§ 250. In general. IV. COUNTERMAND OR WITHDRAWAL V. PROSECUTION AND PUNISHMENT § 251. Principals in the second degree, aiders and abettors. § 252. Accessaries-Indictment. VI. ACTS FOR WHICH A PERSON IS CRIMINALLY RESPONSIBLE § 264. Acts not criminal on part of person committing them. VII. RESPONSIBILITY AS RESULT OF PARTICULAR RELATIONSHIPS A. Principal and Agent, Master and Servant § 265. Responsibility of principal or master-Acts directed or authorized. - Unauthorized acts-In general. § 266. § 267. § 268. § 269. Statutes dispensing with necessity for authority or knowledge. Presumption of authority. § 270. Responsibility of agent or servant. § 271. Responsibility of officers or agents of corporations. § 272. Partners. B. Other Relationships § 273. Husband and wife-Liability of husband for wife's crimes. § 274. Liability of wife for husband's crimes. § 275. Liability of landlord for acts of tenant. I. CLASSIFICATION OF PARTIES § 218. In general. At common law a person may be connected with a felony either as a principal in the first degree, or as a principal in the second degree, or as an accessary before the fact or an accessary after the fact.1 14 Bl. Com. 34, 35; Smith v. State, 8 Ala. App. 187, 62 So. 575; State v. Grady, 34 Conn. 118. And see § 225 et seq., infra. The term accomplice, in its broad sense, includes all persons who have been concerned in the commission of a crime, whether they are principals in the first or second degree or accessaries before or after the fact. It is commonly applied to witnesses, as in the case of the rule requiring corroboration of the testimony of accomplices, rather than to persons accused of committing crimes, though it would be equally appropriate if applied to them. In some states, however, the statute calls those who would be accessaries before the fact at common-law accomplices.* § 219. Offenses in which these distinctions are recognized-In general. The distinction between principals in the first and second degree is necessarily recognized in all offenses, whether they be treason, felony, or misdemeanors. But it is in felonies only, that any distinction is made between principals and accessaries. All concerned are guilty and punishable as principals, if guilty at all, whether present or absent, in treason, and in misdemeanors. The 2 Com. v. Barton, 153 Ky. 465, 156 S. W. 113; Levering v. Com., 132 Ky. 666, 117 S. W. 253, 136 Am. St. Rep. 192, 19 Ann. Cas. 140. An accomplice is any one who cooperates, aids or assists another in the commission of a crime, either as principal or accessary. State v. Wappenstein, 67 Wash. 502, 121 Pac. 989. 3 Levering v. Com., 132 Ky. 666, 117 S. W. 253, 136 Am. St. Rep. 192, 19 Ann. Cas. 140. And see standard works and articles on evidence and witnesses. 4 See § 237, infra. 53 Inst. 138; 1 Hale P. C. 612, 613; 2 Hawk. P. C. c. 29, § 2; United States v. Greathouse, 4 Sawy. 457, Fed. Cas. No. 15,254; United States v. Hanway, 2 Wall. Jr. 139, Fed. Cas. No. 15,299; In re Charge to Grand Jury, 2 Wall. Jr. 134, Fed. Cas. No. 18,276; Homestead Case, 1 Pa. Dist. 785; Reg. v. Clayton, 1 Car. & K. 128; Throgmorton's Case, 1 Dyer 986. And see discussion of this question by Chief Justice Marshall in United States v. Burr, 4 Cranch (8 U. S.) 469, Fed. Cas. No. 14,693. 61 Hale P. C. 613; 2 Hawk. P. C. c. 29, § 2. See also the following decisions: United States. United States v. Gooding, 12 Wheat. 