ground of millions of migrating birds and migrating whales and other animals, some of them rare or endangered species. It also has large numbers of year-round residents, particularly the huge herds of walrus and seals in the ocean and caribou on land. Polar bears and Arctic foxes range widely into the most remote and inhospitable regions of the central Arctic Ocean. Finally, man has occupied the Arctic for thousands of years and has adapted himself in a unique way to the environment. His customs and technology are of great interest to scientists, as are his problems in adapting to ever-changing outside Western influences. Archaeologists, ethnologists, anthropologists, and other social scientists find Alaska- the bridge for major migrations from Asia to North America-a fascinating area for their studies. These brief examples illustrate the uniqueness and diversity in structure, dynamics, and behavior of the arctic region as an important part of the whole Earth. Other nations are expending great efforts in the study of the Arctic because they understand that the keys to many of our planet's present and future problems may lie in this region. If the United States is to participate in this process in any meaningful way, it must begin to involve itself in arctic research now. SCIENTIFIC TRAINING The intensive study of the arctic environment obviously requires a cadre of trained and experienced scientists and resource specialists. Over the span of the last few decades the demands for polar science from one year to another and the fluctuating funding levels for arctic research have prevented the creation of a body of researchers of sufficient dedication and size to adequately respond to arctic problems. Thus, whenever a problem arises, scientific teams must be created virtually from scratch, and solutions to the problems are unnecessarily delayed. Moreover, when work on a specific task is completed, the teams are allowed to disintegrate. This is not an efficient procedure. It wastes valuable training and experience and squashes professional enthusiasm. A good example of such an occurrence was the Arctic Ice Dynamics Joint Experiment (AIDJEX), which took place in the Arctic from approximately 1970 to 1978. The experiment arose from the need to study basic and applied aspects of ice dynamics in the Arctic Ocean. AIDJEX was particularly important for developing adequate forecasting of ice conditions, which could be used in the annual Prudhoe Bay barge supply and for future tanker traffic in the Arctic. Also, AIDJEX perhaps was a response to the perceived need to close the arctic research gap with the Russians. The AIDJEX experiment was highly successful. With the sophisticated instrumentation and computer technology available to the U.S. and Canadian researchers, it made a giant stride in catching up with the Russians. However, when it was completed, funding stopped, and the scientific team was allowed to disintegrate-losing almost entirely for the United States its accumulated collective experience. A few years later, new teams had to be assembled to examine similar problems associated with the offshore industrial development of the Arctic. That the originally assembled talent could not be utilized for subsequent tasks emphasizes the absence of foresight, planning, coordination, and long-range interest by the federal government in arctic science. A number of highly topical and important problems, both pure and applied, are not adequately addressed at present because there are no scientists available to do so, even if funds were available. When an agency in the federal government suddenly discovers the urgent need to obtain data to solve one of these problems, the inevitable and all too familiar crash program results. An example of the federal government's lack of foresight in recognizing the need for long-term research are the outer continental shelf studies of the U.S. Department of the Interior, which examine the possible effects of petroleum exploitation offshore Alaska. Lack of long-term research on bowhead whales has already led to litigation, delays, and loss of revenues and threatens additional delays and possibly severe reductions in offshore oil and gas development in the Arctic and embarrassing legal complications for the United States, both domestically and internationally (International Whaling Commission bowhead hunting quotas). Similarly, most of the research conducted on Alaska fish resources in the Bering Sea has been done by foreign countries. The consequence is that we do not know as much as we should about the fish resources we allow other nations to exploit. In itself, the fact that one of the United States' most productive resource areas is almost entirely exploited by foreign countries shows a deplorable lack of interest by the United States in arctic and subarctic resources. There are numerous other examples of needed research which are of vital interest to the nation but which are not carried out because the United States does not encourage or support careers in arctic science. LOGISTICS AND FACILITIES Logistic and facilities support of arctic science