§ 807. The power to open, repair and improve highways. It is customary to grant to all subordinate public corporations the general power to open or construct highways within their limits 557 although in the absence of such a grant some authorities claim that the power would still exist, being one implied because essential to the existence of the corporation.558 The grant of the power to open or construct streets carries with it the implied power to improve them through the construction of gutters or sidewalks and laying them out upon a suitable grade.559 As al 557 City of Hannibal v. Campbell, 86 Fed. 297. A city authorized to open streets eighty feet in width is not required to improve and maintain them for travel throughout their entire width; its duty has been performed by improving and maintaining a sufficient portion for the reasonable accommodation of the public. Cohen v. City of Alameda, 124 Cal. 504, 57 Pac. 377. Statutes 1889, p. 70, authorizing the payment of the cost of street extension by special assessments on benefited land is constitutional. Murphy v. City of Waycross, 90 Ga. 36; City of Chicago v. Law, 143 Ill. 569, 33 N. E. 855; Taylor v. McFadden, 84 Iowa, 262; Greiner v. Town of Sigourney (Iowa) 89 N. W. 1103. One not the owner of land cannot restrain a village from opening a street through it. In re Dassler, 35 Kan, 678, 12 Pac. 130; City of Argentine v. State, 46 Kan. 430; Bigelow v. City Council of of Worcester, 169 Mass. 390, 48 N. E. 1; Kulwicki v. Munro, 95 Mich. 28; Yanish v. City of St. Paul, 50 Minn. 518; Keough v. City of St. Paul, 66 Minn. 114; City of Springfield v. Weaver, 137 Mo. 650; Saxton Nat. Bank v. Bennett, 138 Mo. 494; State v. Wright, 54 N. J. Law, 130, 23 Atl. 116; Jersey City v. National Docks R. Co., 55 N. J. Law, 194; Wilson v. Inhabitants of Trenton, 55 N. J. Law, 220; In re Deering, 85 N. Y. 1. The power is limited to streets legally laid out. Young v. Town of Henderson, 76 N. C. 420; Parsons v. City of Columbus, 50 Ohio St. 460, 34 N. E. 677. The Taylor Law, so called, of May 11th, 1886, held valid. Hamilton County Com'rs v. State, 50 Ohio St. 653, 35 N. E. 887. The grant of such a power may be unconstitutional because special legislation. Huddleston v. City of Eugene, 34 Or. 343, 55 Pac. 868, 43 L. R. A. 444; Commonwealth v. Kline, 162 Pa. 499, 29 Atl. 799; Smith V. Grayson County, 18 Tex. Civ. App. 153, 44 S. W. 921; City of Waco v. Chamberlain, (Tex. Civ. App.) 45 S. W. 191; City of Austin v. Nalle, 85 Tex. 520; McCrowell v. City of Bristol, 89 Va. 652, 20 L. A. R. 653. See, also, §§ 423 et seq., ante. 558 Serviss V. Detroit Public Works, 115 Mich. 63, 72 N. W. 1117. A city may, under charter provisions, control the making of plats for additions to it. State v. District Court of Ramsey County, 80 Minn. 293, 83 N. W. 183. 559 Burlington & M. R. R. Co. v. Spearman, 12 Iowa, 112; Taber v. Grafmiller, 109 Ind. 206; Adams 560 ready stated, the extent of these improvements, their character and the time of making them, is usually discretionary, and, in the absence of an abuse of the power, will not be reviewed or controlled by the courts." The power to open a street or highway also carries with it the general power to keep it in repair. 