except where the statute provides to the contrary.17 And there may be principals in the second degree or aiders and abettors to voluntary manslaughter.18 But there cannot be accessaries before the fact to voluntary manslaughter at common law and under most of the statutes,19 although some courts have held otherwise under particular drive, and should be absent when the latter runs over and kills a person, he would be guilty of manslaughter as accessary before the fact. See Reg. v. Gaylor, Dears. & B. C. C. 288. Where several persons went out together to shoot at a mark, and selected such a position that their shooting was negligent, and one of them accidentally killed a man, all were held guilty of manslaughter. Reg. v. Salmon, 14 Cox C. C. 494. The elements constituting manslaughter as defined by the statute do not preclude the possibility that there may be aiders and abettors in the commission of that offense. Hagan v. State, 10 Ohio St. 459. There may be principals in the second degree, and persons who are present, aiding and abetting the perpetrator, may be convicted of manslaughter under an indictment for murder charging them as principals in a state where the distinction between principals in the first and second degree is not recognized. State v. Putman, 18 S. C. 175, 44 Am. Rep. 569. In Goff v. Prime, 26 Ind. 196, it is said that one aiding and abetting in the commission of a common assault and battery resulting in the accidental killing of the person assailed might be guilty of aiding and abetting in the perpetration of the crime of manslaughter. In Adams v. State, 65 Ind. 565, it is said that there cannot be an aider and abettor in a case of involuntary manslaughter, since the killing is done without any design or purpose of killing. The rule was applied to a case where the deceased was accidentally killed while defendant was assisting in attempting to take away a pistol from him. 17 The Texas statute provides that there may be accomplices to all offenses except manslaughter and negligent homicide. Fondren v. State, 74 Tex. Cr. 552, 169 S. W. 411. 18 Alabama. Martin v. State, 89 Ala. 115, 8 So. 23, 18 Am. St. Rep. 91; State v. Coleman, 5 Port. 32. Arkansas. Sneed v. State, 47 Ark. 180, 1 S. W. 68; Freel v. State, 21 Ark. 212. Georgia. Brown v. State, 28 Ga. 199; Boyd v. State, 17 Ga. 194; Pope v. State, 13 Ga. App. 711, 79 S. E. 909. Indiana. Goff v. Prime, 26 Ind. 196. Iowa. State v. Gray, 116 Iowa 231, 89 N. W. 987; State v. Mushrush, 97 Iowa 444, 66 S. W. 746. And see State v. Cobley, 128 Iowa 114, 103 N. W. 99. Kentucky. Polly v. Com., 24 S. W. 7. Missouri. State v. Hermann, 117 Mo. 629, 23 S. W. 1071. Ohio. Woolweaver v. State, 50 Ohio St. 277, 34 N. E. 352, 40 Am. St. Rep. 667; Goins v. State, 46 Ohio St. 457, 21 N. E. 476. South Carolina. State v. Putman, 18 S. C. 175, 44 Am. Rep. 569. West Virginia. State v. Yoho, 64 W. Va. 250, 61 S. E. 367; State v. Prater, 52 W. Va. 132, 43 S. E. 230. 19 Georgia. Boyd v. State, 17 Ga. 194; Pope v. State, 13 Ga. App. 711, 79 S. E. 909. Indiana. See Stipp v. State, 11 Ind. 62. statutes.20 There may be accessaries after the fact to both voluntary and involuntary manslaughter.21 § 222. Suicide. There may be principals in the second degree and accessaries before the fact to suicide, where it is regarded as a crime,22 but not otherwise.23 At common-law accessaries before the Louisiana. State v. Kinchen, 126 La. 39, 52 So. 185. Oregon. State v. Holbrook, 98 Ore. 43, 188 Pac. 947, 192 Pac. 640, 