for support, do not prove dependency; 27 nor does a moral obligation of support to be effectuated in the future constitute depend

sons, received regular contributions toward the support of herself and family, and it appears that the husband and sons were all employed in gainful occupations under the same employer, the Commission held that, while it did not appear that the contributions were necessary to her support, it did appear that they were made, and this made her a dependent. Buchanan v. White Lumber Co., supra. But where the father of a deceased employé, claiming dependency because of his being a paralytic, is found to be receiving a total disability allowance from the Foresters lodge, and to have received no contributions from the deceased son for a year past, he is not dependent. Murphy v. Standard Oil Co., 2 Cal. I. A. C. Dec. 304. Where it appeared that, after contributing for several years to his mother's support, an employé had for several years prior to his death discontinued such contributions and made payments on a small ranch, to which he intended bringing her to live with him on completion of the purchase and the building of a

27 Da Luz v. Rideout, supra.

Evidence of occasional gifts by the workman to his brother does not establish dependency of such brother. Holleron v. Hill, 2 Cal. I. A. C. Dec. 289. Evidence of contributions made to a mother in the nature of occasional gifts, and not as contributions to her support, does not establish dependency. Avery v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 2 Cal. I. A. C. Dec. 311. Where a mother received occasional sums sent to her by her son, only at irregular intervals and on request, such sums were merely occasional gifts, not regular contributions for support, and the mother was not a dependent of the son. Turley r. Bible Institute Building Co., 1 Cal. I. A. C. Dec. 472. Where deceased has not for three years before his death contributed regularly to the support of his parents, but has at irregular intervals sent money to them as remembrances, the parents are not dependent on him. Cal. State Board of Prison Directors v. Dickerson, 1 Cal. I. A. C. Dec. 262.

In Blackall v. Winchester Repeating Arms Co., 1 Conn. Comp. Dec. 183, where the father of the deceased testified that she had never had steady employment, and it appeared that she was barely self-supporting, if that, small sums given at various times to her grandmother, who at other times helped her to buy clothes, do not make the grandmother dependent upon her. In Blanton v. Wheeler & Howes Co., 1 Conn. Comp. Dec. 415, where it appeared that the claimant daughter of the deceased workman was married and living apart from him, was earning a little herself, and apparently as well situated as her father, though she received small irregular gifts of money from him, which she used for living expenses, the commissioner decided as a question of fact that she was not a dependent within the meaning of the Act.

28

ency in fact. The existence or nonexistence of a legal obligation to support, though persuasive and a factor to be considered in de

house, her dependency on him was not shown. Prichard v. American Beet Sugar Co., 2 Cal. I. A. C. Dec. 341.

Where the deceased workman lived at home with his widowed mother and a sister who did the housework, his only brother living in another city and earning sufficient to support himself, and turned over all of his wages to his mother, she was the only dependent. Maire v. Wm. Landauer & Co., Rep. Wis. Indus. Com. 1914-15, p. 20.

Where a deceased employé was survived, besides a wife and child, by his mother and two sisters, aged 23 and 9 years, but had never contributed anything toward the support of any of the three latter, they were not dependent upon him to any extent. In re Laura Shaffer, vol. 1, No. 7, Bul. Ohio Indus. Com. p. 7. A sister of full age was neither wholly nor partially dependent on an unmarried brother with whom she did not reside, though he occasionally gave her small sums of money, where she had been regularly employed for some years at from $9 to $10 a week. In re Bertha R. Cavett, vol. 1, No. 7, Bul. Ohio Indus. Com. p. 150. An employé was killed in the course of his employment leaving surviving him a widow and a son 35 years of age, mentally and physically deficient, but who, for a number of years prior to and at the time of the death of the workman, was employed at a weekly wage of $7.50. The Commission held that the son was not wholly or partially dependent upon deceased. In re Frances Williams, vol. 1, No. 7, Bul. Ohio Indus. Com. p. 31.

Where the earnings of a workman and his two sons combined to support the whole family, and all three were killed in the same accident, the widow was a dependent of all three. Hodgson v. Owners of West Stanley Colliery (1910) 3 B. W. C. C. 260, H. L., and 2 B. W. C. C. 275, C. A. Where a father who received 10s. a week from his son and was earning 26s. a week by his own efforts, he was not dependent. Arrol & Co., Ltd., v. Kelly (1905) 7 F. 906, Ct. of Sess. (Act of 1897).

