the indictment or presentment must be found or exhibited within a specified time "after the offense shall have been made known to a public officer, having the power to direct a public prosecution." 36 It is only the time of concealment or during which the offender or offense is unknown that is omitted in computing the period of limitation under statutes of this character.3 37 § 206. Persons fleeing from justice. The federal statute of limitations provides that its provisions shall not extend to persons fleeing from justice,38 and similar provisions are found in the statutes of some of the states.39 It is evasion of the authority of the courts of justice that makes one a fugitive from justice.40 A person fleeing beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the court in which the offense alone can be prosecuted is a fugitive from justice.41 And he need not have left the United States in order to come within the provision of the federal statute.42 Nor is it necessary that he be found. period was at work nearby for a citizen of said county. Harris v. State, 10 Ga. App. 366, 73 S. E. 413. 36 State v. West, 105 La. 639, 30 So. 119; State v. Anderson, 51 La. Ann. 1181, 25 So. 990; State v. Touchet, 46 La. Ann. 827, 15 So. 390; State v. Victor, 36 La. Ann. 978; State V. Tinney, 26 La. Ann. 460. A deputy sheriff is an officer having power to direct a public prosecution within the meaning of such a provision. State v. Stelly, 126 La. 659, 52 So. 864. 37 Pitts v. State, 147 Ga. 801, 95 S. E. 706; s. c., 22 Ga. App. 247, 95 S. E. 935; Colvin v. State, 127 Ind. 403, 26 N. E. 888. 38 United States v. Hewecker, 79 Fed. 59; United States v. O'Brian, 3 Dill (U. S.) 381, Fed. Cas. No. 15, 908. A prosecution is not barred although the time between the commission of the crime and the flight of the accused and the time between his re-arrest and the finding of an indictment against him, when added together, amount to more than the stat Louisiana State v. Gibson, 108 La. 464, 32 So. 332; State v. Anderson, 51 La. Ann. 1181, 25 So. 990; State v. Victor, 36 La. Ann. 978; State v. Vines, 34 La. Ann. 1073; State v. Barton, 32 La. Ann. 278. Nebraska. State v. Robertson, 55 40 Howgate v. United States, 7 App. Cas. (D. C.) 217. 41 Howgate v. United States, 7 App. Cas. (D. C.) 217. 42 Howgate v. United States, 7 App. Cas. (D. C.) 217. If the accused leaves the district where the crime was committed, and is found in another state and district where he does not reside, under in another jurisdiction.48 And it has been held that an offender who conceals himself to avoid arrest is a fugitive from justice within the meaning of a state statute although he does not leave the state.44 A person flees from justice if he goes away for the purpose of avoiding arrest or to escape prosecution.45 But it has been held that it is not necessary to show that he left for the purpose of avoiding a prosecution anticipated or begun, and that it is immaterial that he left openly and in the immediate pursuit of his business.46 And it has also been held that it is not necessary that there should have been an intent to avoid the justice of the United States in order to come within the provisions of the federal statute, but that it is sufficient if there is an intention to avoid the justice of a state having criminal jurisdiction over the same territory and the same act.47 Nor is it necessary that the course of justice should have been put in operation at the time of his flight by the finding of an indictment or the filing of an information or by the making of a complaint before a magistrate.48 A person does not cease to be a fugitive from justice because he has been seen in public, nor because officers of the government have conversed with him and have failed to take action to apprehend him,49 nor because, after having removed his domicile from the state where the crime was committed, he makes brief transient visits to it for specific purposes and without any intention of remaining.50 But circumstances indicating a purpose to evade the authority and jurisdiction of the local courts, he may be considered a fugitive from justice. Greene v. United States, 154 Fed. 401, aff'g 146 Fed. 803, certiorari denied 207 U. S. 596, 52 L. Ed. 357, 28 Sup. Ct. 261 (mem. dec.). 43 Porter v. United States, 91 Fed. 494. 44 State v. Miller, 188 Mo. 370, 87 S. W. 484; State v. Harvell, 89 Mo. 588, 1 S. W. 837. 