460, 6 L. Ed. 693; United States v. Winslow, 195 Fed. 578, aff'd 227 U. S. 202, 57 L. Ed. 481, 33 Sup. Ct. 253; Richardson v. United States, 181 Fed. 1; United States v. Williams, 159 Fed. 310; Bliss v. United States, 105 Fed. 508. Alabama. Mulvey v. State, 43 Ala. 316, 94 Am. Dec. 684; Smith v. State, 8 Ala. App. 187, 62 So. 575; Gratton v. State, 4 Ala. App. 172, 59 So. 183; Boyd v. State, 3 Ala. App. 178, 57 So. 1019. Arkansas. Strong v. State, 88 Ark. 240, 114 S. W. 239, 22 L. R. A. (N. S.) 560; Burrow v. City of Hot Springs, 85 Ark. 396, 108 S. W. 823; Sanders v. State, 18 Ark. 198. Georgia. Slaughter v. State, 113 Ga. 284, 38 S. E. 854, 84 Am. St. Rep. 242; Kinnebrew v. State, 80 Ga. 232, same was also true of petit larceny at common law, although it was a felony. And it has also been held to be true, by analogy, in the 5 S. E. 56; Groves v. State, 76 Ga. 808; Hawkins v. State, 13 Ga. 322, 58 Am. Dec. 517; Strickland v. State, 14 Ga. App. 591, 81 S. E. 819; Deal v. State, 14 Ga. App. 121, 80 S. E. 537. Illinois. Stevens v. People, 67 Ill. 587. Indiana. Shorter v. State, 179 Ind. 527, 101 N. E. 821; Topper v. State, 118 Ind. 110, 20 N. E. 699; Lay v. State, 12 Ind. App. 362, 39 N. E. 768. Kansas. State v. Stark, 63 Kan. 529, 66 Pac. 243, 88 Am. St. Rep. 251. Kentucky. Com. v. Bottom, 140 Ky. 212, 130 S. W. 1091. Massachusetts. Com. v. Gannett, 1 Allen 7, 79 Am. Dec. 693. Mississippi. 103 Miss. 859, 60 So. 1015; Kittrell v. State, 89 Miss. 666, 42 So. 609; Wortham v. State, 80 Miss. 205, 32 So. 50; Beck v. State, 69 Miss. 217, 13 So. 835; Williams v. State, 12 Smedes & M. 58. State v. Treweilder, Missouri. Reynolds v. Publishers: George Knapp & Co., 155 Mo. App. 612, 135 S. W. 103; State v. Ostman, 147 Mo. App. 422, 126 S. W. 961. Nebraska. Skiles v. State, 85 Neb. 401, 123 N. W. 447; Wagner v. State, 43 Neb. 1, 61 N. W. 85. New Jersey. State v. Spence, 81 N. J. L. 265, 79 Atl. 1029; State v. Wilson, 80 N. J. L. 467, 78 Atl. 144, aff'g 79 N. J. L. 241, 75 Atl. 776; State v. Warady, 78 N. J. L. 687, 75 Atl. 977, aff'g 77 N. J. L. 348, 72 Atl. 37. New York. People v. Schultz, 149 App. Div. 844, 134 N. Y. Supp. 293; People v. Acritelli, 57 Misc. 574, 110 N. Y. Supp. 430; People v. Warden of City Prison, 89 N. Y. Supp. 322, aff'd 86 App. Div. 626, 83 N. Y. Supp. 1113, aff'd 176 N. Y. 577, 68 N. E. 1120; Lowenstein v. People, 54 Barb. R. I. 133, 69 Atl. 340. South Carolina. Hartsville v. McCall, 101 S. C. 277, 85 S. E. 599; State v. Hunter, 79 S. C. 73, 60 S. E. 240; State v. Lymburn, 1 Brev. 397, 2 Am. Dec. 669. Tennessee. Hyde v. State, 131 Tenn. 208, 174 S. W. 1127; Thompson v. State, 105 Tenn. 177, 58 S. W. 213, 51 L. R. A. 883, 80 Am. St. Rep. 875; Howlett v. State, 5 Yerg. 144; State v. Smith, 2 Yerg. 273. Texas. Berdell v. State, 87 Tex. Cr. 310, 220 S. W. 1101; Albright v. State, 73 Tex. Cr. 116, 164 S. W. 1001; Oliver v. State, 65 Tex. Cr. 150, 144 S. W. 604; Strong v. State, 52 Tex. Cr. 133, 105 S. W. 785. Virginia. Watts v. Com., 99 Va. 872, 39 S. E. 706. Wisconsin. Wilson v. State, 1 Wis. 184. England. Reg. v. Clayton, 1 Car. & K. 128; Reg. v. Moland, 2 Moody C. C. 276. This is true in the case of statutory misdemeanors, whether the aiders and abettors are referred to in the statute or not. United States v. Martin, 176 Fed. 110. 72 Inst. 183; 4 Bl. Com. 36; 1 Hale P. C. 530; 1 Hawk. P. C. c. 29, §§ 1, 24. Of course this is true where petit larceny is a misdemeanor. Slaughter case of violations of municipal ordinances, in jurisdictions where the violation of such an ordinance is not regarded as a crime in the strict sense of that term.8 § 220. Statutory offenses. The distinction between principals and accessaries applies to statutory felonies as well as to felonies at common law, unless the statute shows a contrary intent. But where the plain intent of the statute is to inflict punishment only upon the person actually committing the offense, 10 or upon certain specified classes of persons,11 others cannot be brought within its provisions as principals upon proof that they were aiders or abettors. A statute providing in general terms for the punishment of persons who aid, abet or procure the commission of a felony, applies to acts made felonies by subsequent legislation. 