be employed in domestic and foreign trade. This license was issued in the name of the Columbia Iron Works as owner.

On July 19, 1903, the Iroquois Transportation Company received a bill of sale of the steamer and delivered to the Columbia Iron Works ninety-six negotiable bonds of $500 each, secured by mortgage on the steamer, and paid the balance of the purchase money, which was to be paid in cash, then amounting to between $400 and $500.

The agreement recited that possession was given to the Iroquois Transportation Company for the purpose of completing and finishing up those things still remaining undone on the steamer and required to be done by the iron works by the terms of the contract for the construction of the steamer, "it being the sole intent and purpose of this agreement to enable the Iroquois Transportation Company to obtain immediate possession of the steamer, and without intending either to limit the extent of the obligation of said Columbia Iron Works under the original specifications."

The steamer left St. Clair for Lorain, Ohio, July 19, 1903. At that time she was not completed, and workmen remained on her and went with her to St. Clair, where additional work was done upon her. She was afterwards engaged in carrying cargoes between points on Lake Erie and Lake Superior.

On July 30, 1903, the Columbia Iron Works made an assignment for the benefit of creditors. On August 25, 1903, the De Laney Forge and Iron Company served notice on the Iroquois Transportation Company that it made a claim of lien against the steamer for forging and material furnished; and on October 6, 1903, complaint was filed in the Circuit Court of Wayne County, Michigan, and shortly thereafter Edwards and others intervened in the case, claiming a lien. The Iroquois Company gave a bond under the statute for the release of the vessel. Decrees were rendered in favor of the claimants and intervenors in the Circuit Court of Wayne County, and upon appeal they were affirmed in the Supreme Court of Michigan. 142 Michigan, 84.

205 U.S.

Argument for Plaintiff in Error.

Mr. Charles E. Kremer, with whom Mr. William T. Gray was on the brief, for plaintiff in error:

The Winnebago was, at the time of her seizure, not used or intended to be used in navigating the waters and canals of this State. Sauter v. The Sea Witch, 1 California, 162; Tucker v. Sacramento, 1 California, 403; Ray v. Henry Harbeck, 1 California, 451; Haytien Republic, 65 Fed. Rep. 120.

A proceeding under the statutes of Michigan against a vessel which has already been enrolled and licensed under the laws of the United States, and at the time of the seizure was actually engaged in interstate commerce, is unconstitutional and void. because in conflict with the Constitution and laws of the United States. The Glide, 167 U. S. 606; Johnson v. Elevator Company, 119 U. S. 397; White's Bank v. Smith, 7 Wall. 646; The Menominee, 36 Fed. Rep. 197; Perry v. Haynes, 191 U. S. 17; The Edith, Fed. Case 4283; S. C., 11 Blatchf. 451; The Edith, 94 U. S. 519; Moir v. The Dubuque, Fed. Case 9696; The Roanoke, 189 U. S. 185.

The Winnebago, engaged in interstate commerce, was not subject to seizure while passing from port to port through the waters within the jurisdiction of the courts of the State of Michigan. Mich. C. R. Co. v. Chicago M. L. S. Co., 1 Ill. App. 339; Wall v. Norfolk & W. R. Co., 52 W. Va. 485; Connery v. Quincy O. & K. C. R. Co., 99 N. W. Rep. 365.

The contract to build a ship is a maritime contract and therefore there is a lien for material and labor furnished which can be enforced in a court of admiralty, there being a lien under the state law. People's Ferry Co. v. Beers, 20 How. 383; Roach v. Chapman, 22 How. 129; J. E. Rumbell, 148 U. S. 1; Davis v. New Brig, Fed. Cas. 3643; Read v. Hull of a New Brig, Fed. Cas. 11,609; The Calisto, Fed. Cas. 2316; The Hull of a New Ship, Fed. Cas. 6859; Van Pelt v. The Ohio, Fed. Cas. 16,870; The Abbie Whitman, Fed. Cas. 15; Sewall v. The Hull of a New Ship, Fed. Cas. 12,682; Purington v. The Hull of a New Ship, Fed. Cas. 11,478; The Richard Busteed, Fed. Cas. 11,764; Drew v. The Hull of a New Ship, Fed. Cas. 4078; The

Argument for Defendant in Error.

205 U.S.

Chas. Mears, Fed. Cas. 10,766; N. J. Steam Nav. Co. v. Merchants' Bank, 6 How. 378; Benedict's Admiralty, 2d ed., § 264; De Lovio v. Boit, 2 Gall. 475; Insurance Co. v. Dunham, 11 Wall. 10; 2 Parsons on Ship. and Adm. 327; Dupont De Nemours v. Vance, 19 How. 162; The Grape Shot, 9 Wall. 129; The Guy, 9 Wall. 758; The Lulu, 10' Wall. 192; The General Custer, 10 Wall. 204; The Patapsco, 13 Wall. 329; The Robert Parsons, 191 U. S. 17; The Blackheath, 195 U. S. 361; The Magnolia, 20 How. 296, 307.

