continuing one.71 Similarly, the offense of receiving stolen goods is complete and the statute commences to run when the defendant receives the property, and the fact that he retains possession of it does. not make the offense a continuing one or prevent the running of the statute.72 And the statute runs against the offense of entering upon the practice of veterinary medicine or surgery without a license from the time when the accused begins to engage in such practice, though he subsequently continues to engage in it,73 and against the offense of interfering or tampering with a water meter with intent to defraud from the time when the interference or tampering takes place, though water is thereafter stolen.74

75

§ 199.- Conspiracy. Where the crime of conspiracy is not complete until an overt act is committed in pursuance of the conspiracy, the statute runs from the date of the commission of such an overt act, rather than from the date of the formation of the conspiracy.76 If the conspiracy contemplates but a single overt act, the statute runs from the date of its commission, and the prosecution is barred after the expiration of the statutory period computed from that time.77 But if the conspiracy is a continuing one, contemplating various overt acts and the consequent continuing of the conspiracy beyond the commission of the first one, each overt act gives a new, separate, and distinct effect to the conspiracy,78 and the statute commences to run from the commission of the last of them. Hence if an overt act was committed within the statutory period, the prosecution is not barred

71 The crime is completed and the statute commences to run from the time when the bankrupt fails to turn over the property to the trustee on demand. United States v. Phillips, 196 Fed. 574.

The property is concealed where the property is knowingly and fraudulently concealed before bankruptcy, and on the appointment of a trustee the bankrupt fails to surrender it or to disclose the disposition made of it. In such case a demand may be presumed. Warren v. United States, 199 Fed. 753, 43 L. R. A. (N. S.) 278.

72 Jones v. State, 14 Ind. 346. 73 The prosecution is barred where more than the statutory period has elapsed since that time, although he

76 Brown v. Elliott, 225 U. S. 392, 54 L. Ed. 1136, 32 Sup. Ct. 812; Breese v. United States, 203 Fed. 824; Lonabaugh v. United States, 179 Fed. 476, rev'g judgment 158 Fed. 314; United States v. Bradford, 148 Fed. 413, aff'd 152 Fed. 616.

77 See Jones v. United States, 162 Fed. 417, certiorari denied 212 U. S. 576, 53 L. Ed. 657, 29 Sup. Ct. 685 (mem. dec.).

78 See ch. 15, infra.

although the original conspiracy was formed and other overt acts were committed more than the statutory period before the prosecution was instituted.79 An act which will prevent the running of the statute under this rule must be an active rather than a passive one, must be the act of one or more of the conspirators, and must be done to effect the object of the conspiracy.80

If a conspirator withdraws from the conspiracy, as he may do,81 the statute commences to run as to him from the date of such withdrawal, notwithstanding the conspiracy is a continuing one and though there are subsequent overt acts by his co-conspirators.82 But some affirmative action on his part is necessary to constitute a withdrawal within the meaning of this rule,83 and even after such withdrawal a conspirator may again become responsible by participating or acquiescing in acts subsequently done in pursuance of the conspiracy.84

Embezzlement, false pretenses, fraud, etc. In embezzlement the statute runs from the date of the fraudulent misapplication or conversion of the money or property.85 And generally no demand is necessary to put it in motion,86 at least unless the defendant holds the money or property in some official capacity, such as guardian, trustee of an express trust, or treasurer of a society or corporation,87 or under such circumstances that he cannot know to whom he can

legally turn it over.88 So in the case of embezzlement by a public. officer, the statute runs from the date of the commission of the offense, rather than from the date when he failed or refused to pay to his successor on demand.89 And where the offense is the fraudulent failure or refusal of a public officer to turn over public funds in his hands to his successor on the expiration of his term of office, the statute runs on the failure to pay over the money, and no demand is necessary.90 But under a statute making it an offense for a public officer to fail to pay over public money intrusted to him on demand, limitations do not commence to run until there has been an actual valid demand.91

The crime of withholding money by an attorney from his client is complete and the statute commences to run whenever the act or series of acts necessary to constitute to constitute a criminal withholding have transpired.92 Where the statute defines the offense as being a failure to pay the money on demand, or within six months after receipt thereof, limitations run from the date of a demand or the expiration of the six months, whichever first happens, nor is the statute tolled by demands made after the expiration of the six months.93

The statute commences to run against the offense of obtaining money or property under false pretenses from the date when the money or property is delivered to the person making the false representations,94 and against the offense of using the mails to defraud from the time when a letter is mailed in pursuance of the scheme to defraud, regardless of when such scheme was devised.95

88 See People v. Kinard, 14 Cal. App. 283, 111 Pac. 504.

89 Baschleben v. People, 188 Ill. 261, 58 N. E. 946; Weimer v. People, 186 Ill. 503, 58 N. E. 378. And see State v. Locke, 73 W. Va. 713, 81 S. E. 401.

