Where it does not appear that the employé's misstatement of his name and age induced the employer to enter into the employment contract, such misrepresentation does not constitute fraud such as will relieve the employer from liability.58

Neither the regents of the University nor the state board of agriculture come within the Michigan Workmen's Compensation Act by reason of the provision that the state shall be subject to the Act; and hence an employé of the Agricultural College is not an employé of the state, where the College has not voluntarily come within the Act.59 Regular employés of the state working upon state highways come within the Washington Act." Where a member of the California National Guard is injured by an accident arising out of his employment and caused by the falling of his horse, on which he was riding while on duty, he is entitled to compensation for the resulting disability. A school-teacher employed to supervise gymnasium classes in a state imbecile school of Connecticut is an employé of the state, and the Compensation Act applies to injuries received in her employment."

61

62

Gilroy v. Mackie et al. (Leith Distress Committee), (1910) 2 B. W. C. C. 269, Ct. of Sess. Where a blind man injured while working in an industrial institute for blind people, which institution was partly supported by charity, and which paid him 5s. a month over his board and lodging, he was under a contract of service. Macgillivray v. Northern Counties Institute for the Blind (1911) 4 B. W. C. C. 429, Ct. of Sess.

Where a man worked in a labor yard maintained by a charitable institution, so that unemployed workmen could earn their board and lodging, and sometimes trifling sums besides, there was no evidence of a contract of service. Burns v. Manchester & Salford Wesleyan Mission (1909) 99 L. T. 581, C. A.

58 Havey v. Erie R. Co., 87 N. J. Law, 444, 95 Atl. 124.

59 (Pub. Acts 1912 [Ex. Sess.] No. 10, pt. 1, § 5) Agler v. Michigan Agricultural College, 181 Mich, 559, 148 N. W. 341.

60 (Wk. Comp. Act, Wash. § 17) Opinion Atty. Gen. Sept. 17, 1913.

61 Peterson v. State of California, 2 Cal. I. A. C. Dec. (Bulletins 1915) 48. 62 Skinner v. Connecticut School for Imbeciles, 1 Conn. Comp. Dec. 106.

63

Jurors, since they are not under any contract of hire, express or implied, with the county, and are not subject to its control or supervision, are not employés of the county. Clerical employés in the office of the city clerk are not employés of the city in conducting a light and water plant as contemplated by the Kansas Act.** Employés under civil service appointment are not under the Washington Act. A horseman and trained member of a fire company, who was classified as in the "official service" and not in the "labor service," has been held not to belong to the class of city employés entitled to compensation under the Massachusetts Act as "laborers, workmen and mechanics." But a fireman or policeman is an employé of the city in Minnesota, where he was in the service of the city and not appointed for a regular term of office. County engineers and laborers employed by the county are employés under the Iowa Act.68 A civil engineer, appointed by a Minnesota district court to supervise the construction of a judicial ditch, is an employé of the counties interested in the construction of the ditch." The source from which the money for carrying on work on the roads

66

€3 (Laws 1913, c. 467, § 34, subd. 1 [Gen. St. 1913, § 8230]) Op. Atty. Gen. on Minn. Wk. Comp. Act, Bul. 9, p. 27.

84 (Wk. Comp. Act, § 6, Laws 1911, c. 218) Udey v. City of Winfield, 97 Kan. 279, 155 Pac. 43.

65 (Wk. Comp. Act, Wash. § 17) Rulings Wash. Indus. Ins. Com. 1915, p. 23. 66 Devney v. City of Boston, 223 Mass. 270, 111 N. E. 788.

A laborer ordinarily is a person without particular training, who is employed at manual labor under a contract terminable at will, while workmen and mechanics broadly embrace those who are skilled users of tools. Oliver v. Macon Hardware Co., 98 Ga. 249, 25 S. E. 403, 58 Am. St. Rep. 300; Ellis v. U. S., 206 U. S. 246, 27 Sup. Ct. 600, 51 L. Ed. 1047, 11 Ann. Cas. 589, Breakwater Co. v. U. S., 183 Fed. 112, 114, 105 C. C. A. 404.

87 State ex rel. City of Duluth v. District Court (Minn.) 158 N. W. 790, 791. 68 (Code Supp. 1913, tit. 12, c. 8a, § 2477m16[b]) Op. Sp. Counsel to Iowa Indus. Com. (1915) p. 7.

69 Op. Atty. Gen. on Minn. Wk. Comp. Act, Bul. 13, p. 31.

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of the state is derived has no bearing on the question of liability, and although the funds consist in part of money appropriated by the county board and part of funds appropriated by the state, the employé being hired by the county, the county is solely liable.7° A prisoner of the county serving sentence on a work farm, his wife being paid a small amount by the county, is not an employé of the county."1

§ 54.

73

California

Employés of municipal corporations, entitled to compensation under the California Act, include a street inspector under control of the city and paid indirectly out of a paving assessment, but directly by the contractor,72 a street commissioner, a manager of waterworks, a substitute fireman appointed by a municipal officer, where his services are accepted and paid for by the city," or his appointment is according to an established custom, though he be not under the civil service rules,75 a deputy marshal, who has acted as such and been paid therefor by the city, though his appointment has never been ratified or approved as required by law, and a deputy appointed by a town marshal and under control of the town authorities, though he is not on the town pay roll." Where a city

72 Barron v. City of Venice, 2 Cal. I. A. C. Dec. 25.

73 Op. Sp. Counsel to Iowa Indus. Com. (1915) p. 8.

76

74 The appointment by a municipal officer of a substitute fireman, the acceptance of the fireman's services, and payment of his wages by the municipality make him an “employé," though he be not under the civil service rules. Campbell v. City of Los Angeles, 2 Cal. 1. A. C. Dec. 300.

