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LOANS.

TREASURY DEPARTMENT, February 19, 1793.

Loans.

SIR: The last Letter which I had the honor to address to the House of Representatives contained a pretty full exposition of the conduct and views of this Department in regard to the Foreign Loans. There remain, however, some incidental topics which it may not be expedient to pass over in silence.

In order to carry the attention of the House immediately to a just application of the remarks which will be submitted, it is necessary to premise, that it is known to have been suggested that the proceeds of the Foreign bills drawn for to this country had no object of public utility, answered none, and were calculated merely to indulge a spirit of favoritism towards the Bank of the United States.

It has already been shown, clearly, I trust, that, but for the instrumentality of the parts of the Loan drawn for prior to April, 1792, amounting nearly to one-half of the whole sum, the purchases of the Debt which were made to that time could not have been made; and that these purchases, besides being the object designated by law for the application of the fund, were productive of positive and important advantages.

How far the operation could have been influenced by motives of favor to the Bank of the United States, the following facts will still more completely decide.

That Bank did not begin its operations till the 12th of December, 1791.

The Banks of North America and New York were the agents of the Treasury for the sale of the bills in question. They sold them, collected, and, with the exception which will be presently stated, disbursed the proceeds.

The receipts on account of those bills began in March, 1791, and concluded in March, 1792.

On the 31st of December, 1791, as the Treasurer's account before the House will show, the public cash was deposited as follows:

In the Bank of the United States

In the Bank of North America

In the Bank of New York

In the Bank of Massachusetts
In the Bank of Maryland
In the Bank of Providence

Making, together

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$133,000 00 471,972 28 224,677 35 65,578 22 50,665 29 7,969 61

$953,862 75

There was then also some moneys in the Banks of North America and New York in a course of receipt which had not been passed over to the Treasurer; but all the public moneys, of whatever kind, in the Bank of the United States, are included in the above sum of $133,000, which had arisen from the duties on imports and tonnage.

It appears, then, that, on the 31st of December, 1791, no transfer for the benefit of the Bank of the United States had been made; and that the deposites of the Government there (exclusive of the

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A concentration of the public deposites in the Bank of the United States was a measure which grew out of the relation between that establishment and the Government; yet, instead of hastening it through favor, it was resolved to let it have a gradual course, so as to consult, in a due degree, the convenience of the other banks, and to effect it rather by letting the public disbursements fall upon the moneys in those banks than by direct transfer.

But a state of things took place in the month of February, between the Banks of the United States and North America, which rendered a more expeditious transfer than was meditated, for the mutual convenience of the two institutions.

The effect of this was, that the state of the Treasury, on the 1st of March, stood as follows: In the Bank of the United States In the Bank of Massachusetts In the Bank of New York In the Bank of North America

In the Bank of Providence

In the Bank of Maryland

Making, together

$692,959 06 31,769 05

32,352 52

31,515 74 8,404 94 34,752 85 $831,754 16

But at this time there was in the Bank of New York, from the proceeds of the Foreign bills, $121,984 71, not transferred to the account of the Treasurer.

This accumulation, however, in the Bank of the United States was of very short duration.

On the 1st of April ensuing, the state of the public cash was as follows:

In the Bank of the United States
In the Bank of New York -
In the Bank of North America
In the Bank of Massachusetts
In the Bank of Providence
In the Bank of Maryland

Making, together

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- $359,643 64

254,930 41 31,515 74 37,712 58

7,156 65 60,418 32

$751,377 34

A similar state of things lasted to the 1st of June, comparatively more disadvantageous to the Bank of the United States. The receipts of public revenue continued to go into the Bank of New

Loans.

York till the 1st of April, 1792, when a branch of the Bank of the United States began to operate in that city, which is the reason of the sum in the Bank of New York bearing so near a proportion to that of the Bank of the United States, and so far exceeding the Bank of North America. By this time, also, the balance of the proceeds of Foreign bills had been passed to the account of the Treasurer, yet still remaining in deposite in the Bank of New York.

These views of the state of the public cash are conformable to the Treasurer's statement of halfmonthly balances, accompanying my Letter of the 13th instant.