581 The exercise of the power may, by statute, be made dependent upon the action of certain designated property owners, and statutory provisions of this character necessarily control the time and the manner of the construction, improvement or repair.562 The power 560 Havens v. Town of Wethersfield, 67 Conn. 533, 35 Atl. 503; City of Brunswick v. King, 91 Ga. 522, 17 S. E. 940; Culver v. City of Chicago, 171 Ill. 399, 49 N. E. 573; Chicago & N. P. R. R. Co. v. City of Pa. 499, 29, Atl. 799; Smith v. Chicago, 172 Ill. 66, 49 N. E. 1006; Peyton v. Village of Morgan Park, 172 Ill. 102, 49 N. E. 1003; Topliff v. City of Chicago, 196 Ill. 215, 63 N. E. 692; Neff v. Covington Stone & Sand Co., 21 Ky. L. R. 1454, 55 S. W. 697; Blundon v. Crosier, 93 Md. 1355, 49 Atl. 1; Seattle Transfer Co.v. City of Seattle,27 Wash. 520, 68 Pac. 90. See, also, §§ 341, 342 and 798, ante. 561 Santa Cruz Rock Pavement Co. v. Broderick, 113 Cal. 628, 45 Pac. 863. The term "repair" does not include the right to improve in a manner different from that previously done. Flickinger v. Fay, 119 Cal. 590, 51 Pac. 855; Center Tp. Grant County v. Davis, 24 Ind. App. 603, 57 N. E. 283; Weir v. Owensboro & N. R. R. Co., 14 Ky. L. R. 875, 21 S. W. 643; In re East Syracuse, 20 Abb. N. C. (N. Y.) 131. A highway controlled by a village though within its limits may be improved within the discretion of the public authorities. Hines v. City of Lockport, 50 N. Y. 236; Somerset v. Stoystown Road, 74 Pa. 61. 562 City St. Imp. Co. v. Babcock (Cal.) 68 Pac. 584; City of Atlanta v. Smith, 99 Ga. 462, 37 S. E. 696; Taylor v. City of Bloomington, 186 Ill. 497, 58 N. E. 216; Trah v. Village of Grant Park, 192 Ill. 351, 61 N. E. 442; Sunderland v. Martin, 113 Ind. 411, 15 N. E. 689. But landowners may be stopped by their action from setting up the illegality of an improvement. Town of Covington v. Nelson, 35 Ind. 532; Pruden v. Jackson County Com'rs, 156 Ind. 325, 58 N. E. 437; Lowe v. White County Com'rs, 156 Ind. 163, 59 N. E. 466; Shearer v. Bay County Sup'rs, 128 Mich. 552, 87 N. W. 789; Fohl v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 84 Minn. 314, 87 N. W. 919; Shoenberg v. Field, 95 Mo. App. 241, 68 S. W. 945; La Monte v. Chosen Freeholders of Somerset County (N. J. Law) 35 Atl. 1; Springer v. Inhabitants of Logan, 58 N. J. Law, 588; Shapter v. Carroll, 18 App. Div. 390, 46 N. Y. Supp. 202; May v. Bermel, 20 App. Div. 53, 46 N. Y. Supp, 622; Conde v. City of Schenectady, 29 App. Div. 604, 51 to open, improve or repair may be also limited by statutory or constitutional provisions relative to the expenditure of public funds, the incurring of indebtedness,563 the necessity for the passage of a resolution of intention, other legal measures prescribed as preliminary to the making of an improvement," 564 or provisions basing the extent of the improvement upon the benefits received by abutting property owners.565 The power to repair is also restricted by the principle that the term "to repair" does not include the making of an original improvement, but only a reconstruction, renewal or restoration of an original improvement. The term "repair" is defined by Webster as follows: "To restore to a sound or good state after decay, injury, dilapidation, or partial destruction; to renew; to restore; to mend." 568 The power to pave a street. The paving or macadamizing of a street or the construction of a bridge is usually expensive and N. Y. Supp. 854; In re City of New York, 167 N. Y. 624, 60 N. E. 1108, affirming 57 App. Div. 166, 68 N. Y. Supp. 196; Hixson v. Burson, 54 Ohio St. 470, 43 N. E. 1000. An unconstitutional statute is not made lawful by its proper exercise. In re Public Alley in Borough of West Chester, 160 Pa. 89, 28 Atl. 506. See, also, § 360, ante. 563 Smith v. City of St. Joseph, 122 Mo. 643, 27 S. W. 344. Rev. St. 1889, § 