In Central India alone they seemed for a moment to have some chance. Colonel the Hon. W. Monson was detached for the protection of Rajputan, in an unpropitious season, and with an insufficient force. Entangled in a wild and wasted region, deserted by most of his allies, and all his native horse, he struggled on for three months, and at last brought the miserable remnant of his column to Lake, at Agra, 31st September. About six weeks later Holkar was emboldened by this success to besiege Delhi. Colonel Ochterlony at once sent to Colonel Burn, commanding at Saharanpore, who hastened to his assistance with a battalion of sepoys and some irregular infantry. For ten days the British officers, devotedly served by their native infantry and their few gunners, defended the wide range of rotten ramparts against an army of twenty thousand men, till relieved on the 15th October by the timely arrival of the Commander-in-Chief. On being chased out of the Duáb, Jaswant sought refuge in the Ját principality of Bhurtpore, where his army was defeated, with the loss of seventy-eight guns, on the 13th November, at Dig; on which occasion Monson, who took command on General Fraser being disabled by a wound,* had the satisfaction of recovering some of the guns and wagons which he had lost in the summer. Lake (created a viscount for his services), lost no time in coming up with reinforcements. On arrival he took command of the forces, and assaulted the fort of Dig, which—though belonging to the Rája of Bhurtpore, a professed ally-had fired on the British troops during the battle. The place was taken by storm; this success emboldened Lake to besiege Bhurtpore itself; and he dispersed the followers of Holkar and Amir Khán, who endeavoured to drive him off, but the siege itself * Of this he subsequently died, and was buried at Muttra, where his monument was to be seen a few years ago. never prospered. The fortifications were strong, the ditch was wide and deep. Four resolute assaults were driven back, the stormers hopeless and reeling with slaughter. Lake found that the place was not to be rushed like Aligarh and Dig, but his spirit did not fail; and, sending for his battering train, he was preparing for a formal siege, when the Rája, weary and anxious, hastily, sent in proposals of peace. The proceedings of Jaswant Ráo still called for attention, and the Home Government was known to be desirous of a pause in the forward movement. The Rája was accordingly admitted to terms, and the army broke up from Bhurtpore on 21st April 1805. The failure of this siege, coming after Monson's retreat, showed that British generals were not infallible; and the discovery encouraged Sindia to raise his head. Generals Lake and Wellesley, as it turned out, had offered him different terms about Gwalior; and, when the chief claimed the benefit of the more favourable, the Governor-General- -in spite of energetic protests from his brother and Malcolm, the Resident-treated Sindia with oppressive severity, and deprived him of both Gwalior and Gohad.* Sirji Ráo, Sindia's evil genius (of whom mention has been made more than once above) urged his master and son-in-law to resistance; by his advice the camp of the Resident was plundered, and an advance made on the Chambal with a large force under the command of the veteran Ambáji; while the British Resident was placed in a kind of honourable arrest. Lake, however, strongly remonstrated; Holkar and other possible allies held aloof; and, finally, Sindia made his submission. Amid these cares and anxieties, and with his unfinished policy hanging-so to speak-in fragments, Lord Wellesley was suddenly relieved of his duties by the appearance of Lord Cornwallis, who had * The latter is now the small Ját principality known as the Ránaship of Dholpore. undertaken the office of Governor-General a second time, at the earnest desire of the Court of Directors, and who landed in Calcutta on the 29th July.* It is, of course, quite easy to blame the whole "forward policy," and to criticise every measure by whose aid it was carried out. Equally simple, on the other side, is the roseate picture of national strength and glory that English historians have often been content to draw. Both extremes will be avoided if we will only let Lord Wellesley speak for himself, and see what it was that he undertook to do, and what—after it was done--he believed himself to have accomplished. The nature of the task which the Marquess conceived to be before him towards the end of 1802 is well put by the memorandum —already cited-that opens the volume of Mr. Owen's "Selections from the Wellington Despatches." His conception of what, afterwards, had been done appears in his Appendix A ("Notes," Part III.), and his despatch in council, dated June 2nd, 1805. It will be fair to infer from these documents that the conquest of India was not the object of Wellesley's wars. He speaks of "Our alacrity to resist aggression and to punish all the Principals and Accomplices of unjust attacks . . . on a Government uniting moderation with energy and equally determined to respect the just rights of other States, and to maintain its own." There is more to the same purport, making it evident that, while seeking out influence by way of treaties, often imposed at the bayonet's point, the Government of Calcutta did not conceive itself to be conquering the people of India, who, indeed, did not, as a rule, make any resistance. Therefore, their laws, creeds, and customs were to remain in force; and no new taxation appears to have been contemplated. "The throne of Delhi" was to be protected; but the British were placed under no obligation to consider the *The dissatisfaction of the Company was shared by Castlereagh and Pitt. political rights or claims of the Emperor, or any "question connected with the future exercise of the imperial prerogative and authority." [Consult "Notes Relative to the Late Transactions,” Dec. 15, 1803; also Parts II. III. of the same, Fort William, 1804. Thorn's "War in India," London, 1818, is a straightforward narrative, with good plans of battles, in most of which the author took part as a cavalry officer. It only remains to be added that the important political narrative cited as the "Intercepted Despatch," is a paper of unequalled value. Captured by the French at sea, it was published, in a French translation, in the Moniteur of June 5, 1805. A re-translation into English appeared in London (Stockdale, 1805).] 380 CHAPTER XI. THE EVE OF EMPIRE. Section I: Non-intervention, in two shapes - Section 2: Internal administration under Lord Minto-Section 3: Revenue, Justice, Public Debt. SECTION 1.In later days it has become so customary to regard India as a mere dependency of the British Empire that it may seem strange to think that, at the opening of the nineteenth century the country was still a fortuitous aggregate of disconnected Asiatic powers which most Englishmen who thought of the matter at all were inclined to respect and maintain. Not only was conquest deprecated by Pitt, Dundas, Castlereagh, and Canning; but even Wellesley's able brother, who did so much for his ambitious schemes, shrank from the the idea of rapid advance: while Munro-perhaps the ablest of Anglo-Indian statesmen-recorded a strong protest against the "subsidiary system." One of his expressed objections was "its inevitable tendency to bring every native State under the exclusive dominion of the British Government." It was by this school considered questionable whether such a change was to be desired, either in the interests of the natives or of the people of Great Britain. "One effect of such a conquest," so Munro urged with prophetic judgment, "would be that the Indian army . would gradually lose its military habits and discipline to feel its own strength and. .. to turn it against its Euro |