The same statement will show that a proportion of the public deposites has continued, since the 1st of April, 1792, in the State banks-in those of North America and New York down to the end of the period which that statement embraces. From these details, the following inferences are deducible:

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THIRD QUARTER of 1791.
Six per cents. from
Three per cents., from
Deferred,

17s. 10d. to 21s. 3d. 9s. 9d. to 12s. 5d. from 9s. 9d. to 12s. 10d. As early as the 6th of August, the six per cents. had a temporary rise to 21s., but, by the 16th, they had fallen to 20s., on the 20th, they had risen to 20s. 6d., and were sometimes above that rate, but never lower during the rest of the quarter.

That, as far as any advantages may have accrued from the deposites, on account of the Foreign bills drawn prior to April, 1792, they accrued substantially to the Banks of North America and New York, not to the Bank of the United States, or to its branches. That, in transferring the pecuniary concerns of the Government from the pre-existing banks to that of the United States and its dependencies, a cautious regard has been paid to the convenience of the former institutions, and the reverse of a policy unduly solicitous for the accommodation of the Bank of the United States has prevailed. Indeed, so much has this been the case, that it might be proved, if it were proper to enter into the proof, that a criticism has been brought upon the conduct of the Department, as consulting less the accommodation of the last-mentioned institution than was due to its relation to the Government and to the services ex-Deferred, pected from it.

But further examination will demonstrate another point, which is, that none of the establishments in question have received any accommodations which were not in perfect coincidence with the public interest, and in the due and proper course of events.

This examination will be directed towards two objects-one, the state of the Treasury at the commencement of each quarter, during the years 1791 and 1792; the other, the state of the market in regard to the prices of stock during the same years.

These periods are selected because they afford the truest criterion of the state of the Treasury, from time to time, being those at which the principal public payments are made, and for which it is necessary to be prepared by intermediate accumulations.

The state of the Treasury at the periods in question was as follows:

In the year 1791year

January i

March 1

June 1
October 1

$569,886 55

As early as the 23d of July, the three per cents. had reached 12s., and were sometimes higher, but never lower during the rest of the quarter.

On the 23d of July the deferred also reached 12s., and afterwards rose to 12s. 6d.

FOURTH QUARTER of 1791. Six per cents., from 20s. 4d. to 22s. 4d. Three per cents., from 12s. 2d. to 13s. 8d. 11s. 8d. to 13s. 6d. The prices were lowest in the early, and highest in the latter part of the quarter.

from

During the whole of the month of December, the deferred was at 12s. 8d. and upwards, the greatest part of the time at 13s.

FIRST QUARTER of 1792.
Six per cents., from
Three per cents., from
Deferred,

21s. Od. to 25s. Od. 12s. 6d. to 15s. Od. 12s. Od. to 15s. Od. The low prices were, in the last ten days of

March.

from

SECOND QUARTER OF 1792.

from

Six per cents.,
Three per cents., from
Deferred,

to 20s. Od. 22s. 6d. 12s. Od. to 13s. 9d. from 11s. 6d. to 13s. 4d. THIRD QUARTER OF 1792.

Six per cents., from
Three per cents., from
Deferred,

21s. Od. to 22s. 3d.

12s. 4d. to 13s. 6d. from 12s. 3d. to 13s. 7d. FOURTH QUArter of 1792.

373,434 53 Six per cents., from 20s. 2d. to 21s. 9d.
533,638 24 Three per cents., from
662,233 99 Deferred,
from

12s. 3d. to 13s. 6d. 11s. 10d. to 13s. 6d.

Loans.

In October, the deferred was at the highest. The lowest prices were in the month of December.

which has been mentioned, as proper to regulate the arrangements of the Treasury.

But two circumstances operated against a further investment-a sudden rise of prices, and a state of temporary disorder in the two principal mercantile scenes of the country, (occasioned by the excessive speculations that had preceded,) which admonished the Treasury to be cautious in its disbursements.

This view of the subject is derived from a statement of prices, pursuant to actual purchases and sales, furnished by a dealer of this city, respectable for his intelligence and probity, combined with the accounts from time to time published in the Gazette of the United States. The papers marked (A x) and (B y) are transmitted for the more particular information of the House on this head. It results from the foregoing view of the subThe market prices of stock no doubt varied at ject, that, as far as any extraordinary sum may other places; at some may have been higher, at appear to have remained unemployed in the banks others lower. At Philadelphia, too, it is believed a longer term than was desirable, it proceeded es-. that small sums were obtainable at particular pe-sentially from a state of things which did not perriods, from necessitous individuals, below the mit its employment, and is in no degree attribuprices in the statement. table to that spirit of favoritism towards those establishments, or any of them, which has been imagined, as the solution of appearances not rightly understood and much overrated.