28 Prichard v. American Beet Sugar Co., 2 Cal. I. A. C. Dec. 341.

Where a son of the deceased employé is nineteen years old, and in his divorced mother's custody, with no provision for his support by his father, and no contributions to such support in fact made by the father, the son is not a dependent. Dolbeer & Carson Lumber Co. v. Watson, 1 Cal. I. A. C. Dec. 654. In Pinel v. Rapid Ry. System, 184 Mich. 169, 150 N. W. 897 (Comp. Laws 1897, § 4487 et seq.), it was held that where the mother of a workman was living apart from him at the time of his death and was not dependent upon him, and he, though under a moral obligation, was under no legal obligation to support her, she was not a "dependent." The court said: "The claimant did not belong to the class conclusively presumed by the compensation law to be a dependent. On the date of the accident it is conceded claimant was

termining dependency,20 is not conclusive unless made so by statutc. Purely voluntary contributions may establish dependency.30 Thus, voluntary contribution to the support of a workman's minor child fixes dependency as a matter of fact, though the child has been awarded to its mother by a divorce decree which makes no provision for support by the father, and entitled the child to an award

not dependent by reason of any support furnished her by the deceased. On the date of the accident she was not dependent on the deceased by force of any order of court based upon section 4487 et seq. A son is always under moral obligation to assist his indigent mother, but he is under no legal obligation to do so until proceedings under the statute have resulted in an order compelling him to do so. No such order was in force at the time of the accident; therefore he was under no legal obligation at that time to support his mother." This case is supported by Rees v. Penrikher Nav. Co., 87 L. T. 661, 5 W. C. C. 117; Schwanz v. Wujek, 163 Mich. 492, 128 N. W. 731.

*

In Merriman v. Scovill Mfg. Co., 1 Conn. Comp. Dec. 596, where the deceased son had agreed with his father that he was to be allowed to keep and use his own wages, and was to board at home without any present payments, but was to pay $3 per week for such board after he had obtained an education and was able to reimburse his father, it was held that the father could not be held to be a dependent upon the strength of such expected payments. 29 A ten year old child of a workman by his first wife, who, though she had not lived with her father and stepmother for five years previous to his death, had not been adopted by the people with whom she was living, and expected to return to live with her father at any time, was a dependent. (Gen. Laws 1913, c. 467, § 14 [Gen. St. 1913, § 8208]) Op. Atty. Gen. on Minn. Wk. Comp. Act, Bul. 11. p. 31.

Where all five sons of a widow were liable for her support, but one really provided her support, and he was killed, she was totally dependent upon him. Rintoul v. Dalmeny Oil Co., Ltd. (1909) 1 B. W. C. C. 340, Ct. of Sess. Where a workman gave the wife and two children he had deserted only trifling amounts for two years, and then when a decree of aliment was rendered against him, disappeared entirely, and was not heard of until he died a year and a half later, the children were held to be dependent. Young v. Niddrie & Benhar Coal Co., Ltd. (1913) 6 B. W. C. C. 774, H. L., and (1912) 5 B. W. C. C. 552, Ct. of Sess.

30 Death benefits under the Act are not limited to those for whose support the deceased workman was legally chargeable. "Dependents" include those supported by the workman's voluntary contributions. Walz v. Holbrock, Cabot & Rollins Corp., 170 App. Div. 6, 155 N. Y. Supp. 703.

of death benefits based on the amount of such contributions; 31 but voluntary contributions of money, support, or service by a brother to a sister, or by a sister to a brother, are not necessarily evidence of the dependency of either, or of the extent of the dependency.32 Minority of a deceased workman does not prevent his parents from being dependent on him.33 The husband of the mother of an illegitimate son, when not the putative father, is not a dependent of the son, so as to be entitled to compensation for his death.34

