CHAPTER IX. ALIENS-NATURALIZATION. As we have already seen, naturalization neither confers the right to vote, nor is it, in all the states, essential to the right of suffrage.1 But in most of the states it is. The general rule is, that an alien is one born out of the jurisdiction and allegiance of the United States.2 But to this there are exceptions. The inhabitants of territory ceded to the United States by treaty, become citizens without naturalization, by act of congress.3. The same is the case in regard to the inhabitants of a territory acquired by annexation.4 The rights and privileges of citizenship, whether arising from birth or acquired by naturalization, are the same with the exception of the right to hold the office of president or vice president of the United States, and the children of citizens of the United States, native or naturalized, born without the limits of the country, are entitled to all the. 1. See suffrage clauses of constitution of West Virginia, Kansas, Minnesota and Alabama; Spragin v. Houghton, 3 Ill., 377; Note 5 Chase's Blackstone, page 124, (*375.) 2. 2 Kent's commentaries, 50. 3. Harrold's case, 1 Clark, 214. 4. Cryer v. Andrews, 11 Texas, 183. privileges of citizenship,1 and this, notwithstanding the mother is an alien, the principle partus sequitur patrem controlling in such cases.2 Even where a citizen of the United States removes to a foreign country, intending to make it his permanent home, and, carrying out his intention, settles and dies there, it is held that the mere change of residence and domicile in a foreign country, does not forfeit his citizenship, and that his children, born after his removal and during his residence abroad, are citizens of the United States.4 The doctrine that gives to the child the full benefit of all the rights or privileges of citizenship, partially or wholly acquired by the father, has been carried to the extent that the children of an alien, who are born abroad, but come to this country under seventeen years of age, become citizens on attaining twenty-one years, the father having declared 1. Davis v. Hall, 1 N. & McCord, S. C. Rep., 292; Oldtown v. Bangor, 58 Maine, 353; McKay v. Campbell, 2 Saw., Nevada Rep., 118; State v. Adams, 45 Iowa Rep., 99; 10 Rich, (S. C.) Equity, 38. 2. Ludlam v. Ludlam, 31 Barbour, N. Y., 486. 3. Brown v. The U. S., 5 Ct. of Cl., 511; Beavers v. Smith, 11 Ala., 420. 4. State v. Adams, 45 Iowa, 99. In this case the father of the person whose status was in question, being a citizen of the United States, went to Canada, intending to make it his permanent home, and, after some years, during which the person in question was born, died there. Held that this case was within the rule that, ordinarily, the citizenship of the child is determined by that of its father. "By the common law," said the court, "allegiance is not a matter of individual choice. It attaches at the time and on account of birth, and under circumstances in which the family owe allegiance and are entitled to protection. A person may be domiciled in one place or country and owe allegiance to and be a citizen of another." Citing Calais v. Marshfield, 30 Maine, 411; Peck v. Young, 26 Wendell, 612; Inglis v. Trustees, etc., 6 Peters., 99. his intention, after having been here the proper time, but died before receiving his certificate of naturalization.1 The inchoate citizenship created in the parent by the declaration of intention, is thus transmitted to the child, and ripens into a perfect citizenship with the attainment of his majority. On the other hand, a child born within the allegiance of the United States, is a citizen thereof, without reference to the political status or condition of its parents,2 and it has been accordingly held that the child of aliens born during their temporary sojourn in this country is a citizen of the United States.3 In a New York case it was held, that a native of Holland who, after being in this country nine years, returned to Holland, remained there six years and was married there, and then returned to this country and was employed continuously for fifteen years in the American merchant service may, having declared his intention at the proper time, be naturalized, though he has a wife and family at his place of birth; the wife refusing to follow him to this country. The principle upon which this decision was rested, was that a vessel is part of the territory of the government to whose jurisdic 1. Schrimpf v. Stettegart, 38 Texas, 96. But see Beardstown v. Virginia, 76 Illinois Rep., 34. Where a person of foreign birth, who was a minor when he came to this country, testified that he had never been naturalized, and did not know that his father had been-held, that this afforded prima facie evidence that such person was not entitled to vote. 2. McKay v. Campbell, (supra.,) 2 Sawyer (Nevada), 118. 3. Munro v. Merchant, 26 Barbour, 383. tion she is subject, and that five years continuous employment upon the vessel of a nation is equivalent to such a residence upon the land as is required by the naturalization laws.1 In Ex parte Scott, 1 Daly, 534, it was held that an alien who came to this country with his parents at the age of three years, and lived with them in the city of New York until their death, when he shipped as a seaman in an American vessel, and for seven years thereafter was employed exclusively as a mariner in the merchant service of the United States, has such a residence as entitles him to naturalization. But where an alien came to this country when he was thirteen years of age, and resided here until he was twenty-three, when he returned to Ireland, the place of 1. 2 Daly's N. Y. Rep., 525, in matter of Thomas Bye. "We have repeatedly held that a mariner of foreign birth, who has been employed exclusively in American vessels for five years continuously prior to his application to be admitted a citizen, and who, for the last year of that term, has shipped only in vessels belonging to the port of New York, is, within the meaning of the naturalization laws, to be deemed a resident during that term of the United States and a resident of this state for one year, unless there are circumstances which show that he has maintained and kept up a previous residence. (In the matter of Scott, 1 Daly, 534; In the matter of Hawley, Ib., 531; Dunlap's Laws of the United States, 307, 493, 494, 1167; Story's Conflict of the Laws, Secs. 42 to 48.) A foreigner, continuously and exclusively employed in the vessels of a nation, may, by length of time, acquire a residence in that nation as effectually as though he had remained upon the land within its boundaries; for vessels are subject to the jurisdiction of the country to which they belong, and, for certain purposes, are regarded as part of its territory; as in the case put by Vattel of a child born in the vessel of a nation upon the high seas, which, he says, may be reputed to be born in its territory. (Vattel, B 1, Ch. 19, Sec. 216, and see Lawrence's Wheaton, p. 209.) (In the The judge ren his birth, to see his father who was ill, and remained there for seven years working as a mechanic, it was held that he had lost his residence in this country, though he may have intended to return, and could not be naturalized, though he had declared his intention to become a citizen, until he had lived in this country continuously for five years after his return. matter of Hawley, 1 Daly, N. Y., 531.) dering judgment said that as when Hawley left this country for Ireland, he no doubt intended to return here, and as he went there in consequence of the illness of his father, and probably contemplated nothing more than a temporary absence, had it been merely a visit to see his parents, and had he returned to this country within what would have been deemed a reasonable time, under the circumstances, in view of the intention he expressed when leaving, the case might have been regarded as one of continuing residence never abandoned. But he was absent for seven years, and it appeared that during a portion of that time he worked as a mechanic in Ireland, as he had done in this country. This last circumstance, coupled with his long absence, was considered decisive upon the question of residence. Where a person of foreign birth alleged to be illegitimate, came to this country as a member of the family of his putative father, whose wife was his mother, and the reputed father was naturalized while the alleged illegitimate child was yet a minor, it was held that as the child was yet an infant at the time of the reputed father's nat |