Would not silence As President of the

the President do? Ought he to remain silent? be regarded as acknowledging the indictment? United States he would not notice it, but as an individual he could with propriety reply. Let us not forget that neither Horace Greeley, nor any one, other than the members of the Cabinet, knew of the proclamation which for a month had been lying in the President's desk, penned by the same hand that wrote this reply to the editor of the "Tribune:"

Aug. 23.

"DEAR SIR,-I have just read yours of the 19th, addressed to myself through the New York Tribune.' If there be in it any statements, or assumptions of fact, which I may know to be erroneous, I do not, now and here, controvert them. If there be in it any inferences which I may believe to be falsely drawn, I do not, now and here, argue against them. If there be perceptible in it an impatient and dictatorial tone, I waive it in deference to an old friend, whose heart I have always supposed to be right. As to the policy I seem to be pursuing,' as you say, I have not meant to leave any one in doubt. I would save the Union. I would save it the shortest way under the Constitution. The sooner the national authority can be restored the nearer the Union will be the Union as it was.' If there be those who would not save the Union unless they could at the same time save slavery, I do not agree with them. If there be those who would not save the Union unless they could at the same time destroy slavery, I do not agree with them. My paramount object in this struggle is to save the Union, and it is not either to save or destroy slavery. If I could save the Union without freeing any slave I would do it; and if I could save it by freeing all the slaves I would do it; and if I could save it by freeing some and leaving others alone, I would also do that. What I do about slavery and the colored race I do because I believe it helps to save the Union; and what I forbear I forbear because I do not believe it would help to save the Union. I shall do less whenever I shall believe what I am doing hurts the cause, and I shall do more whenever I shall believe doing more will help the cause. I shall try to correct errors when shown to be errors, and I shall adopt new views so fast as they shall appear to be true views. I have here stated my purpose according to my view of official duty; and I intend no modification of my oft-expressed personal wish that all men everywhere could be free."

The Confederate cavalry under Stuart gained the rear of Pope's army, and captured his supplies at Manassas. Then came the battle at Groveton, and the second at Bull Run, resulting in the deAug. 26. feat of Pope through the want of co-operation on the part of Fitz-John Porter with his division of the Army of the Potomac. General Franklin's corps was at Alexandria. Halleck directed that it should make a forced march to join Pope, and start as Aug. 27. soon as possible. McClellan thought it would be better for Franklin not to go, and questioned whether Washington was safe. He recommended the troops be held where they were for its defence. Halleck issued an order for Franklin to move at once. ply of McClellan :

This the re

"The moment Franklin can be started with a reasonable amount of artillery he shall go."

Three hours passed; it was nearly night. Then came a telegram that Franklin was not in a condition to move, but might be able to do so in the morning. Halleck replied:

"There must be no delay. They must go to-morrow morning, ready or not ready." Through the following day the President could hear the thunder of cannon in the battle which Pope was fighting. The aid expected Aug. 29 from Fitz-John Porter was not given.

The members of the Cabinet were discussing the situation. Secretary Stanton drew up a remonstrance against the further continuance of McClellan in command of the Army of the Potomac, to be sent to the President. It was signed by himself, also by Mr. Chase, Secretary of the Treasury; Mr. Bates, Attorney - general; and Mr. Smith, Secretary of the Interior. Mr. Welles, Secretary of the Navy, agreed with them, but declined to sign it, as the President might think it an unfriendly act. The remonstrance was not presented to the President; why, we do not know.

Night closed with the Union army in retreat to Centreville. Sumner's and Franklin's corps were there, but had arrived too late to be of any use. It is not surprising that McClellan keenly felt the Aug. 30. change that had come to him. He had been commander of all the armies, had issued orders to generals in the Far West-to Halleck; but now Halleck was issuing orders to him. He had seen his troops taken from him and sent to a commander whom he did not like.

General Pope was discouraged. He saw that the army must fall back to Washington and be reorganized. He said, in a despatch to Halleck :

46

'When there is no heart in their leaders, and every disposition to hang back, much cannot be expected of the men."

We are not to forget, as we review in bare outline the events of the hour, the letter written by McClellan from Harrison's Landing, in which he arraigned the President-a letter which Mr. Lincoln had not forgotten. His heart was now wrung with anguish at the want of cordiality manifested by the commander of the army. His sense of jus tice was outraged by the despatch which suggested that Pope be left to "get out of his scrape as best he could."

"McClellan has acted very badly towards Pope. He really wanted him to fail," said the President to his secretaries. (')

The army was drifting back to Arlington Heights. Halleck directed

McClellan to take command of the troops in the defences, but not to assume control of those that were to arrive. Adjutant-general Kelton

1862.

was sent to the front by McClellan, and directed to make special Sept. 1, inquiries as to the state of affairs. We do not know whom Kelton saw or what was said, but he had a doleful story to tell the President: that the army was demoralized, that there were 30,000 stragglers making their way to Washington.

Through the night the President walked his chamber. The dawn. was just appearing in the east as he listened to Kelton's account. What should he do? The remonstrance of the members of the Cabinet Sept. 2. had not been laid before him, but he knew they had no confidence in McClellan. Mr. Stanton, who was intrusted with the management of military affairs, and Mr. Chase, who must maintain the credit of the nation, were bitterly opposed to continuing him in command, but Abraham Lincoln comprehended that under existing conditions there was but one course to be pursued.

