Imágenes de páginas

nese soldiers is 2,400. The intention is to keep the officers prisoners, and to let the soldiers go outside the Japanese lines, taking away their arms, and furnishing them with two days' rations. These matters should be reported to the American War Department by mail.

Lieutenant O'BRIEN. Attaché of American Legation.

Mr. Dun to Mr. Gresham.

No. 104.]


Tokyo, Japan, February 27, 1895.

(Received March 21.)

SIR: I have the honor to inclose herewith a clipping from the Japan Mail of the 25th instant, giving a translation of a speech on the subject of the proposed Korean loan delivered by Count Ito, minister president of state, before the lower house of the Imperial Diet on the 21st instant.

The bill, as recommended by the Government, authorizing a loan of 3,000,000 yen to the Korean Government has been passed by the House of Representatives.

I have, etc.,


[Inclosure in No. 104.-The Japan Daily Mail, February 25, 1895.]


The following is a translation of the speech delivered by His Excellency Count Ito, minister president of state, in the House of Representatives, on the 21st instant, in connection with the proposed loan of 3,000,000 yen to the Korean Government:

GENTLEMEN: I have presented a special budget to the house. Its object is to lend money to Korea, which step is temporarily necessitated by the present financial difficulties of that country. As to the condition of Korea since last year, you are well aware that the Tonghak rebellion, which commenced early last summer, was followed by a failure of the harvest, and then came the war between Japan and China. Korea has ever since stood as our ally, and being still to-day in the midst of the war, our Government can not remain unconcerned, and is therefore brought under the necessity of making a loan to Korea. You are also aware that even to-day there are still some remnants of the Tonghak rebels; but the King and the Government of Korea, acting upon the advice of our Government, are desirous to enforce reforms without delay. With regard to the Korean reforms, our Government proposed in June last year to the Chinese Government that Japan and China should jointly carry them out, with the object of maintaining Korea's independence. But the refusal of China in this matter led at length to the present great war. Since then our country has lent its aid to Korea to maintain her independence by our own power and out of pity for her isolation and weakness, and now, she having fallen into her present difficulties, we can not avoid the necessity of giving her temporary assistance. The Korean Government is planning to raise a loan sooner or later to meet the various national expenditures; and as soon as the plan is matured we intend to require the repayment of our own loan. Such being the unavoidable circumstances, I desire that you will, after full discussion, give your speedy consent to the budget. If there are questions to be put regarding details, it is the intention of the Government to send a delegate conversant with the matter to give explanations at the meeting of the special committee. Further, as I shortly leave the capital and return to the headquarters, I do not think I shall have an opportunity of ineeting you gentlemen again this session. I also express my desire that a decision on the supplementary budget of war expenditures will be quickly given.

In reply to Mr. Haseba Sumitaka, who desired to know the general policy of the Government with regard to the internal administration of Korea and the attitude of foreign powers toward that policy, the minister president said:

I do not think that the policy of our Government toward Korea has once changed since the opening of relations with that country. China regarding her as a tribu

tary State and we considering her an independent power, our views have clashed from the outset. Though it need hardly be said that there are at times changes of circumstances more or less marked in one power's relations with another, still I can say confidently that the general policy of our country toward Korea has not up to to-day undergone change. In proof of this I may state that, while China, declaring the autonomy of Korea, generally evaded responsibility for that country's foreign relations, she attempted to interfere forcibly in her internal administration. Now there is no nation that has closer and more intimate relations with Korea than ours, and therefore Chinese interference became a constant obstruction to the friendly relations between the two countries.

In matters of small importance we could not go on removing that obstruction perpetually. I do not know if you, gentlemen, have cause to condemn the policy of our Government since the dispatch of our embassy to Korea in 1876 and the conclusion of a commercial treaty; but leaving that apart as an unimportant branch of the history of the past and coming down to the events of the last year, we have at length clear evidence from China's making the Tonghak rebellion a pretext; from the internal condition of Korea before the outbreak of the rebellion, and from the action and behavior of the officials dispatched from China, that efforts were made to sever the relations between our country and Korea. There also exists conclusive evidence that on the King of Korea's appealing, or rather being compelled to appeal, to China for the dispatch of troops, China intended by using the suppression of the Tonghak rebellion as a pretext to destroy the independence of Korea and make her in reality a tributary State. Thereupon our country was obliged to wage war; for though I have always firmly believed that war is not only a matter of the greatest national importance, but also that a nation as such should not lightly wage it, yet if we had borne the matter in silence and remained passive to the known designs of China, our attitude would have affected not only our interests, but our honor as well, or rather the maintenance of our national dignity, and we were therefore compelled as a result to carry out the general policy to which we have consistently adhered since the conclusion of the treaty of 1876. [Hear! hear!]

