place after sentence is a mitigation and not an increase of punishment.56 But a statute changing the punishment from death to one year's imprisonment at hard labor, and then death, if the governor shall issue his warrant therefor, has been held unconstitutional as to offenses previously committed.57 Statutes shortening the minimum time within which execution may take place after sentence,58 or providing for solitary confinement between the time of sentence and the time of execution,59 have also been held to be within the constitutional inhibition. § 59. Indeterminate sentence. Statutes providing for an indeterminate sentence between a maximum and minimum period fixed by existing law, and permitting a release of the convict on parole after a certain length of time in case of good behavior are generally held to be valid as applied to offenses committed before. the passage of the act,60 although there is authority to the contrary, v. State, 10 Okla. Cr. 369, 136 Pac. 982, 52 L. R. A. (N. S.) 113. 56 Rooney v. State of North Dakota, 196 U. S. 319, 49 L. Ed. 494, 25 Sup. Ct. 264, 3 Ann. Cas. 76, aff'g 12 N. D. 144, 95 N. W. 513; Alberty v. State, 10 Okla. Cr. 616, 140 Pac. 1025, 52 L. R. A. (N. S.) 248. 57 In re Petty, 22 Kan. 477; Ratzky v. People, 29 N. Y. 124, 28 How. Pr. 112; Hartung v. People, 22 N. Y. 95, 26 N. Y. 167; Kuckler v. People, 5 Park. Cr. (N. Y.) 212. 58 In re Tyson, 13 Colo. 482, 22 Pac. 810, 6 L. R. A. 472, holding, however, that the statute in question did not shorten the time. 59 In re Medley, 134 U. S. 160, 33 L. Ed. 835, 10 Sup. Ct. 384. Punishment of a criminal condemned to death is not substantially increased or made more severe by substituting close confinement in the 'penitentiary prior to execution for confinement in the county jail. "Close confinement' does not mean solitary confinement. Rooney V. State of North Dakota, 196 U. S. 319, 49 L. Ed. 494, 25 Sup. Ct. 264, Ann. Cas. 76, aff'g 12 N. D. 144, 95 N. W. 513. See also In re Storti, 180 Mass. 57, 61 N. E. 759, where it was held that the earlier statute more clearly than the later one permitted the confinement to be solitary. 60 Davis v. State, 152 Ind. 34, 51 N. E. 928, 71 Am. St. Rep. 322; Com. v. Brown, 167 Mass. 144, 45 N. E. 1; Com. v. Kalek, 239 Pa. 533, 87 Atl. 61. A statute requiring the sentence in certain cases to be not less than a fixed minimum, and not more than a maximum fixed by the court, and not longer than the longest term fixed by law for the punishment of the offense, does not make the punishment more severe than it otherwise would have been, and is valid. Com. v. Brown, 167 Mass. 144, 45 N. E. 1. The indeterminate sentence must be deemed a sentence for the maximum term prescribed by law as a on the ground that the punishment is thereby changed to the prejudice of the defendant.61 Such a statute is invalid, however, where it increases the minimum punishment for offenses to which it applies,62 or takes away a right to a reduction of sentence for good behavior, or interferes with such right to the prisoner's disadvantage.63 It is permissible for the legislature to change the method of granting permits to be at liberty under an indeterminate sentence law.64 § 60. Habitual offenders. Laws which provide for an increased punishment for a second or third offense are not within the prohibition, though the prior offense may have been committed before its enactment.65 And the same has been held to be true of a statute punishment for the offense. Com. v. Brown, 167 Mass. 144, 45 N. E. 1; Com. v. Kalek, 239 Pa. 533, 87 Atl. 61. 