and the fact that a proper foundation had not been laid in the identification of the trunk.

When the State offered in evidence the statements made by defendant following his arrest, the trial court excluded the jury and heard the testimony of the persons present at the time for the purpose of determining the competency thereof. After the examination of a number of witnesses, who detailed fully the circumstances under which the statements were made, counsel objected "because there is no foundation laid for it and because it was [not] voluntary." This objection was overruled and the evidence admitted.

The state Supreme Court held that the trial court in admitting the testimony did not commit error. This notwithstanding the constitution of Missouri provided "That no person shall be compelled to testify against himself in a criminal case." Its ruling upon that proposition is not subject to review in this court.

After the decision of the Supreme Court in banc affirming the judgment, plaintiff in error filed a petition for rehearing which was denied without opinion. The third ground of that motion was as follows: "Because counsel for appellant, through neglect and inadvertence, failed to call the attention of the court to the proposition that the cross-examination of appellant complained of as 'improper,' and the admission as evidence of statements or 'confessions' made by appellant while in the 'sweat box' of the St. Louis police department, was in direct violation of the Constitution of the United States, Article V, amendments to the Constitution of the United States, in that it compelled the appellant to become a witness against himself." The suggestion came too late, and, moreover, Article V of the amendments, alone relied on, does not operate as a "restriction of the powers of the State, but was intended to operate solely upon the Federal Government." Brown v. New Jersey, 175 U. S. 172. And if, as decided, the admission of this testimony did not violate the rights of the plaintiff in error under the constitution and laws of the State of Missouri, the record

affords no basis for holding that he was not awarded due process of law. Howard v. Fleming, 191 U. S. 126.

3. Plaintiff in error filed a demurrer to the indictment, one of the grounds of which was: "Because of the inconsistency, multiplicity and repugnancy of said counts, the defendant is being proceeded against in violation of the state and Federal guarantee of due process of law and in violation of his constitutional right to be specifically informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him." The demurrer was overruled. And also a motion to quash, assigning similar grounds, which was likewise overruled.

These rulings in respect of the sufficiency of the indictment present no Federal question. Howard. v. Fleming, 191 U. S. 126, 135, and cases cited.

4. After the demurrer and motion to quash had been disposed of, a plea in abatement was filed, averring that the prosecuting attorney intentionally refrained from endorsing the names of certain witnesses on the indictment; that defendant was a native of Great Britain and a subject of the King, and that by virtue of treaties, the law of nations, the laws and Constitution of the United States, and the laws of Missouri, defendant was entitled to know who were the witnesses against him.

A similar point, with like allegations, was made in the motion to quash. The court heard the evidence on the plea in abatement and found the issues against defendant, except that it found that he was a native citizen and subject of Great Britain.

The question of citizenship is immaterial as affecting the jurisdiction of this court under § 709, Rev. Stat. French v. Hopkins, 124 U. S. 524. Nor are we aware, as Chief Justice Waite said in Spies v. Illinois, 123. U. S. 131, 182, of any treaty giving to subjects of Great Britain any different measure of justice than secured to citizens of this country. And the general rule of law is that aliens are subject to the law of the territory where the crime is committed. Wildenhus's Case, 120 U. S. 1; Carlisle v. United States, 16 Wall. 147; People v. McLeod, 1 Hill (N. Y.), 377; Wharton, Conflict of Laws, § 819.

As to the allegation that the prosecuting attorney intentionally refrained from endorsing the names of certain witnesses on the indictment in the motion to quash, as well as in the plea in abatement, the state courts held that the charge was not sustained by the evidence.

The right of the accused to the endorsement of names of witnesses does not rest on the common law, but is statutory and provided for in Missouri by § 2517 of the Revised Statutes of 1899, whereby the right of the State to use other witnesses not so endorsed is recognized. The state Supreme Court discussed the matter at length, held there was no error, and added: "Aside from all this it is manifest that the defendant has no right to complain of any prejudicial error upon the action of the court upon this motion. This motion was filed October 6, 1903, and the record discloses upon the showing made upon such motion and plea in abatement that appellant had notice of these additional witnesses which were introduced by the State at the trial. The trial did not occur until the 23d of February, 1904, some three or four months subsequent to the time of which the record discloses that he had notice of these witnesses."