193 Pac. 434; State v. Steeves, 29 Ore. 85, 43 Pac. 947. South Carolina. State v. Kennedy, 109 S. C. 141, 95 S. E. 350; State v. Putman, 18 S. C. 175, 44 Am. Rep. 569. And see State v. Burbage, 51 S. C. 284, 28 S. E. 937. Texas. Jones v. State, 13 Tex. 168, 62 Am. Dec. 550; Gerard v. State, 78 Tex. Cr. 294, 181 S. W. 737; Fondren v. State, 74 Tex. Cr. 552, 169 S. W. 411; Bowman v. State (Tex. Cr. App.), 20 S. W. 558. Washington. State v. Robinson, 12 Wash. 349, 41 Pac. 51, 902. And see State v. McFadden, 48 Wash. 259, 93 Pac. 414, 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1140. West Virginia. See State v. Prater, 52 W. Va. 132, 43 S. E. 230. England. Bibithe's Case, 4 Coke 43b; Goff v. Byby, Cro. Eliz. 540, 78 Eng. Reprint 787. See Reg. v. Gaylor, 1 Dears. & B. 288. And see 4 Bl. Com. 36; 1 Hale P. C. 616. 20 Thomas v. State, 73 Fla. 115, 74 So. 1, where the manner in which the homicide was committed does not appear. In Mathis v. State, 45 Fla. 46, 34 So. 287, the court says that it does not see why there could not be an accessary before the fact to manslaughter under certain circumstances, whether accomplished by commission or omission. See also State v. Hermann, 117 Mo. 629, 23 S. W. 1071. One who is present, aiding and abetting, and who would therefore be a principal in the second degree at common law, may be convicted of manslaughter, although the statute denominates such persons accessaries before the fact. Freel v. State, 21 Ark. 212; People v. Newberry, 20 Cal. 439; People v. Barrett, 261 Ill. 232, 103 N. E. 969. Where the statute abolishes the distinction between accessaries before the fact and principals, and provides that all persons concerned in the commission of the offense shall be indicted, tried and punished as principals, a person who advises the doing of an act which results in the death of another may be indicted for the crime of voluntary manslaughter as a principal, though he would have been an accessary at common law. State v. McFadden, 48 Wash. 259, 93 Pac. 414, 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1140. 21 State v. Tapp, 105 S. C. 55, 89 S. E. 394; State v. Burbage, 51 S. C. 284, 28 S. E. 937; Goff v. Byby, Cro. Eliz. 540, 78 Eng. Reprint 787. 22 Alabama. McMahan v. State, 168 Ala. 70, 53 So. 89. Kentucky. Com. v. Hicks, 118 Ky. 637, 82 S. W. 265, 4 Ann. Cas. 1154. Massachusetts. Com. v. Mink, 123 Mass. 422, 25 Am. Rep. 109; Com. v. Bowen, 13 Mass. 356, 7 Am. Dec. 154. Missouri. State v. Webb, 216 Mo. 378, 115 S. W. 998, 20 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1142, 129 Am. St. Rep. 518, 16 Ann. Cas. 518. England. Rex v. Dyson, Russ. & R. 523. As to whether suicide is a crime, see § 686, infra. 23 Blackburn v. State, 23 Ohio St. 146. fact to suicide could not be punished because of the impossibility of convicting the principal, but this rule has been changed by statute in many states.24 Assisting another to commit suicide is sometimes made a substantive offense.25 § 223. Statutes abolishing common-law distinctions. Statutes in many states abolish the common-law distinction between principals in the first and second degree and between principals and accessaries before the fact, and make all persons concerned in the commission of an offense principals, whether they directly commit the act, or aid and abet in its commission, even though not present.26 In other 24 See § 686, infra. 25 See § 686, infra. 