General McClellan was at breakfast when the President and General Halleck called and asked him to resume command of the troops. Mr. Lincoln had not informed any member of the Cabinet of what he was about to do. He knew that he alone must bear the responsibility, be the result beneficial or attended with disaster.

The hour arrived for the meeting of the Cabinet to discuss the questions of the moment.

"I have set McClellan to putting the troops into the fortifications. I think that he can do it better than any other man," said the President. "This can be done just as well by the engineer who constructed the forts," Mr. Chase remarked.

"No one is now responsible for the defence of the Capitol," said Mr. Stanton, "for the order to McClellan has been given by the President, and General Halleck considers himself relieved from responsibility, though he acquiesced and approved of the order. McClellan can now shield himself under Halleck should anything go wrong, while Halleck can disclaim all responsibility."

"I consider General Halleck," said the President, "just as responsible now as he was before. The order directs McClellan to put the troops into the fortifications, and command them for the defence of Washington."

"I can but feel that giving McClellan command is equivalent to giv ing Washington to the rebels," Mr. Chase said.

"It distresses me exceedingly," said the President. "to find myself

differing from the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Treasury on this point; so much do I feel it that I would gladly resign my place. I cannot see who can do this as well as it can be done by McClellan." "Hooker, Sumner, or Burnside will do it better than he," Mr. Chase replied. (2)

"I have issued the order, and I must be responsible to the country for it," the calm but firm words of the President. (')

His constitutional advisers disagree with him. He thinks of the attitude of McClellan; of the army drifting back to Washington; of the thousands of dead and wounded on the field of Manassas; of the victorious Confederates preparing to invade Maryland. He walks his chamber and exclaims, "How willingly would I exchange places today with the soldier who sleeps on the ground in the Army of the Potomac !" (*)

We are not to conclude that the President had lost courage on account of the disasters that had come through the tardiness and inefficiency, or lukewarmness, on the part of those who had been intrusted with command. He was deeply grieved over the differences between himself and the members of the Cabinet, but there was no yielding of his faith in what would be the final outcome. He believed in the army and in the people. He directed Halleck to proceed with all Sept. 3. possible despatch to organize an army for active operations, independent of the forces he might deem necessary for the defence of Washington when the active army should take the field.

The Confederate army was crossing the Potomac at Leesburg. It was universally believed in the South that the sympathies of the people of Maryland were with the Confederates. General Lee thought Sept. 5. thousands of young men would hasten to join him; that Baltimore would welcome him. The harvests had been gathered, and there would be little difficulty in finding food. If he could win a victory north of the Potomac the moral and political results would be of inestimable value to the Confederacy. He divided his army, and sent "Stonewall" Jackson to capture the 10,000 Union troops, under General Miles, holding Harper's Ferry. McClellan the while was moving slowly out from Washington with an army of 100,000. He was calling for more troops.

Sept. 9.

In the silence and seclusion of his chamber, Mr. Lincoln meditated upon the situation. He looked beyond the turmoil of the hour, to ascertain if possible the ways and meanings of divine Providence. These his thoughts as recorded by himself:

"The will of God prevails. In great contests each party claims to act in accordance with the will of God. Both may be, and one must be, wrong. God cannot be for and against the same thing at the same time. In the present Civil War it is quite possible that God's purpose is something different from the purpose of either party; and yet the human instrumentalities, working just as they do, are of the best adaptation to effect His purpose. I am almost ready to say that this is probably true; that God wills this contest, and wills that it shall not end yet. By His great power on the minds of the non-contestants He could have either saved or destroyed the Union without a human contest. Yet the contest began, and, having begun, He could give the final victory to either side. Yet the contest goes on." (")

The disaster that had come to the Army of the Potomac created consternation among the loyal people of the North. A delegation of ministers from Chicago reached Washington to urge the President to do something to abolish slavery. Mr. Lincoln kindly listened to their remarks. He did not inform them that for two months a proclamation had been lying in his desk, and that he was waiting for a victory before issuing it.

"Gentlemen," he said, in reply, "you know that I am powerless to enforce the Constitution in the States now in rebellion. Allow me to ask you if you think that I can enforce a proclamation of emancipation any better?"

The delegates interpreted the question as indicating a reluctance on the part of the President to issue such a proclamation, even if he had the power to enforce it.

"What you have said,” replied one of the gentlemen, "compels me to say that it is a message of the divine Master, through me, commanding you, sir, to open the doors and let the oppressed go free!"

"Well, that may be," said the President, with twinkling eyes, "but if it is, as you say, a message from your divine Master, is it not a little odd that the only channel of communication to me must be by the roundabout way of that awfully wicked city of Chicago?" () They departed without having obtained any satisfaction.

A very important and valuable paper fell into the hands of McClellan -an order issued by General Lee, outlining the future movements of the Confederate army. A soldier had picked it up where the Sept. 13. Confederate army had been encamped; there was no doubt about its being genuine. McClellan learned that Lee had divided his army. Jackson was to move to Harper's Ferry; Lee, with the other