Compensation cannot be awarded to alleged dependents not belonging to the classes of relatives enumerated by statute.35 The enumeration of certain persons after the heading "dependents" should not be held to place them in the relationship of actual dependents; such enumeration merely indicating that they must prove themselves dependents in fact, as distinguished from theoretical dependents.36 A statute authorizing compensation to actual dependents will be liberally construed to allow compensation to the dependent parent of a deceased workman, though he has left no surviving wife or child, and no specific amount of compensation is fixed for such a case.37

31 Morse v. Royal Indemnity Co., 1 Cal. I. A. C. Dec. 53.

32 Miller v. Riverside Storage & Cartage Co. (Mich.) 155 N. W. 462.

33 (Consol. Laws, c. 67, § 16, subd. 4) Friscia v. Drake Bros. Co., 167 App. Div. 496, 153 N. Y. Supp. 392.

84 McLean v. Moss Bay Iron & Steel Co., Ltd. (1910) 2 B. W. C. C. 282, C. A. 35 Hammill v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 87 N. J. Law, 388, 94 Atl. 313.

A sister-in-law, with whom the deceased employé resided and for whom he made contributions, is not dependent upon him, she not being included in the classes of relatives enumerated. Western Indemnity Co. v. O'Brien, 2 Cal. I. A. C. Dec. 368.

36 Miller v. Public Service Ry. Co., 84 N. J. Law, 174, 85 Atl. 1030.

37 Compensation may be awarded under P. L. 1911, p. 139, § 2, par. 12, subd. 1, to a mother who is "actually dependent" on a deceased son, although the son leaves no widow; the object of this section being to award compensa. tion to actual dependents. The right to compensation of actual dependents was fixed by the earlier words of the statute, and it is immaterial that no specific amount is fixed by way of compensation to the mother, where dece dent leaves no widow. A basis for compensation in the case of the mother

An Act providing that, in case the employé dies of his injury, compensation shall be awarded to those persons who were in fact his next of kin or members of his family at the time of the injury, and who in fact were dependent upon him for support at that time. does not authorize an award of compensation to be made, for example, to persons who would have been his next of kin if his sole next of kin had been dead, and who were not in fact dependent upon him, but might have been dependent upon him, had it been that the next of kin who was dependent upon him had died. The widow of a subcontractor's employé, killed in the course of his employment, is entitled to compensation under the Massachusetts

Act.38

alone is found in the schedule in the fact that 25 per cent. of the wages is to be awarded where there is a widow alone, and 50 per cent. where there is a widow and father or mother. While the courts cannot read into the statute words which are not there, they may, on legal principles, read into the basis of compensation words essential to the main intent, as indicated by the words “actual dependents." Blanz v. Erie R. Co., 84 N. J. Law, 35, 85 Atl. 1030. This case cites Eyston v. Studd, cited in Bacon's Abridgment, "Stat utes," 1, 6, holding that a statute giving a remedy against executors might be extended by equitable construction to administrators, because they are within the equity of the statute, which case was followed and applied in Hoguet v. Wallace, 28 N. J. Law, 523, and recently was applied in State v. Alderman, 81 N. J. Law, 549, 79 Atl. 283, holding that a statute forbidding objections to an indictment for defects apparent on its face, unless taken before the jury was sworn, applied to a case where the defendant plead nolo contendere, in which, therefore, no jury could be sworn.

The parents are entitled to compensation for death of the employé, if dependent upon him, though he left no surviving wife or child. (Consol. Laws, c. 67, § 16, subd. 4) Friscia v. Drake Bros. Co., 167 App. Div. 496, 153 N. Y. Supp. 392; In re Murphy (Mass.) 113 N. E. 283. Where the mother with whom the employé lived and to whose support he contributed was his only next of kin, the rest of the family being her sons and daughters, she was the only dependent entitled to compensation for the death of the employé. Id. Where the workman left surviving him a dependent mother, and brothers and sisters not dependent, the mother was entitled to the entire compensation. (Wk. Comp. Act 1912, § 4; Jones & A. Ann. St. 1913, par. 5452) Matecny v. Vierling Steel Works, 187 Ill. App. 448.

38 (St. 1911, c. 751, pt. 2, §§ 6, 7, and pt. 3, § 17) In re King, 220 Mass. 290, 107 N. E. 959.