favor of the right of congress to use coercive measures against the states, under the old confederation; but the difficulties of such a measure were great enough, probably, to prevent congress from attempting to use such a power, even if expressly granted. Of course, congress was becoming a laughing-stock and a by-word among the nations; invested with an authority, indeed, to do great things, but without the least power to exercise its rights. The plan of operating directly upon individuals was the one thing wanting, and completed the grand outline of a constitutional government, by rendering it thoroughly and effectually national. It would perhaps be difficult to say who is to be considered as the author of this grand discovery. It was probably the result of gradual approximations, as have been many other grand discoveries. The germ of it appears in the proposition which had been made by congress to the states, for a permanent revenue to be derived from duties laid on imported commodities, and collected by officers, appointed by, or at least responsible to, congress. The three great fundamental principles of the union namely, nationality, perpetuity, and individual responsibility-being once firmly established, the rest followed of course. The greatest practical difficulties which remained were taxation and representation; and we can probably in no way better complete our purpose of giving some idea of the debates, and the manner of reporting them, than by adding a few extracts from some of the speeches on these points.

“Mr. Wilson. The subject, it must be owned, is surrounded with doubts and difficulties. But we must surmount them. The British government cannot be our model. We have no materials for a similar one. Our manners, our laws, the abolition of entails of primogeniture, the whole genius of the people, are opposed to it. He did not see the danger of the states being devoured by the national government. On the contrary, he wished to keep them from devouring the national government. He was not, however,

for extinguishing these planets, as was supposed by Mr. Dickinson; neither did he, on the other hand, believe that they would warm or enlighten the sun. Within their proper orbits they must still be suffered to act for subordinate purposes, for which their exist ence is made essential by the great extent of our country. He could not comprehend in what manner the landed interest would be rendered less predominant in the senate by an election through the medium of the legislatures, than by the people themselves. If the legislatures, as was now complained, sacrificed the commercial to the landed interest, what reason was there to expect such a choice from them as would defeat their own views? He was for an election by the people, in large districts, which would be most likely to obtain men of intelligence and uprightness; subdividing the districts only for the accommodation of voters."

"Mr. Wilson hoped, if the confederacy should be dissolved, that a majority, nay, a minority, of the states would unite for their safety. He entered elaborately into the defence of a proportional representation, stating for his first position, that, as all authority was derived from the people, equal numbers of people ought to have an equal number of representatives, and different numbers of people, different numbers of representatives. This principle had been improperly violated in the confederation, owing to the urgent circumstances of the time. As to the case of A and B stated by Mr. Patterson, he observed, that, in districts as large as the states, the number of people was the best measure of their comparative wealth. Whether, therefore, wealth or numbers was to form the ratio, it would be the same. Mr. Patterson admitted persons, not property, to be the measure of suffrage. Are not the citizens of Pennsylvania equal to those of New Jersey? Does it require one hundred and fifty of the former to balance fifty of the latter? Representatives of different districts ought clearly to hold the same proportion to each other, as their respective constituents hold to each other. If the small states will not confederate on this plan, Pennsylvania, and he presumed some other states, would not confederate on any other. We have been told that each state being sovereign, all are equal. So each man is naturally a sovereign over himself, and all men are therefore naturally equal. Can he

retain this equality when he becomes a member of civil government? He cannot. As little can a sovereign state, when it becomes a member of a federal government. If New Jersey will not part with her sovereignty, it is in vain to talk of government. A new partition of the states is desirable, but evidently and totally impracticable."

The following remarks, from Dr. Franklin, must have been much to the purpose:

"Mr. Chairman, -It has given me great pleasure to observe, that, till this point, the proportion of representation, came before us, our debates were carried on with great coolness and temper. If any thing of a contrary kind has on this occasion appeared, I hope it will not be repeated; for we are sent here to consult, not to contend, with each other; and declarations of a fixed opinion, and of determined resolution never to change it, neither enlighten nor convince us. Positiveness and warmth on one side naturally beget their like on the other, and tend to create and augment discord and division, in a great concern wherein harmony and union are extremely necessary to give weight to our councils, and render them effectual in promoting and securing the common good.

