power to discharge or employ, the one company for the other; and that, although the service was in a sense common, it was kept distinct and separate in the control and payment of the employés while in the separate service of the respective companies.

It is true that the Pacific Company practically owns the controlling stock in the Gulf Company, and that both companies constitute elements of the Rock Island System. But the holding of the majority interest in the stock does not mean the control of the active officers and agents of the local company doing business in Texas. That fact gave the Pacific Company the power to control the road by the election of the directors of the Gulf Company, who could in turn elect officers or remove them from the places already held; but this power does not make it the company transacting the local business.

This record discloses that the officers and agents of the Gulf Company control its management. The fact that the Pacific Company owns the controlling amounts of the stock of the Gulf Company and has thus the power to change the management does not give it present control of the corporate property and business. Pullman Palace Car Company v. Missouri Pacific Co., 115 U. S. 587, 597.

In Conley v. Mathieson Alkali Works, 190 U. S. 406, suit was brought upon a contract with the Mathieson Alkali Works. The defendant had designated no agent upon whom summons could be served, and service was made upon two members of the board of directors resident of the city of New York. Upon motion made to set aside the service of summons a reference was directed to ascertain whether the defendant corporation was doing business in the State of New York. The master reported, among other things, that the defendant had operated a plant at Niagara Falls, but had conveyed all its property to another corporation organized under the laws of Virginia. That the consideration expressed for the conveyance was $1.00 and other valuable consideration, but the substantial consideration was the entire capital stock of the

grantee, the Castner Electrolytic Alkali Company. That the business of the defendant since said transfer was carried on in Providence, where it had its principal place of business. The master found that the company at the time of attempted service was not doing business in New York. Of the effect of the transfer of the entire stock of the new company to the defendant the master found: "The fact that it held the entire capital stock of the Castner Electrolytic Alkali Company, and that the operations of that company were carried on under the same management as before December 31, 1900, is not material. The new corporation was a separate legal entity, and, whatever may have been the motives leading to its creation, it can only be regarded as such for the purpose of legal proceedings. It was that corporation alone which transacted any business in this State, notwithstanding it may have been for all practical purposes merely the instrument of the defendant corporation. People v. American Bell Telephone Co., 117 N. Y. 241; United States v. American Bell Telephone Co., 29 Fed. Rep. 17.”

Upon exceptions the master's report and conclusions were affirmed and the service set aside. That judgment was affirmed in this court. In the course of the opinion, Mr. Justice McKenna, speaking for the court, coming to deal with the effect of the transfer to the Castner Company, said: "The defendant was competent to convey its property to the Castner Electrolytic Alkali Company and afterwards make the locality of its own business Providence and Saltville. Whether the transfer to the latter company was fraudulent we certainly cannot decide from this record, and the by-law which provided for a monthly meeting in New York could not of itself keep the corporation in New York. The testimony is positive that no business of the corporation was done in New York city after the transfer of the Niagara Falls plant; that all of the business of the corporation was conducted at Providence, except of a purely manufacturing character, which was conducted at Saltville."

So, in the case at bar, notwithstanding the ownership of the stock in the Gulf Company by the Pacific Company, the former company transacts the business in Texas, and is a separate legal entity, authorized under the laws of Texas and legitimately carrying on business there.

There is no evidence that the Pacific Company may not lawfully hold the stock of the Gulf Company, and under the statute of Illinois it seems to be authorized so to do. Starr & Curtis, Ill. Stat. vol 3, p. 3229. It is true that the Pacific Company loaned the money to build the road of the Texas Company, predecessor of the Gulf Company. But as was well observed by Judge (afterwards Justice) Jackson in United States v. American Bell Telephone Company, 29 Fed. Rep. 17: "For one person to supply means for another to do business on is not the doing of that business by the former."