The decision of the Supreme Court that defendant had been tried in accordance with the procedure provided by the statutes of Missouri is not open to revision here in the circumstances.

We have not been astute to apply to these motions the rigor of our rules, and have explored the record with care, but have not found therein any denial of fundamental rights, of due process of law or of the equal protection of the laws. The Federal questions asserted in the brief or suggested by the record are wholly inadequate to justify our interference.

Writ of error dismissed.

WHITFIELD v. ÆTNA LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF HARTFORD.

CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH

CIRCUIT.

No. 258. Argued April 12, 1907. Decided April 22, 1907.

If an insurance company does business in a State it must do so subject to such valid regulations as the State adopts.

A State may adopt such public policy as it deems best, provided it does not in so doing come into conflict with the Federal Constitution; and if constitutional the legislative will must be respected, even though the courts be of opinion that the statute is unwise.

The statute of Missouri, that suicide, unless contemplated when the policy was applied for, shall be no defense to actions on policies of life insurance, is a legitimate exercise of the power of the State; and a stipulation in a policy that the company shall only be liable for a portion of the amount in case of suicide, not contemplated when the policy was applied for, is void, and cannot be set up as a defense.

Whatever tends to diminish a plaintiff's cause of action or to defeat recovery in whole or in part amounts in law to a defense. 144 Fed. Rep. 356, reversed.

THIS is a suit upon an accident policy of insurance issued November 3, 1900, by the Ætna Life Insurance Company of Hartford, Connecticut, upon the life of James Whitfield, a resident of Missouri. The policy specifies various kinds of injuries; also, the amount that will be paid by the company on account of such injuries respectively. It provides: "If death results solely from such injuries within ninety days, the said Company will pay the principal sum of five thousand dollars to Amanda M. S. Whitfield, his wife, if living; and in event of the death of the said beneficiary before the death of the insured, to the executors, administrators, or assigns of the insured." The policy recites that it was issued and accepted by the assured, James Whitfield, subject to certain conditions, among which are these: 5. In event of death, loss of limb or sight, or disability due to injuries inten

tionally inflicted upon the insured by any other person (except assaults committed for the sole purpose of burglary or robbery), whether such other person be sane or insane, or under the influence of intoxicants or not; or due to injuries received while fighting or in a riot; or due to injuries intentionally inflicted upon the insured by himself; or due to suicide, sane or insane; or due to the taking of poison, voluntarily or involuntarily, or the inhaling of any gas or vapor; or due to injuries received while under the influence of intoxicants or narcotics, then in all such cases referred to in this paragraph, the limit of this Company's liability shall be one-tenth the amount otherwise payable under this policy, anything to the contrary in this policy notwithstanding. . . 8. The maximum liability of the Company hereunder in any policy year shall not exceed the principal sum hereby insured, and in no event will claim for weekly indemnity be valid if claim is also made for any of the stated amounts herein provided for specified injuries based upon the same accident and resulting injuries."

The insured died April 7th, 1902, the plaintiff, his widow and the beneficiary of the policy, alleging in her petition that he died "from bodily injuries, effected through external, violent, and accidental means, and by a pistol shot." The petition also states that the company after receiving proofs as to the death of the insured offered to pay $500 as the full amount due by §5 of the policy, but refused to pay more. The plaintiff asked a judgment for $5,000 with interest from the date of the death of the insured.

The company, in its answer, denied liability for the whole principal sum and averred, among other things, that by the terms of the policy "in the event death is caused by intentional. injuries inflicted by the insured or any other person, whether such person be sane or insane, or while fighting or in a riot, or by suicide, sane or insane, or by poison or by inhaling gas or vapor, or while under the influence of intoxicants or narcotics then the amount to be paid shall be one-tenth of the principal sum or $500; that said James Whitfield died from