discharge. The words in the fourth subdivision of § 17, “while acting
as an officer, or in any fiduciary capacity," extend to "fraud, em-
bezzlement, misappropriation," as well as "defalcation." (Crawford
v. Burke, 195 U. S. 176.) Tindle v. Birkett, 183.
2. Life insurance policies within meaning of § 70a of bankruptcy act of 1898.
The provisions in § 70a of the bankruptcy act of 1898, that a bankrupt
having policies of life insurance payable to himself and which have a
cash-surrender value, may pay the trustee such value and thereafter
hold the policies free from the claims of creditors, are not confined to
policies in which the cash-surrender value is expressly stated, but permit
the redemption by the bankrupt of policies having a cash-surrender
value by the concession or practice of the company issuing the same.
Hiscock v. Mertens, 202.
3. When jurisdiction of bankruptcy court concurrent with that of state court—
Effect of amendment of February 5, 1903, to bankruptcy act of 1898.
The possession of a temporary receiver in bankruptcy of the proceeds of
property, upon which the bankrupt had fraudulently imposed a lien,
deposited as a special fund to await the further order of the court, did
not affect the rule that under the bankruptcy act of 1898, prior to the
amendment of February 5, 1903, 33 Stat. 797, the state court in which
an action could have been brought prior to the bankruptcy to set aside
the lien had exclusive jurisdiction of a similar action brought by the
trustee. The amendment of February 5, 1903, gave the bankruptcy
court in such a case concurrent, not exclusive, jurisdiction. Frank
v. Vollkommer, 521.
4. When presumed that trustee represented claims of creditors in proceeding
in state court to set aside chattel mortgage.
Where it was necessary that a trustee in bankruptcy should represent
judgment creditors in order to attack the validity of a chattel mort-
gage given by the bankrupt, if the state court has set the mortgage
aside and the record shows that all the proceedings in the bankruptcy
court were in evidence in the state court, it will be presumed that the
trustee represented the necessary claims of creditors, although the
evidence is not returned to this court. Ib.
See CONTRACTS, 7;
TAXES AND TAXATION, 3.
Boundary between the States of Mississippi and Arkansas defined.
Under the acts of Congress of March 1, 1817, 3 Stat. 348, admitting Mis-
sissippi, and of June 15, 1836, 5 Stat. 50, admitting Arkansas to the
Union, the boundary line between the two States is the middle of the
main channel of the Mississippi River as it was in 1817, and at the point
where Island No. 76 is situated it was at that time on the Mississippi
side of that island which has never been within the State of Mississippi,
notwithstanding attempts on the part of that State to exercise juris-
diction thereover. Moore v. McGuire, 214.
See JURISDICTION, D 4;
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, 4.
BUILDING CONTRACTS.
See CONTRACTS, 6.
BURDEN OF PROOF.
See JURISDICTION, B 1;
SAFETY APPLIANCE ACT, 3.
See SAFETY APPLIANCE ACT.
Joy v. St. Louis, 201 U. S. 332, distinguished from Moore v. McGuire, 214.
Vance v. W. A. Vandercook Co., 170 U. S. 438, distinguished from Delamater
v. South Dakota, 93.
Brown v. New Jersey, 175 U. S. 172, followed in Barrington v. Missouri, 483.
·Board of Trade v. Christie Grain and Stock Co., 198 U. S. 236, followed in
Hunt v. New York Cotton Exchange, 322.
Crawford v. Burke, 195 U. S. 176, followed in Tindle v. Birkett, 183.
De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 1, followed in Pearcy v. Stranahan, 257.
Jellenik v. Huron Copper Mining Co., 177 U. S. 1, 10, followed in Citizens'
Sav. & Trust Co. v. Illinois Central R. R., 46.
Johnson v. Southern Pacific Co., 196 U. S. 1, followed in Schlemmer v. Buf-
falo, R. & P. Ry. Co., 1.
Jones v. United States, 137 U. S. 202, followed in Pearcy v. Stranahan, 257.
Northern Pacific Railway v. Slaght, 205 U. S. 122, followed in Same
v. Same, 134.
Pabst Brewing Co. v. Crenshaw, 198 U. S. 17, followed in Delamater v.
South Dakota, 93.
Slater v. Mexican Central Nat. R. R. Co., 194 U. S. 120, followed in Mexican
Central Ry. Co. v. Eckman, 538.
Tinsley v. Treat, 205 U. S. 20, followed in Kessler v. Treat, 33; Gould v.
Youngworth, 538.
United States v. Rice, 4 Wheat. 246, followed in Pearcy v. Stranahan, 257.
United States v. Rauscher, 119 U. S. 407, followed in Johnson v. Browne, 309.
United States v. Shipp, 203 U. S. 563, followed in Patterson v. Colorado, 454.
Weston v. Charleston, 2 Pet. 449, followed in Home Savings Bank v. Des
Moines, 503.
