and employed decedent outside the state to work in Pennsylvania, in which state he was killed in the course of his employment, the employment of decedent was outside the state of New York, and therefore compensation could not be awarded under the New York Act, the court saying: "In this case the decedent had not been employed by the appellant in the state since 1912. His employment had not been continuous, but had been from time to time for certain jobs which were being performed entirely without the state. The contract of employment did not contemplate any work by him. within the state; no such work was done. The statute in question is intended to regulate the relations between the employer and employé in hazardous employments within the state, and to protect the employé within the state from the ordinary risks of the employment, and to charge those risks upon the ultimate consumer. The mere fact that an employé is engaged by a resident of the state to go out of the state for service, and no service in the state is contemplated or done, cannot bring the employment within the Act. Ordinarily a statute has no extraterritorial effect. But where the regular service of the employé is being performed in the state, and as an incident to it he goes over the state line temporarily, we have held that such temporary absence from the state does not relieve the employer from liability under this statute. The relations between. the decedent and the company with reference to the work at Ford City depended upon the laws of the state of Pennsylvania, and the protection there given to the employer and the employé. The mere fact that the contract was made in the state, if it was made in the state, is not material here, when we understand that the contract related solely to work to be performed outside of the state. It follows, therefore, that the employment of the decedent was outside of the state of New York." 80 This principle has been applied by the Commission.1 A resident of New Jersey, injured by ac

80 Gardener v. Horseheads Const. Co., 171 App. Div. 66, 156 N. Y. Supp. 899. 81 Where, though the contract of employment was made in New York, the workman was a resident of, and the accident happened in, West Virginia, the

cident in the course of his employment in New York, is entitled to compensation under the New York Act, although the contract of hiring was made in Pennsylvania.82

Since the New Jersey Act provides that in case of dispute or failure to agree on a claim all questions shall be submitted to the court of common pleas of that state on petition, which petition shall be answered and the issues raised determined by that court, thereby providing a forum wherein disputes between employer and employé relative to compensation may be settled, a Supreme Court of New York will not assume jurisdiction to enforce a claim under the New Jersey Act,83 though defendant is a corporation which has moved its place of business to the state of New York and cannot be personally served in New Jersey.R

84

An employé injured on a river over which two states have concurrent jurisdiction may recover under the Compensation Act of either state. Where the federal government has acquired land by purchase for the construction of docks, forts, arsenals, or other buildings, the Washington Act is inapplicable to works and occupations carried on within the confines of such land.8

Commission of New York had no jurisdiction to grant compensation. Lloyd v. Power Specialty Co., The Bulletin, N. Y., vol. 1, No. 6, p. 9. Although an accident happening in New York may come under the Act, even where the contract of employment was made in another state, for the reason that the New York Act takes away the action for damages for negligence for all injuries received in the state, where the contract is made and the accident happens outside the state, this reason does not apply, and the claim is not under the New York Act. Dissosway v. Jallade, The Bulletin, N. Y., vol. 1, No. 6, p. 13. 82 Griffiths v. American Bitumastic Enamels Co., The Bulletin, N. Y., vol. 1, No. 7, p. 8.

83 McCarthy v. McAllister Steamboat Co., 94 Misc. Rep. 692, 158 N. Y. Supp. 563.

84 Lehmann v. Ramo Films, 92 Misc. Rep. 418, 155 N. Y. Supp. 1032.

85 Op. Atty. Gen. on Minn. Wk. Comp. Act, Bul. 9, p. 16.

86 Wk. Comp. Act Wash. § 17; Opinion Atty. Gen. Sept. 20, 1911.

§ 9. Admiralty jurisdiction

According to the courts of Connecticut and New York, a proceeding to recover under a Workmen's Compensation Act is a personal action, and not one in rem, and therefore not one of which admiralty courts have exclusive jurisdiction where the injuries occur on the high seas or navigable waters.87 It has been held by a federal court that, while the Washington Act does not88 and cannot take from an injured workman his right to proceed in admiralty by abolishing his right to pursue a common-law remedy for injury,89 yet, where the workman takes the benefit of this Act, which is provided in lieu of his common-law remedy, he cannot thereafter pursue his remedy in admiralty." The Washington Supreme Court has held that a Compensation Act cannot be permitted to encroach on the admiralty jurisdiction of the federal court, or make the owners of a vessel liable, where it is not claimed that they have been at fault, beyond the limits prescribed by the federal statutes."1 Ac

87 Kennerson v. Thames Towboat Co., 89 Conn. 367, 94 Atl. 372, L. R. A. 1916A, 436. Citing Knapp, Stout & Co. v. McCaffrey, 177 U. S. 638, 643, 648, 20 Sup. Ct. 824, 44 L. Ed. 921; Schoonmaker v. Gilmore, 102 U. S. 118, 26 L. Ed. 95; Leon v. Galceran, 11 Wall. 185, 20 L. Ed. 74; The Belfast, 7 Wall. 624, 19 L. Ed. 266; The Hine v. Trevor, 4 Wall. 555, 567, 568, 18 L. Ed. 451; Manchester v. Mass., 139 U. S. 240, 11 Sup. Ct. 559, 35 L. Ed. 159. An accident occurring on a navigable river was within the jurisdiction of the New York Act. In re Walker, 215 N. Y. 529, 109 N. E. 604, Ann. Cas. 1916B, 87.

