4. Prohibitions Needed on CIA Activities At Home In 1947 the CIA was barred from exercising "any police, subpeona, enforcement powers, or internal security functions within the United States." Because of excessive secrecy surrounding the CIA and its covert mission, and the consequent lack of public accountability, Congress determined that the agency's focus should be exclusively outward. The Church Report documents the dangers inherent in the breakdown of this structure---the abuses of Operation CHAOS, Operation MERRIMAC, and Operation RESISTANCE. S. 2525, designed to prevent such abuses in the future, instead legitimizes them by broadly conferring and expanding exactly those powers which the CIA has heretofore been denied by the Congress. Instead of flatly prohibiting domestic activities by the CIA to restore the barrier, Title IV (Section 432 (b)) states that the agency "shall have no police, subpoena or law enforcement powers, nor perform any internal security or criminal investigation functions except to the extent expressly authorized by this Act." The - exceptions are numerous. First, the CIA is permitted to conduct foreign intelligence investigations in the United States directed against foreign persons, a category which includes resident aliens and some citizens. The CIA may also conduct counterintelligence and counterterrorism activities within the United States as are "integrally related" to its activities abroad. These activities may include investigations and preventive actions directed against United States persons as well as foreigners. Moreover, virtually all counterintelligence and counterterrorism activites could be deemed "integrally related" to its activities abroad. No showing has been made that these investigations could not be handled by the FBI. Second, the CIA is broadly authorized to conduct investigations in the United States to determine objects of recruitment, possible targets, foreign contacts, and "potential sources", activities now barred by law. See Weismann v. CIA, 565 F. 2d 692 (D.C. Cir. 1977) Third, the authority of the CIA to conduct investigations to protect its installations and personnel in the United States from "physical threats” and to engage in activities to "counter" espionage or 'prevent" terrorism in this country gives the CIA police and law enforcement functions. S. 2525 effectively opens the door to the exercise of internal security functions by the CIA in the United States. Moreover, the- domestic jurisdiction flowing from all of these authorizations is subject to expansion. Because jurisdictional disputes are to be settled independent of the charter's provisions (see S 141 (3) and $113(k)), CIA authority may be further expanded. This whole scheme to permit the super-secret CIA to operate in this country should be recast to reestablish and effectively implement the 1947 Act. No credible showing has been made that these activities could not or should not be handled by the more accountable FBI. G. The Use of First Amendment Institutions for Purposes £2525 explicitly recognizes that the use of independent institutions for covert and clandestine purposes violates the integrity of those institutions. It embodies many of the reccommendations of the Church Committee to protect the necessary independence of these institutions. However, the restrictions do not go far enough; the only way to adequately protect these institutions is to prohibit covert and ela dosting activitior. But, assuming these activities will be authorized, the chuter's restrictions should be strengthened in critical areas. 1. The Restrictions Designed to Protect Independent The scope of protection for First Amendment institutions is inadequate. Provisions in the charter designed to protect individuals affilisted with independent institutions indicate that the deatvers of $2525 understand the detrimental consequences that relationships with the CIA have on these institutions. However, $2525 does not sufficiently insulate these institutions from involvement with the intelligence community. (a) Protecting liedia Organizations. $2525 restricts use of the media by intelligence agencies. Section 132 (a) (3) prohibits intelligence agencies from paying certain media employces to "engage in any intelligence activity...or provide any intelligence information." HOWever, this prohibition applies only to accredited journalists and those persons involved with United States media organizations as regular contributors, editors, or policy makers. The Church Committee found that the largest category of CIA/ media relationships involved freelance journalists, "stringers," who work for newspapers or news services. The draft charter authorizes continued relationships with stringers. Moreover, $2525 defines media organization narrowly by failing to include book publishers. The scope of protection should be expanded to prohibit covert relationships with publishers and "stringers." The restrictions on using clergy for operational purposes only covers persons who follow a "full time religious vocation." The adjective is inappropriate. The Church Committee correctly recommended a ban on all covert or contractual relationships between the CIA and "any American clergyman or missionary." Furthermore, section 132 (a) (6) prohibits the use of "U.S. religious organizations--undefinedfor purposes of cover. It is not clear whether the term would even include the Catholic Church in this country. Section 132 only restricts the use for operational assistance of a "United States person" who is "sponsored and supported by a United States academic institution." This is inadequate protection. First, academics who are not U.S. persons but affiliated with an academic institution in the United States are not covered. Second, académics who may be sponsored by a foundation, for example, when traveling