The conduct and control of the business in Texas was entrusted to the Gulf Company. As the largest stockholder the Pacific Company had an interest in that business, but a separate corporation had been legally created in Texas, with authority to make contracts and control its own affairs and carry on its own business. This separate corporation had its own officers, a large amount of its own property, was responsible for its contracts and to persons with whom it dealt.

Nor do we think that the persons served with process are agents of the Pacific Company doing the business of the company in Texas. Section 2 of the act of March 13, 1905, Laws of Texas, 1905, p. 30, is very broad, and would seem to comprehend conductors who handle trains for two or more corporations over foreign or domestic roads across the state lines of Texas and on the track of a domestic railroad within the State of Texas, or upon any agent who has an office in Texas and who sells tickets or makes contracts for the transportation of passengers or property over any line of railroad or part thereof, of any such foreign corporation or company; and such companies and agents by section 3 of the act are made agents of the foreign corporation or company, upon whom the cita

tion may be served. But it is essential to the validity of such service that the corporation shall be doing business within the State, and that the service be upon an agent representing the corporation with respect to such business. Goldie v. Morning News, 156 U. S. ubi sup.; Conley v. Mathieson Alkali Co., 190 U. S. ubi sup.

The conductors, one of whom was served, when he crossed the Texas line, this record shows, became the servant and agent of the Gulf Company. The ticket agent sold tickets for the Gulf Company, in whose employment he was. He would also sell tickets good upon its line, and over the lines of the Pacific Company, but he transacted this business as the agent of the Gulf Company. As to Hovey, the record fails to show that he was agent of the Pacific Company; on the contrary, it shows that he had no connection with the company, and that his duties were confined to the affairs of the Gulf Company. The same is true of Merrell; and as to Sebree, the record shows that for the services rendered as trainmaster he was paid by each company for the service performed for it and had no charge as agent of the business of the Pacific Company in the State of Texas.

We reach the conclusion that the Pacific Company was not doing business in the State of Texas and that the attempted service was not upon agents of that company transacting its business in that State in such a sense as to give jurisdiction by service of citation upon them. The judgment of the Circuit Court is

Affirmed.

Dissenting: The CHIEF JUSTICE and MR. JUSTICE MOODY.

205 U.S.

Argument for Plaintiff in Error.

METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF NEW YORK v. CITY OF NEW ORLEANS.

ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF LOUISIANA.

No. 199. Argued January 31, 1907.-Decided April 8, 1907.

Neither the fiction that personal property follows the domicil of the owner, nor the doctrine that credits evidenced by notes have the situs of the latter, can be allowed to obscure the truth; and personal property may be taxed at its permanent abiding place although the domicil of the owner is elsewhere.

Where a non-resident enters into the business of loaning money within a State and employs a local agent to conduct the business, the State may tax the capital employed precisely as it taxes the capital of its own citizens, in like situation, and may assess the credits arising out of the business, and the foreigner cannot escape taxation upon his capital by temporarily removing from the State the evidences of credits which, under such circumstances, have a taxable situs in the State of their origin. Loans made by a New York life insurance company on its own policies in Louisiana are taxable in that State although the notes may be temporarily sent to the home office.

115 Louisiana, 698, affirmed.

THE facts are stated in the opinion.

Mr. Charles Pollard Cocke, with whom Mr. William Wirt Howe and Mr. Walker B. Spencer were on the brief, for plaintiff in error:

The property sought to be taxed was beyond the limits. and jurisdiction of the State of Louisiana, and the statute of Louisiana of 1898, as construed and applied, deprives the plaintiff in error of its property without due process of law, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. State Tax on Foreign-held Bonds, 15 Wall. 300; Railroad Co. v. Jackson, 7 Wall. 262; Murray v. Charleston, 96 U. S. 432, 440; Erie Railroad Co. v. Pennsylvania, 153 U. S. 628–648; New Orleans v. Stempel, 175 U. S. 309, and Board of Assessors v. Comptoir National d'Escompte, 191 U. S. 389, distinguished.

The Supreme Court of Louisiana cannot be held to have