and forcing a retrograde and hostile policy upon the Tycoon, under penalty of deposition or death, if he hesitated.'

The Tycoon placed in this dilemma, and too weak to resist such a coalition backed by the sovereign authority of the Mikado, yielded, accepted their programme, and on the 23rd of June returned to Yeddo pledged to carry it out. The first evidence of action came in the shape of a secret order respecting silk, and the consequent stoppage of trade in that staple. To all remonstrances a deaf ear was turned, and total ignorance of the real cause unblushingly insisted upon.'

'The political state of the country was each day becoming worse, and the powerful party of Daimios united together against the Tycoon and his foreign policy, more hostile and violent. The Mikado, with his sovereign power to decree, was in their hands. The Tycoon's second visit, on which he had set out when I returned to my post, was a last effort to extricate his suzerain and himself from their toils. His failure sent him back to Yeddo in June, desperate and with a divided council. The whole government of the country was paralysed, and threatened with dissolution by the violence of contending parties, while civil war broke out menacing the existence of the Tycoon and of all foreigners.

'Such a consummation would have been a calamity beyond redress. The dissolution of the government, apart from any immediate danger, would be the destruction of the treaty-making Power. To him and his government alone could we look for support against those most hostile to the maintenance of foreign relations. It is true his support had been feeble and doubtful in many instances. Nevertheless, from the Tycoon only could we, with any effect or show of legal right, demand the fulfilment of engagements made by his predecessors, and acknowledged by him alone as valid and binding. In the dissolution of his government and existing relations, we should lose the only solid foundation for the assertion of treaty rights. To take new ground and go to Kioto in search of a better basis from the Mikado, would involve a costly expedition to begin with; and an explorative voyage of discovery in unknown regions of political difficulty. This one danger above all others, therefore, the disorganisation and disappearance of the Tycoon's government, was, if possible, to be averted.'

'In little more than six months all the conditions so fraught with danger and injury to the material interests of the treaty Powers have been reversed. The Straits have been opened permanently. The Prince who held them closed with his batteries during fifteen months with perfect impunity, defying alike the Tycoon's government and all the treaty Powers, has been beaten in open day by superior forces brought to bear upon him under the four flags, and after a fair trial of strength. All his batteries were dismantled, and he became a humble suitor for a cessation of hostilities and friendly relations within three days from the commencement of the operations. The whole Sako party, of which he was the head, and their right arm too, has been discouraged and paralysed. Trade has been

restored to both ports, and Yokohama, the point chiefly menaced, placed in a position of security in the only way that was possible, by respect for our prowess, and a consciousness of our superiority in the art of war.

'Nor is this all: a total reversal of the double-faced and temporising policy of the Tycoon has been formally announced by the Gorogio, and in great part secured by the accession of strength derived from our success and support. They have engaged to obtain the formal ratification of the treaties by the Mikado, which carries with it the acceptance or acquiescence of the chief Daimios, and in the meantime assurance of his adhesion has been already obtained, though only in an informal manner yet. Thus, the only solution of a hitherto insoluble problem in Japanese politics, which holds out any hope of stable or peaceable relations, has been all but secured.

And these comprehensive and satisfactory results have been obtained at the cost of a few hours' fighting with the forces we had at hand, directed against an outlawed Daimio, in which the issue was never for a moment doubtful. There were not 100 casualties among those engaged on our side. There was no loss of life whatever to non-combatants, or injury to their property; and the whole expense of the expedition will be paid, and gladly paid-looking to the result by the Tycoon, should the treaty Powers demand it.'

I leave security, union, and a position of strength, not depending on batteries or fortifications, where I found nothing but a general sense of insecurity, disunion, and danger, with no promise of improvement in the future. I leave trade restored, where I found it interrupted or stagnant.'

The whole history of our recent relations with Japan, and the results of the brief and decisive struggle with the hostile coalition of Daimios, is full of instruction. Want of space,

however, will not allow us on this occasion to do more than place before our readers some of the more striking conclusions to be drawn from the facts, and their bearing upon any future policy both in China and Japan.

The line of argument taken last year by Lord Grey and Mr. Cobden, in opposition to the policy of the Government, may be briefly described as an advocacy of conciliatory measures and forbearance without limit; the withdrawal from all political relations, and the restriction of all intercourse or points of contact, even for commercial purposes, to one or two ports, and these if possible in islands situated, like Hong Kong and Chusan, at some distance from the main land.

In so far as the avowed end of this policy is concerned-peace, we apprehend there can be no two opinions as to its desirability. Throughout this country the desire to avoid all complications and wars in the Far East, as in all our more distant depen

dencies, is so universal that whoever could point out a certain method of securing the result, without a total sacrifice of national dignity and commerce, would beyond doubt be hailed as a great public benefactor. All strong divergence of opinions has reference to the means which may best secure this endcertainly not as to the end itself. And the first and gravest objection therefore to the policy laid down by the Manchester school for the conduct of our relations in the East is, the certainty of failure.

In this point of view it is surely a very remarkable fact that the policy so strongly and undoubtingly insisted upon during the recent debates, as an infallible means of securing peaceable relations with China and Japan and promoting commerce hand in hand, in no single point differs from that which during more than two centuries was perseveringly carried out by the Dutch in Japan, and by ourselves and other European States in China.