26 See the statutes of the various states and the following cases: United States. Pen. Code, § 332; Ruthenberg v. United States, 245 U. S. 480, 62 L. Ed. 414, 38 Sup. Ct. 168; Vane v. United States, 254 Fed. 32; United States v. Rogers, 226 Fed. 512; Rooney v. United States, 203 Fed. 928. Alabama. Jones v. State, 174 Ala. 53, 57 So. 31; McMahan v. State, 168 Ala. 70, 53 So. 89; Smith v. State, 8 Ala. App. 187, 62 So. 575. Arkansas. Ray v. State, 102 Ark. 594, 145 S. W. 881. California. People v. Nolan, 144 Cal. 75, 77 Pac. 774; People v. Rozelle, 78 Cal. 84, 20 Pac. 36; People v. Lewis, 9 Cal. App. 279, 98 Pac. 1078. Connecticut. State v. Wakefield, 88 Conn. 164, 90 Atl. 230; State v. Burns, 82 Conn. 213, 72 Atl. 1083, 16 Ann. Cas. 465; State v. Scott, 80 Conn. 317, 68 Atl. 258; State v. Carey, 76 Conn. 342, 56 Atl. 632. District of Columbia. Maxey V. United States, 30 App. Cas. 63. Idaho. State v. Cramer, 20 Idaho 639, 119 Pac. 30; State v. Bland, 9 Idaho 796, 76 Pac. 780. Illinois. People v. Lucas, 244 Ill. 603, 91 N. E. 659; Lionetti v. People, 183 Ill. 253, 55 N. E. 668; Conley v. People, 170 Ill. 587, 48 N. E. 911; Usselton v. People, 149 Ill. 612, 36 N. E. 952; Spies v. People, 122 Ill. 1, 12 N. E. 865, 17 N. E. 898, 3 Am. St. Rep. 320, petition for writ of error dismissed, 123 U. S. 131, 31 L. Ed. 80, 8 Sup. Ct. 21, 22; Dempsey v. People, 47 Ill. 323; Baxter v. People, 3 Gilm. (8 Ill.) 368. Iowa. State v. Smith, 100 Iowa 1, 69 N. W. 269. Kansas. State v. Hoerr, 88 Kan. 573, 129 Pac. 153; State v. Elliott, 61 Kan. 518, 59 Pac. 1047. Michigan. People v. Wycoff, 150 Mich. 449, 114 N. W. 242. Minnesota. State v. Whitman, 103 Minn. 92, 114 N. W. 363, 14 Ann. Cas. 309. Missouri. State v. Lee, 228 Mo. 480, 128 S. W. 987; State v. Shour, 196 Mo. 202, 95 S. W. 405; State v. Sykes, 191 Mo. 62, 89 S. W. 851; State v. Umble, 115 Mo. 452, 22 S. W. 378; State v. Orrick, 106 Mo. 111, 17 S. W. 176, 329; State v. Fredericks, 85 Mo. 145; State v. Ostman, 147 Mo. App. 422, 126 S. W. 961. Montana. State V. Geddes, 22 Mont. 68, 55 Pac. 919. Nevada. State v. Mangana, 33 Nev. 511, 112 Pac. 693. New York. People v. Michalow, 229 N. Y. 325, 128 N. E. 228; People v. states statutes abolish the distinction between principals in the first and second degree, but preserve the distinction between principals and accessaries before and after the fact.27 So it has been held that the distinction between accessaries before the fact and principals is not abolished by statutes making one who aids, abets or procures another to commit a felony guilty of a substantive crime,28 or providing that such a person may be proceeded against as principal or as an accessary before the fact, according to the nature of the offense committed, and upon conviction shall suffer the like punishment as the principal offender,29 or that accessaries before the fact shall be punished as principals are punished, and may be prosecuted and convicted whether or not the principal has or has not been previously convicted or tried.30 But, on the other hand, it has been held that a statute, providing that accessaries shall be punished in Mills, 178 N. Y. 274, 70 N. E. 786, 67 L. R. A. 131, aff'g 91 App. Div. 331, 86 N. Y. Supp. 529; People v. Bliven, 112 N. Y. 79, 19 N. E. 638, 8 Am. St. Rep. 701; People v. Britton, 134 App. Div. 275, 118 N. Y. Supp. 989. Oklahoma. Pearce v. Territory, 11 Okla. 438, 68 Pac. 504; Drury v. Territory, 9 Okla. 398, 60 Pac. 101; Etter v. State, 11 Okla. Cr. 208, 144 Pac. 560; Bowes v. State, 8 Okla. Cr. 277, 127 Pac. 883; Buchanan v. State, 4 Okla. Cr. 645, 