take an excellent example, the report of the efficiency and economy committee shows that

the executive department consists of a Governor, Lieutenant-Governor, Secretary of State, Auditor of Public Accounts, Treasurer, Superintendent of Public Instruction and Attorney General, provided for by the constitution and elected by popular vote; and of more than a hundred other state officers, boards and commissions, created by statute, and in most cases appointed by the governor, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.2

In that state, as in others,

the number of State officers, boards and commissions has been rapidly increasing; and every session of the General Assembly sees the origin of new authorities. Less than a fourth of those now in existence were established before 1870; and more than a third of the present number have been created during the last decade. These executive departments, offices and institutions now employ about 6,000 persons and expend annually about $19,000,000.

The committee then goes on to say that this constant increase of administrative officials, without order and without plan, has resulted in enormous waste of money and energy and a deplorable lack of efficiency. Chief among the characteristic faults of the present arrangement are the failure to correlate the offices, the duplication of functions, ineffective supervision, the fact that offices with related objects are scattered among different cities or in different buildings of the same city, the lack of standards of compensation and of a budget system, inadequate accounting and insufficient advice from administrative departments to the legislature. Under these arrangements, finally,

while the general public is deluged with printed reports, it fails to receive reliable information in digestible form as to the conduct of the State administration, and is unable to locate definite responsibility for negligence or misconduct in public business. Public opinion usually considers the Governor responsible for the conduct of the State government; but with the lack of effective executive control over the subordinate officials this opinion is not fully justified. At the same time, the popular conception of the Governor's responsibility, in the opinion of this Com

2Report of Efficiency and Economy Committee, 1915, p. 7. Interesting accounts of efforts at administrative reform in several of the states are found in the American Political Science Review, X, 258; IX, 264, 273, 287; also see ib. 294, and 488.

155. Administrative Boards.

mittee, is based on a sound and just principle; and the machinery of State administration should be so organized as to enable this conception to be adequately realized.*

In order to effect such an organization as might secure a tolerable degree of efficiency and economy, the committee proposed a reorganization and consolidation of administrative offices into ten departments—after the manner of the executive departments at Washington,-each headed by an appointee of the governor and senate, who should be responsible to the gov ernor for the conduct of his department. The proposed departments are Finance, Charities and Corrections, Education, Public Works and Buildings, Agriculture, Public Health, Labor and Mining, Trade and Commerce, Law, Military Affairs. In addition to these the contemplated administration would consist of a consolidated board of elections, the civil service commission and the secretary of state.

5

Summaries of the various department reports should be published together in an official state manual. Incidentally, the committee protested vigorously against requiring administrative boards to be bi-partisan. Such a requirement

makes it possible for a Governor by the use of patronage to exert influence over the minority party in the General Assembly; and at the same time it reduces the responsibility of the Governor for the acts of such boards, without definitely fixing responsibility on the minority members, or their party.

The rapid growth of administrative functions has been characterized by the creation of boards and commissions, sometimes called administrative tribunals. They are variously elected and appointed and often partake of the nature of the legislative, executive and judicial functions of government—the separation of which it has been one of the cardinal principles of American constitutions to preserve. They have been considered by some writers to form a fourth department and, indeed, along with the articles on the legislative, executive and judicial departments

4Ib. 24.

Ib. 28-30.

"Several states publish such a manual at present, e. g., Iowa, Ky., R. I., Wis. Report, 31.

Finley and Sanderson, op. cit., 173.

a few constitutions have a separate article on the administrative department. These articles relate, however, to the duties of such constitutional offices as those of the auditor, treasurer and secretary of state rather than to the administrative boards,1 which are for the most part creations of statute law. Preceding paragraphs have, indeed, clearly indicated that the constitutions provide for a very small proportion of the state administrative officers. It is necessary to limit the present discussion to constitutional administrative offices, the chief of which is, in every state, that of the governor.

2

The

Executive

The governor's powers and duties are of two kinds, those 156. relating to the political or policy-determining functions of gov- Governor and ernment and those relating to the execution or administration Department. of policies already determined. The former have already been discussed in connection with the enactment of laws by the legislature. The latter, together with the general constitutional provisions concerning the governor, will now be outlined.

In every constitution save one, the supreme executive power of the state is vested in the governor. There are some clauses which make the executive department consist of other officers in addition, for instance,

The Executive Department shall consist of a Governor, in whom shall be vested the supreme executive power of the State, a Lieutenant-Governor, a Secretary of State, an Auditor, a Treasurer, a Superintendent of Public Instruction, and an Attorney-General.*

But Oklahoma" alone nominally vests the executive power in several enumerated officials. In forty-six states the governor

9e. g., Ind., VI; Ore., VI. This book does not distinguish between "executive" and "administrative."

1Administrative boards find their prototypes in standing committees of the legislature. They were at first agencies for procuring information for the solution of difficult problems. Now permanent commissions are chiefly industrial and agricultural, scientific (e. g., boards of health), supervisory (e. g., corporation and arbitration commissions), examining boards, educational, executive (e. g., highway commissions), and corrective and philanthropic.

2See Goodnow, F. J., Comparative Administrative Law, pp. 49-51, 71. 3Supra, ch. 10.

4N. C., III, 1. For other examples, see Ala., V, 112; Ill., V, 1; Neb., V, 1, 26; Okla., VI, 1; Pa.. IV, 1; Tex., IV, 1; W. Va., VII, 1.