61 Changing the punishment from imprisonment in the penitentiary for a term to be fixed by the jury to an indeterminate sentence imposed by the court. Johnson v. People, 173 III. 131, 50 N. E. 321. See also Ware v. San lers, 146 Iowa 233, 124 N. W. 1081. 62 In re Lambrecht, 137 Mich. 450, 160 N. W. 606. 63 In re Murphy, 87 Fed. 549; Murphy v. Com., 172 Mass. 264, 52 N. E. 505, 43 L. R. A. 154, 70 Am. St. Rep. 266; People v. Johnson, 44 N. Y. Mise. 550, 90 N. Y. Supp. 134. As where it substitutes for a fixed right to a reduction a discretionary right to such a reduction vested in a boar charged with the administration of the law. In re Lee, 177 Cal. 690, 171 Pac. 958; State v. Tyree, 70 Kan. 203, 78 Pac. 525, 3 Ann. Cas. 1020. In Davis v. State, 152 Ind. 34, 51 N. E. 928, 71 Am. St. Rep. 322, it was held that an indeterminate sentence law was not ex post facto because it repealed an existing good time law since the latter related only to rules for the government of the prison officials, and the indeterminate sentence law simply substituted a new and different method of crediting good time to the convict. 64 A statute relating to indeterminate sentences was held not be ex post facto because it required the approval of the governor and council to permits to the prisoner to be at liberty after the expiration of the minimum term, or because it rendered the duration of the sentence uncertain, or gave the prison commissioners power to fix the term of imprisonment. Murphy v. Com., 172 Mass. 264, 52 N. E. 505, 43 L. R. A. 154, 70 Am. St. Rep. 266. 65 United States. McDonald V. State of Massachusetts, 180 U. S. 311, 45 L. Ed. 542, 21 Sup. Ct. 389, aff'g McDonald v. Com., 173 Mass. 322, 53 N. E. 874, 73 Am. St. Rep. 293; State of Iowa v. Jones, 128 Fed. 626. And see Carlesi v. New York, 233 U. S. 51, 58 L. Ed. 843, 34 Sup. Ct. 576, aff'g 208 N. Y. 547, 101 N. E. 1114, which aff'd 154 N. Y. App. Div. 481, 139 N. Y. Supp. 309; Graham v. State of West Virginia, 224 U. S. 616, 56 L. Ed. 917, 32 Sup. Ct. 583, aff'g 68 W. Va. 248, 69 S. E. 1010, 40 L. R. A. (N. S.) 924. California. People v. Stanley, 47 Cal. 113, 17 Am. Rep. 401; Ex parte requiring the performance of vasectomy on criminals twice convicted of a felony, though one of such convictions was prior to the passage of the act.66 The validity of statutes denying to second offenders the benefits of rules made for the maintenance of good order in prison is considered in another section.67 § 61. Laws referable to prison discipline. Any change in the law which is fairly referable to prison discipline, or penal administration, as its primary object, may be made to take effect upon past as well as future offenses, as changes in the manner or kind of employment of convicts sentenced to hard labor, the system of supervision, the means of restraint, and the like. Changes of this sort may operate to increase or mitigate the severity of the punishment of the convict, but they are not within the constitutional prohibition. 