plummer v. Com., 1 Bush (64 Ky.) 76; Butler v. Com., 2 Duv. (63 Ky.) 435. Missouri. State v. Orrick, 106 Mo. 111, 17 S. W. 176, 329. Oklahoma. Moore v. State, 4 Okla. Crim. 212, 111 Pac. 822. Washington. State v. Peasley, 80 Wash. 99, 141 Pac. 316. 22 United States. Hicks v. United States, 150 U. S. 442, 37 L. Ed. 1137, 14 Sup. Ct. 144. Alabama. Jones v. State, 174 Ala. 53, 57 So. 31; Morris v. State, 146 Ala. 66, 41 So. 274; Tanner v. State, 92 Ala. 1, 9 So. 613; Raiford v. State, 59 Ala. 106; Eaton v. State, 8 Ala. App. 136, 63 So. 41; Pearce v. State, 4 Ala. App. 32, 58 So. 996. Indiana. Doan v. State, 26 Ind. 495. Massachusetts. Com. v. Knapp, 9 Pick. 496, 20 Am. Dec. 491. Mississippi. McCarty v. State, 26 Miss. 299. of the perpetrator of the offense, and knows that his presence will be regarded by him as an encouragement and protection.23 § 234. Necessity for preconcert. A person may aid and abet another in the commission of a crime without having previously entered into an agreement or conspiracy with the actual perpetrator to commit it.24 And a person who knowingly contributes to the commission of an offense is an aider and abettor even though the actual perpetrator has not communicated his purpose to him.25 But if there is no prearrangement or preconcert, mere presence even with the intent to aid, if necessary, is not aiding or abetting unless the principal has knowledge of such presence and intent,26 nor will uttering words of incitement or encouragement make the utterer guilty unless they are addressed to, or at least heard by, the perpetrator.27 Missouri. State v. Darling, 216 Mo. 450, 115 S. W. 1002, 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 272, 129 Am. St. Rep. 526; State v. Walker, 98 Mo. 95, 9 S. W. 646, 11 S. W. 1133; State v. Ostman, 147 Mo. App. 422, 126 S. W. 961. Texas. Cortez v. State, 43 Tex. Cr. 375, 66 S. W. 453; Lyons v. State, 30 Tex. App. 642, 18 S. W. 416. If he knows that the crime is to be committed, counsels and directs its commission and is present when it is committed, ready and intending to aid in its consummation, he is a principal in the second degree whether a conspirator or not. State v. Prater, 52 W. Va. 132, 43 S. E. 230. 25 People v. Bond, 13 Cal. App. 175, 26 Hicks v. United States, 150 U. S. § 235. Intent-In general. A criminal intent is necessary to make a person guilty as a principal in the second degree or an aider or abettor.28 And generally there must be a community of unlawful purpose between him and the actual perpetrator of the crime, and a common criminal intent on the part of both.29 There need not necessarily have been a previous agreement between them,30 but, as a rule, he must know of the intent of the principal offender to commit the offense,31 and he is guilty only to the extent of such knowledge, or for the natural and reasonable consequences of the acts aided or encouraged by him.32 It has been held, however, that it is sufficient if the person aiding or abetting knows that the principal has a felonious purpose and assists him in it, although they have no common purpose and his purpose is different from that of the person aided.33 And in many jurisdictions principals in the first degree and principals in the second degree or aiders and abettors may be convicted of different grades or degrees of crime where they act with different intents.34 A person cannot be convicted as a principal in the second degree for aiding and abetting in the commission of an act which is not criminal on the part of the person committing it, even though he supposed that it was.85 And a public officer or private person who enters into communication with one who is suspected of criminal acts, and apparently aids or abets him in the commission of an act, is not a principal in the second degree, or a principal under the statute, if he did so, not with a criminal intent, but for the purpose of detecting the other party, and disclosing his guilt for the benefit of the 28 People v. Sweeney, 161 N. Y. App. Div. 221, 146 N. Y. Supp. 637, aff'd 213 N. Y. 37, 106 N. E. 913; Woolweaver v. State, 50 Ohio St. 277, 34 N. E. 352, 40 Am. St. Rep. 667; Rountree v. State, 10 Tex. App. 110. And see the cases cited in the following notes. The fact that the defendant had legitimate business at the scene of a killing does not exclude the possibility of his having gone there with criminal intent also. State v. Prater, 52 W. Va. 132, 43 S. E. 230. 