RECORDS OF UNITED STATES COURTS-WHAT SUFFICIENT AS. —— A record of the proceedings against a bankrupt, attested by the clerk of the District Court is good evidence, the act of Congress not requiring the certificate of the presiding judge in the case of records from United States Courts.

WITNESS -- INTEREST AS A DISQUALIFICATION.-If the objection to a witness on account of interest arise from proof made by the objector, the witness cannot discharge himself of the objection by any matter sworn by himself; it must be removed by proof drawn from some other source.

DEPOSITIONS REQUISITES TO. -Depositions which do not show, either in the caption or body of them, between what parties they were taken cannot be received. NONSUIT-SURPRISE AS A GROUND FOR SETTING ASIDE.-If a plaintiff supposing himself ready, press a trial, and it is found on the trial that the testimony he relied on cannot be given in evidence as he expected, and he be nonsuited, the allegation of surprise shall not prevail to set aside the nonsuit.

PER CURIAM. MARSHALL, Chief Justice, and POTTER, Judges. Loomis and Tillinghast assigned to the plaintiffs the note sued on, which was made by the defendants, and afterwards became bankrupts, and obtained a certificate. And now Loomis is offered as a witness for the plaintiffs. He is a competent witness, for he is by the certificate discharged of all debts provable under the commission, and his indorsement to the plaintiffs rendered him liable to them, so as to make their demand provable against him; secondly, the record of the proceedings against them, attested by the clerk of the District Court, without any certificate of the presiding judge, is good evidence; for the act of Congress relates to certificates in case of officers of the several States, not to those of the United States; thirdly, if the objection to a witness arises from proof made by the objector, the witness cannot discharge himself of the objection by any matter sworn by himself; it must be removed by proof drawn from some other source; fourthly, depositions, not specifying the parties between whom they are taken, in the caption, nor naming them as parties in the body of the deposition, cannot be received; fifthly, if a plaintiff supposing himself ready, press for trial, and it is found on trial that the testimony he relied on cannot be given in evidence as he expected, and he be nonsuited, the allegation of surprise shall not prevail to set aside the nonsuit.

NOTE.-RECORDS OF UNITED STATES COURTS do not require the judges' certificate; such provisions apply only to certificates of State officers. (United States v. Wood, 2 Wh. Cr. Cas. 326.)

WITNESS INCOMPETENT FROM INTEREST.- Interest being proved the witness cannot be examined at all, nor the objection be removed by his oath; the objection must be discharged by other proof. (The Watchman, 1 Ware, 235, citing case in text.) DEPOSITIONS, REQUISITES OF. — See Waskern v. Diamond, Hemp. 701.

MCALISTER ET AL. v. BARRY ET AL.

[U. S. Circuit Court, District of North Carolina, 1803.-2 Hayw. 290.]

EQUITY-FRAUD as Ground for SETTING ASIDE CONVEYANCE. - Misrepresentations and obtaining a bargain, in consequence thereof, disadvantageous to the party complaining, is a ground in equity for setting aside a conveyance, although the party imposed on were of sound urderstanding, and had time enough to detect the falsehood before he made the contract. But the grantee shall be allowed for improvements made on the estate.

PER CURIAM.-Misrepresentations, and obtaining a bargain in consequence thereof, disadvantageous to the party deceived by them, is a ground in equity for setting aside the conveyance, although the party imposed on were of sound understanding, and had time enough to detect the falsehood before he made the contract. In this case the debts due from the testator were represented to his legatees to be very large, and likely to fall upon the estate in remainder devised to them; and it was concealed from them that a fund was provided by the testator for payment of his debts. The conveyance must be set aside, but the grantee shall be allowed for the improvements made on the estate. NOTE.-See Boyce v. Grundy, 3 Peters, 210.

HAMILTON v. JONES ET AL.

[U. S. Circuit Court, District of North Carolina, 1803.-2 Hayw. 291.] SCIRE FACIAS AGAINST HEIR-RIGHTS OF INNOCENT VENDEE. —A scire facias issued against an heir to have execution of the lands of the deceased, but before the scire facias issued the heir sold the lands, and it was held that the purchaser from the heir might, in the name of the heir, be permitted to plead to the scire facias that the executor had assets.

This was a scire facias against the heirs and devisees of John Jones, deceased, to have execution against the lands descended or delivered to him, of a judgment obtained against the executors upon a plea of fully administered, found for the executors. After the test of the scire facias, but before the issuing of it was known to Peter Arrington, he purchased a share of the lands from one of the defendants, who being served with the scire facias would not plead thereto. Arrington alleged there were personal assets much more than sufficient to pay the debt.

MARSHALL, Chief Justice. The seller impliedly gave power to the vendee to plead such pleas in his name as were necessary for the defense of the land; and should a plea be now put in by Arrington in the name of the vendor, I would not consent to strike it out.

Whereupon Arrington put in the plea of personal assets in the hands of the executor, enough to satisfy the judgment. And he put in the name of the vendor in open court.