68 Statutes denying to second offenders the benefits of Gutierrez, 45 Cal. 429; People v. Indiana. See Tavis v. State, 152 Ind. 34, 51 N. E. 928, 71 Am. St. Rep. 322. Iowa. State v. Dowden, 137 Iowa 773, 115 N. W. 211. Kansas. State v. Adams, 89 Kan. 674, 132 Pac. 171. Kentucky. Armstrong v. Com., 177 Ky. 690, 198 S. W. 24. Maine. State v. Woods, 68 Me. 409. Massachusetts. Com. v. Ellis, 207 Mass. 572, 93 N. E. 823; McDonald v. Com., 173 Mass. 322, 53 N. E. 874, 73 Am. St. Rep. 293, aff'd 180 U. S. 311, 45 L. Ed. 542, 21 Sup. Ct. 389; Sturtevant v. Com., 158 Mass. 598, 33 N. E. 648; Com. v. Graves, 155 Mass. 163, 29 N. E. 579, 16 L. R. A. 256; Com. v. Marchand, 155 Mass. 8, 29 N. E. 578; In re Ross, 2 Pick. 165. Michigan. See In re Miller, 110 Mich. 676, 68 N. W. 990, 34 L. R. A. 398, 64 Am. St. Rep. 345. New York. People v. Warden of Workhouse, 176 App. Div. 602, 163 N. Y. Supp. 910; People v. Dean, 94 Mise. 702, 159 N. Y. Supp. 601; Ex parte Morris, 163 N. Y. Supp. 907; People v. Butler, 3 Cow. 347. Ohio. In re Allen, 91 Ohio St. 315, 110 N. E. 535; BlackLurn v. State, 50 Ohio St. 428, 36 N. E. 18; In re Kline, 6 Ohio Cir. Ct. 215, 3 Ohio Cir. Dec. 422. Oklahoma. Tucker v. State, 14 Okla. Cr. 54, 167 Pac. 637; Jones v. State, 9 Okla. Cr. 646, 133 Pac. 249, 48 L. R. A. (N. S.) 204. Virginia. Rand v. Com., 9 Gratt. 738. Washington. State v. Le Pitre, 54 Wash. 166, 103 Pac. 27, 18 Ann. Cas. 922. As a statute providing for the infliction of a heavier penalty for carrying concealed weapons if the defendant has previously been convicted of a felony. People v. Smith, 36 Cal. App. 88, 171 Pac. 696. 66 Davis v. Berry, 216 Fed. 413, rev'd on other grounds 242 U. S. 468, 61 L. Ed. 441, 37 Sup. Ct. 208. 67 See § 61, infra. 68 In re Storti, 180 Mass. 57, 61 N. E. 759; Murphy v. Com., 172 Mass. 264, 52 N. E. 505, 43 L. R. A. 154, 70 rules made for the maintenance of good order in the prison have been held to be valid when enacted before the commission of the second offense, though after the commission of the first, as, for example, a statute providing that convicts serving a second term shall be entitled to a less reduction of sentence for good behavior. than those serving their first term.69 But the legislature cannot take away from a convict the right to the deduction for good behavior which was allowed at the time the offense was committed.70 Statutes providing for the parole of prisoners previously convicted have been held to be valid, where no prisoner is obliged to accept parole.71 D. Indefiniteness of Statutes § 62. In general. A criminal statute, to be valid, must be sufficiently definite to show with reasonable certainty what acts the legislature intended to prohibit and punish,72 and the punishment to Am. St. Rep. 266; Hartung v. People, 22 N. Y. 95; Com. v. Kalek, 239 Pa. 533, 87 Atl. 61. 69 In re Miller, 110 Mich. 676, 68 N. W. 990, 34 L. R. A. 398, 64 Am. St. Rep. 376. 70 Murphy v. Com., 172 Mass. 264, 52 N. E. 505, 43 L. R. A. 154, 70 Am. St. Rep. 266; In re Canfield, 98 Mich. 644, 57 N. W. 807; People v. Johnson, 44 N. Y. Misc. 550, 90 N. Y. Supp. 134. Hence an indeterminate sentence law so providing is invalid as to prior crimes. State v. Tyree, 70 Kan. 203, 78 Pac. 525, 3 Ann. Cas. 1020. It cannot substitute for a fixed statutory right to a reduction a discretionary power on the part of a board to grant a reduction. In re Lee, 177 Cal. 690, 171 Pac. 958. 71 Ware v. Sanders, 146 Iowa 233, 124 N. W. 1081. 72 United States. Holmes v. United States, 267 Fed. 529, certiorari denied 254 U. S. 640, 65 L. Ed. 452, 41 Sup. Ct. 13. California. In re Lockett, 179 Cal. 581, 178 Pac. 134. Colorado. Dekelt v. People, 44 Colo. 525, 99 Pac. 330. District of Columbia. United States v. Capital Traction Co., 34 App. Cas. 592; Czarra v. Board of Medical Sup'rs, 25 App. Cas. 443. Georgia. Hale v. State, 21 Ga. App. 658, 94 S. E. 823. Illinois. People v. Beak, 291 Ill. 449, 126 N. E. 201. Indiana. Smith v. State, 186 Ind. 252, 115 N. E. 943; Cook v. State, 26 Ind. App. 278, 59 N. E. 489. Kentucky. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Com., 99 Ky. 132, 35 S. W. 129, 33 L. R. A. 209, 59 Am. St. Rep. 457. New York. People v. Harden, 110 Misc. 72, 179 N. Y. Supp. 732. Oregon. State v. Mann, 2 Ore. 238. Texas. Ex parte Leslie, 87 Tex. Cr. 476, 223 S. W. 227; Griffin v. State, 86 Tex. Cr. 498, 218 S. W. 494; Cogdell v. State, 81 Tex. Cr. 66, 193 S. W. 675. be inflicted in case it is violated," 73 so that all men subject to its provisions may know in advance what acts will be criminal under it, and therefore what acts it is their duty to avoid. And a statute which is meaningless upon its face, or which is found to be impossible of interpretation when applied to a particular case, or which cannot be understood, is void.75 It is sufficient, however, if an offense is so 73 Holmes v. United States, 267 Fed. 529, certiorari denied, 254 U. S. 640, 65 L. Ed. 452, 41 Sup. Ct. 13. 74 United States. United States v. Brewer, 139 U. S. 278, 35 L. Ed. 190, 11 Sup. Ct. 538; United States v. Reese, 92 U. S. 214, 23 L. Ed. 563; United States v. Bernstein, 267 Fed. 295; Lamborn v. McAvoy, 265 Fed. 944; United States v. Armstrong, 265 Fed. 683; United States v. Rosenblum, 264 Fed. 578; United States v. Spokane Dry Goods Co., 264 Fed. 209. District of Columbia. United States V. Capital Traction Co., 34 App. Cas. 592; Czarra v. Board of Medical Sup'rs, 25 App. Cas. 443. Georgia. Hayes v. State, 11 Ga. App. 371, 75 S. E. 523. Illinois. People v. Beak, 291 Ill. 449, 126 N. E. 201. Kentucky. Louisville & N. R. Co. V. Com., 99 Ky. 132, 35 S. W. 129, 33 L. R. A. 209, 59 Am. St. Rep. 457. Nevada. Eureka Bank Habeas Corpus Cases, 35 Nev. 80, 126 Pac. 655, 129 Pac. 308. Tennessee. State v. Dixon, 138 Tenn. 195, 196 S. W. 486. Texas. Griffin v. State, 86 Tex. Cr. 498, 218 S. W. 494. It must be couched in such explicit terms that the party upon whom it is to operate may with reasonable certainty ascertain what the statute requires to be done, and when it must be done." Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. of Texas v. State, 100 Tex. 420, 100 S. W. 766; Ex parte Leslie, 87 Tex. Cr. 476, 223 S. W. 227. "Penal statutes should be expressed in such language that every man of ordinary understanding may be able to know when he has committed a crime." State v. Lawrence, 9 Okla. Cr. 16, 130 Pac. 508. The statute must so clearly define the acts upon which the penalty is denounced that no ordinary person can fail to understand his duty and the departure therefrom which the law attempts to make criminal." Brown v. State, 137 Wis. 543, 119 N. W. 338. It must fix a standard of conduct that it is possible to know in advance. International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U. S. 216, 58 L. Ed. 1284, 34 Sup. Ct. 853, rev'g 147 Ky. 564, 144 S. W. 1064, 147 Ky. 795, 146 S. W. 12, 148 Ky. 572, 147 S. W. 1199. 75 People v. Goldberger, 163 N. Y. .Supp. 663; State v. Partlow, 91 N. C. 550, 49 Am. Rep. 652; Augustine v. State, 41 Tex. Cr. 59, 52 S. W. 77, 96 Am. St. Rep. 765. A statute prohibiting the sale of spirituous liquors within three miles of Mt. Zion church in Gaston County cannot be enforced where there are two churches of that name in said county, and there is nothing in the act to indicate which of them was meant. State v. Partlow, 91 N. C. 550, 49 Am. Rep. 652. A statute making it an offense to sell or expose for sale meat falsely represented to be kosher, or as having been prepared under and of a product or products sanctioned by the orthodox Hebrew religious require |