75 Where it is customary for a battalion fire chief to appoint a substitute fireman in place of a fireman on leave of absence, a substitute so appointed and injured was entitled to disability compensation, though the civil service rules neither permitted nor prohibited such employment. Id.

76 Olsen v. Rogers Development Co., 2 Cal. I. A. C. Dec. 586.

77 Eastman v. State Compensation Insurance Fund, 2 Cal. I. A. C. Dec. 390.

marshal places his son in charge of a pump, which it is the marshal's duty to care for, and the son is injured, compensation sought against the city must be denied, if it does not appear that the marshal had express authority to employ his son.78 The director of an irrigation district is an employé within the meaning of this Act.79 Where a city charter provides for creating and maintaining a relief, health, life insurance, or pension fund for municipal employés, and such system covers the subject of compensation for accidental injury or death in line of duty, such charter provisions, not the Compensation Act, govern the city's liability to employés or their dependents covered by it; the Compensation Act being excluded from operation by virtue of section 6 of article 11 of the Constitution.8

$ 55.

80

Federal employés

An "artisan," within the original federal Act, continued in force as to injuries prior to the Act of 1916, is one who practices an industrial art, a trained workman, a superior mechanic.81 The term "laborer," though not so easily susceptible of accurate definition, was evidently used by Congress to designate men who do work requiring little skill, as distinguished from artisan.82 These terms.

78 Noonan v. City of Ferris, 2 Cal. I. A. C. Dec. 89.

79 Kiernan v. Turlock Irrigation District, 2 Cal. I. A. C. Dec. 259.

80 Crehan v. City of Los Angeles, 1 Cal. I. A. C. Dec. 252.

81 In re Grant, Op. Sol. Dept. of L. 94.

82 The ordinary and popular understanding of the word "laborer" accords with the definition given by the Standard Dictionary, whereby a laborer is described as "one who performs physical or manual labor requiring little skill or training other than regular domestic servants, one who gains a living by manual toil," and the definition given by the dictionary accords with the view taken by probably a decided majority of the courts. 24 Cyc. 810 et seq. According to general understanding, the occupation of a laborer is distinguished from other occupations by the fact (1) that his work is essentially physical and toilsome; (2) that it makes a demand primarily upon his physical or mechanical powers and not upon his intellectual faculties except in a

83

have been determined to include a storekeeper in the Canal Zone,' an inspector whose duties involved no manual labor, a messen

84

minor degree; (3) that it requires on his part relatively little skill, except of a manual or mechanical sort, and relatively little training, except such as comes from examples and experience; (4) that it calls for the exercise of little or no independent judgment or discretion; and (5) that it is performed by rule of thumb or under the immediate direction of a superior. In re Grant, Op. Sol. Dept. of L. 94.

In its ordinary and usual acceptation, the word carries with it the idea of actual physical and manual exertion or toil. Farinholt v. Luckhard, 90 Va. 936, 21 S. E. 817, 44 Am. St. Rep. 953. A laborer is one who labors with his physical powers in the service of and under the direction of another for fixed wages. Blanchard v. Railroad Co., 87 Me. 241, 32 Atl. 890. A laborer is one whose work depends upon mere physical power to perform ordinary manual labor, and not one engaged in services consisting mainly of work requiring mental skill or business capacity, and involving the exercise of the intellectual faculties. Kline v. Russell, 113 Ga. 1085, 39 S. E. 477. Primarily a clerk in a mercantile establishment is not a laborer, even though the proper discharge of his duties may include the performance of some amount of manual labor. If the contract of employment contemplated that a clerk's servlces were to consist mainly of work requiring mental skill or business capacity, and involving the exercise of his intellectual faculties rather than work the doing of which properly would depend upon the mere physical power to perform ordinary labor, he would not be a laborer. If, on the other hand, the work which the contract required the clerk to do was, in the main, to be the performance of such labor as that last above indicated, he would be a laborer. Oliver v. Macon Hardware Co., 98 Ga. 249, 25 S. E. 403, 58 Am. St. Rep. 300. "Laborer" should be construed according to its common acceptation, and to mean men who do work which requires little skill, as distinguished from an artisan. Guise v. Oliver, 51 Ark. 356, 11 S. W. 515. When we speak of laboring or working classes, we do not intend to include therein persons like civil engineers, the value of whose services rests rather in their scientific than in their physical ability. In one sense the engineer is a laborer; but so is a lawyer, a doctor, and a banker, yet no statistician has ever been known to include these among the laboring classes. Railroad Co. v. Berry, 31 Tex. Civ. App. 408, 72 S. W. 1049. The word "laborers" refers to those whose services are manual or menial, those who are responsible for no independent action, but who do a day's work or stated job under the direction of a superior. Wildner v. Ferguson, 42 Minn. 112, 43 N. W. 794, 83 In re Inniss, Op. Sol. Dept. of L. 81.

84 In re Shetler, Op. Sol. Dept. of L. 108; In re Creamer, Op. Sol. Dept. of L. 109.