The provision of the New York Act that compensation shall be the exclusive liability, and in place of all other liability, extends only to suits at common law; and where the circumstances of the case bring it under the Act, and also under admiralty jurisdiction, the employé may choose which remedy he will pursue. Walker v. Clyde S. S. Co., 215 N. Y. 529, 109 N. E. 604, Ann. Cas. 1916B, 87.

88 The Washington Act does not withdraw from a workman who is injured on a vessel his remedy to proceed against the vessel in admiralty for the wrong sustained. The Fred E. Sanders (D. C.) 208 Fed. 724.

89 Id.

91 State v. Daggett, 87 Wash. 253, 151 Pac. 648, L. R. A. 1916A, 446.

cording to a federal decision, an action brought for compensation under the New Jersey Act, not being an action for tort or one based on negligence, was one of which the state courts had at least concurrent jurisdiction with the federal courts sitting in admiralty, and the state court having first acquired jurisdiction, the cause was not removable as one of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.92

When the action is brought in a state court and is maintainable therein, it must be determined according to state laws and not according to the laws of admiralty."

§ 10. Interstate commerce

In the absence of any decision on the question by the United States Supreme Court, and in view of the conflict between the decisions of other courts, the question of the extent to which, if any, the state Compensation Acts may apply to employés of interstate carriers by railroad, without conflicting with the federal Employers' Liability Act, cannot be answered with any show of authority, otherwise than by calling attention to and contrasting these conflicting decisions. Attempts to formulate any general rule by which these decisions may be tested and satisfactorily reconciled, meet with failure. However, it may be stated on positive authority that, where Congress has not entered the particular field and thereby excluded state action, a state law is within the state's jurisdiction, though it indirectly affects interstate and foreign commerce, and that it remains so until Congress enters the field."

92 Berton v. Tietken, etc., L. Dry Dock Co. (D. C.) 219 Fed. 763. 93 Lindstrom v. Mutual S. S. Co. (Minn.) 156 N. W. 669.

94 Jensen v. Southern Pac. Co., 215 N. Y. 514, 109 N. E. 600, L. R. A. 1916A, 403, Ann. Cas. 1916B, 276; Sherlock v. Alling, 93 U. S. 99, 23 L. Ed. 819; Morgan's Steamship Co. v. Board of Health, 118 U. S. 455, 6 Sup. Ct. 1114, 30 L. Ed. 237; Reid v. Colorado, 187 U. S. 137, 23 Sup. Ct. 92, 47 L. Ed. 108; Simpson v. Shepard, 230 U. S. 352, 33 Sup. Ct. 729, 57 L. Ed. 1511, 48 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1151, Ann. Cas. 1916A, 18; Erie R. R. Co. v. Williams, 233 U. S. 685, 34 Sup. Ct. 761, 58 L. Ed. 1155, 51 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1097.

The jurisdiction of Congress over interstate commerce, and thus over remedies against employers therein for injuries sustained by employés while engaged in such commerce, is paramount, and, since Congress in the Employers' Liability Act has fixed the employer's liability in cases where the act is caused by his own negligence, that Act is the exclusive remedy in such cases at least, and the state Act does not apply. The Act of Congress does not apply, of course, where the parties are not in any wise engaged in interstate commerce.9°

95

95 Grand Trunk Ry. Co. of Canada v. Knapp (C. C. A.) 233 Fed. 950. 96 Blauvelt v. Chicago & A. R. Co., Bulletin No. 1, Ill., p. 181. Employés not engaged in interstate commerce.-An employé repairing a car used indiscriminately for intrastate and interstate commerce, in a car shop in New York, is not engaged in interstate commerce; his status being determined by the character of the work done at the time of the injury. Parsons v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 167 App. Div. 536, 153 N. Y. Supp. 179. A railroad watchman employed to guard property and tools and materials used in building a new station and laying new tracks, which when finished were to be used in interstate commerce, was not engaged in interstate commerce, and was entitled to compensation. White v. New York Central R. R., 2 N. Y. St. Dep. Rep. 477. Where an employé at the time of his injury was engaged in uncoupling cars on a railroad which operated exclusively and entirely within the state, the fact that the railroad sometimes carried interstate baggage and passengers, though always within the state, did not make the employé a workman engaged in interstate commerce. Fairchild v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 170 App. Div. 135, 155 N. Y. Supp. 751. An employé, working in a railroad car shop maintained and operated entirely within the state, was not engaged in interstate commerce, although the cars repaired, and the car on which he was working at the time of the accident, were used in both intrastate and interstate commerce. Okrzsezs v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 170 App. Div. 15, 155 N. Y. Supp. 919. Illinois.—A private watchman employed by a railroad company, whose duty was to make the rounds of the yards, inspecting the freight house and various portions of yards, keep improper persons off the premises, and prevent stealing from cars, and who had power to arrest in cases of necessity, who was injured in the performance of his duty, was entitled to compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act of Illinois. Bassett v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., Bulletin No. 1, Ill., p. 120. The fact that along the line of a particular train of a railroad there was merchandise of an interstate character to be handled, and that just prior to the occurrence of the accident the crew and train had been handling inter