must be directed by national priorities. This was the reason given by the U.S. Navy for closing its arctic research laboratory (NARL) at Pt. Barrow, Alaska. For the purposes of the Navy this seems justified, although it does not remove the need for other logistics and support facilities in the Arctic. The Navy had operated NARL since 1947. During this time the laboratory supported arctic science related to the Navy's mission as well as that of a host of civilian scientists supported by or representing other federal agencies, most prominently, the National Science Foundation, U.S. Geological Survey, and the Cold Regions Research and Engineering Laboratory (CRREL) of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. In the mid-1970's the Navy decided that its arctic mission no longer required the expensive ($10 million annually) maintenance of NARL. Recently, the Navy's office of naval research announced NARL's phasedown to caretaker status and its intention to seek closure of the laboratory in 1982 unless a new host agency was found prior to April 30, 1981. Various study groups in both federal and state government and the University of Alaska have examined this situation with a view towards continuing the lab's operation under different aegis. As of this writing there is no federal agency willing to undertake future NARL management. Similarily the State of Alaska and the University of Alaska do not consider the high maintenance costs justifiable in relationship to their scientific research missions. There seems to be nearly universal agreement that the scope of arctic science has changed so dramatically in the past decade that alternate facilities and bases from the Bering Sea to the Mackenzie River delta and at Fairbanks and Anchorage, Alaska are generally more cost effective and suitable to the pursuit of scientific inquiry. A final determination of NARL's future is mandated by Sec. 1007 of the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (16 USC 3147). This section instructs the secretaries of the Departments of Interior, Defense, and Energy to initiate and carry out a study to determine the future of the laboratory within an overall context of "redirecting the United States Arctic research policy. . ." The secretaries will then make their recommendations about the future of the single laboratory devoted to U.S. arctic science. The conduct of science in arctic seas is another story. The American oceanographic community has achieved its prestigious position largely through pioneering efforts and imaginative approaches in the temperate and tropical regions of the world's oceans. Its arctic capabilities and experience are sorely deficient. If national scientific priorities are to be reordered toward arctic interests, we must quickly develop a capability for the conduct of marine science in ice-covered seas. Our national oceanographic fleet is notably deficient with respect to sea ice capability. U.S. Coast Guard icebreakers primarily are committed to other missions and are generally ill-suited to scientific pursuits. The need for research platforms, capable of operating in seasonal sea ice and in high latitude open oceans, is now widely appreciated within the national oceanography community. Basi cally, what is required is a long-term, broadly based commitment to arctic marine research in general, which would fully employ an array of new research facilities, including satellite imagery technology, long-range aircraft, submarines, drifting ice stations, and remote sensing. Most importantly, however, arctic scientific research requires economical, ice-strengthened, stable research ships, which to our national disgrace, we now lack. FRAMEWORK FOR A U.S. ARCTIC SCIENCE COMMITMENT A Sense of Urgency U.S. arctic science policy must be more closely linked to national needs, primarily for extractive resources which exist in abundance in the Arctic. Most urgent is the U.S. need for oil and gas from arctic petroleum-bearing structures; second is the need for strategic and critical minerals; and third, food from fisheries. There can be no question that solutions to the "Alaska" or "arctic dilemma" of resource delivery may well be central to the economic survival of the United States in the next 20 to 50 years. The nation must face up to this reality. Already, a decade and a half have been lost due to the limitations placed on arctic science by the events surrounding National Security Council Memorandum 144 and by our increasing dependence as a nation on Middle East and other foreign energy imports. Needed now is a central and comprehensive national dedication to develop and increase the understanding of the Arctic-its people, its resources, its environmental hazards and frailties, and its ecosystem interactions. With these, a new productive future for North American society can be achieved-without it we will probably cease to be an important world society. It is that stark a reality and really that simple. National attention on arctic problems is increasing. Many new disparate forums and programs are taking shape and substance, even while other programs decline. Certain |