But there is good ground of reliance that it is substantially a just representation of the state of the stock market during the periods to which it refers.

The state of the Treasury from the first of January to the first of October, 1791, may be said to have been at its proper level, exhibiting none, or an inconsiderable excess beyond the sum which has been mentioned as necessary to be there, and concerning which a further explanation has been promised, and will be given in the course of this Letter. The public purchases in August and September, 1791, amounted to $349,744 99.

The only question, then, of which the matter is susceptible is this: Was not the state of things that did take place to have been foreseen, so as to have influenced the drawing for a proportionably less sum?

This question may safely be answered in the negative.

The bills, the proceeds of which contributed to constitute the excess, which remained unemployed during the two quarters, were drawn in May, 1791. In that month, the highest prices of stock were 17s. 2d. for six per cents., 9s. 2d. for three per cents., and 9s. 3d. for deferred.

No reasonable anticipation, at this juncture, of the progressive rise of stock could have carried it in so short a time to the height which it attained, or beyond the limits within which purchases were deemed advantageous. The rapid and extraordinary rise which did ensue was, in fact, artificial and violent, such as no discreet calculation of probabilities could have pre-supposed. It, therefore, cannot impeach the prudence or expediency of having made provision, on a different supposition, for an extension of purchases.

In the last quarter of the year 1791, beginning with the month of November, and the first quarter of the year 1792, there appears to have been an excess of some magnitude in the Treasury, being from about $250,000 to about $450,000. Taking the first quarter of 1792 as the truest criterion, (which it certainly was, because, at the expiration of that quarter, the payment of interest on the assumed debt began, and was to be provided for,) the real excess ought to be considered as $250,000, with the addition of about $80,000 then in the Bank of North America, from the proceeds of Amsterdam bills, beyond the advances of the Bank for the public service, which had not been passed into the Treasurer's account. It is The proceeds of the bills which were drawn proper to remark that the course of importations subsequent to May, only began to be collected about Occasions large receipts in the latter part of each the beginning of February, and continued in colyear, which circumstance contributed to the ac-lection until the 29th of March. On the 2d of cumulation in question. February, the sum received amounted to no more than $13,431 33.

From the last of November to about the 21st of March, an investment of the excess on hand in purchases was impracticable.

To enable the House to understand what is meant by saying that purchases were impracticable during that period, it is necessary to add, that the prices of stock exceeded the limits which the Commissioners of the Sinking Fund had prescribed to themselves. Indeed, a large proportion of the time those prices were manifestly artificial, and such as predicted a great fall not far distant. The delay incurred was accordingly well compensated by the prices at which investments were afterwards made.

From the 21st of March to the 25th of April, purchases were effected to the extent of $242,688 31 in specie; within $80,000 or $90,000 of what could have been spared, consistently with the rule

These last bills were drawn when the rapid rise of stock commenced, and were sold upon a credit of three months. It was a natural conjecture that a rise so sudden and violent could not be of long duration, and that a declension would shortly succeed, which would afford an opportunity of purchasing with advantage, and render the intervention of public purchases advantageous, in more than one respect. The event fully corresponded with the anticipation.

With regard to the bills drawn in April last, it has been stated that they were directed to be sold upon a credit of six months; that those drawn in July, August, and October, were made payable, one moiety in two, the other moiety in four months. Hence, with a moderate allowance for delay in the sales, the period contemplated by the arrange

Loans.

ment for the commencement of receipts was the month of October, that for their consummation the month of February.

The inducements to the drawing of these bills have been stated. The present examination has relation merely to the question whether the Bank of the United States, by premeditation of this Department, or subsequent omissions, had enjoyed any undue advantage from the deposites of the proceeds of the bills at the end of the year 1792, the point of time to which this inquiry has reference.

The proposition itself has not yet received the decision of the House.

Another ground upon which the suggestion of mismanagement and undue concession to the interest of the banks has been founded, respects the Domestic Loans which have been obtained. Those of them which have been made of the Bank of the United States are represented as unnecessary, tending to afford an emolument to that institution, for which the United States had no equivalent advantage.

