service rendered which naturally must be ascertained by the elements of each individual case rather than by any hard and pre

separation and assortment for the purpose of being shipped by water to other markets for the purpose of sale, it was held that the property was not subject to taxation in New Jersey. The court said:-'Delay within the state, which is no longer than is necessary for the convenience of transshipment for its transportation to its destination, will not make it property within the state for the purpose of taxation.' *** The (General Oil) company was doing business in the state and its property was receiving the protection of the state. Its oil was not in movement through the state.. It had reached the destination of its first shipment, and it was held there, not in necessary delay or accommodation to the means of transportation, as in State v. Engle, but for the business purposes and profit of the company. It was only there for distribution, it is said, to fulfill orders already received. But to do this required that the property be given a locality in the state beyond a mere halting in its transportation, It required storage there-the maintenance of the means of storage, of putting it in and taking it from storage. The bill takes pains to allege this. 'Complainant shows that it is impossible, in the coal oil business, such as complainant carries on, to fill separately each of these small orders directly from the railroad tank cars, because of the great delay and expense in the way of freight charges incident to such a plan, and for the further reason that an extensive plant and apparatus is necessary, in order to properly and conveniently unload and receive the oil from said tank cars, and it would be impracticable if not impossible, to have such apparatus and machinery at every point to which complainant ships said oil.' This certainly describes a business-describes a purpose for which the oil is taken from transportation, brought to rest in the state and for which the protection of the state is necessary, a purpose outside the mere transportation of the oil. The case, therefore, comes under the principle announced in American Steel & Wire Co. v. Speed, 192 U. S. 500, 48 L. Ed. 538, 24 Sup. Ct. 365."

See also Susquehanna Coal Co. v. South Amboy, 228 U. S. 665, 57 L. Ed. 1015, 33 Sup. Ct. 712, where was involved a tax on coal shipped to that point and there unloaded and stored but destined to further and later transshipment. The court here said: "The coal, therefore, was not in actual movement through the state; it was at rest in the state, and was to be handled and distributed from there. Therefore the principles expressed in General Oil Co. v. Crain, 209 U. S. 211, 52 L. Ed. 754, 28 Sup. Ct. 475, and Bacon v. Illinois, 227 U. S. 504, 57 L. Ed. 615, 33 Sup. Ct. 299, are applicable to it. The products in neither of those cases were destined for sale in the states, where stored; the delay there was to be temporary -a postponement of their transportation to their destinations. There was, however, a business purpose and advantage in the delay which was availed of, and while it was availed of, the products secured the protection of the state. In both cases it was held that there was a cessation of interstate commerce and subjection to the dominion of the state."

conceived or artificial rules. Of whatever nature, the shipment must be bona fide and not a mere pretence for the purpose of avoiding certain obligations or securing certain advantages.

Manifestly telegraph messages from one state to another constitute a branch of interstate commerce. The Act to Regulate Commerce, as originally passed and approved February 4, 1887, made no mention of this subject but the amendment of June 18, 1910, bestowed upon the Interstate Commerce Commission the control and regulation of this phase of interstate commerce.23

Commerce to or from Foreign Countries.-The Act to Regulate Commerce by its terms includes traffic "from any place in the United States to an adjacent foreign country," and "from any place in the United States through a foreign country to any other place in the United States" and also "from any place in the United States to a foreign country and carried from such place to a port of transshipment," and as well "from a foreign country to any place in the United States and carried to such place from a port of entry either in the United States or an adjacent foreign country." By its scope this language includes the whole field of commerce-excepting only that wholly within a state-both between the various states and territories of the United States and that which is embraced within our export and import trade. The jurisdiction of the Commission under the scope of the act is limited naturally, however, to only that part of the export or import rate and shipment belonging to and conducted by the carrier in the United States." But the Act has thus included in its scope

23 In Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Crovo, 220 U. S. 364, 55 L. Ed. 498, 31 Sup. Ct. 399, the court said:-"That companies engaged in the telegraph business, whose lines extend from one state to another, are engaged in interstate commerce and that messages passing from one state to another constitute such commerce is indisputable. Such companies and such messages come, therefore, under the regulating power of Congress." See also Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Commercial Milling Co., 218 U. S. 406, 54 L. Ed. 1088, 31 Sup. Ct. 59, and cases therein cited.

