to distinguish moral or legal right from moral or legal wrong, and to recognize the particular act as morally or legally wrong.1 If there is an insane delusion that God has directed the commission of the act, it cannot be said that the defendant knows the act to be wrong although he knows that it is forbidden by law, and he will be held not to be responsible although he has such knowledge. But a belief that providence will intervene to prevent the detection and punishment of any act he may commit is not a defense where he knows that his act is a violation of the criminal law. § 119. -Insane delusions. A man may be insane as to certain objects, or on certain subjects only, and perfectly sane with respect to other objects and on other subjects. In such a case he labors under partial insanity, or insane delusions. Because of disease of the mind he sees objects in a false light, or believes in the existence of facts which do not exist. In respect to this species of insanity the judges in McNaghten's case, referred to in a preceding section, held that in case a person labors under a partial delusion only, and is not in other respects insane, he must be considered in the same situation as to responsibility as if the facts with respect to which the delusion exists were real, and that if he would have been exempt from punishment if the facts had been really as he, by reason of his delusion, supposed them to be, he is not criminally responsible, but if he would have been liable to punishment even if the facts had been as he believed them to be, then he is responsible. This rule is still recognized in England, and has been generally adopted and applied by the courts in this country. Ann. Cas. 1916 A 978, reviewing the cases on the subject. Capacity to know that one's acts are in violation of law is not recognized separately as one of the tests of insanity. Bell v. State, 120 Ark. 530, 180 S. W. 186. "Cases may be found where, in explaining what is meant by knowledge that an act is wrong, the courts have blended the elements of legal and moral wrong, but none, we believe, can be found in which the element of moral wrong has been excluded." People v. Schmidt, 216 N. Y. 324, 110 N. E. 945, L. R. A. 1916 D 519, Ann. Cas. 1916 A 978. 1 State v. Bramlett, 114 S. C. 389, 103 S. E. 755; State v. Jackson, 87 S. C. 407, 69 S. E. 883; State v. McIntosh, 39 S. C. 97, 17 S. E. 446. 2 Guiteau's Case, 10 Fed. 161; People v. Schmidt, 216 N. Y. 324, 110 N. E. 945, L. R. A. 1916 D 519, Ann. Cas. 1916 A 978. 3 Watson v. State, 133 Tenn. 198, 180 S. W. 168. 4 McNaghten's Case, 10 Clark & F. 200, 1 Car. & K. 130, 8 Scott N. R. 595. 5 See Reg. v. Burton, 3 Fost. & F. 772; Hadfield's Case, 27 How. St. Tr. 1281. 6 Arkansas. Hankins v. State, 133 According to the weight of authority, an insane delusion, as was stated in the McNaghten case, is no ground of exemption, unless the party would be exempt if the facts were really as he supposed. Thus, a man is responsible for a homicide committed as the result of an in Ark. 38, 201 S. W. 832, L. R. A. 1918 D 784; Bell v. State, 120 Ark. 30, 180 S. W. 186; Smith v. State, 55 Ark. 259, 18 S. W. 237; Bolling v. State, 54 Ark. 588, 16 S. W. 658. Colorado. Ryan v. People, 60 Colo. 425, 153 Pac. 756, L. R. A. 1917 F 646, Ann. Cas. 1917 C 605. Georgia. Allams v. State, 123 Ga. 500, 51 S. E. 506; Roberts v. State, 3 Ga. 310; Carter v. State, 2 Ga. App. 254, 58 S. E. 532. Louisiana. State v. Lyons, 113 La. 959, 37 So. 890. Maine. State v. Lawrence, 57 Me. 574. Massachusetts. Com. v. Rogers, 7 Mete. 500, 41 Am. Dec. 458. Mississippi. Cunningham v. State, 56 Miss. 269, 31 Am. Rep. 360. Nebraska. Thurman v. State, 32 Neb. 224, 49 N. W. 338. New York. People v. Taylor, 138 N. Y. 398, 34 N. E. 275; Freeman v. People, 4 Denio 9, 47 Am. Dec. 216. Pennsylvania. Taylor v. Com., 109 Pa. St. 262; Com. v. Freth, 3 Phila. 