and later by the Court of Claims, has never hitherto been officially raised, I deemed it best to secure statements, of the commanders of the five ships (other than the Brooklyn and New York, the flagships of the two admirals) which 5 were actively engaged in the fight. Admiral Philip is dead. I quote extracts from his magazine article on the fight, written immediately after it occurred; closing with an extract from his letter to the Secretary of the Navy of February 27, 1899:

"It was the blockade that made the battle possible. The battle was Io a direct consequence of the blockade, and upon the method and effectiveness of the blockade was very largely dependent the issue of the battle. . . . Under the orders of Admiral Sampson the blockade was conducted with a success exemplified by the result. . . . When the Spanish Admiral at last made his dash to escape, we were ready15 ready with our men, with our guns, and with our engines. . . . It was only a few minutes after we had seen the leader of the advancing squadron that it became apparent that Cervera's plan was to run his ships in column westward in an effort to escape. . . . Before he had fairly found himself outside the Morro the entire blockading 20 squadron - Indiana, Oregon, Iowa, Brooklyn, and Texas-was pumping shell into him at such a rate as virtually to decide the issue of the battle in the first few moments. All our ships had closed in simultaneously. Then occurred the incident which caused me for

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a moment more alarm than anything Cervera did that day. . . . Sud25 denly a whiff of breeze and a lull in the firing lifted the pall, and there bearing toward us and across our bows, turning on her port helm, with big waves curling over her bows and great clouds of black smoke pouring from her funnels, was the Brooklyn. She looked as big as half a dozen Great Easterns, and seemed so near that it took 30 our breath away. Back both engines hard!' went down the tube to the astonished engineers, and in a twinkling the old ship was racing against herself. The collision which seemed imminent, even if it was not, was averted, and as the big cruiser glided past, all of us on the bridge gave a sigh of relief. Had the Brooklyn struck us then it 35 would probably have been the end of the Texas and her half thousand At ten minutes to 10 (the Spanish ships had appeared at about 9.30) . the Iowa, Oregon, and Texas were pretty well bunched, holding a parallel course westward with the Spaniards. The Indiana was also coming up, well inside of all the others of our squad40 ron, but a little in the rear, owing to her far eastward position at starting. . . . About a quarter past 10 the Teresa, which had been

men. . .

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in difficulties from the moment she left the shelter of the Morro, turned to seek a beaching place. She was on fire, and we knew that she was no longer a quantity to be reckoned with. Five minutes later our special enemy, the Oquendo, also turned in shore. . . . The Viscaya kept blazing away viciously, but the pounding she got 5 from our four ships, more particularly the Oregon, was too much for her, and in half an hour she too headed for the beach. . . . I determined to push on with the Texas. . . It gives me pleasure to be able to write that, old ship as she is and not built for speed, the Texas held her own and even gained on the Colon in that chase. . . ." 10 "Admiral Sampson was Commander-in-Chief before, during, and after the action."

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Captain Clark's statement is as follows:

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"The credit for the blockade which led up to the fight is of course Admiral Sampson's. The position of the ships on the morning of the 15 fight in a semicircle head-on to the harbor, in consequence of which we were able to close in at once, was his. In closing in, that is, in making the first movements, we were obeying his instructions; though as a matter of fact we would all have closed in any way, instructions or no instructions. When the Spanish ships came out of the harbor the nav- 20 igator of my ship saw the New York to the eastward, but I received no signal of any kind from the New York during the action, nor was she near enough to signal directly to me until after the Colon surrendered.

The engagement may be said to have been divided into three 25 parts: First, the fight proper, while the Spanish squadron was coming out of the harbor and until it was clear of the Diamond Shoals and definitely headed westward; second, the running fight with the already damaged vessels as they fled westward, until the Teresa, Oquendo, and Viscaya ran ashore; and, third, the chase of the Colon, dur- 30 ing which there was practically no fighting. During the first stage I did not see the Brooklyn or receive any signals from her. At the close of this stage the Oregon had passed the Iowa and Texas, and when we burst out of the smoke I saw the four Spanish ships going west apparently uninjured, and followed hard after, at the same, time 35 observing the Brooklyn a little ahead and offshore. She was broadside to the Spanish vessels and was receiving the weight of their fire, and was returning it. The Brooklyn and the Oregon thereafter occupied substantially these positions as regards each other, being about equidistant from the Spanish ships as we successively 40 overtook them, except when the Oregon attempted to close with the Oquendo. The heaviest fighting was at the harbor mouth and while

Not long after

the enemy was breaking through or passing our line. the running fight began the Teresa and then the Oquendo turned and went ashore, the Viscaya continuing for some distance farther before she also was beached. Throughout this running fight the 5 Brooklyn and Oregon were both hotly engaged, being ahead of any of our other ships; and we then constituted the western and what I regard as the then fighting division of our fleet. I considered Commodore Schley in responsible command during this running fight and chase so far as I was concerned, and acknowledged and repeated a sig10 nal he had flying, for close action or something of the kind. As, however, the problem was perfectly simple, namely, to pursue the Spanish ships as I had been doing before I saw the Brooklyn, he did not as a matter of fact exercise any control over any movement or action of the Oregon, nor did I perform any action of any kind whatever in 15 obedience to any order from the Brooklyn, neither as to my course nor as to my speed, nor as to my gun-fire, during the fight or chase.

