8. Eminent domain; validity of taking where amount assessed for benefits
exceeds value of property.
Constitutional rights like others are matters of degree, and a street opening
statute, which has stood for a long time will not be declared uncon-
stitutional as taking property without compensation because in a
particular instance the amount assessed under the strict letter of the
statute exceeded the value of the property, but the statute should be
so interpreted, as is possible in this case, so that the apportionment
of damages be limited to the benefit. Martin v. District of Columbia,
135.
Equal protection of laws. See Supra, 6, 7;
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, 3.
9. Federal power to borrow money; state burdens on.
The Constitution has conferred upon the Government power to borrow
money on the credit of the United States and that power cannot be
burdened, impeded, or in any way affected by the action of any State.
(Weston v. Charleston, 2 Pet. 449.) Home Savings Bank v. Des Moines,
503.
10. Fifth Amendment; effect upon powers of States.
Article V of Amendments to the Constitution does not operate as a restric-
tion on the powers of the State, but solely upon the Federal Govern-
(Brown v. New Jersey, 175 U. S. 172.) Barrington v. Missouri,
11. Full faith and credit; when judgment not entitled to.
Where an action is brought to recover upon a judgment the jurisdiction
of the court rendering the judgment is open to inquiry; and the Con-
stitutional requirement as to full faith and credit in each State to be
given to the public acts, records and judicial proceedings of every other
State does not require the enforcement of a judgment rendered without
jurisdiction or otherwise wanting in due process of law. Wetmore v.
Karrick, 141.
12. Full faith and credit; judgment in personam without jurisdiction of person,
not entitled to.
A judgment rendered in personam against a defendant without jurisdiction
of his person is not only erroneous but void, and is not required to be
enforced in other States under the full faith and credit clause of the
Constitution or the act of Congress passed in aid thereof, § 905, Rev.
Stat. Ib.
See JUDGMENTS AND DECREES, 5.
States. See Ante, 2, 9.
Trial by jury. See CRIMINAL LAW, 5.
OF GRANTS OF GOVERNMENTAL POWER. See Contracts, 4.
1. Application of rule that prior negotiations are merged in contract.
The rule that prior negotiations are merged in the contract is general in
its nature and does not preclude reference to letters between the parties
prior to the execution of a contract in order to determine whether from
the language used in the contract the parties intended stipulated deduc-
tions for delay as a penalty or as liquidated damages. United States
v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 105.
2. Time as of essence-Deductions for delay in performance.
Where in response to Government advertisements the same party submits
different bids, the largest price being for the shortest time of delivery,
the acceptance of the bid for the shorter time is evidence that the ele-
ment of time is of essence, and a stipulated deduction of an amount
per day equivalent to the difference between the short and long time
for delivery is to be construed as liquidated damages for whatever
delay occurs in the delivery, and not as a penalty, although the word
penalty may have been used in some portions of the contract. Ib.
3. Grant of immunity from exercise of governmental power not transferable.
Although the obligations of a legislative contract granting immunity from
the exercise of governmental authority are protected by the Federal
Constitution from impairment by the State, the contract itself is not
property which as such can be transferred by the owner to another, but
is personal to him with whom it is made and incapable of assignment,
unless by the same or a subsequent law the State authorizes or directs
such transfer; and so held as to a contract of exemption with a street
railway company from assessments for paving between its tracks.
Rochester Ry. Co. v. Rochester, 236.
4. Legislative immunity from taxation; construction of grant of.
The rule that every doubt is resolved in favor of the continuance of gov-
ernmental power, and that clear and unmistakable evidence of the
intent to part therewith is required, which applies to determining
whether a legislative contract of exemption from such power was
granted also applies to determining whether its transfer to another
was authorized or directed. Ib.
5. Legislative contract of immunity from taxation not transferable.
A legislative authority to transfer the estate, property, rights, privileges
and franchises of a corporation to another corporation does not au-
thorize the transfer of a legislative contract of immunity from assess-
ment. Ib.
6. Building contracts-Conclusiveness of architect's certificate.
Although under a building contract the builder, to be entitled to payment,
must first obtain the certificate of the architect, in the absence of, a
provision in plain language to that effect, the certificate is not con-
clusive as to the amount due nor a bar to the owner showing a viola-
tion of the contract, in material parts, by which he has sustained dam-
age. Mercantile Trust Co. v. Hensey, 298.
7. Bonds-Right of bona fide purchaser before maturity of county bonds to
assume that conditions of issue were complied with.