105, 5 Clark 455; Com. v. Winnemore, 1 Brewst. 356. Texas. Merritt v. State, 39 Tex. Cr. 70, 45 S. W. 21. And see the other cases cited in the following notes: Insane delusion is insanity, whether partial or general. State v. Wilner, 40 Wis. 304. This form of insanity is variously denominated "partial insanity," "monomania," or "paranoia" in its first stage of development. Hankins v. State, 133 Ark. 38, 201 S. W. 832, L. R. A. 1918 D 784. 7 Arkansas. Bolling v. State, 54 Ark. 588, 16 S. W. 658. California. People v. Hubert, 119 Cal. 216, 51 Pac. 329, 63 Am. St. Rep. 72. State V. Mewherter, 46 Iowa. Iowa 88. Louisiana. State v. Lyons, 113 La. 959, 37 So. 890. Mississippi. Ford v. State, 73 Miss. 734, 19 So. 665, 35 L. R. A. 117. Nebraska. Thurman v. State, 32 Neb. 224, 49 N. W. 338. Nevada. State v. Lewis, 20 Nev. 333, 22 Pac. 241. New York. People v. Taylor, 138 N. Y. 398, 34 N. E. 275; People v. Pine, 2 Barb. 566. Pennsylvania. Com. v. Wireback, 190 Pa. St. 138, 42 Atl. 542, 70 Am. St. Rep. 625. • England. McNaghten's Case, 10 Clark & F. 200, 1 Car. & K. 130, 8 Scott N. R. 595. And see the other cases cited in the following notes: In Arkansas this is true of a person afflicted with paranoia in its first or earliest stage of development, but when that disease has reached the second stage or subsequent stage, and its form and hallucinations are such as to indicate that its victim, because of the disease, is no longer able to control his will and actions, then the doctrine of irresistible impulse applies. Hankins v. State, 133 Ark. 38, 201 S. W. 832, L. R. A. 1918 D 784; Bell v. State, 120 Ark. 530, 180 S. W. 186; Smith v. State, 55 Ark. 259, 18 S. W. 237. sane delusion that the deceased was trying to marry his mother, or had acted dishonestly toward him, or had not properly attended to his business, or had inflicted a serious injury to his character and fortune, 10 or had been putting poison in his food,11 or was spying upon him and had divulged his plan to escape from prison.12 But he is not responsible where he kills as a result of an insane delusion that the deceased was attempting to kill him and that it was necessary to kill him in self-defense.13 Some courts, however, have repudiated this rule, and hold that an insane delusion may prevent a conviction even though the supposed state of facts with respect to which the delusion existed would not have justified the commission of the act, if real.14 To exempt a person in any case, the delusion must be the result of disease of the mind rendering him incapable of reason with respect to the object of the delusion, that is, it must be an unreasoning belief in the existence of facts, and not merely an erroneous belief based upon reasoning and reflection.15 The delusion must also be connected 8 Bolling v. State, 54 Ark. 588, 16 S. W. 658. 9 State v. Lyons, 113 La. 959, 37 So. 890. 10 McNaghten's Case, 10 Clark & F. 200, 1 Car. & K. 130, 8 Scott N. R. 595. 11 People v. Hubert, 119 Cal. 216, 51 Pac. 329, 63 Am. St. Rep. 72. 12 People v. Taylor, 138 N. Y. 398, 34 N. E. 275. 