Mr. ELLSWORTH seconded the motion. On the question for allowing each state one vote in the second branch, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, ay, 5; Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no, 6. Mr. WILSON and Mr. HAMILTON moved, that the right of suffrage in the second branch ought to be according to the same rule as in the first branch. On this question for making the ratio of representation the same in the second as in the first branch, it passed in the affirmative. Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, ay, 6; Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, no, 5.101 The eleventh resolution, for guarantying republican government and territory to each state, being considered, the words "or partition were, on motion of Mr. MADISON, added after the words "voluntary junction." Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, ay, 7; Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, no, 4. Mr. READ disliked the idea of guarantying territory. It abetted the idea of distinct states, which would be a perpetual source of discord. There can be no cure for this evil but in doing away states altogether, and uniting them all into one great society. Alterations having been made in the resolution, making it read, "that a republican constitution, and its existing laws, ought to be guarantied to each state by the United States," the whole was agreed to, nem. con. The thirteenth resolution, for amending the national Constitution, hereafter, without consent of the national legislature, being considered, several members did not see the necessity of the resolution at all, nor the propriety of making the consent of the national legislature unnecessary. Col. MASON urged the necessity of such a provision. The plan now to be formed will certainly be defective, as the Confederation has been found on trial to be. Amendments, therefore, will be necessary; and it will be better to provide for them in an easy, regular, and constitutional way, than to trust to chance and violence. It would be improper to require the consent of the national legislature, because they may abuse their power, and refuse their assent on that very account. The opportunity for such an abuse may be the fault of the Constitution calling for amendment. Mr. RANDOLPH enforced these arguments. The words "without requiring the consent of the national legislature," were postponed. The other provision in the clause passed, nem. con.102 The fourteenth resolution, requiring oaths from the members of the state governments to observe the national Constitution and laws, being considered, Mr. SHERMAN opposed it, as unnecessarily intruding into the state jurisdictions. Mr. RANDOLPH considered it necessary to prevent that competition between the national Constitution and laws, and those of the particular states, which had already been felt. The officers of the states are already under oath to the states. To preserve a due impartiality, they ought to be equally bound to the national government. The national authority needs every support we can give it. The executive and judiciary of the states, notwithstanding their nominal independence on the state legislatures, are in fact so dependent on them, that, unless they be brought under some tie to the national system, they will always lean too much to the state systems, whenever a contest arises between the two. Mr. GERRY did not like the clause. He thought there was as much reason for requiring an oath of fidelity to the states from national officers, as vice versa. Mr. LUTHER MARTIN moved to strike out the words requiring such an oath from the state officers, viz., "within the several states,' observing, that if the new oath should be contrary to that already taken by them, it would be improper; if coincident, the oaths already taken will be sufficient. On the question for striking out, as proposed by Mr. L. Martin,Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, ay, 4; Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no, 7. Question on the whole resolution, as proposed by Mr. Randolph, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, ay, 6; Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, no, 5.103 The committee rose, and the House adjourned. TUESDAY, June 12. In Committee of the Whole.-The question was taken on the fifteenth resolution, to wit, referring the new system to the people of the United States for ratification. It passed in the affirmative. Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, ay, 6; Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, no, 3; Delaware, Maryland, divided. (Pennsylvania omitted in the printed Journal. The vote is there entered as of June 11.) 104 Mr. SHERMAN and Mr. ELLSWORTH moved to fill the blank left in the fourth resolution, for the periods of electing the members of the first branch, with the words, "every year; Mr. Sherman observing, that he did it in order to bring on some question. Mr. RUTLEDGE proposed "every two years.' Mr. JENIFER proposed "every three years;" observing, that the too great frequency of elections rendered the people indifferent to them, and made the best men unwilling to engage in so precarious a service. Mr. MADISON seconded the motion for three years. Instability Is one of the great vices of our republics to be remedied. Three years will be necessary, in a government so extensive, for members to form any knowledge of the various interests of the states to which they do not belong, and of which they can know but little from the situation and affairs of their own. One year will be almost consumed in preparing for, and travelling to and from, the seat of national business. Mr. GERRY. The people of New England will never give up the point of annual elections. They know of the transition made in England from triennial to septennial elections, and will consider such an innovation here as the prelude to a like usurpation. He considered annual elections as the only defence of the people against tyranny. He was as much against a triennial house, as against an hereditary executive. Mr. MADISON observed, that, if the opinions of the people were to be our guide, it would be difficult to say what course we ought to take. No member of the Convention could say what the opinions of his constituents were at this time; much less could he say what they would think, if possessed of the information and lights possessed by the members here; and still less, what would be their way of thinking six or twelve months hence. We ought to consider what was right and necessary in itself for the attainment of a proper government. A plan adjusted to this idea will recommend itself. The respectability of this Convention will give weight to their recommendation of it. Experience will be constantly urging the adoption of it; and all the most enlightened and respectable citizens will be its advocates. Should we fall short of the necessary and proper point, this influential class of citizens will be turned against the plan, and little support, in opposition to them, can be gained to it