HAMILTON v. SIMMS.

[U. S. Circuit Court, District of North Carolina, 1803.-2 Hayw. 291.]

HEIR - LIABILITY for Debts of ANCESTOR. — If the heir, in an action against him on the bond of his ancestor, plead nothing by descent or devise, and it be found against him, judgment shall be de bonis propriis.

PER CURIAM.This is a debt upon bond against the heir of the obligor; and if the plea of nothing by descent or devise be falsified by verdict, the judgment will be de bonis propriis of the heir or devisee. And it will not help the defendant if the jury should find the value of the land on such issue, for still the court would give the judgment against the defendant in jure proprio for the whole debt. Thereupon this plea was by consent withdrawn, and the lands devolved to the defendant in remainder set forth in a new plea.

JONES & WIFE v. WALKER ET AL.

[U. S. Circuit Court, District of North Carolina, 1803.-2 Hayw. 291.] ADMIRALTY COURT-EFFECT OF APPEAL FROM. - An appeal from an inferior court of admiralty takes the cause from that court, and it can no longer act in such cause; but it still retains power to take care of the goods seized, which are the subject of the suit, and to that end may order a sale of such as are likely to perish. DEPOSITIONS-TO PROVE ACTS OF COURT NOT ON RECORD.- Where the records of an admiralty court appear to have been loosely and carelessly kept on slips of paper, depositions may be read to prove that an order for the sale of property was made in a causc.

DECREE IN ADMIRALTY-WHO BOUND BY. -All persons are bound by a decree in admiralty on the point then in controversy. But those who become interested by a purchase, under orders and proceedings of a court of admiralty are not bound by a decree as to right of property between libelants and claimants.

PER CURIAM.-An appeal from an inferior court of admiralty takes the cause from that court, and such court can no longer act in it. But it still retains power to take care of the goods seized, which are the subject of the suit; and to that end it may order a sale of such goods as are likely to perish. What raised the greatest doubt with us was the uncertainty whether the goods in question were sold by order of the court. The proceedings show that after the appeal the now plaintiff was ordered to pay for salvage one third in value of the property by a certain day, or otherwise an order of sale should issue. Then it appears that the counsel for the claimant procured a postponement of the sale till the 4th of February. It appears also, by a deposition of the marshal, that he sold by order of the court. And it appears by other depositions [202] that the papers of this court were kept very loosely, on slips of paper, which were often removed from the office, as applied for by individuals. From all these circumstances we have concluded that the evidence is in favor of the order of sale. Then if the court ordered a sale, those who purchased under it should be protected; and the defendants are those persons. It was argued that all the world are parties to a prize cause in the admiralty, and are affected by a decree in the appellate court. This should be understood with some restriction. Upon the publication made of the suit depending, in order that all persons interested may come in and defend, all persons are bound by the decree pronounced upon the point then in controversy. But there is no controversy between the libelants or claimants, and those who afterwards became interested by a purchase, under orders and proceedings of the court in the cause between the libelant and claimants. Such intervening persons are not bound by a decree made between the libelants and claimants in the appellate court. The defendants are entitled to retain the property they have purchased, although the decree of the appellate court declared it to belong to the claimant.

DUNLOP & CO. v. WEST, THE MARSHAL.

[U. S. Circuit Court, District of North Carolina, 1805. -2 Hayw. 346.]

SHERIFF

LIABILITY FOR NEGLECT TO SELL AFTER EXECUTION.- Where a sheriff after seizing property on execution neglects to sell it, he is liable in damages.

PER CURIAM.-If the sheriff or marshal seizes property in execution, and neglects to sell it, and is sued for his neglect, the plaintiff shall recover damages to the amount of what the property would have produced had he sold it.

MUTTER'S EXECUTORS v. HAMILTON.

[U. S. Circuit Court, District of North Carolina, 1805.-2 Hayw. 346.] INJUNCTION TO STAY TRIAL. - Where a cause is ready for trial, an injunction will not be granted so as to stay the trial.

PER CURIAM.-We will not grant an injunction so as to stay trial, or entering up judgment; therefore this cause now ready for trial shall not be postponed, although the bill in equity which has been read for obtaining an injunction may contain matter enough to warrant the granting it.

v. LEWIS'S EXECUTORS.

[U. S. Circuit Court, District of North Carolina, 1805.—2 Hayw. 346.]

LIMITATIONS- RUNNING OF STATUTE DURING WAR.—The Statute of Limitations was suspended during the continuance of the war as to alien enemies disqualified to sue in our courts.

[347]

PER CURIAM.-The Act of 1715, whilst it was unrepealed, was suspended from its usual operation by the acts disqualifying British adherents to sue in our courts. It did not begin to operate as to such persons till the end of the war, and then if the seven years were not completed before it was repealed by the act of 1789, no bar could ever be operated under it. Lewis, the testator, died in 1780; between the end of the war and 1789 were not seven years. The demurrer to the plea, stating these facts, and relying upon the Act of 1715, must be allowed. Plea held good.