112 Pac. 32, 36 L. R. A. (N. S.) 83; Cox v. State, 3 Okla. Cr. 129, 104 Pac. 1074, 105 Pac. 369; Sturgis v. State, 2 Okla. Cr. 362, 102 Pac. 57. Oregon. State v. Case, 61 Ore. 265, 122 Pac. 304; State v. Lewis, 51 Ore. 467, 94 Pac. 831; State v. Steeves, 29 Ore. 85, 43 Pac. 947. Washington. State v. Wappenstein, 67 Wash. 502, 121 Pac. 989; State v. McFadden, 48 Wash. 259, 93 Pac. 414, 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1140; State v. Gifford, 19 Wash. 464, 53 Pac. 709. West Virginia. Weil v. Black, 76 W. Va. 685, 86 S. E. 666. 27 Gonzales v. State, 74 Tex. Cr. 458, 171 S. W. 1146; Cooper v. State, 69 Tex. Cr. 405, 154 S. W. 989; Red v. State, 39 Tex. Cr. 667, 47 S. W. 1003, 73 Am. St. Rep. 965; Walker v. State, 29 Tex. App. 621, 16 S. W. 548. 28 Skidmore v. State, 80 Neb. 698, 115 N. W. 288; Lamb v. State, 69 Neb. 212, 95 N. W. 1050; Jahnke v. State, 68 Neb. 154, 94 N. W. 158, 104 N. W. 154; Oerter v. State, 57 Neb. 135, 77 N. W. 367; Casey v. State, 49 Neb. 403, 68 N. W. 643. The statute is declaratory of the common law. Casey v. State, 49 Neb. 403, 68 N. W. 643; Dixon v. State, 46 Neb. 298, 64 N. W. 961. 29 State v. Shapiro, 29 R. I. 133, 69 Atl. 340. 30 Able v. Com., 5 Bush (68 Ky.) 698; State v. Ricker, 29 Me. 84; Pierce v. State, 130 Tenn. 24, 168 S. W. 851, Ann. Cas. 1916 B 137; Krueger v. State, 171 Wis. 566, 177 N. W. 917; Karakutza v. State, 163 Wis. 293, 156 N. W. 965. But see Com. v. Hargis, 124 Ky. 356, 99 S. W. 348. As to whether such a provision authorizes the conviction of a person as accessary on an indictment against him as principal, and vice versa, see § 252, infra. the same manner as the principal felon, in effect makes accessaries before the fact principals.81 In Ohio where there are no common-law offenses,32 it is held that as a consequence there are in law no accessaries after the fact.38 In New Jersey the distinction between felonies and misdemeanors is not observed by the Code, and all statutory crimes are misdemeanors or high misdemeanors.34 Hence the common-law distinction between principals and accessaries does not apply to such crimes, but all who aid, abet or participate are principals,85 as in the case of misdemeanors at common law.36 Statutes abolishing the common-law distinctions apply to felonies created after their enactment.87 But, though general in their terms, they are usually held to be intended to meet cases not otherwise specifically provided for by statute, and not to apply to acts which, by specific and distinct statutes, are expressly designated and made subject to punishment as primary acts in themselves.38 § 224. Who may be aiders and abettors or accessaries. Any person who is capable of committing a crime may be guilty as a principal in the second degree or accessary before the fact; and it can make no difference that, by reason of age, sex, condition, or class, he or she is incompetent to commit the particular crime as principal in the first 39 J. L. 467, 78 Atl. 144, aff'g 79 N. J. 87 State v. Elliott, 61 Kan. 518, 59 Pac. 1047. 38 State v. Furth, 82 Wash. 665, 144 Pac. 907. So it has been held that persons offering a bribe are not, by virtue of such a statute, principals in the crime of receiving it, where offering a bribe is a separate primary offense. People v. Bunkers, 2 Cal. App. 197, 84 Pac. 364, 370; State v. Wappenstein, 67 Wash. 502, 121 Pac. 989. Compare Brennan v. People, 113 Ill. App. 361. 39 United States. United States v. Williams, 159 Fed. 310; United States |