lien existed. If this statue is broad enough to include strictly maritime liens, it can only be held unconstitutional, in a case coming from a state court, where the complaint on that ground is made by the holder of such a demand. We agree with Judge Severens, speaking for the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, in a case directly involving this question, where other claimants upon the Winnebago had removed a case to the United States Circuit Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, whence it was taken to the Circuit Court of Appeals:

"And the fact that she [the Winnebago] might become subject to maritime liens would not destroy liens already lawfully acquired. It is true she might become subject to maritime liens which would be superior to the existing lien, and that such liens would have to be enforced in the admiralty. But that possibility does not defeat the enforcement by the state court of the non-maritime lien to which she is subject. How else is the owner of the latter to obtain his remedy? It may be the vessel will never become subject to maritime liens at all; and, if so, the holder of the existing lien may never have even the privilege of proving his claim in some cause instituted for another purpose, but no such supposed embarrassment has yet occurred. And they are as yet imaginary. But suppose such other liens should attach. That should not prevent the enforcement of the earlier lien in the proper court. If the holder of the earlier lien delays his action, he subjects himself to the danger of superior liens becoming fastened, and the enforcement of his own lien in the state court must leave the vessel subject to the superior liens of which the state court cannot take cognizance. If occasion requires, and the admiralty court enforces the superior liens, it is in no wise obstructed by the action of the state court, and a title under a decree of the former court would defeat the title gained under the decree of the state court. The case of Moran v. Sturgis, 154 U. S. 256 is a good illustration of this subject. There is no difficulty other than such as may happen in case one court should take and have possession of the vessel at a time when the other

should require it; but that is an incident common along all the lines of concurrent proceedings in the state and Federal courts, and gives no ground for the denial of jurisdiction to either." The Winnebago, 73 C: C. A. 295.

It is next insisted that the materials and supplies were not furnished on the credit of the vessel, but were contracted for, furnished and delivered on the credit of the Columbia Iron Works.

The findings upon this proposition are again questions within the exclusive jurisdiction of the state court. The findings will not be disturbed here.

It is next objected that the court erred because certain items were allowed for material furnished the vessel after she was launched, and therefore the subject of exclusive jurisdiction for which a lien could only be enforced in the admiralty. But we agree with the state court that these items were really furnished for the completion of the vessel and were fairly a part of her original construction. In such a case the remedy was within the jurisdiction of the state court. The Iosco, Fed. Cas. 7060; The Victorian, 24 Oregon, 121; The Winnebago, 73 C. C. A. 295.

It is urged that the attempt to enforce the lien on the vessel was while she was engaged in interstate commerce, and therefore proceedings against her were unlawful and void, in view of the exclusive control of this subject by Congress under the Constitution and laws of the United States. But it must be remembered that concerning contracts not maritime in their nature, the State has authority to make laws and enforce liens, and it is no valid objection that the enforcement of such laws may prevent or obstruct the prosecution of a voyage of an interstate character. The laws of the States enforcing attachment and execution in cases cognizable in state courts have been sustained and upheld. Johnson v. Chicago & Pacific Elevator Co., 119 U. S. 388-398. The State may pass laws enforcing the rights of its citizens which affect interstate commerce but fall short of regulating such commerce in the sense

in which the Constitution gives exclusive jurisdiction to Congress. Sherlock et al. v. Alling, 93 U. S. 99, 103; Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U. S. 1, 23; Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. Hughes, 191 U. S. 477.

=

Upon the subject, Mr. Justice Brown, speaking for the court in Knapp v. McCaffery, 177 U. S. 638–642, said:

"That wherever any lien is given by a state statute for a cause of action cognizable in admiralty, either in rem or in personam, proceedings in rem to enforce such lien are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the admiralty courts.

"But the converse of this proposition is equally true, that if a lien upon a vessel be created for a claim over which a court of admiralty has no jurisdiction in any form, such lien may be enforced in the courts of the State. Thus, as the admiralty jurisdiction does not extend to a contract for building a vessel, or to work done or materials furnished in the construction (The Jefferson, People's Ferry Co. v. Beers, 20 How. 393; The Capitol, Roach v. Chapman, 22 How. 129), we held in Edwards v. Elliott, 21 Wall. 532, that in respect to such contracts it was competent for the States to enact such laws as their legislatures might deem just and expedient, and to provide for their enforcement in rem."