1303, forbidding an appropriation in excess of revenue does not exempt a city from its liability for damages for a change of street grade though an appropriation has been made. See, also, as holding the same, the case of City of Springfield v. Baker, 56 Mo. App. 637. See, also, §§ 175 et seq., ante. 564 Piedmont Pav. Co. v. Allman, 136 Cal. 88, 68 Pac. 493; Altman v. City of Dubuque, 111 Iowa, 105, 82 N. W. 461; Farr v. Inhabitants of Ware, 173 Mass. 403, 53 N. E. 898; Golding V. Inhabitants of North Attleborough, 172 Mass. 223; Abb. Corp. Vol. II — 60. Kiley v. Bond, 114 Mich. 447; Dunston v. Smith, 49 N. J. Law, 150, 6 Atl. 663; Village of Tonawanda v. Price, 171 N. Y. 415, 64 N. E. 191; Reynolds v. Schweinefus, 27 Ohio St. 311; Brophy v. Landman, 28 Ohio St. 542; City of Cincinnati v. Davis, 58 Ohio St. 225, 50 N. E. 918; Freidrich v. City of Milwaukee, 114 Wis. 304, 90 N. W. 174. See, also, §§ 361 et seq., ante. 565 McKee v. Town of Pendleton, 154 Ind. 652, 57 N. E. 532; McManus v. Hornaday, 99 Iowa, 507; Borough of Connellsville v. Hoag,. 156 Pa. 326, 27 Atl. 25; In re Wick St., 184 Pa. 93, 39 Atl. 3. See, also, §§ 347 et seq., ante. 566 Mackin v. Wilson, 20 Ky. L. R. 218, 45 S. W. 663; Levi v. Coyne, 22 Ky. L. R. 493, 57 S. W. 790; Ritterskamp v. Stifel, 59 Mo. App. 510; Barber Asphalt Pav. Co. v. Hezel, 155 Mo. 391, 56 S. W. 449, 48 L. R. A. 285; Hurley v. Inhabitants of Trenton, 66 N. J. Law, 538, 49 Atl. 581. But see Regenstein v. City of Atlanta, 98 Ga. 167, 25 S. E. 428. is not regarded as an ordinary improvement or repair,567 and it is necessary for a municipal corporation in order to improve its streets in this manner, to have the right expressly given.568 The grant of the power to pave, unless there are limiting conditions, usually carries with it the implied power to repave or repair the pavement when this becomes necessary through the destruction or wearing out of the original improvement.509 § 808. Alteration of streets or highways. It may become necessary through changed conditions, or for the purpose of better serving the public necessities, to alter or relocate, in the manner provided by law, a highway or street through a change in the character of the roadway,570 a change in its direction,571 or by an increase or decrease in its width or length.572 The general statutory power to open highways carries with it, as a rule, the right to make such alterations as are suggested above and the official authorities of cities, villages, road districts or counties, are usually regarded as the exclusive judges of the propriety and the necessity of these changes or alterations and, in accordance with the rule already stated, courts of equity will not interfere with the exercise of this discretion unless there manifestly appears injustice or a gross abuse of the power.573 The rule 567 Palmer v. Burnham, 20 Cal. 364; Diggins v. Hartshorne, 108 Cal. 154, 41 Pac. 283; Phelps v. City of Detroit, 120 Mich. 447, 79 N. W. 640; People v. City of Buffalo, 52 App. Div. 157, 65 N. Y. Supp. 163; City of Chester v. Bullock, 187 Pa. 544, 41 Atl. 452. But see Mullarky v. Town of Cedar Falls, 19 Iowa, 21. 568 Greenleaf V. Pasquotank County Com'rs, 123 N. C. 30, 31 S. E. 264; Town of Grand Isle v. Kinney, 70 Vt. 38, 41 Atl. 130. 569 Burckhardt V. City of Atlanta, 103, Ga. 302, 30 S. E. 32; Re genstein v. City of Atlanta, 98 Ga. 167, 25 S. E. 428. 