after July 12, 1912, may be reliquidated free of duty where the liquidation has not become final, and free entry will be granted to wood pulp, paper, and paper board in bond for which no permit of delivery has been issued.

The Secretary of State has this day been advised of this amendment of the said regulations and requested to instruct the consular officers concerned to add to their usual certificate on invoice a specific verification of the exporter's declaration of origin.

(67747.)

JAMES F. CURTIS, Acting Secretary.

(T. D. 32758.)

Drawback on driving axles, engine-truck axles, etc.

Drawback on driving axles, engine-truck axles, tender-truck axles, connecting rods, piston rods, wrist pins, and guides manufactured from imported steel blooms by the Standard Steel Co., of Burnham, Pa., and the Baldwin Locomotive Works, of Philadelphia, Pa., when exported as such or incorporated in locomotives manufactured by the Baldwin Locomotive Works.-T. D. 24418 of May 7, 1903, revoked.

TREASURY DEPARTMENT, August 10, 1912. SIR: Drawback is hereby allowed under section 25 of the tariff act of August 5, 1909, and the regulations promulgated thereunder (T. D. 31695 of June 16, 1911), on driving axles, engine-truck axles, tendertruck axles, connecting rods, piston rods, wrist pins, and guides manufactured from imported steel blooms by the Standard Steel Co., of Burnham, Pa., and the Baldwin Locomotive Works, of Philadelphia, Pa., when exported as such or incorporated in locomotives manufactured by the Baldwin Locomotive Works.

A sworn statement shall be filed with or form a part of each entry, showing the quantity of imported steel blooms used, the quantity of the finished articles, the quantity of valuable waste, the values of such waste and the imported material at the factory, and the quantity of worthless waste.

The allowance shall not exceed the net weight of the manufactured articles, with an addition for worthless waste and for valuable waste, depending upon the number of pounds of imported material which such waste will replace.

The manufacturers' sworn statement, dated March 6, 1903, is now on file at your port, and the special agent's report, dated July 31, 1912, is inclosed herewith.

T. D. 24418 of May 7, 1903, is hereby revoked.

Respectfully,

(20030.)

JAMES F. CURTIS,

Assistant Secretary.

COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, Philadelphia, Pa.

(T. D. 32759-G. A. 7384.)

Jurisdiction.

1. JURISDICTION-BOARD OF GENERAL APPRAISERS.

Subsection 14 of section 28, tariff act of 1909, gives the Board of General Appraisers jurisdiction to review the decisions of the collectors of customs in two distinct and separate respects: First, as to the rate and amount of duty chargeable upon imported merchandise, including all dutiable costs and charges; second, as to all fees and exactions of whatever character, except duties on tonnage.

2. SAME-FEES AND EXACTIONS-DRAWBACKS.

The Board of United States General Appraisers has jurisdiction to review the action of the collector in charging certain fees and making certain exactions in connection with the lading of a vessel with articles manufactured in the United States, the exporter thereof having filed claims for drawback of duty paid upon the imported material entering into the manufacture of these articles.

United States General Appraisers, New York, August 9, 1912.

In the matter of protests 564259, etc., of the Atlantic Transport Co. against the assessment of duty by the collector of customs at the port of Baltimore.

Before Board 3 (WAITE, SOMERVILLE, and HAY, General Appraisers; SOMERVILLE, G. A., absent).

HAY, General Appraiser: This is a motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction certain protests filed against the action of the collector of the port of Baltimore. The protestant is the Atlantic Transport Co., a steamship company operating a line of steamships between the ports of the United States and foreign countries. The protestants claim that the collector at the port of Baltimore exacted, and that they paid to him, certain sums for the service of an inspector of customs supervising the lading on vessels of their line at night certain articles manufactured in the United States, the exporters thereof having filed claims for drawback of duty paid upon the imported material entering into the manufacture of these articles. The United States, through its attorneys, files a motion to dismiss upon the ground that the Board of United States General Appraisers has no jurisdiction over the action of the collector in regard to goods intended for export; that the jurisdiction of this tribunal is confined to reviewing the decisions of the collector relative to imported merchandise. Whatever jurisdiction this board has is derived from subsection 14 of section 28 of the act of 1909, which, in so far as it affects the question here involved, is the same as section 14 of the customs administrative act of 1890, which section reads as follows: That the decision of the collector as to the rate and amount of duties chargeable upon imported merchandise, including all dutiable costs and charges, and as to all fees and exactions of whatever character (except duties on tonnage), shall be final and conclusive against all persons interested therein, unless the owner, importer, consignee, or agent of such merchandise, or the person paying such fees, charges, and exactions other than duties, shall, within 15 days after but not before such ascertainment and liqui