24 Texas and Pacific Railway Company v. Interstate Commerce Commission, (The Import Rate Case) 162 U. S. 197, 40 L. Ed. 940, 16 Sup. Ct. 666. Here the shipment involved consisted of goods from Liverpool and London to San Francisco via New Orleans on a through rate. The court said: "It would be difficult to use language more unmistakably signifying that Congress had in view the whole field of commerce (excepting commerce wholly within a state) as well that between the states and territories as that going to or coming from foreign countries."

the entire commerce of the United States foreign and interstate and subjected to its regulations all carriers so engaged in the transportation of people or property whether by railroads or by combinations of railroads and water lines.

Transportation Partly by Railroad and Partly by Water.Under this section "common carriers engaged in the transportation of passengers or property *** partly by railroad and partly by water when both are used under a common control, management, or arrangement for a continuous carriage or shipment" are within the terms of the Act and under the control of the Interstate Commerce Commission. Such common carriers are subject to the provisions of the Act in the same terms and manner as the other companies named in the legislation. It is doubtless true that certain provisions of the act by their nature relate to some carriers and not to others but within the broad terms of section I carriers partly by railroad and partly by water under a common arrangement for a continuous carriage or shipment are as specifically included as carriers entirely by railroad.25

25 Interstate Commerce Commission v. Goodrich Transit Co., 224 U. S. 194, 56 L. Ed. 729, 32 Sup. Ct. 436. The Goodrich Transit Company was engaged in carrying on traffic, both passenger and freight, on the Great Lakes by joint rates with the railroads. Here the court said:-"The first section makes the act apply alike to common carriers engaged in the transportation of passengers or property wholly by railroad or partly by railroad and partly by water under an arrangement for a continuous carriage or shipment. It is conceded that the carriers filing the bills in these cases were common carriers engaged in the transportation of passengers and property partly by railroad and partly by water under a joint arrangement for a continuous carriage or shipment. Such common carriers are declared to be subject to the provisions of the Act in precisely the same terms as those which comprehend the other companies named in the act. Carriers partly by railroad and partly by water under a common arrangement for a continuous carriage or shipment are as specifically within the terms of the Act as any other carrier named therein. It may be that certain provisions of the Act are in their nature applicable to some carriers and not to others; but we are only concerned to inquire in this case whether the carriers thus broadly brought within the terms of the Act by section I thereof are subject to the provisions of the statute by the authority of which the Commission undertook to require the system of accounting, etc. In Wilmington Transportation Co. v. California Railroad Commission, 236 U. S. 151, the Supreme Court said: "The Interstate Commerce Commission has not been authorized to prescribe rates for water transportation unconnected with transportation by railroad."

Common Control, Management or Arrangement for a Continuous Carriage or Shipment.-The evidences and the proof of a common control, management or arrangement for a continuous carriage or shipment may vary with specific cases but the usual tests approved by the Supreme Court include a through routing of the freight in interstate commerce, the acceptance of the goods by connecting carriers by virtue of through bills of lading, and the participation in through rates and charges therefor. Nor is it essential that there should be an agreement for a through rate, since the receipt and forwarding of shipments in the usual manner by carriers engaged in interstate commerce under through bills of lading, amount to a common arrangement such as is contemplated by the statute. And a railroad which lies wholly within a state which participates in the carriage of an interstate shipment by making an arrangement for its continuous carriage under a through bill of lading and with an agreement for participating in through rates, becomes to the extent of that shipment at least subject to the jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission.26

