CHAP. Tubingen, and the whole Church herself, solely under his officers of State. XVII. Bavaria, Baden. Although in Bavaria this period brought civil equality to the Protestants, as it did to the Catholics in Würtemberg and Saxony, yet Montgelas took care that the evangelical Church should not acquire a position of independence in the new kingdom, but be directly subject to the government. Of all the States included in the Rhenish Confederation, Baden alone under the guidance of her grand-duke and his able servant, J. F. Brauer, showed that the practical duties of ecclesiastical legislation were understood in that country. In Germany the era of the Revolution had swept away, as in other things, so in the relations of Church and State, much that was untenable. But it had done nothing more than remove the old it was reserved for the following epoch to show how far any vital power existed to create the new. : CHAPTER XVIII. THE RESTORATION AND THE CATHOLIC CHURCH. Principle of Legitimacy-Congress of Vienna and the Church-Restoration of Pius VII.-Revival of Papal Pretensions-Re-establishment of the Jesuits-Restoration in Spain, Sardinia, Naples, the Papal States, and Tuscany-France: Clerical reaction under Louis XVIII.-Papal Convention of 1817-Failure to revive Concordat of 1517-Activity of the Parti Prètre-Law of Sacrilege-The Jesuits denounced by Montlosier— Ordinances of 1828 on Education-Unpopularity of the Clergy-Germany: Opposition of Bavaria to a Federal Concordat-Metternich opposes a Concordat for Austria-Bavarian Concordat of 1817-Constitutional Act and Edict of Religion-Protest of Rome-Royal Rescript of Tegernsee-Negotiations of Prussia with Rome-Niebuhr's Memorial of 1819-Bull De Salute Animarum-Circumscription Bull for Hanover -Frankfort Conference of South German States-their Negotiations with Consalvi-Concordat with the Netherlands-Redistribution of Dioceses in Switzerland-Germany: Roman sympathies of Catholic Clergy— Anti-Febronian Movement-Wessenberg's Attempts at Church ReformRomantic and Historic Theories of Catholicism-Ultramontane Doctrines of Görres and Droste-Feeble Policy of the Prussian Government— Catholic reaction in Silesia-Memorial of 1826-Schimonsky and President Merckel-Ultramontane Progress in the Netherlands-Catholic Emancipation in England. WITH the fall of Napoleon commenced an epoch, every effort of which was directed to allaying the convulsions of the last five and twenty years by a re-establishment of opposite principles. The Restoration followed upon the Revolution. If the latter had originated in the presumption of the equal rights of all mankind, and the recognition of a philosophical right of reason, to be realised in the State without any regard to existing historical conditions of society; now, on the contrary, the rights of dynasties and of privileged classes were asserted, as the CHAP. XVIII. XVIII. Principle of CHAP. sole divinely-sanctioned Government of the world, under the distinctive appellation of the principle of legitimacy. legitimacy. Strange, indeed, it must have seemed at that time, that Talleyrand, so long the servant of the Revolution, should now come forward as the most ardent champion of this new doctrine. And yet his conduct, in reality, was consistent. There is no other alternative, he said, but Napoleon and Louis XVIII. A principle, whatever it may be, is needed to give stability to the new Government; Louis XVIII. represents a principle.' His object was to strengthen the Bourbon restoration, which he sought to promote, in the interests of France, not only by extending it to Naples, but also by reinstating the king of Saxony. For the same reason he looked upon legitimacy from a purely dynastic point of view, such as dealt with public interests, simply like those of princely families, whilst the existence and historical development of nations remained altogether disregarded. So far, this principle exactly suited the leading statesmen of the day, who sought in it at first merely a safeguard against revolution. But as the temptation to strain its application increased, they proceeded to parcel out countries among themselves, with a genuine Napoleonic disregard of natural frontiers and relations, according to the mere numbers of souls.1 Even the Emperor Francis— that paragon of uprightness-was no more hindered by any scruples of conscience from taking back Venetia, once ac In this respect Consalvi rightly remarks: On espère dominer la révolution en la comprimant ou en la forçant au silence; et la révolution déborde même au milieu du congrès par des fissures que des mains trop intéressées ou trop complaisantes lui ouvrent à plaisir. Faire à chaque quart de siècle changer les peuples de maîtres, de lois, de mœurs et d'usages, n'a jamais été d'une habile et prévoyante politique.' Mem. i. p. 23. There follows, of course, a philippic against the liberty of the press, as the source of all evil. LEGITIMIST POLICY IN EUROPE. 37 XVIII. quired by the shameful treachery of Campo Formio, than CHAP. he was prevented, by his devotion to the Holy See, from directing all his efforts to unite the Legations with his Italian possessions.1 And not one of the States included in the Rhenish Confederation, who survived the great crisis, ever dreamed of giving up one tittle of the spoil, which they owed to their subservience to the Usurper against their country. They accepted the principle of legitimacy in the manner that best furthered the interests of their newly-acquired sovereignty, which they peremptorily strove to guard against all limitation by the constitution of the German Confederation. Nor yet did that mysterious league of the three continental powers-the so-called Holy Alliance (September 26, 1815)-introduce any change in this respect. The only sincere promoter of that compact was the Emperor Alexander, who, under the influence of Madame de Krüdener and the philosopher Baader, saw in it the first step towards the realisation of his projects, namely, the union of the various Christian religions into one Church, and the annihilation of the Ottoman rule in Europe. Practically, the sole incident that determined the events of the period immediately following, was the agreement of the four great powers, which had broken the might of Napoleon, to maintain the state of things, as re-established after the long convulsions of the Revolution, and to put down whatever seemed to endanger it, as a menace to the peace of Europe. This leading idea 1 The real intention of Austria went still further. In a note of May 26, 1814, Metternich reminded Lord Castlereagh that the promises which England had made at Prague in 1813, to induce Austria to join the coalition, contained no stipulation for the restoration of the temporal rule of the pope. Thus, the inviolable right of Austria to that part of Italy remained, in fact, unabridged, as much because the emperor was king of the Romans as because he was the hereditary head of Germany. Just as if Francis I. had never resigned the imperial crown! Congress of Vienna, 1814. CHAP. became the programme of policy for the next ten years, adopted by the Congress of Vienna, and gave rise to conflicts with the antagonistic currents of the time. Such a change in high politics could not, even by itself, remain without influence on the relations of Church and State, although nothing was more remote from the minds of the leading statesmen at the Congress than to occupy themselves closely with such matters. Personally, they were either wholly indifferent to religious questions, or they were disciples of that philosophical doctrine of enlightenment, which desired to retain no more of Christianity than its purified system of morals. But in either case they judged of all Church questions simply from political points of view: they furthered or opposed them, according as dynastic interests determined. In disregarding the desire of Consalvi for the restoration of the German Catholic Church to her former position, no less than his demand for the re-establishment of the Holy Roman Empire; in conforming as little to the wishes of the secularised chapters, as to those of Wessenberg, who re-advanced Dalberg's project of a German hierarchy, culminating in a national primate, their leading motive lay not in any fear of a renewal of the contest between Church and State, but solely in political and material considerations. The German sovereigns were anxious to retain the former ecclesiastical principalities and domains, as well as the possessions of the mediatised secular states; and in the settlement of the relations between the Catholic and Evangelical Churches of their dominions, by the Act of Confederation (June 8, 1815), they resented all dictation by the central power as much for themselves, as for the rights of their territorial diets. Just as the kings of Bavaria and Würtemberg resisted most keenly |