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The Oregon always had fires under all boilers. In spite of the speed shown by the Oregon in this fight she had not been and is not classed as the fastest ship; but during all her service, in order that no 20 scale should form in them, not one of our boilers was used for condensing, though the resulting discomfort for all hands was an additional hardship for her commanding officer."

The following is Admiral Evans's statement:

"The credit for the blockade, for the arrangement of the ships at 25 the opening of the fight, and for the first movements forward into the fight must of course belong to Admiral Sampson, whose orders we were putting into effect. When the fight began Admiral Sampson's ship, the New York, was in plain sight. I saw her turning to overtake us. Throughout the fight I considered myself as under 30 his command, but I received no orders from him until the Viscaya was aground. Nor did I receive any orders whatever from the Brooklyn nor should I have heeded them if I had received them, inasmuch as I considered Admiral Sampson to be present and in command.

35

"The heavy fighting was during the time when the Spanish vessels were coming out of the harbor and before they had stretched fairly to the westward. When they thus stretched to the westward we all went after them without orders of course we could do nothing else. Until the Teresa and Oquendo ran ashore the Iowa 40 was close behind the Oregon and ahead of the Texas, and all of us were firing steadily at the Spanish ships. The Texas then recovered her speed --for she was dead in the water after having backed

to avoid the Brooklyn when the Brooklyn turned — and she went ahead of the Iowa. Both of us continued to fire at the Viscaya until she went ashore. Then I stopped, but the Texas followed the Brooklyn and the Oregon after the Colon.

5

"When the battle began the New York was not much farther to the eastward of me than the Brooklyn was to the westward. After the Viscaya had grounded the New York overtook me and signaled me to return to the mouth of the harbor to prevent any other Spanish ship from coming out and attacking the transports. I received no signals of any kind from the Brooklyn. All we had to do was to close in 10 on the Spanish squadron as it came out of the harbor, in obedience to the orders of Admiral Sampson, and then, when the heaviest fighting was over and the Spanish ships were trying to escape to the west, to follow them - and of course there was no signal necessary to tell us to follow a fleeing enemy. 15

"The machinery of the Iowa was not in condition to get the best speed, though every effort had been made to make it so. Her cylinder heads had not been off for more than six months, owing to the service she was performing. Her bottom was very foul, as she had not been docked for a period of seventeen months. The Indiana was un- 20 avoidably in even worse shape.

"The New York had left the blockading line flying the signal 'Disregard the movements of the Commander-in-Chief,' a signal frequently made, and well understood by the entire fleet. It did not transfer the command. No signal was made for the second in command to assume 25 command of the fleet, which was usually done by the Commander-inChief before reaching the limit of signal distance when he proposed for any reason temporarily to relinquish his command to the next ranking officer."

The following is Admiral Taylor's statement:

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"At the beginning of the fight the New York was about as far to the eastward of me as the Brooklyn was to the westward. The only signal I received from the New York was at the very close of the fight, when she signaled to me to return and guard the mouth of the harbor so that nothing should come out to attack our transports. I 35 received no signal whatever from the Brooklyn, and should not have heeded any if one had been made, as I considered Admiral Sampson present and in command. From her position the Indiana took full part in the actual fight as the Spanish ships came out of the harbor. When they ran to the westward the Indiana fell behind, but con- 40 tinued firing at them and at the torpedo boats until all but the Colon were sunk or beached. I saw the Brooklyn turn and run out sea

ward, seemingly over a mile, about the time the rear one of the Spanish ships turned to the west; if instead of making this loop the Brooklyn had stood straight in towards the Spaniards, as the other American ships did, it seemed to me that the fight would have been settled then, 5 without need of the long chase."

The following is Commander Wainwright's statement :

"At the outset of the fight the New York was not much farther away from me in one direction than the Brooklyn was in the other and was in plain sight. A signal from Admiral Taylor in connection 10 with my moving forward to attack the torpedo boats was the only signal I received. I made one to the New York just before the last torpedo boat sank. The New York at that time was coming up under the fire of the batteries, and herself fired a couple of shots at the torpedo boat. Of course Admiral Sampson was present and in command. I 15 received no signals from the Brooklyn, and would not have noticed her at all had it not been for the fact that when the other vessels closed in she made what has been since called 'the loop,' so that my attention was attracted by not seeing the Texas because she stopped, and by not seeing the Brooklyn because she went to seaward, away from the 20 Spanish vessels. In other words, the left or westward part of our line was refused, and this attracted my attention, because it seemed to me from where I was that this permitted the Spanish vessels to try to escape to westward."

The survey of the damages of the four Spanish war ves25 sels shows that in addition to several score hits by the 6pounder and 1-pounder guns of the American fleet, they were struck forty-three times by the larger guns of four inches calibre and over. The Colon, which came out inside the others and did comparatively little fighting, received but three 30 of these hits. The other three ships, which bore the brunt of the action, received forty among them. Of these forty, eleven, according to the report of the board which examined into them, were by 4-inch guns, ten by 5-inch guns, four by either 4 or 5 inch (the board could not determine which), while 35 one was by either a 5 or 6 inch, twelve were by 8-inch, and two by 12-inch guns. All of our big ships except the Texas had 8-inch guns. Only the Texas and Iowa had 12-inch guns. The Oregon and Indiana had 13-inch guns; and they and