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SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE. (Supplemental suit-Damages.)
Held that a party who had obtained a decree for a specific performance might obtain by supplemental suit compensation for damage done to him, by abstraction (by the defendant) pendente lite of part of the subject matter of the original suit; the amount of damage to be assessed in an action brought under the direc
tion of the court. Nelson v. Bridges, B. 239. VENDOR AND PURCHASER. (Time of performance-Costs.)
Where time is not the essence of the contract, by its original terms, it may be made so on reasonable notice by either party; but where an objection founded on such a notice is set up and fails, the defendant will have to pay the costs up to the hearing.
Taylor v. Brown, B. 180. WILL. (Construction-Legal representatives.) There being a
bequest to A. or his legal representatives, A. being dead at the date of the will (which the testator did not know): Held, that A.'s next of kin, according to the statute of distribution, were entitled, to the exclusion of his legatees or executors. Cotton
v. Cotton, B. 67. 2. (Construction-Partial restraint on alienation.) Bequest of
money and leaseholds to a feme sole “ for her own absolute use, without liberty to sell or assign during her natural life :” Held to confer an absolute interest without power of alienation during
life. Baker v. Newton, B. 112. 3. (Construction-Payment of legacies.) Where legacies given
by will were made payable at twenty-one : Held, that the payment of them was not accelerated by a direction in a codicil to pay all legacies as far as practicable within six months. Frost
v. Capel, B. 184. 4. (Construction-Period of survivorship.) Testator gave to his
wife for life all his remaining estates and also all his capital in trade in trust at his death for his then surviving children, except as to the rental of his estates, which he gave to his surviving female children, subject to certain restrictions, with a gift over (from one to the other) upon the decease of any of the children without issue, and from the last female child to the males in like VOL. XXVI. -NO. LI.
manner : Held, that the surviving female children meant the
children surviving his wife. Wordsworth v. Wood, B. 25. 5. (Construction- Separate use.) Bequest in trust to pay income
to testator's wife for her life, to be by her applied for the maintenance of herself and children by the testator : Held, not to
be a gift to the separate use. Wardle v. Claxton, S. 524. 6. (Absolute interest— Remoteness.) Where there was a bequest
of personalty, in terms giving an absolute interest in the first instance to the testators, followed by a direction to invest in trust for them for life, with a remainder to their children that was too remote, it was held, that the absolute gist was not cut down by
the subsequent direction. Ring v. Hardwick, B. 352. 7. (Construction.) Testator gave 6001. to be applied in payment
of the debt to which Z. chapel was or might be subject at his death. At that time, by arrangement among the body of dissenters with which the chapel was in connexion, 6001. was laid on the congregation belonging to that chapel, but there was no legal charge affecting the chapel : Held, that the legacy failed.
Davies v. Hopkins, B. 276. 8. (Construction-interest-share.) Bequest to trustees to be di
vided between the testator's wife and six poor members of a chapel : Held, that the wife had a seventh absolutely, and that the interest only of the other six-sevenths was payable to the six poor members in perpetuam. Gregory v. The Attorney
General, B. 366. 9. (Cumulative legacy.) A testator bequeathed to A. B. an annu
ity of 1501. half-yearly, for her separate use, afterwards, on hearing that she was married, (as she was at the time of the original bequest), he wrote on the margin of the will opposite
“ now Mrs. C. D., one hundred guineas per annum, in quarterly payments," which he signed. The two handwritings were proved separately: Held nevertheless that the annuity of one hundred guineas was in substitution for the other, and that this was given to the separate use.
Martin v. Drinkwater, B. 215. 10. (Remoteness.) A devise in these words, " to all and every
the above passage,
four years :
my grandchildren, the children of my said son A., and three daughters, B., C., and D., who shall attain the age of twenty
" Held void, for remoteness, although there were no grandchildren, not born in the testator's life time. Newman
v. Neuman, S. 51. 11. (Specific legacy-Word “his.") Testator bequeathed as many
of his canal shares as he should leave children him surviving, one share for each child, " at the date of his will, he had eight shares and seven children ; at his death, ten shares and eleven children :” Held, that the eight shares only passed. Miller v.