But, as all the world knows, Korea is a truly poor and weak country. Though I do not think that the Kingdom is wanting in natural resources, still there exists as yet not the least means or method of exploiting such resources. And the nation also is content with inaction and temporizing methods, and does little more than pass the day without effort of any kind. Both high and low live in a state of indolence. I believe this arises from absolute ignorance of the present condition of the world; and as the necessity of making such a nation independent not only concerns Korea but has also a great bearing on our Empire, which is separated from Korea by a narrow strip of water, I am confident that the maintenance of her independence has also a most important relation to the position of our Empire as a nation. And, therefore, though we had hoped by effecting reforms in Korea, to maintain her independence in conjunction with China, our Government, though China's intention being, as I have already stated, different from ours, assumed alone this responsibility. As to the question, then, of the interference of other powers, I firmly believe that there is no reason for any power to object to our sympathy with the isolated and weak or to our extending aid to others to maintain their independence. [Hear! hear!] To realize and preserve such independence in the case of Korea appears to be a most difficult undertaking, but we can not escape from the duty imposed upon us. The necessity, as I stated at the outset, now causes us to lend to Korea 3,000,000 yen; and on inquiring into the reforms contemplated I do not think that Korea can rise alone by a mere change of officials at Seoul, or by the suppression of the Tonghaks. Therefore, when the Korean rebellion is suppressed the provincial government must be reorganized, access to national resources must be provided for by the improvement of the means of transportation; and while the country may be unable to maintain a large army, still sufficient provision must be made to guarantee peace throughout the Kingdom. Before rapid progress can be made in these directions the extent of Korea's national resources must be fully investigated. Though of course our principal object is to make the Koreans themselves maintain their own independence, it is necessary for us to give them aid for that purpose. I need not point out that there is naturally a distinction between principal and accessory. [Hear! hear!] Though there may be in the details of the reforms some matters not yet definitely determined and others that are already determined, I do not think there is any necessity to make special mention of either. Our Government has not in the least mistaken this policy. Indeed, there are, I believe, reasons that effectively obviate any mistake in policy. Is the general outline I have given sufficient? On Mr. Haseba's again rising and expressing his hope that the minister president would remain firm in his determination that nothing can triumph over reason, Count Ito replied:

I have already replied to the interrogation arising out of the Korean question. Being in a position of responsibility for the present great affair, I can not offer any

undertaking for the future. That must depend upon the august will of His Gracious Majesty, as will be clear to you if you consider the facts. Again, there was a slight misapprehension in Mr. Haseba's speech just now. With regard to the maintenance by Japan of Korean independence and sympathy with her isolation and weakness, and the determination to assist her to the last in her efforts to assume a sovereign position, I did not say that no one would interfere, neither did I declare that no one would object. I said that I believed everyone would agree. Again, what has happened up to to-day since the outbreak of affairs last year? In regard to diplomatic matters, such as the relations between different powers-for instance, between Japan, and Korea, other powers and Korea, Japan and China, or other powers and Chinathese things constitute, in my opinion, quite a different question. But I make this one statement: I am here to-day as a representative of His Gracious Majesty's Government, and am charged with important affairs affecting the well-being of this Empire of Japan. Therefore I must be careful not only not to utter a single irresponsible word, but I must also not violate what should be inviolable. That much I must state to the house. [Cheers.]

Mr. Denby to Mr. Gresham.


No. 105.]

PEKING, March 2, 1895.

Japan agrees to receive Li. Changes are to be made in letters patent. Place of meeting, Shimonoseki. Time not fixed. Plenipotentiary may use cipher.

No. 107.]

Mr. Denby to Mr. Gresham.


PEKING, March 15, 1895. Li Hung-chang left Taku for Shimonoseki this morning. Foster, Pethick accompanied him. He will reach Shimonoseki 18th. Sails under German flag, two steamers. He takes 133 people. Wants to live on steamers at Shimonoseki.