26 Cincinnati, New Orleans and Texas Pacific Railway Company v. Interstate Commerce Commission (The Social Circle Case), 162 U. S. 184, 40 L. Ed. 935, 16 Sup. Ct. 700. Here a charge of $1.07 per hundred pounds was made on shipments from Cincinnati to Atlanta and an additional charge of 30 cents (the local rate from Atlanta to Social Circle) or $1.37 on the same shipment from Cincinnati to Social Circle. It was claimed that the 30-cent charge from Atlanta to Social Circle was purely the local charge between those two points over the Georgia Railroad, that it was not under a common control or an arrangement for continuous shipment and therefore not within the provisions of the Act to regulate commerce. The Supreme Court as to this contention said: "It may be true that the Georgia Railroad Company, as a corporation of the state of Georgia, and whose entire road is within that state, may not be legally compelled to submit itself to the provisions of the Act of Congress, even when carrying, between points in Georgia, freight that has been brought from another state. * * * But when the Georgia Railroad Company enters into the carriage of foreign freight, by agreeing to receive the goods by virtue of foreign through bills of lading, and to participate in through rates and charges, it thereby becomes part of a continuous line, not made by a consolidation with the foreign companies, but made by an arrangement for the continuous carriage or shipment from one state to another, and thus becomes amenable to the Federal Act, in respect to such interstate commerce. We do not perceive that the Georgia Railroad Company escaped from the supervision of the Commission, by requesting the foreign companies not to name or fix any rates for that part of the transportation which took place in the state of Georgia when the goods were shipped to

Where one of the railroads with its portion of the carriage is entirely within a state it is immaterial that it receives the entire benefit of the rate on its own line provided there is a through bill of lading and a through routing under and by virtue of which there is a continuous carriage rather than an entirely separate and distinct shipment and contract of carriage evidenced in part by a local bill of lading."

Pipe Lines. By the Act of June 29, 1906, section I was amended so as to include in the act to regulate commerce interstate pipe lines except those used to carry water or natural or artificial gas, and to make those engaged, for instance, in the trans

local points on its road. It still left its arrangement to stand with respect to its terminus at Augusta and to other designated points. Having elected to enter into the carriage of interstate freights and thus subjected itself to the control of the Commission, it would not be competent for the company to limit that control, in respect to foreign traffic, to certain points on its road and exclude other points."

27 Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company v. Behlmer, 175 U. S. 648, 44 L. Ed. 309, 20 Sup. Ct. 209. This case involved rates on hay and grain transported from Memphis to Summerville, South Carolina,the rate being reached by adding to the through rate from Memphis to Charleston, the local rate from Charleston back over the same line to Summerville. The benefit of this additional local rate was received wholly by the local road on which Summerville was situated, and it was contended that under these conditions the carriers did not constitute a continuous line bringing them within section 1 of the Act to regulate commerce. "The conceded facts," said the court, "from which it was deduced as a matter of law that the carriers were operating 'under a common control, management or arrangement for a continuous carriage or shipment' were as follows: The several carriers transported hay from Memphis under through bills of lading, by continuous carriage to Summerville and Charleston. The several roads shared in an agreed rate on traffic to Charleston and in a precisely equal in amount rate on traffic to Summerville. On shipments to Summerville, however, there was added to the Charleston rate the amount of the local rate from Charleston to Summerville, the benefit of which additional exaction was solely received by the local road on which Summerville was situated. The contention that under this state of facts the carriers did not constitute a continuous line, bringing them within the control of the Act to regulate commerce, is no longer open to controversy in this court. In Cincinnati, New Orleans and Texas Pacific Railway v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 162 U. S. 184, 40 L. Ed. 935, 16 Sup. Ct. 700, decided since the case in hand was before the Commission and the Circuit Court, it was held under a state of facts substantially similar to that here found that the carriers were thereby subject to the Act to regulate commerce."