Little, B. 259. 12. (Vesting of legacies-Time of payment.) Where there was
first a distinct gift of a legacy, and then a direction that it should be paid within six months, and a general declaration that all legacies should be vested only when payable, and the legatee died within the six months: Held, that the legacy had vested. Lucas v. Carline, B. 367.
Selections from 3 Haggard, part 2.
ADMIRALTY. (Office and jurisdiction of lord high admiral
Droits.) The origin and limits of the office and jurisdiction were fully considered, and it was decided, that it begins on the coast of the kingdom regularly at low water mark, and obtains, alternately within the land jurisdiction, whether by common law or grant, over the space between high water mark and low water mark, and it was the opinion of the court, that a grant to a private person in derogation of these limits was void.
The limit of three miles below low water mark is a territorial limit between nation and nation. The King v. Forty-Nine
Casks of Brandy, 257. BOTTOMRY. (Purchaser of bond without notice.) A public advertisement for sale of a bottomry bond does not discharge a purchaser from the obligation to inquire into the fact of "an
unprovided necessity.” Prince of Saxe Cobourg, 387. COLLISION. (Close hauled and free-Costs.) A vessel close
hauled, and which ought therefore to have held on, in order to get out of the way of a vessel going free, which had neared her without altering her course, attempted to wear, and was run down by the other vessel, who had changed her course at the same time : Held, according to the opinion of the trinity mas. ter, that the collision was imputable to the former vessel ; but the other vessel not having endeavored to assist after the acci
dent, the owner was condemned in the costs. Celt, 321. 2. (Different tacks.) If two vessels are beating to windward on
opposite tacks, it is the duty of the one on the starboard tack to
hold on, and of the other to give way. Jupiter, 320. 3. (Steamer.) Principles applicable to steamers. Full amount of
damages and costs given against steamer who was going in a fog with unabated speed in a track frequented by coasters, and who did not, when hailed, immediately back her engines. Perth,
414. WRECK OF THE SEA. (What passes by the words.) A grant
of wreck of the sea does not include what is commonly called flotsam, which is droits, but it does include, 1, goods found at low water, between high and low water mark; 2, goods, between the same limits, partly resting on the ground, but still moved by the water. The King v. Forty-Nine Casks of Brandy,
257. 2. (Same.) The same point was decided the same way, and it
was also held, as to goods which have touched the ground, but have been again floated by the tide, and are within low water mark, that the right of the grantee of wreck of the sea, will depend upon circumstances, as whether they were seized by a person wading, or swimming, or in a boat. The King v. Two Casks of Tallow, 294.
II.-DIGEST OF AMERICAN CASES.
Selections from 1 Metcalf's and 19 Pickering's (Massachusetts); and 21 and
22 Wendell's (New York) Reports.
ACCORD AND SATISFACTION. (By one partner.) The ac
ceptance of the note of a third person from one of the members of a firm, indorsed by him, together with the payment of the balance of the account against the firm in cash, is an accord and satisfaction of the demand against the firm ; there being no agreement that such note was received merely as collateral
security. Frisbie v. Larned, 21 Wendell, 450. 2. (Same.) So a judgment confessed by one of the partners for
the debt of the firm is a satisfaction. Ib. ACTION. The provision in the Rev. Sts. c. 118, 42, that
“when any pecuniary forfeiture or fine is made recoverable by bill, plaint or information, it may nevertheless be sued for and recovered by an action of debt or an action of trespass on the case," relates only to forfeitures and fines to be prosecuted for in forms adapted to criminal proceedings, where the suit is brought by the Commonwealth, or by a common informer.
Wiley v. Yale, 1 Metcalf, 553. Colburn v. Swett, Ib. 236. 2. (By inference.) As a general rule, a common informer can.
not maintain an action for a penalty, unless power is given to
him for that purpose by statute. Ib. 3. (Corporation.) When an action is commenced and prosecuted
by a corporation, by direction of its officers de facto, - no other persons claiming a right to act as its officers, the defendant cannot be permitted to show, for the purpose of procuring the action to be dismissed, that those officers were illegally elected. (1 Hall, 191.) Charitable Association, 4-c. v.
Baldwin, 1 Metcalf, 359. ACTION ON THE CASE. (Preparing plaintiff's medicines.)