ostensibly for a neutral port, but destined in reality for a belligerent port, either by the same ship or by another, without becoming liable, from the commencement to the end of the voyage, to seizure, in order to the confiscation of the cargo, we do not agree to it."

The court further said: "It makes no difference whether the destination to the rebel port was ulterior or direct: nor could the question of destination be affected by transshipment at Nassau, if transshipment was intended, for that could not break the continuity of transportation of the cargo.

"The interposition of a neutral port between neutral departure and belligerent destination has always been a favorite resort of contraband carriers and blockade-runners. But it never avails them when the ultimate destination is ascertained. A transportation from one point to another remains continuous, so long as intent remains unchanged, no matter what stoppages or transshipments intervene.

"The same principle is equally applicable to the conveyance of contraband to belligerents: and the vessel, which, with the consent of the owner, is so employed in the first stage of a continuous transportation. is equally liable to capture and confiscation with the vessel which is employed in the last if the employment is such as to make either so liable.

This rule of continuity is well established in respect to cargo." The "Peterhoff," 5 Wall., 28.-This was a case of an English vessel, bound during the civil war in the United States, to Matamoros, Mexico, immediately across the Rio Grande from territory of the state of Texas, which was a part of the Southern Confederacy. The vessel, which contained goods useful in war, was seized and condemned on the ground that the goods were contraband.

The court said: "The classification of goods as contraband or not contraband has much perplexed text-writers and jurists. A strictly accurate and satisfactory classification is perhaps impracticable; but that which is best supported by American and English decisions may be said to divide all merchandise into three classes. Of these classes. the first consists of articles manufactured and primarily and ordinarily used for military purposes in time of war; the second, of articles which may be and are used for purposes of war or peace, according to circumstances; and the third, of articles exclusively used for peaceful purposes.

"Merchandise of the first class, destined to a belligerent country or places occupied by the army or navy of a belligerent, is always contraband; merchandise of the second class is contraband only when actually destined to the military or naval use of a belligerent; while merchandise of the third class is not contraband at all, though liable to seizure and condemnation for violation of blockade or siege.

“A considerable portion of the cargo of the Peterhoff was of the third class, and need not be further referred to.

"A large portion, perhaps, was of the second class, but is not proved, as we think, to have been actually destined to belligerent use. and cannot therefore be treated as contraband. Another portion was, in our judgment, of the first class, or, if of the second, destined directly to the rebel military service. This portion of the cargo consisted of the cases of artillery harness, and of articles described in the

invoices as men's army bluchers, artillery boots, and Government regulation grey blankets. These goods come fairly under the description of goods primarily and ordinarily used for military purposes in time of war. They make part of the necessary equipment of

an army.

"It is true that even these goods, if really intended for sale in the market of Matamoros, would be free of liability; for contraband may be transported by neutrals to a neutral port, if intended to make part of its general stock-in-trade. But there is nothing in the case which tends to convince us that such was their real destination, while all the circumstances indicate that these articles, at least, were destined for the use of the rebel forces then occupying Brownsville, and other places in the vicinity.

"And contraband merchandise is subject to a different rule in respect to ulterior destination than that which applies to merchandise not contraband. The latter is liable to capture only when a violation of blockade is intended; the former when destined to the hostile country, or to the actual military or naval use of the enemy, whether blockaded or not.

The trade of neutrals with belligerents in articles not contraband is absolutely free, unless interrupted by blockade; the conveyance by neutrals to belligerents of contraband and articles is always unlawful, and such articles may always be seized during transit by sea. Hence, while articles, not contraband, might be sent to Matamoros and beyond to the rebel region, where the communications were not interrupted by blockade, articles of a contraband character, destined in fact to a State in rebellion, or for the use of the rebel military forces, were liable to capture, though primarily destined to Matamoros. "We are obliged to conclude that the portion of the cargo which we have characterised as contraband must be conlemned."

[It should be noted that the articles specified are all apparently classed in the Declaration of London as absolute contraband.]

The "Stephen Hart." Blatchford's Prize Cases, 387.-This was a case of the capture in 1862, by a United States man-of-war of a British vessel, bound ostensibly from London to Cardenas, Cuba, with a cargo of munitions of war and army supplies.

The court said: "The question whether or not the property laden on board of the Stephen Hart was being transported in the business of lawful commerce, is not to be decided by merely deciding the question as to whether the vessel was documented for, and sailing upon, a voyage from London to Cardenas. The commerce is in the destination and intended use of the property laden on board of the vessel, and not in the incidental, ancillary, and temporary voyage of the vessel, which may be but one of many carriers through which the property is to reach its true and original destination. If this were not the rule of the prize law, a very wide door would be opened for fraud and evasion. A cargo of contraband goods, really intended for the enemy, might be carried to Cardenas, in a neutral vessel sailing from England with papers which, on their face, import merely a voyage of the vessel to Cardenas, while in fact, her cargo, when it left England, was destined by its owners to be delivered to the enemy by being trans-shipped at Cardenas into a swifter vessel. And such.

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indeed, has been the course of proceeding in many cases during the present war.