Where the qualified voters of the county vote for an issue of bonds for sub-
scription to stock of a railroad on condition that the county be exoner-
ated from a prior subscription authorized for another railroad, and
thereafter the judge of the county court authorized by statute to make
the subscription enters an order to that effect, receives the stock sub-
scribed for, and issues the bonds, and nothing further is ever done in
regard to the prior subscription, although no formal exoneration thereof
was ever made or attempted, a bona fide purchaser before maturity of
the bonds and coupons for value is entitled to assume in his purchase
that the county had been fully exonerated from the prior subscription.
Quinlan v. Green County, 410.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 5;
CORPORATIONS, 1;
JURISDICTION, E;
STATES, 10.
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE.
See NEGLIGENCE, 1;
SAFETY APPLIANCE ACT.
1. Merger of corporations operating as dissolution of constituent—Effect of
legislative contract of exemption from taxation.
Although two corporations may be so united by one of them holding the
stock and franchises of the other, that the latter may continue to exist
and also to hold an exemption under legislative contract, that is not
the case where its stock is exchanged for that of the former and by
operation of law it is left without stock, officers, property or franchises,
but under such circumstances it is dissolved by operation of the law
which brings this condition into existence. Rochester Ry. Co. v. Roches
236.
2. Power to receive from another corporation an exemption inconsistent with
its charter or laws of State.
Where a corporation incorporates under a general act which creates certain
obligations and regulations, it cannot receive by transfer from another
corporation an exemption which is inconsistent with its own charter
or with the constitution or laws of the State then applicable, even
though under legislative authority the exemption is transferred by
words which clearly include it. Ib.
1. Contempts; status of judge in punishing for contempt.
In punishing a person for contempt of court the judges act impersonally
and are not considered as sitting in their own case.
Shipp, 203 U. S. 563, 674.) Patterson v. Colorado, 454.
2. Contempts; truth of improper publication as defense to.
While courts, when a case is finished, are subject to the same criticisms
as other people, they have power to prevent interference with the
course of justice by premature statements, arguments, or intimidation,
and the truth is not a defense in a contempt proceeding to an im-
proper publication made during the pending suit. Ib.
3. Federal interference by habeas corpus with regular course of procedure under
state authority.
Although the power exists and will be exercised in cases of great importance
and urgency, a Federal court or a Federal judge will not ordinarily
interfere by habeas corpus with the regular course of procedure under
state authority, but will leave the petitioner to exhaust the remedies
afforded by the State for determining whether he is legally restrained
of his liberty, and then to bring his case to this court by writ of error
under § 709, Rev. Stat.; this rule applies to a case where petitioner
contends that his commitment under a state statute, providing for
the commitment of one acquitted by reason of insanity, is a depriva-
tion of liberty without due process of law, in violation of the Four-
teenth Amendment. Urquhart v. Brown, 179.
4. Judicial notice as to location of territory.
The court takes judicial cognizance whether or not a given territory is
within the boundaries of the United States, and is bound to take the
fact as it really exists however it may be averred to be. Pearcy v.
Stranahan, 257.
5. Power to overrule long established constitutional construction.
A long established and steadily adhered to principle of constitutional
construction precludes a judicial tribunal from holding a legislative
enactment, Federal or state, unconstitutional and void unless it is
Halter v. Nebraska, 34.
1. Corpus delicti; sufficiency of circumstantial evidence to establish.
While in this case there was no witness to the homicide and the identifica-
tion of the body found was not perfect, owing to its condition caused
by its having been partially burned, yet as the circumstantial evidence
was clearly enough to warrant the jury in finding that the body was
that of the person alleged to have been murdered and that he had been
killed by defendant, the trial court would not have been justified in
withdrawing the case from the jury, but properly overruled a motion
to instruct a verdict of not guilty for lack of proof of the corpus delicti.
Perovich v. United States, 86.
2. Corpus delicti; submission to jury of question of guilt on circumstantial
evidence.
In the absence of positive proof, but where there is circumstantial evidence
of the corpus delicti, it is not error to submit to the jury the question
of defendant's guilt with the instruction that the circumstantial evi-
dence must be such as to satisfy the jury beyond a reasonable doubt
that the corpus delicti has been established. Ib.
3. Evidence of conversations between officer and accused; admissibility.
The testimony of a marshal as to conversations between him and the de-
fendant charged with murder which were voluntary, and not induced
by duress, intimidation or other improper influences, are admissible.
Ib.
4. Interpreters; appointment discretionary with trial court.
Whether in a criminal trial the court interpreter should be appointed is a
matter largely resting in the discretion of the court, and its refusal so
to do is not an error where it does not appear that the discretion was
in any way abused. Ib.
5. Removal for trial under § 1014, Rev. Stat.; admissibility of evidence to
disprove prima facie case made by indictment.
While in a removal proceeding under § 1014, Rev. Stat., an indictment
constitutes prima facie evidence of probable cause it is not conclusive,
and evidence offered by the defendant tending to show that no offense
triable in the district to which removal is sought had been committed
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