45 State v. Washburn, 48 Mo. 240. 46 It is sufficient that he left the jurisdiction where the crime was committed and was found in another jurisdiction. In re Bruce, 132 Fed. 390, aff'd 136 Fed. 1022. 47 Streep v. United States, 160 U. S. 128, 40 L. Ed. 365, 16 Sup. Ct. 244. 48 Streep v. United States, 160 U. S. 128, 40 L. Ed. 365, 16 Sup. Ct. 244. And see United States v. White, 5 Cranch C. C. (U. S.) 38, Fed. Cas. No. 16,675. If a person indicted for a crime flees from justice, the statute will not run during the time of his absence against other crimes committed by him before his flight. Howgate v. United States, 7 App. Cas. (D. C.) 217. 49 Howgate v. United States, 7 App. Cas. (D. C.), 217. 50 In re Bruce, 132 Fed. 390, aff'd 136 Fed. 1022. a person cannot be regarded as a fugitive from justice during the time of his imprisonment in a foreign country.51 Provisions of this character apply to a person who has been in custody and afterwards escapes, 52 or who has absconded after having been released on bond.53 § 207. When prosecution is deemed commenced-In general. Where the proceeding is instituted by the finding of an indictment, the prosecution is begun, and the running of the statute is interrupted, when a valid indictment is returned, rather than when a warrant thereunder is issued.54 And where it is instituted by presentment, the filing of a valid presentment is a commencement of the prosecution and will stop the running of the statute.55 A prosecution by affidavit and information is commenced at the time the information is filed with the clerk by the state through its proper officers,56 and a prosecution before a justice of the peace for an offense punishable by him is commenced when a warrant is issued.57 51 As where a person accused of murder shot another on an American vessel in Havana harbor and before the deceased died was imprisoned in Havana for another offense. United States v. Hewecker, 79 Fed. 59. 52 This is true though his keepers or others have negligently or wilfully aided and abetted his escape. Howgate v. United States, 7 App. Cas. (D. C.) 217. 53 State v. Barton, 32 La. Ann. 278. 54 Parker v. State, 2 Ala. App. 127, 56 So. 872; Gardner v. State, 161 Ind. 262, 68 N. E. 163; State v. Hoke, 84 Ind. 137; Jones v. State, 14 Ind. 346; State v. Williams, 151 N. C. 660, 65 S. E. 908. If the warrant is issued within the time prescribed, it operates by relation as though issued immediately upon the report of the grand jury. State v. Smith, 72 Kan. 244, 83 Pac. 832. 55 State v. Kiefer, 90 Md. 165, 44 Atl. 1043; State v. Williams, 151 N. C. 660, 65 S. E. 908; State v. Cox, 28 N. C. 440. If the defendant is presented by the grand jury within the time prescribed, the prosecution is not barred although the indictment is not made out until after the statutory period has elapsed. Brock v. State, 22 Ga. 98. A prosecution by presentment for a misdemeanor is commenced when the presentment is made rather than at the time of filing an information upon it. If not barred when the presentment is made, it will not be barred by failure to file an indictment or information upon it within the prescribed time. Com, v. Christian, 7 Gratt. (Va.) 631. 56 Gardner v. State, 161 Ind. 262, 68 N. E. 163. See also Hoover v. State, 110 Ind. 349, 11 N. E. 434. 57 Such a prosecution is not barred where the warrant is issued within the time prescribed for commencing the prosecution although the defendant is not arrested until after the expiration of such time. Com. v. Egler, 24 Pa. Dist. Ct. 939. Some of the statutes provide that the indictment must be found or the information instituted within a specified time after the commission of the offense, in which case the prosecution is barred if the indictment is not found or the information instituted within the time prescribed,58 and the statute is not tolled by the filing of a complaint before a magistrate,50 or the issuance of a warrant by him,60 even 58 United States. Warren v. United States, 199 Fed. 753, 43 L. R. A. (N. S.) 278; Lonabaugh v. United States, 179 Fed. 476, rev'g 158 Fed. 314. California. People v. Ayhens, 85 Cal. 86, 24 Pac. 635. Delaware. State v. Jacobs, 2 Harr. 548. Florida. Weinert v. State, 35 Fla. 229, 17 So. 570; Warrace v. State, 27 Fla. 362, 8 So. 748. Georgia. Flint v. State, 12 Ga. App. 169, 76 S. E. 1032. Illinois. Lamkin v. People, 94 Ill. 501; Garrison