Hate Crimes Sentencing Enhancement Act of 1992: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Crime and Criminal Justice of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, One Hundred Second Congress, Second Session, on H.R. 4797 ... July 29, 1992
United States. Congress. House. Committee on the Judiciary. Subcommittee on Crime and Criminal Justice
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992 - 214 páginas
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action activity Amendment applied associations basis believe bias bigotry bill caused civil rights color Commission committed Committee concerns conduct CONGRESS THE LIBRARY considered constitutional constitutionally creates criminal danger Dawson decision defendant directed discrimination discriminatory distinction effect element ethnic evidence example expression fact federal fighting words freedom gender harm hate crimes hatred held ideas important impose individual intent interest invalid issue judge Justice legislation limited majority matter means motivated offense opinion ordinance particular Paul penalize penalty permitted person political prejudice present problem Professor prohibit proscribable protected prove provides punishment question race racial racist reason regulation religion religious requirements ruling s.ct SCHUMER Sentencing Enhancement sexual simply society speech statement statute suggest Supreme Court Thank thought threats unconstitutional United victim viewpoint violate Wisconsin
Página 62 - These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or 'fighting' words- those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace. It has been well observed that such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.
Página 162 - Whoever places on public or private property a symbol, object, appellation, characterization or graffiti, including, but not limited to, a burning cross or Nazi swastika, which one knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, alarm, or resentment in others, on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender...
Página 31 - Some of her answers might excite popular prejudice, but if there is any principle of the Constitution that more imperatively calls for attachment than any other it is the principle of free thought — not free thought for those who agree with us but freedom for the thought that we hate.
Página 40 - But freedom to differ is not limited to things that do not matter much That would be a mere shadow of freedom. The test of its substance is the right to differ as to things that touch the heart of the existing order...
Página 196 - If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire or go in disguise on the highway or on the premises of another, for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws...
Página 202 - District to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or to different punishments, pains, or penalties, on account of such inhabitant being an alien, or by reason of his color, or race, than are prescribed for the punishment of citizens, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both; and if death results shall be subject to imprisonment for any term of years or for life.
Página 116 - ... fighting words" — those which by their very utterance Inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace. It has been well observed that such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.
Página 81 - ... truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality." . . . We have sometimes said that these categories of expression are "not within the area of constitutionally protected speech" ... or that the "protection of the First Amendment does not extend