dation of duties, as well in cases of merchandise entered in bond as for consumption, or within 15 days after the payment of such fees, charges, and exactions, if dissatisfied with such decision, give notice in writing to the collector, setting forth therein distinctly and specifically, and in respect to each entry or payment, the reasons for his objections thereto, and if the merchandise is entered for consumption shall pay the full amount of the duties and charges ascertained to be due thereon. Upon such' notice and payment the collector shall transmit the invoice and all the papers and exhibits connected therewith to the board of nine general appraisers, for due assignment and determination as hereinbefore provided; such determination shall be final and conclusive upon all persons interested therein, and the record shall be transmitted to the proper collector or person acting as such, who shall liquidate the entry accordingly, except in cases where an application shall be filed in the United States Court of Customs Appeals within the time and in the manner provided for in this Act. Like in many customs cases, the decisions upon this question are not in entire harmony. Prior, however, to the decision by this board in the American Express Co.'s case (the so-called packed package case), G. A. 6552 (T. D. 27962), the question of the board's jurisdiction to pass upon the collector's action in imposing fees and exactions had never been squarely presented or thoroughly considered. Czarnecki's case, G. A. 3785 (T. D. 17851), does, we think, tend to support the Government's contention, but it is quite apparent from the opinion in that case that the exact meaning of the law or the intent and purpose of Congress had not been very thoroughly drawn to the attention of the board. It should be observed, however, that the General Appraiser writing that decision said:

Now, the act of June 10, 1890, refers to the importation of merchandise and various incidents relating thereto, and this and nothing else was the subject matter in the mind of Congress.

Accepting without approving this as a true construction of the statute, the transaction out of which the protests in this case grew was one of the various incidents relating to the importation of merchandise that is, it was the action of the collector relative to the exportation of commodities manufactured from imported material for which the law provides a drawback. The entire transaction, therefore, rests upon the importation of the material out of which the manufactured product was made. The case of In re Fassett (142) U. S., 479) is not, in our judgment, authority for the Government's contention. In that case the collector of the port of New York had assessed duty upon a yacht, whereupon the owner of the yacht had filed a libel in the District Court for the Southern District of New York, and the case came up to the Supreme Court upon a writ of prohibition, by which the United States asks that court to prohibit the district court from hearing the case. This the court refused to do upon the ground that the District Court had original jurisdiction. under the libel to determine the only question involved, to wit, whether or not the yacht is an imported article, and for the court to issue its writ of prohibition would be to assume original jurisdiction

of a case in which it had only appellate jurisdiction. The only question passed upon by the court in that case relative to the jurisdiction of the Board of General Appraisers was, that the protest authorized by the customs administrative act does not bring up for review before the board the question as to whether or not an article is imported merchandise.

In Acker, Merrall & Condit Co.'s case, G. A. 5689 (T. D. 25331) this board took jurisdiction of a protest which challenged the action of the collector in making certain charges for merchandise detained under the so-called pure-food law and held that the charge was unauthorized. The board in that case took jurisdiction, evidently upon the theory that the administrative act authorized the board to review the decisions of the collector in two distinct and separate respects: First, as to the rate and amount of duty chargeable upon imported merchandise, including all dutiable costs and charges; and, second, as to all fees and exactions of whatever character except duties on tonnage. The question as to the board's jurisdiction, however, was not raised in that case, but in the subsequent case (the packed package case, supra) that question was raised and was quite fully considered. by this board. In the decision in that case the board said:

As pointed out, section 14, in our judgment, provides two distinct and separate acts of the collector against which protests may be filed-first, his decision as to the rate and amount of duties upon imported merchandise, and, second, his decision upon fees and exactions. We think this is made perfectly clear by the fact that the limitation of time wherein protests may be filed is separately stated. A protest against the decision of a collector as to the rate and amount of duty must, under the section, be filed within 10 days after, but not before, the ascertainment and liquidation of the duties. A protest against fees and exactions must be filed within 10 days after the payment of such fees, charges, and exactions. To hold that the board had not jurisdiction in such a case as that here presented would, in our judgment, be in conflict with the express language of section 14 of the act of June 10, 1890.