"I must own, that I was originally of opinion it would be better if every member of congress, or our national council, were to consider himself rather as a representative of the whole, than as an agent for the interests of a particular state; in which case the proportion of members for each state would be of less consequence, and it would not be very material whether they voted by states or individually. But as I find this is not to be expected, I now think the number of representatives should bear some proportion to the number of the represented; and that the decisions should be by the majority of members, not by the majority of the states. This is objected to from an apprehension that the greater states would then swallow up the smaller. I do not at present clearly see what advantage the greater states could propose to themselves by swallowing up the smaller, and therefore do not apprehend they would attempt it."

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Mr. Hamilton was for a strong general government, his fears being that the state sovereignties would prove too strong for the national government.

"All the passions, then, we see, of avarice, ambition, interest, which govern most individuals, and all public bodies, fall into the current of the states, and do not flow into the stream of the general government. The former, therefore, will generally be an overmatch for the general government, and render any confederacy in its very nature precarious. Theory is in this case fully confirmed by experience. The Amphictyonic council had, it would seem, ainple powers for general purposes. It had, in particular, the power of fining and using force against delinquent members. What was the consequence? Their decrees were mere signals of war. The Phocian war is a striking example of it. Philip at length, taking advantage of their disunion, and insinuating himself into their councils, made himself master of their fortunes. The German confederacy affords another lesson. The authority of Charlemagne seemed to be as great as could be necessary. The great feudal chiefs, however, exercising their local sovereignties, soon felt the spirit, and found the means, of encroachments, which reduced the imperial authority to a nominal sovereignty. The diet has succeeded, which, though aided by a prince at its head, of great authority independently of his imperial attributes, is a striking illustration of the weakness of confederated governments. Other examples instruct us in the same truth. The Swiss cantons have scarce any union at all, and have been more than once at war with one another."

The following speech of Mr. Madison is a good illustration of his analytical mode of reasoning, the subject of discussion being the term of office of the second branch of the legislature, namely, the senate.

"Mr. Madison. In order to judge of the form to be given to this institution, it will be proper to take a view of the ends to be served by it. These were, first, to protect the people against their rulers; secondly, to protect the people against the transient impressions into which they themselves might be led.

A people deliberating in a temperate moment, and with the experience of other nations before them, on the plan of government most likely to secure their happiness, would first be aware, that those charged with the public happiness might betray their trust. An obvious precaution against this danger would be, to divide the trust between different bodies of men, who might watch and check each other. In this they would be governed by the same prudence which has prevailed in organizing the subordinate departments of government, where all business liable to abuses is made to pass through separate hands, the one being a check on the other. It would next occur to such a people, that they themselves were liable to temporary errors, through want of information as to their true interest; and that men chosen for a short term, and employed but a short portion of that in public affairs, might err from the same cause. This reflection would naturally suggest, that the government be so constituted as that one of its branches might have an opportunity of acquiring a competent knowledge of the public interests. Another reflection, equally becoming a people on such an occasion, would be, that they themselves, as well as a numerous body of representatives, were liable to err, also, from fickleness and passion. A necessary fence against this danger would be, to select a portion of enlightened citizens, whose limited number, and firmness, might seasonably interpose against impetuous counsels. It ought, finally, to occur to a people deliberating on a government for themselves, that as different interests necessarily result from the liberty meant to be secured, the major interest might, under sudden impulses, be tempted to commit injustice on the minority. In all civilized countries the people fall into different classes, having a real or supposed difference of interests. There will be creditors and debtors; farmers, merchants, and manufacturers. There will be, particularly, the distinction of rich and poor. It was true, as had been observed (by Mr. Pinckney,) we had not among us those hereditary distinctions of rank which were a great source of the contests in the ancient governments, as well as the modern states of Europe; nor those extremes of wealth or poverty, which characterize the latter. We