90 State v. Mason, 108 Ind. 48, 8 N. E. 716. And see State v. Ensley, 177 Ind. 483, 97 N. E. 113, Ann. Cas. 1914 D 1306.

91 No constructive demand is sufficient. Com. v. Shoener, 216 Pa. 71, 64 Atl. 890, aff'g 30 Pa. Super. Ct. 321, writ of error dismissed 207 U. S. 188, 52 L. Ed. 163, 28 Sup. Ct. 110. See also § 542, infra.

92 United States v. Irvine, 98 U. S.

450, 25 L. Ed. 193; State v. Locke, 73 W. Va. 713, 81 S. E. 401.

93 State v. Locke, 73 W. Va. 713, 81 S. E. 401.

94 State v. Smith, 162 Iowa 336, 144 N. W. 32, 49 L. R. A. (N. S.) 834; State v. Gerhardt, 248 Mo. 535, 154 S. W. 722.

Where the representations are made within the statutory period, the prosecution is not barred although the representations were made more than the statutory period before the finding of the indictment. State v. Riley, 65 N. J. L. 192, 46 Atl. 700, judgment rev'd on other grounds, 65 N. J. L. 624, 48 Atl. 536.

95 Bowers V. United States, 244

§201. Rape, seduction, bigamy, abandonment, etc. In rape the statute runs from the date of the act of intercourse charged in the indictment,96 and if that act occurred within the statutory period, the accused is not entitled to an acquittal because the evidence shows other acts of intercourse, a prosecution for which would be barred.97 The crime of seducing or having carnal knowledge of a woman of previous chaste character is complete, and the statute of limitations. runs from the date of the first act of sexual intercourse, and subsequent acts of intercourse do not prevent the running of the statute, since after the first act the woman is not of previous chaste character,98 unless it appears that after the first act, and during the statutory period, she had reformed and was again seduced.99 But it has been held that the prosecution is not barred under a statute making it an offense to obtain carnal knowledge of a woman by virtue of any false or feigned promise of marriage,1 or to seduce and debauch any unmarried woman,2 where acts of intercourse occur within the statutory period, to which the woman is induced to consent by renewed promises of marriage, although the original promise was made and the first act of intercourse occurred more than the statutory period before the commencement of the prosecution.

The crime of bigamy is complete when the bigamous marriage is contracted and the statute of limitations commences to run at that time. The fact that cohabitation with the second woman is continued does not make the crime a continuing one, or prevent the running of the statute. But the offense of cohabitation under a bigamous mar

Fed. 641; Mitchell v. United States, 196 Fed. 874.

96 Eckermann v. State, 57 Tex. Cr. 287, 123 S. W. 424; Ex parte Black, 55 Tex. Cr. 121, 113 S. W. 534.

97 Eckermann v. State, 57 Tex. Cr. 287, 123 S. W. 424.

98 Hatton v. State, 92 Miss. 651, 46 So. 708; State v. Stoker, Mo. -, 190 S. W. 295; State v. McMahon, 234 Mo. 611, 137 S. W. 872; People v. Nelson, 153 N. Y. 90, 46 N. E. 1040, 60 Am. St. Rep. 592, rev'g 91 Hun 635, 36 N. Y. Supp. 1130. 99 State v. Stoker, S. W. 295. And see People v. Millspaugh, 11 Mich. 278.

Mo.

190

1 Norton v. State, 72 Miss. 128, 16

So. 264, 18 So. 916, 48 Am. St. Rep. 538.

2 This is true where the woman is seduced under promise of marriage more than the statutory period before the institution of the prosecution, and the intercourse is broken off and then renewed within the statutory period in reliance on a new promise. Where there is no evidence that the woman was unchaste with other men, all that it is necessary to show in respect to her chastity is that she would not have yielded in the particular case but for the express promise of marriage. People v. Millspaugh, 11 Mich. 278.

3 Scoggins v. State, 32 Ark. 205;