In this case the board had under consideration the action of the collector in exacting the sum of 20 cents on each package contained in a packed package, when the goods embraced in the several items in the packed package were never entered at the customhouse, they being entitled to free admission, which items, as it appeared according to the practice prevailing in the administration of customs, are delivered to the consignee immediately upon it being ascertained that they are entitled to free admission upon the payment of the fees exacted. This case was affirmed by the Circuit Court for the Southern District of New York. United States v. American Express Co. (154 Fed. Rep., 996; T. D. 28285.)

In Steele's case, G. A. 6981 (T. D. 30354), subsequently decided, the board reaffirms the doctrine of the packed-package case, supra, in a case in which the assessment by the collector of the amount provided by section 37 of the act of August 5, 1909, on a foreign-built

yacht was called in question, saying in the opinion that the exaction there made was not a duty upon imported merchandise and not a tonnage duty, but an exaction other than such duty, that "the one thing excepted is tonnage duties only, and hence, under a familiar principle, the exception strengthens the force of the general law." See also United States v. Geo. Hall Coal Co. (134 Fed. Rep., 1003).

From this review of the law we hold that the board has jurisdiction of these cases, and the motion to dismiss is therefore denied.

(T. D. 32760.)

Abstracts of decisions of the Board of General Appraisers.

Board 1-Sharretts, McClelland, and Chamberlain. Board 2-Fischer, Howell, and Cooper. Board 3-Waite, Somerville, and Hay.

BEFORE BOARD 3, August 9, 1912.

No. 29469.-CURRY PASTE-MULLIGATAWNY PASTE.-Protest 519442 of John H.

Magruder (Washington).

WAITE, General Appraiser: The merchandise in question here is invoiced as "curry paste" and "mulligatawny paste." It was assessed for duty under paragraph 253, tariff act of 1909, as a sauce. The importer claims it should be free of duty under paragraph 552, which provides for "curry, and curry powder." The testimony is very unconvincing as to what was known as curry and curry powder at the time the law was passed, or as to what is recognized in the trade as such commodities. The jars containing the two samples in evidence are respectively labeled "Captain White's Curry Paste" and "Captain White's Mulligatawny Paste." There is nothing in the record from which we can find that the commodity invoiced as mulligatawny paste is either curry or curry powder, as provided for in paragraph 552. The protest is therefore overruled as to this item. Note Abstract 20271 (T. D. 29449)

As to the article marked "curry paste," there is no satisfactory proof as to what proportion of curry powder or other ingredients is found in this substance. We think it appears, however, that the term "curry" covers a sauce or substance used for flavoring, a relish similar to, if not identical with, that imported in this case. Curry is primarily derived from the leaf of an East Indian tree (Murraya koenigii) of the rue family (Rutaceae). The dictionary informs us that curry powder is "a powdered condiment of pungent spices, chillies, turmeric, etc., used in making curry sauce." The Century Dictionary says curry is—

A kind of sauce or relish, made of meat, fish, fowl, fruit, eggs, or vegetables, cooked with bruised spices, such as cayenne pepper, coriander seed, ginger, garlic, etc., with turmeric, much used in India and elsewhere as a relish or flavoring for rice.

The Standard Dictionary defines curry to be

A highly flavored and pungent sauce used as a relish for boiled rice, meats, etc. Called also curry sauce.

It would appear from these definitions and the evidence in the case, together with the labels upon the jars, that the substance marked "curry paste" is within the meaning of the term "curry" in the statute. We therefore sustain the protest as to this item and direct reliquidation accordingly.