tions shall not have approximated the amount of the award, though it be the minimum provided by the statute.1 A dependent is entitled to compensation for the full period allowed by the Connecticut Act, though, if he submitted to an operation, he might not thereafter be a dependent.2 Apportionment of compensation between dependents is considered in a subsequent section.3

§ 79. Payment to representatives-Survival of claim

Compensation due minor dependents is payable to their guardian or trustee, or to their surviving parent where by operation of law he is entitled to receive the payment on their behalf. In some states, where a widow and child are both entitled to compensation. the whole amount may be awarded to the widow without apportionment, unless an apportionment is specially applied for. And where the deceased workman leaves minor children and a surviving dependent parent of such children, no guardian ad litem or trus

ing the fact that she profited $100 by his death. Pryce v. Penridyber Navigation Colliery Co. (1902) 4 W. C. C. 115, C. A.

See § 181, post.

1 Appeal of Hotel Bond Co., 89 Conn. 143, 93 Atl. 245.

2 Id.

8 See § 192, post.

4 Compensation awarded to the infant children of a deceased workman may be paid to his widow, where by appointment or operation of law she is their general guardian. (Wk. Comp. Act, §§ 16, 20) Woodcock v. Walker, 170 App. Div. 4, 155 N. Y. Supp. 702.

Where the dependent is a minor, the benefits to which he is entitled will be ordered paid to a trustee for him. Mitchell v. Fairchild-Gilmore-Wilton Co., 1 Cal. I. A. C. Dec. 71.

Where a deceased employé was survived by a wife and child of twenty months, both dependent, since the minor child is under the disability of infancy and in the custody of her mother, that part of the compensation apportioned her will be made payable to the mother for the use of the child. (Page & A. Gen. Code, § 1465-68) In re Laura Shaffer, vol. 1, No. 7, Bul. Ohio Indus. Com. p. 7.

Taylor v. Seabrook, 87 N. J. Law, 407, 94 Atl. 399. As to apportionment, see § 192, post.

tee will be appointed, if the surviving parent is a proper person and entitled to share in the award in her own right; but the entire death benefit will be made payable to her for the support of herself and family, without giving the minor children any legal share therein, thus avoiding the necessity of appointing a trustee or guardian and the giving of a bond. However, where lump sums are awarded in amounts sufficient to reasonably justify the investment, a guardian should usually be appointed. The mother of illegitimate children is a proper person to be appointed their guardjan.8

When incapacity lasts more than 15 days, and the employé dies from causes other than those producing the original injury and before a formal claim is filed, the legal representatives, who under the federal Act are entitled to file a claim and receive payment covering period of incapacity, are the administrator, the executor, or the heirs or next of kin. Where, on account of death of an employé, compensation has been allowed under this Act to the widow and child, and the widow dies within the compensation period, and the care of the child devolves upon the child's maternal grandmother, the remainder of the year's compensation may be paid to such maternal grandmother for the use and benefit of the child.1o

La Salle v. Whiting-Mead Commercial Co., 1 Cal. I. A. C. Dec. 346. Where the deceased employé leaves a widow and minor children, the award is not to be divided among them, but is to be made payable to the widow alone, to be used by her for the support of herself and children in such manner as she sees fit; hence it is not necessary that a guardian ad litem be employed for the minor children, where the widow, their mother, is the applicant. Kennedy v. Guardian Casualty & Guaranty Co., 1 Cal. I. A. C. Dec. 152.

Money allotted to infant children may be paid to the wife, without the appointment of a general guardian and the attendant expenses. Woodcock v. Walker, 170 App. Div. 4, 155 N. Y. Supp. 702.

(Wk. Comp. Act Wash. § 6) Rulings Wash. Indus. Ins. Com. 1915, p. 18.

8 Sexton v. Massachusetts Bonding & Insurance Co., 1 Cal. I. A. C. Dec. 48. In re Karumbellas, Op. Sol. Dept. of L. 614.

10 In re Jefferson, Oct. 1, 1910, Op. Sol. Dept. of L. p. 564.

Compensation due dependents residing in a foreign country will not usually be paid to a consul of that country until he shows authority to receive and transmit same.11 It is not enough merely that he has been appointed administrator of the deceased employé.12 But under the Ohio Act a foreign consul is entitled to receive the compensation payments due citizens and residents of his country without a specific power of attorney, unless the persons entitled to payment have selected, through power of attorney, some other representative.18

A dependent's right to compensation will survive, and if not satisfied before death of the dependent will pass to his or her personal representative, unless otherwise provided by statute.14

11 A foreign consul will be paid compensation due dependents residing in a foreign country only when he files with the Commission a power of attorney from the person entitled to receive the money authorizing him to receive and transmit same. (Comp. Act, § 41) In re Katharina Schatz, vol. 1, No. 7, Bul. Ohio Indus. Com. p. 60.

In Salvatore v. Andreani & Gelormino, 1 Conn. Comp. Dec. 169, it was held that the official position of the Italian consul does not entitle him to receive the award of a dependent widow residing in Italy, but that it may be made to him where he has an authorization from her to receive her compensation. 12 That the Greek consul at New York was appointed administrator of a deceased employé did not make him the legal representative of beneficiaries. In re Lemanes, Op. Sol. Dept. of L. 613.

13 Vujic v. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. (D. C.) 220 Fed. 390.

14 An award of compensation from the Ohio state insurance fund to a wholly dependent person vests in the dependent when the award is made, so that, in case of the death of such dependent, his or her personal representative is entitled to the balance, if any, remaining unpaid. (Workmen's Compensation Act, § 35; 103 Ohio Laws, p. 72) State v. Industrial Commission, 92 Ohio St. 434, 111 N. E. 299.