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"The law seeks out the truth, and never, in any of its branches, tolerates any such fiction as that under which it is sought to shield the vessel and her cargo in the present case. If the guilty intention, that the contraband goods should reach a port of the enemy, existed when such goods left their English port, that guilty intention cannot be obliterated by the innocent intention of stopping at a neutral port on the way. If there be, in stopping at such port, no intention of trans-shipping the cargo, and if it is to proceed to the enemy's country in the same vessel in which it came from England, of course there can be no purpose of lawful neutral commerce at the neutral port by the sale or use of the cargo in the market there: and the sole purpose of stopping at the neutral port must merely be to have upon the papers of the vessel an ostensible neutral terminus for the voyage. "If, on the other hand, the object of stopping at the neutral port be to trans-ship the cargo to another vessel to be transported to a port of the enemy, while the vessel in which it was brought from England does not proceed to the port of the enemy, there is equally an absence of all lawful neutral commerce at the neutral port; and the only commerce carried on in the case is that of the transportation of the contraband cargo from the English port to the port of the enemy, as was intended when it left the English port. This court holds that, in all such cases, the transportation or voyage of the contraband goods is to be considered as a unit, from the port of lading to the port of delivery in the enemy's country; that if any part of such voyage or transportation be unlawful, it is unlawful throughout; and that the vessel and her cargo are subject to capture; as well before arriving at the first neutral port at which she touches after her departure from England, as on the voyage or transportation by sea from such neutral port to the port of the enemy.

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"There must, therefore, be a decree condemning both vessel and cargo."

Contra.

The "Tetartos." Russian and Japanese Prize Cases, Vol. 1, p. 166. This was the case of a German steamer, captured while carrying railroad sleepers (ties) to a Chinese port. Since sleepers were contraband and because certain circumstances led the Russian commander to believe that the real destination was Japan, he sank the vessel, being unable to send her to a Russian port.

Held by the Russian Supreme Court that the cargo was not contraband since the destination of the vessel was a neutral port and Russia did not recognize the doctrine of continuous voyage.

The Lydia Russian and Japanese Prize Cases, vol. 2, p. 359.This was the case of a neutral ship found to be carrying contraband to a Russian coastal fortress and supply-base. Owing to damages to her steering-gear, she put back, intending to go to a neutral port for repairs, but she sustained further damage and was compelled to enter a Japanese port.

Held that the object of the voyage (the carriage of contraband) was not abandoned, and the ship was condemned.

PROOF AS TO VOYAGE OF VESSEL CARRYING CONTRABAND.

Where a vessel is carrying absolute contraband, her papers are conclusive proof as to the voyage on which she is engaged, unless she is found clearly out of the course indicated by her papers and unable to give adequate reasons to justify such deviation.-Declaration of London, Article 32.

The papers therefore are conclusive proof of the course of the vessel, unless she is encountered in circumstances which show that their statements are not to be trusted. See also the explanations given as regards article 35.

Report of committee which drafted Declaration of London.

If the ship has articles of absolute contraband on board, the data in the ship's papers concerning her further voyage are to be accorded full credence, unless the ship has plainly deviated from the route designated in her ships papers, without being able to justify it, or facts appear which establish beyond doubt that the said data in the papers is false. (See 37, sentence 1.)

German Prize Rules, 1909, Article 31.

Article 32, Declaration of London is identical with section 34, French Naval Instructions, 1912.

Article 32. Declaration of London, is apparently identical with section 59, Austro-Hungarian Manual, 1913.

The" Sarah Cristina," 1 C. Rob., 237.-This was the case of a Swedish ship destined according to her papers to Cagliari, an Italian port, but captured going into the enemy port of Cherbourg. The explanation was that the ship was entering Cherbourg to take on water. The Court considered that the place of capture, together with the fact that the ship-broker, before whom the owner of the cargo swore to the charter-party, was a French vice-consul, and other suspicious circumstances, indicated that the destination of the ship was an enemy port, and condemned the cargo.

Ships papers held to be presumptive evidence.

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Miller v. The "Resolution," 2 Dallas, 19.-The court said: "* * if in this case the papers on board affirm the ship and cargo be such property as is not prize, there must be an acquittal, unless the captors are able, by a contrariety of evidence, to defeat the presumption, which arises from the papers, and can show just grounds for condemnation. On the other hand, if the papers affirm the ship and cargo to be the property of an enemy, there must be a condemnation, unless they who contest the capture can produce clear and unquestionable evidence to prove the contrary."

CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER WHICH CONDITIONAL CONTRABAND LIABLE TO CAPTURE-PRESUMPTION AS TO DESTINATION.

Conditional contraband is liable to capture if it is shown to be destined for the use of the armed forces or of a government department of the enemy State, unless in this latter case the circumstances show that the goods cannot in fact be used for the purposes of the war in progress. This latter exception does not apply to a consignment coming under Article 24 (4).

The destination referred to in Article 33 is presumed to exist if the goods are consigned to enemy authorities, or to a contractor established in the enemy country who, as a matter of common knowledge, supplies articles of this kind to the enemy. A similar presumption arises if the goods are consigned to a fortified place belonging to the enemy, or other place serving as a base for the armed forces of the enemy. No such presumption, however, arises in the case of a merchant vessel bound for one of these places if it is sought to prove that she herself is contraband.

In cases where the above presumptions do not arise, the destination is presumed to be innocent.

The presumptions set up by this Article may be rebutted.— Declaration of London, Articles 33 and 34.

The rules for conditional contraband differ from those laid down for absolute contraband in two respects: (1) There is no question of destination for the enemy in general, but of destination for the use of his armed forces or government departments; (2) the doctrine. of continuous voyage is excluded. Articles 33 and 34 refer to the first and article 35 to the second principle.

The articles included in the list of conditional contraband mav serve for peaceful uses as well as for hostile purposes. If from the circumstances the peaceful purpose is clear, their capture is not justified; it is otherwise if a hostile purpose is to be assumed, as, for instance, in the case of foodstuffs destined for an enemy army or fleet, or of coal destined for an enemy fleet. In such a case there is clearly no room for doubt. But what is the solution when the articles are destined for the civil government departments of the enemy state? It may be money sent to a government department for use in the payment of its official salaries, or rails sent to a department of public works. In these cases there is enemy destination which renders the goods liable in the first place to capture and in the second to condemnation. The reasons for this are at once legal and practical.