It will conduce to a correct judgment of this The statement which has been made as to the matter to resume a point already touched upon, time the moneys received to that period had re-and to add here the further illustrations of it which mained in deposite might alone be relied upon as have been promised, to wit: that it ought to be a a sufficient answer. If delinquency can be attach- general principle to have constantly in the comed to the non-employment of one or two hundred mand of the Treasury, at its different places of dethousand dollars for a few weeks, in the money posite, a sum of about $500,000-a principle, too, operations of a nation, it implies a minuteness of which must be understood with reference to the responsibility which could never be encountered beginnings of the quarters of a year, when the with prudence, and never will be fulfilled in prac-chief public payments are made and making. tice. The distractions of attention incident to a The following observations will apply generally great and complicated scene of business, would to the balances which appear at the commencealone disappoint the expectation. ment of each quarter. The greatest part of the But I have more than this to offer upon the pre-interest for the preceding quarter will have been sent occasion. The opportunity for investing the then deducted, but a part is always in a different moneys on hand, during the period in question, situation. was not favorable. This was experienced by the The payment of interest upon a Public Debt, at Treasurer, in his endeavors to invest the fund thirteen different places, is an operation as difficult arising from the interest on the purchased Debt. and complicated as it is new. In carrying it into There was no part but the deferred which could execution, it is of necessity to lodge, for some time be had at all within the limits prescribed. Seve- previous to the expiration of each quarter, at seral indications of an approaching season more ad- veral of the Loan Offices, drafts of the Treasurer vantageous for purchases were discernible, and a for the sums estimated to be necessary at those better employment of the money than at the then offices, with blanks for the direction, and with liprices presented itself to the option of the Legisla-berty to the respective officers to dispose of them ture. This mode of employing it formed, in my upon different places, as a demand accrues. This mind, part of a general plan for the regular re-arrangement has an eye to two purposes-to avoid demption of the Public Debt, according to the right reserved to the Government. The one per cent. which might be saved was regarded as one means of constituting the proposed annuities.

large previous accumulations at particular points; to facilitate the placing of the requisite sums where they are wanted, without the transportation of specie. The allowing of the drafts to be disposed of on several places, gives larger scope to a demand for them, and renders them more easily saleable. But it is a consequence of this, that a part of the drafts are often not placed and brought into the accounts of the Treasurer until some time after the expiration of the quarter. The fund for them of course appears on hand until the transaction is completed."

Accordingly, on the 30th of November last, pursuant to a reference of the 22d of that month, and connected with the plan of redemption contemplated, I submitted to the House of Representatives a proposition for applying the moneys in question towards discharging the Debt which the Government owes to the Bank, and upon which an interest of six per cent. is payable. This was manifestly, at the time of the proposition, the most Connected with the circumstance of paying the profitable use that could be made of the fund. It interest upon the Public Debt at different places is has been already stated that it would produce a this further consequence: the transfers continualsaving, if extended to the whole two millions, worth ly going on from one office to another render it to the Government an annual sum of twenty thou-impossible to know at any moment when provissand dollars-equal to a capital of four hundred thousand dollars.

ion for the payment of interest is to be made, what sum is requisite at each place. Estimate must supply the want of knowledge; and, to avoid disappointment anywhere, the estimate must always

This proposition tended to accelerate the employment of the moneys on hand, in a way the most beneficial to the Government, and, conse-be large, and a correspondent sum placed in the quently, to shorten the duration of the advantage to the banks of holding them by way of deposite. I submit it to the candor of the House, whether it be not full evidence that there was no disposition on my part to prolong to those institutions a benefit at the expense of the Government.

power of the Commissioners. This circumstance alone requires an extra sum at the different places of payment, which ought not to be computed at less than $50,000.

Again: the sums payable on account of the Civil List, at the end of each quarter, which amount to

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Loans.

about fifty thousand dollars, exclusive of what relates to the two Houses of Congress, are always in a course of payment for some time within the succeeding quarter. The fund for them, consequently, appears in the moneys on hand at the beginning of such quarter.

Again: there are constantly considerable arrears of existing appropriations, for which demands on the Treasury are at every moment possible; the times when they will be presented, and to what extent, at any given time, being in a great degree contingent. The arrears for the different objects of the War Department can seldom be estimated at less than $150,000.

are collected. Hence, the apparent sum in the Bank of the United States is always greater than the real, sometimes to a large amount.