Mr. Dun to Mr. Gresham.

No. 108.]



Tokyo, March 25, 1895.

Yesterday Li Hung-chang was shot and seriously wounded in face by Japanese fanatic at Shimonoseki. Negotiations must be suspended.

Mr. Dun to Mr. Gresham.

No. 109.]


Tokyo, March 28, 1895.

Li Hung Chang's speedy recovery anticipated. Early resumption of negotiations probable.


Mr. Gresham to Mr. Bayard.


WASHINGTON, September 12, 1893.

The two powers should, without delay, come to an understanding which will make the regulations found to be necessary by the Paris Tribunal of Arbitration practically effective before the next sealing season. Concurrent legislation and supplemental regulations seem indispensable. You are instructed to inform the British minister that the United States desire to take the matter up at once with the ambassador here, or in some other way satisfactory to both Governments. Efforts to obtain adhesion of other powers to the regulations should be promptly made. The arbitrators recommend that no fur seal be killed on land or sea for one, two, or three years. If this suggestion is adopted the concurrence of Russia should be had, if possible.

Mr. Bayard to Mr. Gresham.


London, September 13, 1893. (Received September 21.)

SIR: I avail myself of the mail pouch, which closes to-day, to send you two pamphlets on the Bering Sea question and the award thereon of the tribunal at Paris.

I have written to the secretary of state for foreign affairs asking an interview, in order to lay before him the purport of your instruction in relation to proceeding, without delay, to agree upon the regulations in fur sealing, made necessary to effectuate the award of the arbitrators.

I shall communicate to you as soon as possible the result of the interview with Lord Rosebery on the subject.

I have, etc.,

Mr. Bayard to Mr. Gresham.



London, September 13, 1893. (Received September 21.)

SIR: Referring to my previous dispatch of this date, I have now the honor to inform you that I have just had an interview with Her Majesty's secretary of state for foreign affairs in which I acquainted

'Printed also in Senate Ex. Doc. No. 67, Fifty-third Congress, third session.


him with the purport of your instruction of to-day by cable in relation to the expediency of the two Governments coming at once to an understanding under which the award of the Paris Tribunal of Arbitration upon the Bering Sea questions would be rendered practically effective before the next sealing season.

His Lordship expressed his willingness to act promptly, and also the opinion that the arrangements for that purpose would be wisely made at Washington, and that the British ambassador, Sir Julian Pauncefote, would be eminently qualified to conduct them in behalf of his Government. But Lord Rosebery told me that he was awaiting a note upon the subject of the award from Sir Charles Tupper, high commissioner for Canada, who has just gone hence to Canada, and was, therefore, not prepared to discuss the matter further until he had heard from him.

I suggested the expediency of the two Governments acting promptly, in which his Lordship expressed his full concurrence, and said he would telegraph Sir Charles Tupper this afternoon and acquaint me with the nature of his reply as soon as it was received.

His Lordship concurred also in my suggestion that it would be highly expedient that no intimation of delay or obstruction should be attributable to Canada, and said in substance that there could be none.

I had a long interview with Sir Charles Tupper on the 12th of August on the general subject of Canadian relations with the United States, which I propose to make the subject of a separate dispatch, in which he expressed the strongest desire to strengthen amicable relations between the United States and Canada; so that I apprehend a ready and willing cooperation in the arrangements suggested by your cable instruction looking to the effective execution of the award of the Paris Tribunal. T. F. BAYARD.

I have, etc.,

Mr. Gresham to Mr. Bayard.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, Washington, September 13, 1893. SIR: Any benefit that this Government derives from the action of the Paris Tribunal of Arbitration will depend upon the regulations and the willingness of Great Britain to cooperate with us in making them practically effective. Concurrent legislation should be obtained and supplemental rules or orders agreed upon and published before the next sealing season begins. Owners of sealing vessels should know in advance the restriction under which they will have to act.

[blocks in formation]

I fear that whatever is done Canadians, and perhaps Americans, will transfer the ownership of their sealing vessels to citizens or subjects of other powers, thus avoiding the effect of the regulations. It remains to be seen whether other powers will now give their adhesion to the regulations. It would seem that the situation calls for both legislation and another treaty, and perhaps you had better sound Lord Rosebery on that point; also, as to how other powers are to be approached for their adhesion to the regulations.

I am, etc.,


« AnteriorContinuar »