29 People v. Leith, 52 Cal. 251; Thornton v. State, 119 Ga. 437, 46 S. E. 640; Brown v. State, 28 Ga. 199; Pope v. State, 13 Ga. App. 711, 79 S. 30 See § 234, supra. 31 Brown v. State, 28 Ga. 199; Adams v. State, 65 Ind. 565; Wilson v. State (Tex. Cr.), 24 S. W. 409; Lyons v. State, 30 Tex. App. 642, 18 S. W. 416; Walker v. State, 29 Tex. App. 621, 16 S. W. 548. 32 Lyons v. State, 30 Tex. App. 642, 18 S. W. 416. public.36 Nor can a person be convicted of aiding and abetting a married woman to commit adultery where he did not know that she was married,87 nor of aiding and abetting a public officer to embezzle public funds, unless he knows the public character of the funds unlawfully dealt with.38 And it has been held that a person who advises or instructs another to kill a third person on the happening of certain conditions is not guilty of murder as a principal in the second degree if such other shoots such third person without the happening of the specified conditions.8 39 If two or more persons conceive the intention at the same time to do the same act, each is responsible for his own acts pursuant to such intention, but neither is an aider or abettor of the other where there is no conspiracy or agreement between them.40 But if several per 36 California. People v. Farrell, 30 Cal. 316; People v. Emmons, 7 Cal. App. 685, 95 Pac. 1032; People v. Bunkers, 2 Cal. App. 197, 84 Pac. 364, 370. Illinois. Price v. People, 109 Ill. 109. Iowa. State v. McKean, 36 Iowa 343, 14 Am. Rep. 530. Massachusetts. Com. v. Downing, 4 Gray 29. New York. People v. Noelke, 29 Hun 461. Texas. Wright v. State, 7 Tex. App. 545, 32 Am. Rep. 599. England. See Rex v. Despard, 28 How. St. Tr. 346. And see § 242, infra. But see Slaughter v. State, 113 Ga. 284, 38 S. E. 854, 84 Am. St. Rep. 242, where a private detective was convicted of larceny in instigating prosecutor's servant to steal, though he did it for the purpose of detection. 37 Ex parte Sullivan, 17 Cal. App. 278, 119 Pac. 526. 38 State v. Cameron, 91 Ohio St. 50, 109 N. E. 584. 39 Thornton v. State, 119 Ga. 437, 46 S. E. 640. 40 Pope v. State, 13 Ga. App. 711, 79 S. E. 909; Wilson v. State (Tex. Cr.), 24 S. W. 409; Lyons v. State, 30 Tex. App. 642, 18 S. W. 416. And see People v. Bond, 13 Cal. App. 175, 109 Pac. 150. As where two persons assault another acting independently. State v. Maloy, 44 Iowa 104. Where three persons assault another and one of them shoots him, the others are not guilty of aggravated assault unless they were all acting in pursuance of a conspiracy or agreement, formed previously or at the time, to consummate the unlawful common design or purpose. Easterlin v. State, 43 Fla. 565, 31 So. 350. If two persons shoot and wound another, and there is no conspiracy or concert of action, each is responsible for the wounds inflicted by himself only. Hendrix v. State, 25 Ga. App. 12, 102 S. E. 377. If there is no conspiracy, where several engage in a sudden fight, each is chargeable only with his own acts, and such acts of the others as he may purposely incite or encourage. Goins v. State, 46 Ohio St. 457, 21 N. E. 476. If there is no conspiracy, one who is present when a homicide is committed by another upon a sudden quarrel, or in the heat of passion, is not guilty of aiding and abetting the |