v. People, 87 Ill. 96. Iowa State v. Disbrow, 130 Iowa 19, 106 N. W. 263, 8 Ann. Cas. 190. Louisiana. State v. Victor, 36 La. Ann. 978. Nebraska. State v. Robertson, 55 Neb. 41, 75 N. W. 37; Boughn v. State, 44 Neb. 889, 62 N. W. 1094. Oklahoma. Ex parte Lacey, 6 Okla. 4, 37 Pac. 1095; State v. Fulkerson, 16 Okla. Cr. 250, 182 Pac. 725. Pennsylvania. Com. v. Haas, 57 Pa. St. 443. deemed commenced when the information was filed in the trial court. State v. Fulkerson, 16 Okla. Cr. 250, 182 Pac. 725. The finding of a presentment is not the finding or institution of an indictment. United States v. Slacum, 1 Cranch C. C. (U. S.) 485, Fed. Cas. No. 16,311. In State v. Moore, 163 Mo. App. 374, 143 S. W. 879, it was contended that, under a statute providing that the mode of procedure first instituted, by the filing of an indictment or information for any offense, shall be pursued to the exclusion of the other so long as the same shall be pending and undetermined, the filing of an information before the offense was barred did not interrupt the running of the statute laid by it until a pending indictment for the same offense was finally determined or dismissed, and that as said indictment was not dismissed until after the statutory period had expired, the information should be treated as not having been filed until the time of such dismissal, and hence a prosecution thereunder was barred. It was held that even if the rule contended for was a sound one, it did not apply to the case at bar since the offenses charged in the indictment and in the information were not the same. though the accused is arrested and a preliminary examination is held, and he is bound over. 61 An indictment is found within the meaning of the statute when it is duly presented by the grand jury in open court, and there received and filed. Where the statute merely requires the prosecution to be instituted within a specified time after the commission of the offense, and the proceeding is instituted by making a complaint before a magistrate, a prosecution will generally be deemed to be commenced when a warrant is duly issued in good faith and placed in the hands of a proper officer for service, rather than on the date when the indictment or information is filed, at least where the warrant is executed without unnecessary delay.63 And it has been held that the prosecution is commenced at that time though there may be subsequent unnecessary delay in executing the writ, but that the time during which such delay continues will be included as a part of the period of limitation prescribed by the statute.64 In some Under a statute requiring the indictment, presentment, information or complaint "to be made and exhibited within one year after the offense is committed,' a prosecution is not barred where an information is presented to a justice of the peace and a warrant issued thereon within a year although the accused is not arrested, examined or tried until after the expiration of a year. Newell v. State, 2 Conn. 38. 61 State v. Robertson, 55 Neb. 41, 75 N. W. 37; Boughn v. State, 44 Neb. 889, 62 N. W. 1094. See also State v. Arlin, 39 N. H. 179. 62 State v. Disbrow, 130 Iowa 19, 106 N. W. 263, 8 Ann. Cas. 190; State v. Fulkerson, 16 Okla. Cr. 250, 182 Pac. 725. 63 Indiana. State v. Simpson, 166 Ind. 211, 76 N. E. 544, 1005. Iowa. State v. Groome, 10 Iowa 308. And see State v. Disbrow, 130 Iowa 19, 106 N. W. 263, 8 Ann. Cas. 190. Kansas. State v. Bowman, 106 Kan. 430, 188 Pac. 242; State V. White, 76 Kan. 654, 92 Pac. 829, 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 556; State v. Water Vermont. State v. Stevens, 64 Vt. 590, 25 Atl. 838. Washington. State v. Erving, 19 Wash. 435, 53 Pac. 717. In Rouse v. State, 44 Fla. 148, 32 So. 784, 1 Ann. Cas. 317, an information filed more than the statutory period after the commission of the of fense was quashed although an affidavit charging the defendant with the offense was made before a justice of the peace and a warrant was issued thereon within the statutory period, where the information did not show that it was based upon the proceedings before the justice or had any connection with it. 64 State v. Bowman, 106 Kan. 430, 188 Pac. 242; In re Broadhead, 74 Kan. 401, 86 Pac. 458. Where the county attorney directs the sheriff not to make present service, and he delays five months before making the arrest although he has |