manding the squadron on the coasts of Virginia and North Carolina, in giving notice of the actual commencement of the blockade, on April 30, 1861, under the President's proclamation extending the blockade to those States, limited the warning to vessels at or near the line of blockade to vessels in ignorance of its existence. This construction of the President's proclamation was not disavowed by the Government. Courts of Judge Grier, in deciding the question of the construction of Decisions of the proclamation of blockade as to the notification to be given, U.S. in the case of the Admiral, on appeal from the decree of condemnation of the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, said: "A vessel which has full knowledge of the existence of a blockade, before she enters upon her voyage, has no right to claim a warning or indorsement when taken in the act of attempting to enter." "It would be an absurd construction of the President's proclamation, to require a notice to be given to those who already had knowledge. A notification is for those only who have sailed without a knowledge of the blockade, and get that first information from the blockading vessels."* Decisions to the same effect were rendered by other United States Courts in prize cases. "After these decisions the practice became settled, and no complaint was made by neutral powers against this construction of the proclamation; and, under it, the law respecting notice of blockades was applied as heretofore in the English and American courts."+ It may be observed, however, that Courts of the United States in cases of capture for violation of the blockade of the Southern ports, admitted some relaxation of the strict ruling laid down, and held that a vessel with full knowledge of the blockade might clear and sail for a blockaded port, but with an alternative destination, where such intention was clearly shown on her papers and no attempt was made at evasion. In the case of the Empress, captured for an attempt to Case of the Embreak the blockade of the mouths of the Mississippi River, press. Judge Betts, of the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York, said: "The rule is also so far *Upton, p. 295. † Dana's Wheaton, p. 682, ". mitigated in its application that sailing purposely for a blockaded port, with the intention properly notified on the ship's papers, or otherwise fairly disclosed, may be excused in a neutral ship, if the object is honestly to inquire elsewhere whether the blockade is still in continuance; and if so, to avoid the blockaded port and complete the voyage at a lawful one. The hazard of allowing such privilege, and the necessity of observing the utmost ingenuousness in its indulgence, are emphatically noted in the authorities; and, accordingly, the courts take heed in administering it that the neutral be not permitted, under cover of that relaxation of prize law, to smother the principle by placing himself out of reach of its restraints. An adherence to the old rule would, therefore, seem still to be exacted in its full simplicity in one of its cardinal features, which is, that the neutral vessel shall make inquiries so plainly clear of the blockaded port that she shall not acquire the ability (as Chancellor Kent phrases the act) to slip herself into it. Phillimore states the general result of the authorities to be that it has never, under any circumstances, been held legal that the inquiry shall be made at the mouth of the river or estuary' of the blockaded port. "It is clear, therefore, to the court that the claimants cannot lawfully, under claim of making inquiry whether a port known to have been under blockade when the voyage was set on foot, and after the vessel had been prosecuting it towards the port, is still under blockade, go forward to entrance of the port and within the actual line of the blockading force; and that such act, according to the law of nations, subjects the vessel to condemnation as prize of war."* The vessel and cargo were condemned for breach of blockade, but the decree of condemnation was set aside by the Circuit Court, on the ground that the blockade of the port of New Orleans had not been officially notified to British and Brazilian authorities, and that the blockade of that port was, as far as concerned the Empress, a blockade de facto only, and no guilt attached to the vessel in sailing directly from Rio Janeiro for New Orleans, and making her inquiries at the line of blockade. Special warning Justice requires that the neutral vessels must have an opportunity of learning of the existence of a blockade, and hence, at the line of blockade. *Blatchford, Prize Cases, p. 178. The Empress. vessels at sea when the notification is received at the ports of departure, are not liable to any penalty for attempting to enter a blockaded port, unless it can be shown that they could have obtained a knowledge of it during the voyage. This case is provided for in many treaties, and special warning at the line of blockade is required.* The principle, however, is so well established as to no longer need any treaty guarantees. tions. The United States have also, at different times, concluded treaties in which it is stipulated that, under some circumstances, a vessel may sail with a full knowledge of the blockade, and not be liable for a first attempt to enter a blockaded port. Several such treaties are still in force, while others are obsolete from countries entering into them having been merged into other nationalities. They are: with Greece, 1837; Prussia, 1828; Sweden and Norway, 1827; Sardinia, 1838; the Two Sicilies, 1855. The language of all these treaties is identical: "Considering the remoteness of the respective countries of the two high Treaty stipulacontracting parties and the uncertainty resulting therefrom, with respect to the various events which may take place, it is agreed that a merchant vessel belonging to either of them, which may be bound to a port supposed at the time of its departure to be blockaded, shall not, however, be captured or condemned for having attempted a first time to enter said port, unless it can be proved that the said vessel could and ought to have learned during its voyage that the blockade of the place in question still continued. But all vessels which, after having been warned off once, shall during the same voyage attempt a second time to enter the same blockaded port, during the continuance of said blockade, shall then subject themselves to be detained and condemned."