abroad would be exempted from the restriction. In effect, S2525 only covers a narrow class of academics who may travel abroad. Like United States religious organizations, "United States academic institution" is undefined. Thus, the scope of the minimal restrictions on the use of academics for operational purposes or academic institutions for "cover" is unclear. (a) Protecting Other First Amendment Institutions. The institutions for which the charter affords some protection all engage in First Amendment activity. It implicitly recognizes that all institutions involved in the exercise of these rights require protection to maintain an open society. Organizations such as Common Cause, the Democratic and Republican National Committees, and the Brookings Institution need to be free from taint or manipulation. The need for protecting all First Amendment organizations has been amply documented on the public record. In 1967 public disclosure of CIA financial support for NSA and other public institutions destroyed the credibility of those institutions and raised questions about the independence of all First Amendment organizations. To restore and maintain confidence in the openness of the political process, the Katzenbach Commission appointed to study CIA involvements recommended that it should be "the policy of the United States Government that no federal agency shall provide any covert financial assistance or support, direct or indirect, The scope of the color's potention is inað, gor te, 727 not-for-profit oquinoticos na à fined in section 502 (3) (3) and (4) of the intrual Revenue Code should be con mod by charter, restricions. 2. Wide-ranging tre of Piest Fren) fat militution Instead of prohibiting clwresting relationships with `jrol. Appäreat institutter, 52525 biosdły zachorizos intelligünce agencies to initiate these duvod veroniin. (a) Cover Because of definitional problems noted above, the prolibition in rection 132 (a) (6) on the use of academic and religioar organizations is waxtain. The prohibition on the use of media orginizations 3g incesplete became of the cxclusion of freelancers and publishing houses. Moreover, other First madent organizations are wholly unprotinated. Cover clearly endangers First Aundrent rights; and an accoss-the -board ban is needed. Cover requires participation which by definition means influencing the layful activities of olganira · tions. Disclosure threaten to destroy the credibility. Even the Cik is asking for a criminal penalty in this cherier for the unauthorized use of its name. The use of academics for operational assistance is authorized in section 132 (1) (2). The requirement that "appropriate officials" at the institution be notified is not a meaningful restriction. The term is undefined. "Appropriate" could in fect be read "cooperative." Moreover, university administrators are not the academic comamity which by definition means those who are engaged in academic purseits at the institution. Moreover, any member of the faculty or student body can be used for operational assistance if he is not a U.S. person or not currently sponsored and supported by the institution. Members of media organizations and religious institutions excluded from the general provisions of section 132 are open to any use for purposes of operational assistance, as are all other First Amendment institutions. One form of operational assistance, recruitment, is unrestricted for all First Amendment institutions. The dangers here are obvious and these loopholes should be closed. (c) Contracting Section 139 authorizes secret contracting with academic institutions. The Harvard University Report on relationships between the Harvard community and U.S. intelligence agencies explains why such contracts must be publicly acknowledged, rather than merely disclosed to appropriate officials. The publication of research supported but not acknowledged to have been done under the auspices of an intelligence agency is subject to abuse for propaganda purposes. If the fruits of the research are classified, the project is not academic. Students and faculty may be unwittingly involved in work for purposes they do not support. Finally and most distressing, contracting opens the door to intrusive investigations of members of the academic community, many of whom are unaware of their connection with the intelligence community. We presume that the authorization to contract with "any private company or institution in the U.S." without disclosing the agency connection excludes all other First Amendment organizations. If the intent of the statute is otherwise, the same objections apply. All contracts with First Amendment institutions should be publicly acknowledged and the research available to the public under the Freedom of Information Act. (d) Recruitment The expressed authorization for the paid undisclosed use of representatives of any and all First Amendment institutions swallows all of the limited restrictions described above. It establishes a relationship between the agency and the member of the institution which is no different from cover or operational assistance. Institutional ties are used to probe the views of other members to determine likely recruits. Likely prospects are subjected to potential source investigations. The recruiter is effectively asking other members of the institution to engage in intelligence activities. The recruiter, for example, a faculty member at a university, is using the authority conferred by the institution on behalf of the agency. If these people are recruiting abroad, as members of the press, academic community, the Peace Corps or a religious organization, they are engaged in espionage or. covert operations. If this practice is not prohibited, the Soviet Union would be justified in preventing American journalists from communicating with dissidents. |