"V, 1,-"The Executive authority of the State shall be vested in a Governor, Lieutenant-Governor, Secretary of State, State Auditor, Attorney General, State Treasurer, Superintendent of Public Instruction, State Examiner and Inspector, chief Mine Inspector, Commissioner of Labor, Commissioner of Charities and Corrections, Commissioner of Insurance, and other officers provided by law and this Constitution."

All save Mass. and N. H.

157.

Election of
Governor.

must "take care that the laws are faithfully executed." Several of these states add that the governor shall expedite measures resolved upon by the legislature. Half a dozen states prohibit the suspension of the execution of laws without the consent of the legislature. These general provisions are, however, of

little significance in practice.

The governor is invariably elected by the qualified voters of the state. The time of election also is usually prescribed. In order that the election returns may be officially convassed and finally declared, several constitutions provide canvassing boards made up of state officials, acting ex officio. The majority of the constitutions, however, provide that the two houses of the legislature, acting jointly, shall officially receive and canvass the returns.1

5

In one state, in case of failure to elect, the legislature, in joint convention, chooses a person to fill the office for the full term and until his successor is qualified. In another the legislature is commanded to declare by law what officer shall act as governor upon the people's failure to elect a governor and lieutenant-governor. A large number of the constitutions have provisions concerning the determination of contested elections. Usually such contests must be decided by the legislature or by

"South Carolina says "faithfully executed with mercy.”

8N. Y., Wis., etc.

'Mass., Va., etc.

1So expressed in twenty-eight constitutions (e. g., Ala., Wyo.). In other states the electorate is the same as that of the legislature or of the upper or lower house (e. g., Ga., N. H., La.), or is composed of adult male citizens (Me., Mass.), with some exceptions. Miss. (V, 140) provides that the person receiving in any county or district the highest number of votes shall be deemed to have received as many votes as the county or district is entitled to members in the lower house of the legislature.

2The same as for members of the legislature (21 states: e. g., Ala., N. C.), or of the lower house (Cal., La., N. Y.), at the general election, (Colo., S. C.), on the first Tuesday after the first Monday of November of a certain year and biennially or quadriennially thereafter, (e. g., Ill., Ky.) or simply on that date biennially (Vt.), etc. In Maine it occurs on the second Monday of September biennially (in practice, even years), except for citizens absent from the state in military service, for whom provision is made in great detail.

3e. g., Minn., V, 2. Returns are made to the secretary of state, who acts with two or more judges of the highest court and two disinterested judges of the district courts. In N. M. the governor is a member of the board, of which the other two members are the secretary of state and chief justice. In Miss. this function is imposed upon the lower house of the legislature and in Vt. upon a joint committee of both houses. In a few states, the matter is left to be prescribed by law.

4e. g., Ala., Ind., Mo., La., Tex., Wash. and other matters vary considerably.

5R. I., Amend. XI, 3, 7.

"Vt., II, 24.

Ind., V, 6; N. C., III, 3; Tenn., III, 2.

Minor details relating to procedural

8

a legislative joint committee. Nearly all of the constitutions prescribe a method of determining the election in case of tie votes. Usually the legislature decides among those whose popular votes are equal."

3

4

Qualifica

Governor.

Forty states require that the governor shall be of a specified 158. age, twenty-five, thirty, and thirty-five years. Most of the tions of states require that he shall be a citizen of the United States.5 many of them specifying from two to twenty years of citizenship, and one that he must be a "natural-born citizen." In the thirteen constitutions which particularly specify terms of citizenship in the state, the variations are from two to ten years, five years being the most usual requirement.1 Several states2 specify that the governor must be a qualified elector. About three-fourths of the states prescribe residence qualifications, ranging from one to ten years in the state.

8

The fact that one has already served as governor may dis qualify him in eighteen states. In several he may not be his own successor. He is, however, expressly declared to be reeligible to the governorship in one state. In another the dis

5

Del., Pa. In the latter (IV, 2, 17) contests are determined by a committee selected from both houses of the legislature and formed and regulated in a manner to be prescribed by law and presided over by the chief justice of the highest court, who decides upon the admissibility of evidence and, on request of the committee, pronounces on questions of law.

e. g., Ind., V, 5; Tex., IV, 3. In Ky. (70) determination is by lot as the legislature may direct. In Me. (V, Pt. I, 3, IX, 4. Amend. 23, 24) and Mass. (Pt. II, ch. II, sec. I, 3, Amend. 23, 24) the lower house chooses two from among the four candidates having the highest vote and the senate decides between them. In Vt. (II, 39) if no one has a majority the legislature decides the winner from among those having the three highest numbers of votes. In Ga. (V, sec. I, 5) similarly, from two highest.

1All except Fla., Kan., Mass., O., R. I., Vt., Wash., Wis.

2Ariz., Cal., Minn., Nev.

se. g., Del., Ga., Ind., Me., Tenn. Thirty at time of election; e. g., Ala., Ia., Mont.

4Mo.

5e. g., Ark., Del., Ga., Ind., Ia., Mo., Miss.

"Me., V, Pt. I, 4.

"Neb., Nev.

8Md.

Ill., etc.

1Six and seven years are occasionaly specified,- -see Ga., Ky., Ala., Tenn. 2e. g., Fla., Md., Okla.

3e. g., Minn. (1), Colo. (2), Ore. (3), Vt. (4), Cal. (5), Ky. (6), Ark. (7), La. (10).

e. g., Ala., La.

"In Del. he may not be elected for a third term; in Ind. for more than four years' and in Tenn. for more than six years' service in eight years; in Ore. for more than eight in twelve years, etc.

S. C., IV, 2.

Ala., V, 116.