The Dutch in their seagirt prison of Decima unrepiningly submitted to the most perfect isolation, and to every indignity, humiliation, and exaction it pleased the Japanese officials to impose. Forbearance and conciliation had absolutely no limits. They were like sheep taken to the shearers, and while an ounce of wool remained on their backs, it was yielded to their masters, and ruthlessly taken. If there be any logic or truth in the arguments or programme for a policy in the East, put forward by the advocates of peace-at-any-price, the result should have been an unexampled growth of commerce and good will. But what was the fruit? For some years after the expulsion of all other Europeans, and the extirpation of Christianity in 1640, the value of the trade was great. And until the Dutch lost Formosa, they were treated with some show of respect. But from the time that this island was taken from them and their prestige and naval supremacy in the Eastern seas fell, their humiliation, and the destruction of their trade were alike decreed. In 1685, the trade was arbitrarily limited to 300,000 takells; two-thirds of which was to be in piece goods and weighable articles, the other third in silks. In 1689, the export of copper was limited to a very small quantity. In 1700, not more than four or five ships were allowed to be sent, and in 1717 their number was finally limited to two; while in 1743 it was reduced to one, and in this to a half cargo! While these successive reductions and restrictions were being enforced by the Japanese authorities, trade was further hampered and rendered unprofitable by constant alterations in the currency, coupled with arbitrary and compulsory valuation of Dutch imports.

Would those who advocate a return to this policy, so long and so meekly carried out by the Dutch, be prepared to accept like results? And if not, upon what do they found a hope that they would be better or different now? We need not pursue the parallel in Canton, the facts are even better known. Though the East India Company were so thoroughly imbued with the policy of unlimited submission to the native powers, that provided they could get cargoes of tea on any terms, their factors had the most stringent orders not to offer any resistance to wrong or violence, nothing but the monopoly the Company enjoyed in England saved it from a loss on the trade with China; so grievous were the exactions and so destructive of all fair dealing were the restrictions of the Governors of Canton.

Taking this lengthened experience of two centuries for our guide, with a peace-at-any-price policy in full operation under more favourable conditions than can ever be secured again, it is surely waste of time to discuss the fallacies of such a system.

Assuming that in the present state of the world no country can possibly succeed in a system of absolute seclusion, there remains but one question-how is this inevitable intercourse to be regulated? By the caprice and will of so many half-savage and Eastern potentates, or by certain established laws based on broad principles of justice and expediency? If European nations want trade and desire peaceable intercourse with the Eastern world, these are only to be attained by imposing equitable conditions which must, in the last resort, be supported by force, if they are to be maintained at all. There may be men who object to any employment of force or compulsion either for the purposes of civilisation or commerce; and to them we would say, if you maintain this opinion and are willing to adhere to it consistently, you must accept the consequence, which is non-intercourse, and the cessation of regularised trade in these countries. But do not insist upon trade and abstinence from the only means by which it can either be established in the first instance, or maintained subsequently with nations who do not desire it, and ignore all the principles of International Law. The history of all our treaties and intercourse with Eastern nations demonstrates the necessity of treaties and political relations if we would have any commercial intercourse with them-because without the former, and the guarantees they provide, the latter is inevitably destroyed by robbery and wrong. Chinese and Japanese statesmen think, naturally enough, that when concessions have been extorted by force of arms, they are doing no more than they have a right to do in

casting them to the winds whenever the force that imposed them is wanting.

The necessary conditions of European intercourse and commerce with Eastern races are yet subjects of discussion. And the permanent establishment of our relations with the Chinese and Japanese Empires on a securer basis of peace and mutual good understanding, is still a problem to be solved. But the field of discussion has been greatly narrowed within the last few years. Even superiority in arms and the power to impose by superior force a treaty or compact upon a nation, becomes of little use without a central authority, a government with which to treat and one capable of binding the nation by its acts. The worst danger with which European Powers have been menaced of late years, both in China and Japan, has been that of anarchy in those countries,-a process of disorganisation and decentralisation, pushed to an extent that would deprive Treaty Powers of all guarantee for the security of their subjects, or means of holding one central authority responsible for serious infractions of treaty.

ART. VIII.

Atalanta in Calydon: a Tragedy. ALGERNON CHARLES SWINBURNE. London: 1865.

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By

T is now some years since, in a review of the history and objects of the Society of Dilettanti,' we described and lamented the decline of classical taste and sentiment in the upper classes of Europe. Since that time a singular state of opinion on this subject has manifested itself in this country. The inquiry into the condition of our Universities, and the executive commission that grew out of it, elicited and expressed the dominant feeling that classical study must remain the basis of the education of the English gentleman. The same tone has pervaded the investigation into the systems of our Public Schools. Eton stands firm in the ancient ways; and although the other great seminaries do not utterly reject any admixture of scientific or linguistic culture, yet there is no slackening of interest in the traditional occupations, and as much pride as ever in the victories of classical competition, whether at the school or the university. Lord Stanhope, it is true, has made an attack in the House of Lords on the construction of Greek Iambics, but, on the other hand, Lord Derby has translated the Iliad. To judge from the discussions and conversations on the subject, it is difficult not to suppose that these earnest advocates of classical