from the unreflecting multitude. Mr. GERRY repeated his opinion, that it was necessary to consider what the people would approve. This had been the policy of all legislators. If the reasoning (of Mr. Madison) were just, and we supposed a limited monarchy the best form in itself, we ought to recommend it, though the genius of the people was decidedly adverse to it, and, having no hereditary distinctions among us, we were destitute of the essential materials for such an innovation. On the question for the triennial election of the first branch,— New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, Georgia, ay, 7; Massachusetts, (Mr. King, ay, Mr. Gorham, wavering,) Connecticut, North Carolina, South Carolina, no, 4.105 The words requiring members of the first branch to be of the age of years, were struck out Maryland alone, no. The words "liberal compensation for members" being considered, Mr. MADISON moved to insert the words "and fixed." He observed, that it would be improper to leave the members of the national legislature to be provided for by the state legislatures, because it would create an improper dependence; and to leave them to regulate their own wages was an indecent thing, and might in time prove a dangerous one. He thought wheat, or some other article of which the average price, throughout a reasonable period preceding, might be settled in some convenient mode, would form a proper standard. Col. MASON seconded the motion; adding, that it would be improper, for other reasons, to leave the wages to be regulated by the states. First, the different states would make different provision for their representatives, and an inequality would be felt among them, whereas he thought they ought to be in all respects equal; secondly, the parsimony of the states might reduce the provision so low, that, as had already happened in choosing delegates to Congress, the question would be, not who were most fit to be chosen, but who were most willing to serve. On the question for inserting the words "and fixed," New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia, ay, 8; Massachusetts, Connecticut, South Carolina, no, 3. Dr. FRANKLIN said, he approved of the amendment just made for rendering the salaries as fixed, as possible but disliked the word "liberal." He would prefer the word "moderate," if it was necessary to substitute any other. He remarked the tendency of abuses, in every case, to grow of themselves when once begun, and related very pleasantly the progression in ecclesiastical benefices, from the first departure from the gratuitous provision for the apostles, to the establishment of the papal system. The word "liberal" was struck out, nem. con. On the motion of Mr. PIERCE, that the wages should be paid out of the national treasury, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia, ay, 8; Connecticut, New York, South Carolina, no, 3. Question on the clause relating to term of service and compensation of the first branch, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia, ay, 8; Connecticut, New York, South Carolina, no, 3. On a question for striking out the "ineligibility of members of the national legislature to state offices," -- Connecticut, New York, North Carolina, South Carolina, ay, 4; New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, Georgia, no, 5; Massachusetts, Maryland, divided. On the question for agreeing to the clause as amended, Massachusetts, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, ay, 10; Connecticut, no, 1. On the question for making members of the national legislature ineligible to any office under the national government for the term of three years after ceasing to be members, Maryland, ay, 1; Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no, 10. On the question for such ineligibility for one year, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, ay, 8; New York, Georgia, no, 2; Maryland, divided. On the question moved by Mr. Pinckney, for striking out "incapable of reëlection into the first branch of the national legislature for years, and subject to recall," agreed to, nem. con.106 On the question for striking out from the fifth resolution the words requiring members of the senatorial branch to be of the age of years at least, Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, ay, 3; Massachusetts, New York, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, South Carolina, no, 6; North Carolina, Georgia, divided. On the question for filling the blank with "thirty years," as the qualification, it was agreed to, Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, ay, 7; Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware, Georgia, no, 4. Mr. SPAIGHT moved to fill the blank for the duration of the ap pointments to the second branch of the national legislature with the words" seven years." Mr. SHERMAN thought seven years too long. He grounded his opposition, he said, on the principle that, if they did their duty well, they would be reëlected; and if they acted amiss, an earlier opportunity should be allowed for getting rid of them. He preferred five years, which would be between the terms of the first branch and of the executive. Mr. PIERCE proposed three years. Seven years would raise an alarm. Great mischiefs have arisen in England from their septennial act, which was reprobated by most of their patriotic statesmen. Mr. RANDOLPH was for the term of seven years. The democratic licentiousness of the state legislatures proved the necessity of a firm Senate. The object of this second branch is to control the democratic branch of the national legislature. If it be not a firm body, the other branch, being more numerous, and coming immediately from the people, will overwhelm it. The Senate of Maryland, constituted on like principles, had been scarcely able to stem the popular torrent. No mischief can be apprehended, as the concurrence of the other branch, and in some measure of the executive, will in all cases be necessary. A firmness and independence may be the more necessary, also, in this branch, as it ought to guard the Constitution against encroachments of the executive, who will be apt to form combinations with the demagogues of the popular branch. Mr. MADISON considered seven years as a term by no means too long. What we wished was, to give to the government that stability which was every where called for, and which the enemies of the republican form alleged to be inconsistent with its nature. He was not afraid of giving too much stability, by the term of seven years. His fear was, that the popular branch would still be too great an overmatch for it. It was to be much lamented that we had so little direct experience to guide us. The constitution of Maryland was the only one that bore any analogy to this part of the plan. In no instance had the Senate of Maryland created just suspicions of danger from it. In some instances, perhaps, it may have erred by yielding to the House of Delegates. In every instance of their opposition to the measures of the House of Delegates, they had had with them the |