570 Dana v. City of Boston, 170 Mass. 593, 49 N. E. 1013. The power to repair will not include the power to make a change in the structural formation of the way. Inhabitants of Lancaster v. Worcester County Com'rs, 113 Mass. 100. The power to alter a way cannot be extended by implication to authorize the construction of a bridge. 571 M'Ilvoy v. Speed, 7 Ky. (4 Bibb.) 85; State Lunatic Hospital V. Inhabitants of Worcester, 42 Mass. (1 Metc.) 437; Inhabitants of Gloucester V. Essex County Com'rs, 44 Mass. (3 Metc.) 375. But under authority to alter a way, an entire new line cannot be located from one terminus to another. Thurston v. City of Lynn, 116 Mass. 544; Lincoln v. Commonwealth, 164 Mass. 1, 41 N. E. 112; Weber v. Ryers, 82 Mich. 177, 46 N. W. 233; Cyr v. Dufour, 68 Me. 492. Upon the alteration of a highway, the newly erected portion is substituted for the old. Chasmer v. Blew, 55 N. J. Law, 67, 25 Atl. 710. Jurisdiction to vacate a portion of a highway does not exist under statutes providing the mode of alteration of the existing highway. Smock v. Vanderveer, 41 N. J. Law, 303; Town of Wheatfield v. Shasley, 23 Misc. 100, 51 N. Y. Supp. 835. Facts considered and held not a relocation of the highway. Kenedy v. Erwin, 44 N. C. (Busb.) 387. Highways should not be altered except when the interests of the public require it. State v. Raborn, 60 S. C. 78, 38 S. E. 260; Williams v. Mitchell, 49 Wis. 284. An order altering a highway is prima facie evidence of the regularity of all the proceedings prior thereto. State v. Hayden, 32 Wis. 663. The power of alteration is limited to the statutory jurisdiction of the body making it. Harrison v. Milwaukee County Sup'rs, 51 Wis. 645. The power to alter a highway does not authorize a change of its grade. State v. Burgeson, 108 Wis. 174, 84 N. W. 241. An order for the alteration of highways may be so indefinite as to render it void. 572 In re Alston, 1 Pen. (Del.) 359, 40 Atl. 938. Under Rev. Code, c. 60, § 4, providing for a change of course of a public road does not authorize the widening of the existing road. Brantly v. Huff, 62 Ga. 532; City of Deering v. County Com'rs, 87 Me. 151, 32 Atl. 797; State v. Canterbury, 40 N. H. 307; Holmes v. Jersey City, 12 N. J. Eq. (1 Beasl.) 299; State v. Hale, 25 N. J. Law (1 Dutch.) 324; Fowler v. Larabee, 59 N. J. Law, 259; People v. Lohnas, 54 Hun, 604, 8 N. Y. Supp. 104; Matter of Broadway Widening, 63 Barb. (N. Y.) 572. A statutory provision relative to the filing of report of commissioners in respect to the widening of a street held directory merely not jurisdictional. Blackman v. Riley, 138 N. Y. 318, 34 N. E. 214; Heiple v. Clackamas County, 20 Or. 147, 25 Pac. 291. Stone V. Langworthy, 20 R. I. 602. Permission cannot be given by a member of a highway. committee to widen a highway. But see Green v. Loudenslager, 54 N. J. Law, 478, 24 Atl. 367; St. Vincent Female Orphan Asylum v. City of Troy, 76 N. Y. 108; Philadelphia County Com'rs v. Spring Garden Com'rs, 6 Serg & R. (Pa.) 522. See, also, cases collected in 32 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas., pp. 88-149. 573 Mitchell V. Coosa County Com'rs Ct., 116 Ala. 650, 22 So. 993. A void order changing a public road may be set aside mero motu. Ponder v. Shannon, 54 Ga. 187; Dunham v. Village of Hyde Park, 75 Ill. 371; Brush v. City of Carbondale, 78 Ill. 74. See, also, § 798, ante. The usual rule of immunity from collateral attack will apply to the action suggested in the text. Quoting and citing Knowles v. City of Muscatine, 20 Iowa, 248; Sullivan v. Robins, 109 Iowa, 235, 80 N. W. 340; Drew v. Cotton, 68 N. H. 22; Stone v. Langworthy, 20 R. I. 602; In re Alston, 1 Pen. (Del.) 359. |