12 But if an act which constitutes one a technical accessary has by statute been made an v. State, 113 Ga. 284, 38 S. E. 854, 84 Am. St. Rep. 242; Ward v. People, 6 Hill (N. Y.) 144; State v. Gaston, 78 N. C. 93, 21 Am. Rep. 459. See Shay v. People, 22 N. Y. 317. In North Carolina all larceny has been reduced by statute to the degree of petit larceny, and in that state there can be no accessaries in larceny, but all concerned are guilty as principals. State v. Stroud, 95 N. C. 626; State v. Gaston, 73 N. C. 93, 21 Am. Rep. 459. 8 De Freese v. City of Atlanta, 12' Ga. App. 201, 76 S. E. 1077; Morse v. City of Macon, 9 Ga. App. 829, 72 S. E. 284; Harbuck v. City of Atlanta, 7 Ga. App. 441, 67 S. E. 108; Toney v. City of Atlanta, 6 Ga. App. 356, 64 S. E. 1106. As where the penalty for violation is recoverable in a civil action. Village of St. Johnsbury v. Thompson, 59 Vt. 300, 9 Atl. 571, 59 Am. Rep. 731. As to whether the violation of such an ordinance is a crime, see § 4, supra. 91 Hale P. C. 613, 614. See also the following decisions: England. Reg. v. Tracy, 6 Mod. 30. 10 Com. v. Carter, 94 Ky. 527, 23 S. W. 344; Frey v. Com., 83 Ky. 190, 7 Ky. L. Rep. 174. 11 So persons outside of the desig nated classes cannot be brought within a statute providing for the punishment of any person who shall be the proprietor, manager, or in any way have the control of or run a gaming house. Strong v. State, 52 Tex. Cr. 133, 105 S. W. 785; or of owners, lessees, or tenants of disorderly houses. Mitchell v. State, 34 Tex. Cr. 311, 30 S. W. 810. 12 Lamb v. State, 69 Neb. 212, 95 N. W. 1050. independent crime, he thereby becomes a principal in such new offense, and the law applicable to the trial of accessaries does not apply.18 And where a statute defining an offense confines it to persons of a particular class, and contains a provision for the punishment of aiders and abettors which is also confined to the same class, persons outside of that class who aid or abet persons within it in the commission of the offense are not subject to prosecution under a general provision for the punishment of aiders and abettors.14 § 221. Homicide. There may be accessaries before the fact in murder at common law, and in murder in all its degrees under the statutes.15 There may be principals in the second degree, aiders and abettors, and accessaries before the fact in involuntary manslaughter,16 where it consists in the unlawful killing of a human being without any design to effect death by one who wantonly or maliciously shoots at or in any dwelling house or other house which is being used or occupied. Thomas v. State, 73 Fla. 115, 74 So. 1; Mathis v. State, 45 Fla. 46, 34 So. 287. 16 Where death results from shooting into a house. Brista v. State, 126 Ark. 565, 191 S. W. 7. Or from failure to provide life preservers and fire fighting apparatus on steamers, as required by the federal statutes. United States v. Van Schaick, 134 Fed. 592. If two men drive separate vehicles at a furious and dangerous speed along the highway, each inciting and abetting the other, and one of them drives over and kills a person, the one thus causing the death is guilty of manslaughter as principal in the first degree, and the other is guilty as principal in the second degree. And the same would be true of two persons in the same vehicle, one driving and the other inciting and abetting him. Reg. v. Swindall, 2 Car. & K. 230. If one should incite another to so |