13 Kentucky. Fain v. Com., 78 Ky. 183, 39 Am. Rep. 213. Louisiana. State v. Lyons, 113 La. 959, 37 So. 890. Massachusetts. Com. v. Rogers, 7 Metc. 500, 41 Am. Dec. 458. New York. People v. Pine, 2 Barb. 566. Pennsylvania. Com. v. Wireback, 190 Pa. St. 138, 42 Atl. 542, 70 Am. St. Rep. 625. Texas. Witty v. State, 75 Tex. Cr. 440, 171 S. W. 229; Montgomery v. State, 68 Tex. Cr. 78, 151 S. W. 813; Merritt v. State, 39 Tex. Cr. 70, 45 S. W. 21. England. McNaghten's Case, 10 Clark & F. 200, 1 Car. & K. 130, 8 14 Parsons v. State, 81 Ala. 577, 2 So. 854, 60 Am. Rep. 193, overruling Boswell v. State, 63 Ala. 307, 35 Am. Rep. 20; Ryan v. People, 60 Colo. 425, 153 Pac. 756, L. R. A. 1917 F 646, Ann. Cas. 1917 C 605; State v. Keerl, 29 Mont. 508, 75 Pac. 362, 101 Am. St. Rep. 579; State v. Jones, 50 N. H. 369, 9 Am. Rep. 242. And see Merritt v. State, 39 Tex. Cr. 70, 45 S. W. 21. As to the rule in Arkansas, see note 6, supra. The defendant is not responsible where he killed the deceased as a result of an insane delusion that the latter was a witch and that he had a right to kill witches. Hotema v. United States, 186 U. S. 413, 46 L. Ed. 1225, 22 Sup. Ct. 895. 15 Porter v. State, 140 Ala. 87, 37 So. 81; Gunter v. State, 83 Ala. 96, 3 So. 600; State v. Lewis, 20 Nev. 333, 22 Pac. 241. A person who kills another in the belief that the latter is a witch and with the act in the relation of cause and effect. Delusions or partial insanity not in any way connected with the crime charged do not constitute a defense.16 And partial insanity or an insane delusion hence that he has a right to kill him is not responsible if such belief is the product of a diseased brain, but is responsible if such belief is not the product of an insane delusion but simply an erroneous conclusion or opinion of an insane mind. Hotema v. United States, 186 U. S. 413, 46 L. Ed. 1225, 22 Sup. Ct. 895. This distinction was brought out with admirable clearness by Judge Cox in his charge to the jury in the Guiteau case. An opinion, he said, however erroneous or absurd, formed upon reasoning and reflection, or examination of evidence, is not an insane delusion, and never exempts a man from responsibility for his acts. If a man, from mental disease, should believe that God had appeared to him, and commanded him to kill his child as a sacrifice, this would be an insane delusion, and, if he should sacrifice his child in obedience to the supposed command of the Almighty, he would not be responsible for the homicide; but if a man, by reading newspapers and by reasoning, however absurdly, should come to the conclusion that the good of the country required the removal of the president, and should assassinate him, he would be guilty of murder. "The important thing is that an insane delusion is never the result of reason ing and reflection. It is not generated by them, and it cannot be dispelled by them. A man may reason himself, and be reasoned by others, into absurd opinions, and may be persuaded into impractical schemes and vicious resolutions, but he cannot be reasoned or persuaded into insanity or insane delusions. Whenever convictions are founded on evidence, the law requires them to reason correctly, as far as their practical duties are concerned. When they have the capacity to distinguish between right and wrong, they are bound to do it. Opinions, properly so called, i. e., beliefs resulting from reasoning, reflection, or examination of evidence, afford no protection against the penal A consequences of crime. man may reason himself into a conviction of the expediency and patriotic character of political assassination, but to allow him to find shelter behind that belief, as an insane