Compensation which had accrued to the employé's widow between death of the employé and her death became part of her estate, and claim therefor could not be made by their children as beneficiaries. In re Towle, Op. Sol. Dept. of L. 565.

Where the widow of a deceased workman claimed compensation, but died before the case was tried, her right survived to her legal personal representative. Darlington v. Roscoe & Sons (1908) 9 W. C. C. 1, C. A. (Act of 1897). Where the mother of a deceased workman, who was his only dependent, died

Thus, where a widow who was entitled to a death benefit under the California Act because of the death of her husband, died before an award was made, leaving a dependent son of herself and such employé, the son was entitled to the whole death benefit under a provision that the Commission "may order payment to a dependent subsequent in right, or otherwise entitled, upon good cause being shown therefor." 15 But the liability of an employer paying compensation to the mother of a deceased workman ceases upon her death, as to payments then unaccrued, and her estate is not entitled to receive the remaining payments, which would have been due, had she lived.18 Therefore, where, after the death of the mother, her administrator files a claim for the payment to the estate of the award, the estate is entitled to only such portion of the award as would have been payable to her to the time of her death.1 Where in a Massachusetts case it appeared that the employé, a widower, left two minor children wholly dependent upon his earnings for support, and one of them died shortly after the decease of his father, the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed a decision that the sum due those wholly dependent should be paid the administrator for the benefit of the surviving child.18

Under the Connecticut Act, compensation for disability forms no part of the estate of a deceased workman, but ceases at his death, except that for medical and burial expense, which is payable to his

before she had claimed compensation, her claim survived to her legal personal representative. United Collieries, Ltd., v. Hendry (1910) 2 B. W. C. C. 308, H. L., and (1909) 1 B. W. C. C. 289, Ct. of Sess.

15 (Wk. Comp. Act Cal. § 19 [2]) Hughes v. Degen Belting Co., 2 Cal. I. A. C. Dec. 595.

16 Matecny v. Vierling Steel Works, 187 Ill. App. 448; In re Murphy (Mass.) 113 N. E. 283.

17 Ledford v. Caspar Lumber Co., 2 Cal. I. A. C. Dec. 691.

18 Janes v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York, 2 Mass. Wk. Rep. of Comp. Cases, 217 (decision of Com. of Arb., affirmed by Indus. Acc. Bd., also by Sup. Jud. Ct., 217 Mass. 192, 104 N. E. 556).

administrator. Under the New Jersey Act decedent's administrator may sue for the benefit of the dependents.19

§ 80. Determination of question of dependency

Actual dependency is a question of fact,20 to be determined, in the absence of any applicable and conclusive statutory presump

19 Corcoran v. Farrel Foundry & Machine Co., 1 Conn. Comp. Dec. 42. (Wk. Comp. Act, § 2, par. 19) Conners v. Public Service Electric Co. (N. J.) 97 Atl. 792.

20 Miller v. Public Service Ry. Co., 84 N. J. Law, 174, 85 Atl. 1030, affirmed in (Wk. Comp. Act, § 43) Appeal of Hotel Bond Co., 89 Conn. 143, 93 Atl. 245; Main Colliery Co., Ltd., v. Davies, 16 T. R. 460; Houlihan v. Connecticut River R. R., 164 Mass. 555, 42 N. E. 108; American Legion of Honor v. Perry, 140 Mass. 580, 5 N. E. 634; Miller v. Riverside Storage Co. (Mich.) 155 N. W. 462; State ex rel. Globe Indemnity Co. v. District Court (Minn.) 156 N. W. 120; Muzik v. Erie R. Co., 85 N. J. Law, 131, 89 Atl. 248, 86 N. J. Law, 695, 92 Atl. 1087; Havey v. Erie R. Co., 88 N. J. Law, 684, 96 Atl. 995; Walz v. Holbrook, Cabot & Rollins Corp., 170 App. Div. 6, 155 N. Y. Supp. 703; In re Branch, Op. Sol. Dept. of L. 576; In re Rock, Op. Sol. Dept. of L. 573.

Where the evidence showed that deceased contributed to the support of his mother, and that she, while not immediately dependent for sustenance on such contributions, was, because of advancing years, condition of mind, and lack of regular employment and of property, liable to become a dependent, the question whether she was partially dependent on deceased was for the jury. Appeal of Hotel Bond Co., supra.

Whether the daughter of a deceased workman was dependent upon him for her support is a question of fact. In re Herrick, 217 Mass. 111, 104 N. E. 432.

Where it appeared that the inability of the workman to obtain and to perform sufficiently remunerative permanent work was the cause of his failure to provide a home for his wife and child, that their living apart was chargeable to his mental and physical deficiencies and characteristics and not to his willful negligence, and that he paid doctors' bills and grocery bills, bought clothes for the child, and gave $200 or $300 to his wife, the Industrial Accident Board should have determined as a fact whether his wife was dependent upon him at the time of his death. St. 1911, c. 751, pt. 5, § 2 (c), as amended by St. 1914, c. 708, § 3; In re Newman's Case, 222 Mass. 563, 111 N. E. 359, L. R. A. 1916C, 1145. It was a question of fact whether the mother and sister of a deceased employé, to whose support he had contributed, were wholly dependent upon him. (St. 1911, c. 751, pt. 2, § 6) Bartley v. Boston & N. St.