Mr. Herbert K. Oakes, with whom Mr. John C. Shaw, Mr. Charles B. Warren, Mr. William B. Cady, Mr. Joseph G. Hamblen, Jr., and Mr. Hugh Shepherd were on the brief, for defendant in error:

The proceeding here does not trench upon the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal courts in admiralty cases. The Glide, 167 U. S. 606 and Perry v. Haynes (The Robert W. Parsons), 191 U. S. 17, distinguished.

Even if the Michigan statute is unconstitutional in some respects, it is constitutional and valid, insofar as it relates to the claims in controversy here, and the part being dealt with in this controversy is not so related in substance, and the provisions are not so interdependent that one cannot operate without the other. Under such circumstances, the part that is constitutional will, under all the authorities, stand. 6 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 2d ed., p. 1088, and cases cited; Keokuk Co. v. Keokuk, 95 U. S. 80; Unity v. Burrage, 103 U. S. 447-459.

So long as the materials furnished were to be used as part of the original construction of the ship, the admiralty will not take cognizance of them. The Iosco, Bro. Adm. 495; S. C., Fed. Cas. 7060; The Victorian, 24 Oregon, 121, 132–135.

Even if there had been seizure in this case, and if it were shown that the Winnebago was engaged in interstate commerce at the time appearance was asked or service accepted, the whole trend of judicial authority, as evidenced by the references

above made, is to the effect that the State here had complete power to make and enforce the law here made and enforced, insofar as it relates to the non-maritime matter here under discussion, and that its enforcement is not a regulation of commerce. Smith v. Maryland, 18 How. 71, 74; Johnson v. Elevator Co., 119 U. S. 388, 398; Cannon v. New Orleans, 20 Wall. 577, 582; Packet Co. v. Catlettsburg, 105 U. S. 559; Trans. Co. v. Parkersburg, 107 U. S. 691.

MR. JUSTICE DAY, after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court.

The Michigan statute, under which the liens are claimed in this case, is as follows:

"Third Compiled Laws of Michigan, p. 3254:

"(10789) Sec. 2. Every water craft of above five tons burthen, used or intended to be used, in navigating the waters of this State, shall be subject to a lien thereon:

"First, for all debts contracted by the owner or part owner, master, clerk, agent or steward of such craft, on account of supplies and provisions furnished for the use of said water craft, on account of work done or services rendered, on board of such craft, by seamen, or any employé, other than the master thereof; on account of work done or service rendered by any person in or about the loading or unloading of said water craft; on account of work done or materials furnished by mechanics, tradesmen, or others, in or about the building, repairing, fitting, furnishing or equipping such craft: Provided, That when labor shall be performed or materials furnished, as aforesaid, by a subcontractor or workman other than an original contractor, and the same is not paid for, said person or persons may give the owner or his agent, or the master or clerk of said craft, timely notice of his or their said claim, and from thenceforth said person or persons shall have a lien upon said craft pro rata for his or their said claims, to the amount that may be due by said owner of said original contractor for work or labor then done on said water craft."

Several objections are urged by the plaintiff in error which, if sustained, will result in the reversal of the judgments of the Supreme Court of Michigan. Some of them are of a nonFederal character. It is insisted that the statute does not apply in this case, because the steamer Winnebago was not to be used in navigating the waters of Michigan, within the terms of the statute. But this only presents a question of state law, upon which the judgment of the state court is final and conclusive. The same may be said as to the objection because the transportation company was a bona fide purchaser without notice of complainant's lien, and because complainant did not within a year file its claim for a lien with the proper court in the county in which it resided. These are state questions, likewise concluded by the decision of the state court.

It is further contended that to seize the vessel and subject her to sale and the proceeds thereof to distribution in the state court would be in direct conflict with the exclusive jurisdiction in admiralty in the courts of the United States in favor of liens of a maritime character, and therefore the Michigan act is unconstitutional. No maritime lien is asserted in this case, and it is merely a matter of speculation as to whether any such claim existed, or might be thereafter asserted. No holder of any such maritime lien is here contesting the constitutionality of the state law.

In a case from a state court, this court does not listen to objections of those who do not come within the class whose "constitutional rights are alleged to be invaded; or hold a law unconstitutional because, as against the class making no complaint, the law might be so held. This was distinctly ruled in a case decided at this term. New York ex rel. Hatch v. Reardon, 204 U. S. 152. See also Supervisor v. Stanley, 105 U. S. 305-311; Lampasas v. Bell, 180 U. S. 276, 283, 284; Clark v. Kansas City, 176 U. S. 114-118; Cronin v. Adams, 192 U. S. 108-114.

There is no one in position in this case to make this objection, and, for aught that this record discloses, no such maritime