delusion, would be monstrous." Guiteau's Case, 10 Fed. 161. * * * 16 United States. United States v. Ridgeway, 31 Fed. 144; Guiteau's Case, 10 Fed. 161. Arkansas. Smith v. State, 55 Ark. 259, 18 S. W. 237. California. People v. Coffman, 24 Cal. 230. Delaware. State v. Danby, Houst. Cr. Cas. 166. Georgia. Allams v. State, 123 Ga. 500, 51 S. E. 506; Carter v. State, 2 Ga. App. 254, 58 S. E. 532. Iowa. State v. Hockett, 70 Iowa 442, 30 N. W. 742; State v. Geddis, 42 Iowa 264; State v. Stickley, 41 Iowa 232. Minnesota. State v. Gut, 13 Minn. 341; aff'd 9 Wall. (U. S.) 35, 19 L. Ed. 573. will not relieve a person from responsibility if he understands the nature and character of the act in question and knows that it is wrong, ,17 and if he has the ability to choose between right and wrong, Mississippi. Ford v. State, 73 Miss. 734, 19 So. 665, 35 L. R. A. 117; Bovard v. State, 30 Miss. 600. Missouri. State v. Huting, 21 Mo. 464. Nebraska. Schwartz v. State, 65 Neb. 196, 91 N. W. 190. New York. Freeman v. People, 4 Denio 9, 47 Am. Dec. 216. Tennessee. Wilcox V. State, 94 Tenn. 106, 28 S. W. 312. Vermont. Doherty v. State, 73 Vt. 380, 50 Atl. 1113. Virginia. Dejarnette v. Com. 75 Va. 867. West Virginia. State v. Maier, 36 W. Va. 757, 15 S. E. 991. England. McNaghten's Case, 10 Clark & F. 200, 1 Car. & K. 130, 8 Scott N. R. 595. The act must be the consequence of the delusion, and must have been caused by it and nothing else. Hopps v. People, 31 Ill. 391, 83 Am. Dec. 231. A person may be partially insane, or insane upon one or several subjects, and yet be perfectly sane upon all other subjects, and legally responsible for a crime committed by him. People v. Willard, 150 Cal. 543, 89 Pac. 124. 17 United States. United States v. Faulkner, 35 Fed. 730. California. People v. Willard, 150 Cal. 543, 89 Pac. 124; People v. Coffman, 24 Cal. 230. Florida. Davis v. State, 44 Fla. 32, 32 So. 822. Georgia. Roberts v. State, 3 Ga. 310. Illinois. Hopps v. People, 31 Ill. 391, 83 Am. Dec. 231. Kansas. State v. Arnold, 79 Kan. 533, 100 Pac. 64. Massachusetts. Com. v. Rogers, 7 Metc. 500, 41 Am. Dec. 458. Minnesota. State v. Gut, 13 Minn. 341, aff'd 9 Wall. (U. S.) 35, 19 L. Ed. 573. Missouri. State v. Paulsgrove, 203 Mo. 193, 101 S. W. 27. New York. People v. Pine, 2 Barb. 566. Texas. Witty v. State, 75 Tex. Cr. 440, 171 S. W. 229; Montgomery v. State, 68 Tex. Cr. 78, 151 S. W. 813; Sartin v. State, 51 Tex. Cr. 571, 103 S. W. 875; Riley v. State (Tex. Cr.), 44 S. W. 498. It has been said that the rule as to partial insanity or delusions is "only another way of stating that there can be no crime where there is a mental incapacity to distinguish between right and wrong; for, though delusions as to particular matters frequently exist in minds which are perfectly rational upon all other subjects, yet, if the delusion be so fixed and vivid as to make the imaginary seem real, there must be upon that subject a total incapacity to distinguish between right and wrong, since, the entire relation between the victim of the delusion and its unconscious subject being mentally perverted, there can be no proper standard of right and wrong in the diseased mind. That which to the rest of the world seems right is to him the most flagrant wrong, and vice versa.'' Cunningham v. State, 56 Miss. 269, 21 Am. Rep. 360. "If a man, " said Judge Cox, in his charge to the jury in Guiteau's case, "is under an insane delusion that another is attempting his life, and kills him in self-defense, he does not know that he is committing an unnecessary |