junction with the use of intoxicating liquors, is not responsible, although temporary insanity resulting from the use of liquor alone would not be a defense under the statute.89

A person is not responsible for acts committed while he is suffering from mania or insanity caused by the voluntary use of a drug, provided it is permanent and fixed in character, so as to destroy the knowledge of right and wrong.40 But the mere fact that his moral nature has become degraded and depraved by the excessive use of drugs will not excuse him.41 And it has been said that insanity caused by the immoderate use of drugs will not be regarded with the same leniency as insanity due to the act of God.42 Insanity or frenzy caused by a drug administered to the defendant without his knowledge is a complete defense.48 And the same is true of insanity, delirium, or frenzy produced by a drug administered as a medicine or prescribed by a physician, at least un

39 The provision of Pen. Code, art. 41, that neither intoxication nor temporary insanity of mind, produced by the voluntary recent use of ardent spirits shall constitute any excuse for the commission of crime, does not apply in such cases. Hazelwood v. State, 79 Tex. Cr. 483, 186 S. W. 201; Lawrence v. State, 65 Tex. Cr. 93, 143 S. W. 636; Moss v. State, 57 Tex. Cr. 620, 124 S. W. 647, 136 Am. St. Rep. 1001; Phillips v. State, 50 Tex. Cr. 481, 98 S. W. 868; Edwards v. State, 38 Tex. Cr. 386, 43 S. W. 112, 39 L. R. A. 262.

40 Perkins v. United States, 228 Fed. 408, rev'g 221 Fed. 109; Strickland v. State, 137 Ga. 115, 72 S. E. 922; State v. Morris, 263 Mo. 339, 172 S. W. 603; State v. Mewhinney, 43 Utah 135, 134 Pac. 632, L. R. A. 1916 D 590, Ann. Cas. 1916 C 537.

41 Sharp v. State, 161 Ind. 288, 68 N. E. 286.

42 Wilcox v. State, 94 Tenn. 106, 28 S. W. 312.

43 Pribble v. People, 49 Colo. 210, 112 Pac. 220; People v. Penman, 271 Ill. 82, 110 N. E. 894; State V. Hawkins, 23 Wash. 289, 63 Pac. 258;

44

State v. Alie, 82 W. Va. 601, 96 S.
E. 1011.

44 As where the defendant commits a homicide while in a frenzy produced by an overdose of morphine administered to him by his brother as a medicine. State v. Rippy, 104 N. C. 752, 10 S. E. 259.

A person is not responsible for a homicide committed by him while in

a

delirium amounting to insanity, caused by a dose of chloral, taken in good faith in accordance with a doctor's prescription, under the belief that it would be a sedative, although the chloral might have been harmless but for a settled state of mental disorder produced by habitual drinking. Nor is he responsible where the delirium or frenzy results from taking a larger dose than that prescribed, where he believed that he would fall into unconsciousness from the larger dose, and had no notice or reason to believe that it was likely to produce delirium or throw him into an uncontrollable frenzy. Perkins v. United States, 228 Fed. 408, rev'g 221 Fed. 109.

less taken with knowledge that it was likely to produce that result.45 A person is not presumed to know that a physician's prescription may produce a dangerous frenzy.46 But he is bound to take notice of a warning appearing on the prescription, especially if he reads it, and if he has notice from the prescription, or the instructions of the physician, or from the effect of a previous dose, or all of these together, that the drug may throw him into an uncontrollable frenzy, then such a frenzy caused by the drug will not relieve him from responsibility.47

The fact that the accused was addicted to the immoderate use of drugs, 48 or that he was under the influence of a drug when the offense was committed,49 will constitute a defense in those cases where a specific intent is an essential element of the offense, if he was thereby rendered incapable of entertaining the requisite intent. And it may, under such circumstances, reduce a homicide from murder to manslaughter.50 But if, nothwithstanding his use of drugs, the accused is capable of forming the necessary intent, then such use is no defense, and will not reduce the grade of the crime, even when a specific intent is essential.51

It has been held that the accused may show that he was addicted to the habitual and excessive use of opium, and that at the time when the offense was committed he had been deprived of his accustomed supply of the drug, and may prove what effect such deprivation would have upon his mental condition, as tending to show whether his mental condition was such that he was able to commit the offense.52

V. CORPORATIONS

§ 139. In general. It was at one time doubted whether a corporation could be guilty of any crime.53 But it is now well settled that

45 Intoxication or delirium from a drug used with knowledge that it is likely to produce intoxication or delirium obviously stands on the same footing as intoxication from alcohol." Perkins v. United States, 228 Fed. 408, rev'g 221 Fed. 109.