+ The special warning and endorsement on the ship's papers may be made by any officer commanding a vessel of the blockading squadron. The endorsement usually gives the name of the blockading vessel, and the latitude and longitude of the place, with the date. The proper notification having been given by an officer of the blockading force, the neutral master "is bound to manifest * U. S. Treaties, 1873. †U. S. Treaties, 1873. Great Britain, p. 328. Brazil, Bolivia, etc. in port at com blockade. by his immediate acts his determination to obey the warning he has received. A very short delay, an interval of probably less than an hour, will enable the belligerent to determine whether the master is pursuing the course he is bound to observe, or whether the temporary detention may not lawfully be followed by a final capture."* Sec. 5. Vessels "With respect to violating a blockade by coming out with a mencement of cargo, the time of shipment is very material; for although it might be hard to refuse a neutral liberty to retire with a cargo already laden, and by that act already become neutral property, yet after the commencement of a blockade, a neutral cannot be allowed to interpose, in any way, to assist the exportation of the property of the enemy. A neutral ship departing can only take away a cargo bona fide purchased and delivered before the commencement of the blockade; if she afterwards take on board a cargo, it is a violation of the blockade. But where a ship was transferred from one neutral merchant to another in a blockaded port, and sailed out in ballast, she was determined not to have violated the blockade. So where goods were sent into the blockaded port before the commencement of the blockade, but reshipped by order of the neutral proprietor, as found unsalable during the blockade, they were held entitled to restitution. For the same rule which permits neutrals to withdraw their vessels from a blockaded port extends also, with equal justice, to merchandise sent in before the blockade and withdrawn bona fide by the neutral proprietor. "After the commencement of a blockade, a neutral is no longer at liberty to make any purchase in that port."† Hautefeuille, inclined generally to favor the neutral, says: "The neutral vessel, which has entered a port before the blockade, can always leave in ballast, or carrying away the goods shipped before the notice. But it cannot, without being guilty of a violation of the law imposed by the conqueror, take on board merchandise after the commencement of the blockade, even although it was purchased before." He quotes some French treaties as permitting vessels to sail with their cargoes, without regard to the time of shipment. Several treaties made by the United States contain stipula *Halleck, Chap. CXXIII, Sec. 30. + Lawrence's Wheaton, p. 842. Hautefeuille, Vol. II, p. 216. tions that vessels in port at the commencement of a blockade shall be free to sail with their cargoes, but are silent as to time of shipment.* In the absence of treaty agreements on this point, the United States Prize Courts follow the general law of nations, which prohibits taking on board any cargo after the actual commencement of the blockade. In the treaty with Italy of 1871 it is stipulated that vessels leaving a blockaded port with cargo shipped after the commencement of the blockade shall be warned to return and discharge such cargo. If, after warning, they persist in sailing with the illegal cargo, they may then be captured and condemned.† watha. In the case of the Hiawatha, captured May 20, 1861, while Case of the Hiaendeavoring to evade the blockade of the James River, Judge Betts held that "The act of egress is as culpable as the act of ingress, when done in fraud of the blockade. On notice that the port of Richmond was under blockade, the Hiawatha, being a neutral vessel, had a right to withdraw, with all the cargo then honestly laden on board, but she could not have a right to add to her cargo after notification or knowledge of the blockade. No cargo was laden on the vessel here until the afternoon of the 11th of May, subsequent to the effort of Lord Lyons to obtain from Mr. Seward a relaxation of the limitation of the time of departure with respect to the Hiawatha. That was a point within the scope of diplomatic arrangement, but the accommodation sought for this vessel, both as to her lading and time of departure, in the letter of Lord Lyons to Mr. Seward, of the 9th of May, and the reply thereto, make no mention of a privilege granted her by this Government to ship cargo after she received notice of the blockade, and the privilege solicited does not seem to have been accorded by Mr. Seward; and, accordingly, the vessel, if she had taken her departure within the period of fifteen days from the establishment of the blockade, would not have been entitled to export the cargo taken on board after knowledge of the blockade, without clear proof that the act was honest and fair as to the belligerent rights of the captors. "Upon the proofs, the vessel herself did not commence her * U. S. Treaties, 1873. Bolivia, Ecuador, Hayti, etc. † U. S. Treaties, p. 507. |