The contract in this case being for the construction of a vessel, and its enforcement within the power and jurisdiction of the state courts, we do not think that execution of such a decree can be avoided because the vessel engaged in interstate

commerce.

Finally, an elaborate and able argument is made in support of the contention that a contract to build a ship is a maritime contract, and therefore can be enforced only in admiralty, but as late as this term, in Graham v. Morton Transportation Company, this contention was overruled upon the authority of the previous decisions of this court. 203 U. S. 577.

The judgments of the Supreme Court of Michigan are

Affirmed.

PETERSON v. CHICAGO, ROCK ISLAND AND PACIFIC RAILWAY COMPANY.

ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS.

No. 225. Argued March 6, 7, 1907.-Decided April 8, 1907.

Foreign corporations can be served with process in a State only when doing business therein, and such service must be upon an agent whò represents the corporation in such business. Under the circumstances of this case a railroad company is not doing business in a State simply because another railroad company, of which it owns practically the entire capital stock, does do business therein, nor is the latter company or its officers and employés agents of the former company for the purpose of service of process even though such agents may at times also represent that company as to business done in other States. There is no partnership liability under such circumstances by which the company owning or controlling the capital stock of the other can be brought into court to respond for a tort by serving the latter company with process.

THIS case comes here upon a certificate from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of Texas, raising the question of the jurisdiction of that court over an action brought by plaintiffs in error, Augusta A. Peterson and Ida Peterson, the latter a minor, suing by her mother and next friend, and both being citizens of Texas, against the Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railway Company, an Illinois corporation, hereinafter at times referred to as the Pacific Company.

The plaintiffs in error, wife and daughter of one John Peterson, an employé of the Pacific Company, sought recovery for the alleged negligent killing of said John Peterson while engaged as an engineer in its employ at Chickasha in the Indian Territory, on October 19, 1903. It is charged in the petition that the Pacific Company was then engaged in carrying on its business in the State of Texas in the name, and through the Chicago, Rock Island and Gulf Railroad, a corporation of the State of Texas, hereafter at times referred to as the Gulf Company, which latter corporation, it was alleged, was

an auxiliary corporation and agent of the defendant, and was then and there dominated and controlled by it, its lines of railroad being operated by the Pacific Company as a part of the Rock Island system.

It was charged that S. B. Hovey, Vice President and General Manager of the Gulf Company, residing in Tarrant County, Texas, was also the general manager and local agent of the Pacific Company in that State. It was also alleged that F. E. Merrell was the local agent in Tarrant County, Texas, of the Pacific Company, and that M. E. Sebree was the local agent for it in said county and State.

Service of citation was made on the defendants by serving the parties above named as its agents in Tarrant County, Texas, in pursuance of the statute of the State. The defendant moved to quash the service on the ground that neither of the parties were such agents, and filed in support of its motion the affidavits of each, Hovey, Merrell and Sebree, denying such agency. Thereafter plaintiffs made application for additional process in pursuance of a later statute of the State of Texas, to be hereinafter noticed, and charged that A. L. Thomas, who resides in Tarrant County, Texas, was a train conductor engaged in handling trains over the tracks of the Gulf Railroad in the State of Texas and over those of the Pacific Railroad beyond the limits of the State, and that he was engaged in running and handling passenger trains on the tracks of both said companies on both sides of the state line, and was an agent and representative of the defendant company, residing in Tarrant County, Texas. It was further charged that V. N. Turpin, who resides in Fort Worth, Tarrant County, Texas, was a ticket agent engaged in the selling of tickets and the making of contracts for transportation and for and in the behalf of the Pacific Company from the city of Fort Worth, Texas, over the lines of the Gulf Company in the State of Texas and over the line of the defendant company beyond the line of said State, and was an agent and representative of the defendant company in said State and county.