CERTIFICATE.
See JURISDICTION, B 7;
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, 9, 10.
To Court of Appeals of District of Columbia; when writ will lie.
While under § 6 of the Court of Appeals Act of 1891, 26 Stat. 828, a cer-
tiorari can only be issued when a writ of error cannot be, it will not
be issued merely because the writ of error will not lie; but only where
the case is one of gravity, where there is conflict between decisions of
state and Federal courts, or between those of Federal courts of different
circuits, or something affecting the relations of this Nation to foreign
nations, or of general interest to the public. Fields v. United States,
292.
CHANCERY SALES.
See SALES, 3.
CHANGE OF VENUE.
See JURISDICTION, A 6.
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.
See CRIMINAL LAW, 1, 2.
CITIZENSHIP.
See JURISDICTION, A 4;
PERSONAL RIGHTS.
CLAIMS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES.
Effect of overpayment to officer of army on claim for extra pay.
Where the United States filed no set-off or counterclaim the court will
not overhaul the allowance made to an officer of the Army by the
auditor of the War Department. An overpayment erroneously made
does not determine the legality of the claim. United States v. Mitchell,
161.
CLASSIFICATION.
See STATES, 4.
COLLISION.
See NEGLIGENCE, 3.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1;
STATES, 8, 9.
COMMISSIONS.
See JURISDICTION, A 1.
COMMON LAW..
See STATES, 5.
CONDITIONAL SALES.
See SALES, 1.
CONFLICT OF LAWS.
See JURISDICTION, B 7.
Acts of. See ACTS OF CONGRESS.
Powers of. See TERRITORIES.
1. Commerce clause-Validity of South Dakota law imposing license tax on
salesmen of intoxicating liquors.
The law of South Dakota imposing an annual license charged on travelling
salesmen selling, offering for sale, or soliciting orders for intoxicating
liquors in quantities of less than five gallons is not unconstitutional
because repugnant to the commerce clause of the Constitution of the
United States. Delamater v. South Dakota, 93.
Contract impairment. See CONTRACTS, 3;
2. Due process of law; deprivation of property; effect of decision of state court
involving nothing more than the ownership of property.
The decision of a state court involving nothing more than the ownership
of property, with all parties in interest before it, cannot be regarded by
the unsuccessful party as a deprivation of property, without due process
of law, simply because its effect is to deny his claim to own such prop-
erty. The Fourteenth Amendment did not impair the authority of
the States to determine finally, according to its settled usages and
established modes of procedure, such questions, when they do not
involve any right secured by the Federal Constitution or by any valid
act of Congress, or by any treaty. Tracy v. Ginzberg, 170.
3. Due process of law; effect of provisions of state constitution and laws.
The requirement in the Fourteenth Amendment of due process of law does
not take up the special provisions of the state constitution and laws
into the Fourteenth Amendment for the purpose of the case, and in
that way subject a state decision that they have been complied with
to revision by this court. Patterson v. Colorado, 454.
4. Due process of law; decision of state court as infraction of.
As a general rule the decision of a state court upon a question of law is not
an infraction of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
and reviewable by this court on writ of error merely because it is wrong
or because earlier decisions are reversed. Ib.
5. Due process of law; violation of contract obligation-Validity of New York
law imposing tax on exercise of power of appointment.
The imposition of a transfer or inheritance tax under ch. 284, Laws of
New York, 1897, on the exercise of a power of appointment in the same
manner as though the estate passing thereby belonged absolutely to the
person exercising the power, does not, although the power was created
prior to the act, deprive the person taking by appointment, and who
would not otherwise have taken the estate, of his property without due
process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment; nor does it
violate the obligation of any contract within the protection of the im-
pairment clause of the Federal Constitution. Chanler v. Kelsey, 466.
6. Due process of law and equal protection; deprivation of property—Validity
of Nebraska flag law.
The statute of Nebraska preventing and punishing the desecration of the
flag of the United States and prohibiting the sale of articles upon which
there is a representation of the flag for advertising purposes is not un-
constitutional either as depriving the owner of such articles of his
property without due process of law, or as denying him the equal
protection of the laws because of the exception from the operation of
the statute of newspapers, periodicals or books upon which the flag
may be represented if disconnected from any advertisement. Halter
v. Nebraska, 34.
7. Due process and equal protection of laws-Police power of State to regulate
mines and mining.
It is an appropriate exercise of the police power of the State to regulate
the use and enjoyment of mining properties, and mine owners are not
deprived of their property, privileges, or immunities without due
process of law or denied the equal protection of the laws by the Illinois
mining statute of 1899, which requires the employment of only licensed
mine managers and mine examiners, and imposes upon the mine
owners liability for the willful failure of the manager and examiner
to furnish a reasonably safe place for the workmen. Wilmington Min-
ing Co. v. Fulton, 60.
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