46 Perkins V. United States, 228 Fed. 408, rev'g 221 Fed. 109.

47 Perkins V. United States, 228 Fed. 408, rev'g 221 Fed. 109.

48 State v. English, 164 N. C. 497, 80 S. E. 72; Wilcox v. State, 94 Tenn. 106, 28 S. W. 312.

49 Williams v. Com., 113 Ky. 652, 68 S. W. 871; Com. v. Detweiler, 229 Pa. 304, 78 Atl. 271.

50 State v. English, 164 N. C. 497, 80 S. E. 72; Com. v. Detweiler, 229 Pa. 304, 78 Atl. 271; Jones v. Com., 75 Pa. St. 403. And see Wilcox v. State, 94 Tenn. 106, 28 S. W. 312.

51 State v. English, 164 N. C. 497, 80 S. E. 72; Com. v. Detweiler, 229 Pa. 304, 78 Atl. 271.

52 Rogers v. State, 33 Ind. 543. 535 Fletcher Cyc. Corp. § 3364 et seq.; Anon., 12 Mod. 559. And see

corporations may be indicted and punished for offenses consisting in mere nonfeasance, such as a failure to perform duties imposed upon them by law, and for many offenses consisting in misfeasance as well.

There are some crimes, however, of which, from their very nature, corporations cannot be guilty, as perjury.55 And according to some courts they cannot be punished for crimes involving malice or evil intent, although the weight of modern authority is to the contrary.56 They cannot be indicted for a felony in any case where the only punishment prescribed is death or imprisonment,57 nor in any case where imprisonment is an imperative part of the punishment prescribed.58 But a corporation may be indicted and convicted for a felony where the punishment prescribed is a fine or imprisonment,59 or a fine with a provision for imprisonment in case it is not paid.60 And the same has been held to be true where the punishment is by fine and imprisonment, on the ground that the latter provision is inoperative where the defendant is a corporation.6:

61

Even where a corporation cannot be punished for violating a statute because the penalty imposed is imprisonment, such violation may nevertheless be regarded as criminal so as to permit the punishment of aiders and abettors, 62 or of persons who enter into a conspiracy. to procure its commission.63

held that a railroad company may be indicted for failure to provide drinking water in its cars as required by statute.

A corporation may be prosecuted criminally for carrying on business without having paid a city license tax. Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. City of Charlottesville, 126 Va. 800, 101 S. E. 357.

55 See New York Cent. & H. River P. Co. v. United States, 212 U. S. 481, 53 L. Ed. 613, 29 Sup. Ct. 304; United States v. John Kelso Co., 86 Fed. 304; Com. v. Pulaski County Agricultural & Mechanical Ass'n, 92 Ky. 197, 17 S. W. 442; State v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 90 N. J. L. 372, 103 Atl. 685. 565 Fletcher Cyc. Corp. § 3369. 57 Com. v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 152 Ky. 320, 153 S. W. 459, 45 L. R. A. (N. S.) 344. And see Com. v. Proprietors of New Bedford Bridge, 2 Gray (Mass.) 339; State v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 90 N. J. L. 372, 103 Atl. 685.

58 United States v. Braun & Fitts,

158 Fed. 456; State v. Ross, 55 Ore. 450, 104 Pac. 596, 106 Pac. 1022, 42 L. R. A. (N. S.) 601, 613.

59 Joplin Mercantile Co. v. United States, 213 Fed. 926, aff'd 236 U. S. 531, 59 L. Ed. 705, 35 Sup. Ct. 291; State v. Belle Springs Creamery Co., 83 Kan. 389, 111 Pac. 474, L. R. A. 1915 D 515.

60 Though the corporation cannot be imprisoned, the fine may be collected through the means provided for the collection of money judgments. Overland Cotton Mill Co. v. People, 32 Colo. 263, 75 Pac. 924, 105 Am. St. Rep. 74.

61 United States v. Union Supply Co., 215 U. S. 50, 54 L. Ed. 87, 30 Sup. Ct. 15; Southern Ry. Co. v. State, 125 Ga. 287, 54 S. E. 160, 114 Am. St. Rep. 203, 5 Ann. Cas. 411; Com. v. Pulaski County Agricultural & Mechanical Ass'n, 92 Ky. 197, 17 S. W. 442.

62 United States v. Van Schaick, 134 Fed. 592.

68 United States v. Young & Hol

A corporation indicted for a statutory offense cannot, if guilty, escape punishment by showing that the act constituting the offense was ultra vires. 64

§ 140. Whether corporations are "persons" within criminal statutes. It has been held by some courts that, since statutes imposing a penalty are to be strictly construed, they do not apply to corporations unless they included them in express terms or by clear implication.65 But according to the weight of modern authority the word "person" in a penal statute which is intended to inhibit an act means person in law, and includes corporations, if they are within the spirit and purpose of the statute.66 And in many states this is