The deductions to be made for this circumstance are shown in the Treasurer's half-monthly statement of balances, No. 5, beginning with the 1st of June, 1792, and ending with the 1st of January, 1793. The period begun with is that when the first instalment of the Loan from the Bank was payable, and has been selected for this reason.

The propriety of these deductions appears to have been objected to, by anticipation, on two grounds-one, that the bills deposited answer all the purposes of cash, and ought to be credited as It is presumed to be a clear principle that the such, on the receipt of them; the other, that "there Treasury ought to be always ready to face such is a regular and constant influx of moneys into the arrears as may be claimed at every instant or with- Bank, by the operation of these bills, and that it is in any short period. An hour's distress or em- not very material whether a bill lodged in the barrassment, to make good a public payment, al- Bank to-day should be paid to-day, provided someready due, would be baneful to public credit. It thing like the same sum should be paid in consehas been a uniform maxim of the present adminis-quence of a bill lodged in Bank one or two months' tration of the Treasury never to risk such distress or embarrassment.

Independently, therefore, of the weighty consideration of being prepared (especially, with a war on hand, liable every moment to greater extension) for future casualties, the mere satisfaction of arrears ought to cause the constant reservation of a sum that would be moderately stated at half the sum which it has been alleged ought always to be in the Treasury. It is to be observed, that it does not often happen that the current receipts to be expected in any immediately succeeding quarter are likely to exceed the probable expenditure of the quarter. The reverse is as often the case. Hence the greater necessity of maintaining a constant surplus. There are still other considerations of weight, in a just estimate of the point in question.

The sum stated as necessary to be always in the command of the Treasury is never in fact at the Seat of the Government, where far the greatest part of the public disbursements are to be made. The depositories of it are the several banks from Charleston to Boston. The whole sum, therefore, can never be brought into immediate action for answering the claims upon the Treasury. No part can be properly viewed as in this situation beyond New York on the one side, and Baltimore on the other. Whatever part is more remote than those points ought not to be regarded as capable of being commanded in less time, upon an average, than sixty days, making allowance for the usual delays in the sale of bills, and the usual terms of credit, which experience has shown to be convenient.

In estimating the effective sum at any time on hand in the Bank of the United States, it is necessary to be known that a practice for the simplification of the Treasurer's bank account begun with the Bank of North America, has been continued with the Bank of the United States, of this nature: the bills drawn by the Treasurer upon distant places, and deposited with the Bank for sale, are immediately passed to his credit as cash, though they are allowed to be sold at credits from thirty to sixty days, and it is understood that the proceeds are not demandable of the Bank till they

ago, and the bill of to-day should be paid one or two months hence."

Neither the one nor the other of these two positions is correct.

In no sense are the notes of the purchasers of the bills, which are taken payable in thirty, fortyfive, and sixty days, the same thing to a bank as cash. It is evident it could not pay its own bills with those notes. In this primary particular, therefore, the comparison fails. Neither could it make discounts upon the basis of those notes as cash; because every discount gives a right to a borrower to call and receive in coin, if he pleases, the amount of the sum discounted. Notes are not coin, nor do they confer an equal power to pay. It is true, that a bank will, in its discounts, make some calculation on expected receipts; but it can never consider them as equivalent to cash in hand, nor operate upon them in any degree to the same extent as upon equal sums in cash. If notes payable at future periods were equivalent to cash, then every discount made by a bank would confer a faculty to make another for an equal sum; for there is always a note deposited for the sum discounted, and the power of discounting might, by the mere exercise of it, become infinite. An hypothesis of this kind will never be acted upon by any prudent directors of a bank, and could not be long acted upon without ruin to the institution. It is to be observed, that the great profitable business of a bank consists in discounting.

There is but one light in which the position under examination is in any degree founded. It is this, that, were it not for the instrumentality of the bills, the specie of the Bank would be sometimes remitted for purposes which are answered by the bills. As often as this happens, they are a substitute to the Bank for cash, because they prevent equivalent sums from being carried away. But this only sometimes happens. In numerous instances, the enterprises to which the bills are subservient, would not be undertaken at all, were it not for the power of anticipation which the credits upon them afford. In many other instances, the bills of the Bank itself would be re

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